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International Law in the Courts of 
Singapore: No Longer a Little Island?
Li-ann Thio1
1.   INTRODUCTION
This article examines the role and scope of international law within the 
courts of Singapore,2 a former British colony, and makes comparative refer-
ences to other common law jurisdictions, where appropriate, to highlight 
points of convergence and divergence in judicial methodology. It consid-
ers in particular the reception, interpretation and treatment of treaty law, 
customary international law and soft law, and also examines the factors 
that might preclude the court from considering arguments based on inter-
national law. It concludes by offering observations on the interaction and 
impact of international law within the municipal legal order of Singapore.
2.   CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE AND  
WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
Like most Asian common law jurisdictions, the Singapore Constitution, 
which is a modified variant of the Westminster parliamentary system, is 
silent on the reception and status of international law within the domestic 
legal order. This is distinct from the approach adopted in contemporary 
constitution-making in the Post-Cold War era where, the reception and 
1 Ph.D. (Cambridge); LL.M. (Harvard); B.A. (Hons.) (Oxford); Barrister (Gray’s Inn, 
UK), Provost Chair Professor of Law, National University of Singapore; Senior 
Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2 See generally Li-ann Thio, Reception and Resistance: Globalisation, International 
Law and the Singapore Constitution, 4(3) National Taiwan University Law 
Review 335, 335-86 (2009) [hereinafter Thio, Reception and Resistance]; Li-ann 
Thio, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law 82-93 (2012) [hereinafter 
Thio, A Treatise].
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ranking of international law within the municipal legal system is explic-
itly provided for.3 The Constitution does not specifically identify which 
government agency has the power to enter into treaties. Following British 
practice, this falls to the parliamentary executive or Cabinet government. 
There is no requirement, as in the US model, that the executive needs 
Parliament’s advice and consent in treaty-making.
Judicial receptivity to international law based arguments turns on a 
range of factors,4 not least judicial knowledge of international law. Unfa-
miliarity with international law can breed a culture of legal resistance5 
and disposition to treat international legal norms as an exotic creature to 
gasp at but give no legal weight to, or alternatively, to adopt a dismissive 
attitude. In terms of British practice, the approach of the courts has been 
increasingly open to international law, and the predominant approach to 
customary international law has been monist in orientation, whereby the 
law of nations is treated as part of the common law.6
A key point to note in relation to Singapore practice is that there has 
been a significant sea change in relation to the treatment of international 
law based arguments raised before national courts. In the last decade of the 
3 See, e.g., Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste May 22, 2002, 
§ 9. See generally Antonio Cassese, Modern Constitutions and International Law, 
in 192 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 
331 (1985).
4 Thio, Reception and Resistance, supra note 2, at 339.
5 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We 
Use It 206-07 (1994).
6 Somerest v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B). This was also the US approach 
adopted in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). More recently, after an 
apparent turn to a dualist approach in R v. Keyn, [1876] 2 Exch. Div. 63 (Eng.) 
which required an Act of Parliament to transform a permissive international legal 
norm into domestic English law, a more robust monist approach was adopted in 
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 (Eng.). This 
recognized an exception to the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis insofar as 
the courts are allowed to declare a new customary international law norm is part 
of the common law even if an existing precedent is based on an older customary 
international norm, without legislative intervention. On British practice, see 
generally Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic Courts 
(1st ed. 2005). 
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20th century, the approach may be characterized as a curt, even contemptu-
ous dismissal of international law. For example, Article 18 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights7 was invoked, presumably to accentuate the 
weight of the Article 15 constitutional guarantee of religious freedom in 
the case of Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v. Public Prosecutor.8 This 
related to the truncation of the religious freedom of the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses community by laws which deregistered them under the Societies 
Act9 and which banned their religious publications under the Undesirable 
Publications Act,10 on the basis that their pacifist orientation was harmful 
to national security and compulsory military conscription. While noting 
that arguments were raised that the ban was “a violation of the freedom of 
religion as enshrined in the Constitution and also a violation of interna-
tional declarations of human rights,” Chief Justice Yong tersely declared: 
“All things being said, I think that the issues here are best resolved by a 
consideration of the provisions of the Constitution, the Societies Act and 
the UPA alone.”11 This unwillingness to consider whether Article 18 of the 
UDHR was applicable to Singapore law, as customary international law 
perhaps, reflects the statist bias of the Singapore court in the 1990s,12 which 
unsurprisingly translates into a dualist mentality towards international law. 
Speaking extra-judicially, this parochialist approach is evident in Chief 
Justice Yong’s declaration, in response to arguments that international 
law norms challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty: “I am not 
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217 (III), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
8  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 (HC) (Sing.).
9 Societies Act, 2014, c. 311 (Sing.).
10 Undesirable Publications Act, 1998, c. 338 (Sing.).
11 Chan Hiang Leng Colin, 3 SLR, ¶ 54.
12 The statist bias is evident in the adjudicative method adopted, where the Chief 
Justice declared extra-textually, a paramount mandate based on the “sovereignty, 
integrity and unity of Singapore,” which trumped all fundamental liberties, 
operating as a collectivist trump. Id. ¶ 64. Dualism is consistent with legal orders 
where the primary public value is statist, which valorizes security and sovereignty, 
and thereby resists the contraction of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ by international legal 
regulation.
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concerned with international law. I am a poor humble servant of the law 
in Singapore. Little Island.”13
Since then, particularly under the judicial bench helmed by Chief 
Justice Chan Sek Keong from 2006 and by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon 
from 2012, there has been a shift in the approach towards judicial review, 
which has been described thus:
The Bench now regularly engages with foreign case law and interna-
tional legal arguments, produces expository judgments, references 
academic opinion and has demonstrated a culture of elaborated 
reason-giving, as opposed to the statist, cursory judgments of a 
former age. If these reflect a concern with communitarianism, with 
local conditions and autochthony, it is clear that the trend is towards 
a “particularism without parochialism,” which is to be welcomed.14
Other commentators have noted that the various government branches 
today have demonstrated “a keen appreciation of what international law 
requires and allows.”15 Indeed, the courts have drawn on international 
law as a source of constitutional law in Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng 
Kong, where the issue was whether the legislative power of the Singapore 
Parliament included the power to enact anti-corruption legislation with 
extra-territorial reach.16 The answer was located in the concept of state 
sovereignty, insofar as it indicates “plenary authority with respect to in-
ternal or external affairs.”17
The Court of Appeal held that on secession from the Federation of 
Malaysia when Singapore became independent on August 9, 1965, “it 
acquired the attributes of sovereignty.” 18 The “inherent nature” of being a 
sovereign state meant that the Singapore Parliament would have “plenary 
power” and could enact laws “to regulate the rights and liabilities between 
13 K.S. Rajah, Cj on “Death Penalty” Article, Straits Times (Sing.), Oct. 1, 2003, at 6.
14 Thio, A Treatise, supra note 2, at xiii.
15 Chin Leng Lim & Mahdev Mohan, Ch.05 Singapore and International Law, 
SingaporeLaw.sg, http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/
overview/chapter-5. 
16 Pub. Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong, [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 (CA), ¶ 30 (Sing.).
17 James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 90 (2d 
ed. 2007).
18 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), ¶ 30.
Thio: International Law in the Courts of Singapore 5
persons in Singapore, or for that matter, anywhere else.”19 Parliament could 
“empower the local courts to punish any person present in its territories 
for having done physical acts wherever the acts were done and wherever 
their consequences took effect. Parliament’s power, however, would have 
no legal effect in other countries, except to the extent that those countries 
permit it.”20 The understanding is that a statute “generally operates within 
the territorial limits of the Parliament that enacted it.”21 This understanding 
of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction is consonant with classic inter-
national law, as expounded in the Lotus case.22 In that case, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice also observed that “in all systems of law, the 
principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental,” 23 
though underscoring this was not an absolute international legal principle24 
as there are other heads of jurisdiction. Indeed, the Singapore legislature has 
enacted laws based on the active nationality principle, whereby Singapore 
citizens may be liable for offences committed outside Singapore contrary 
to the United Nations Act25 which is to facilitate Singapore’s compliance 
with obligations flowing from Article 41 of the UN Charter.
 3.   INTERNATIONAL LAW BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS
The question of international law within municipal legal orders raises 
the following issues a court may have to consider: first, the court has to 
ascertain if the international norm raised does in fact have the juridical 
status of an international legal norm; second, the court must ascertain 
if the international legal norm applies to the facts at issue; third, it must 
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. ¶¶ 30, 66. In Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928), the arbitrator Max Huber stated: “Sovereignty in the relations between 
States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is 
the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of 
a State.” 
22 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
23 Id. ¶¶ 44-47.
24 Id. ¶ 50.
25 United Nations Act, 2002, c. 339, § 6 (Sing.).
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determine whether the international law norm applies automatically or 
requires an additional step of legislative incorporation or judicial recogni-
tion. Fourth, even if an international legal norm applies, how does it rank 
vis-à-vis domestic legal sources? Informing this process is the primary 
issue of whether the international norm is one based on treaty or custom-
ary international law.
a.   Treaty Law
I.  DUALISM AND THE SUPREMACY OF DOMESTIC LAW
Singapore law follows English practice in adopting a dualist approach 
towards international treaties and domestic law. Consonant with the doc-
trine of parliamentary sovereignty, British practice knows no notion of the 
self-executing treaty and treaty norms must be legislatively incorporated 
through an Act of Parliament before it may be given direct effect within 
the domestic legal order. 
The Singapore High Court in the Sahand case26 confirmed that treaties 
are not self-executing. This flows from a dualist model which treats inter-
national and municipal law as distinct systems of law. The court approved 
of the statement by the House of Lords in J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. 
v. Department of Trade and Industry, [1990] 2 AC 418 at 500:
[A]s a matter of the constitutional law of the United Kingdom, the 
Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does 
not extend to altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals 
or depriving individuals of rights which they enjoy in domestic law 
without the intervention of Parliament. Treaties, as it is sometimes 
expressed, are not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is not part 
of English law unless and until it has been incorporated into the 
law by legislation. So far as individuals are concerned, it is res in-
ter alios acta from which they cannot derive rights and by which 
they cannot be deprived of rights or subjected to obligations; and 
it is outside the purview of the court not only because it is made 
in the conduct of foreign relations, which are a prerogative of the 
Crown, but also because, as a source of rights and obligations, it 
is irrelevant.27
26 The Sahand, [2011] 2 SLR 1093 (HC) (Sing.). 
27 J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dep’t of Trade & Indus., [1990] 2 A.C. 418 
(H.L.) 500 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Quentin Loh J. in the Sahand case observed that the English approach was 
based on preventing the Crown through its treaty-making powers from 
altering domestic law “without the authority of Parliament”: The Parlement 
Belge.28 In principle, this accords some degree of legislative review over 
executive policy, though this is formal where the Cabinet controls the 
parliamentary majority, as it does in the Singapore context. Although the 
Singapore Constitution departs from the British model in being supreme,29 
Loh J. considered that the English approach was “equally applicable” to 
Singapore on the basis of Article 38 of the Constitution which vests legis-
lative power in the Legislature.30 He stated it would be contrary to Article 
38 “to hold that treaties concluded by the Executive on behalf of Singapore 
are directly incorporated into Singapore law, because this would, in effect, 
confer upon the Executive the power to legislate through its power to make 
treaties.”31 Without incorporation by primary or subsidiary legislation, a 
treaty “does not create independent rights, obligations, powers or duties.” 32
For example, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods was given effect to by the Sale of Goods (United 
Nations Convention) Act (Cap 283), section 4, which provides that the 
Convention provisions “prevail over any other law in force in Singapore 
to the extent of any inconsistency.” This ranks convention provisions over 
statute law. The United Nations Act (Cap 339) provides that any regulations 
under this Act will not be invalid because it is inconsistent “with any written 
law other than the Constitution,”33 preserving constitutional supremacy.
28 The Parlement Belge, [1879] 4 PD 129 at 154–55 (Eng.).
29 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Aug. 9, 1965, art. 4: “This Constitution 
is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the 
Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent 
with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
30 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 33.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 United Nations Act, c. 339, § 2(3).
8 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE MEANING OF TREATIES WITHIN THE DOMESTIC 
LEGAL ORDER AND THEIR RANK VIS-À-VIS DOMESTIC STATUTES
While the executive may enter into a treaty that creates binding interna-
tional obligations for Singapore on the international plane, and while the 
legislature through legislation gives the treaty domestic legal effect, the 
courts may nonetheless subject these treaties to judicial review, pursuant 
to the judicial power to declare a statute null and void for inconsistency 
with the Constitution.34 The courts will determine the proper meaning, 
scope and applicability of such legislation. The courts have imposed heavy 
sentences for the breach of statutory offences designed to give effect to treaty 
obligations, to demonstrate the seriousness of Singapore’s commitment to 
a treaty regime. The High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Kuah Kok Choon 
held that possessing engendered birds without import permits “went against 
the spirit” of Singapore’s commitment to co-operate with other countries 
“to preserve their endangered species”35 under the Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
which Singapore ratified and gave effect to by the Endangered Species 
(Import and Export) Act36 As such, deterrent sentences were warranted.
i.  Terms of Statute Wider than Terms of Convention
To the extent that an Act of Parliament, which seeks to transform treaty 
law into Singapore law, is inconsistent with the treaty terms, the statute 
prevails, provided that its wording is clear.37
This is evident from the case of Tan Ah Yeo v. Seow Teck Ming, a case 
involving a collision on the Singapore River between two inland crafts, 
34 “The courts, in upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily 
invalidate laws that derogate from the Constitution which is the supreme law of 
our land.” Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), ¶ 89.
35 Pub. Prosecutor v. Kuah Kok Choon, [2000] 3 SLR(R) 752 (HC), ¶ 30 (Sing.).
36 Endangered Species (Import and Export) Act, 2008, c. 92A (Sing.). 
37 This is also the Malaysian approach where, in event of a conflict, the general rule 
is that the statute should prevail: Pub. Prosecutor v. Wah Ah Jee, [1919] 2 FMSLR 
193 (S.C.) (Malay.). This followed the English case of Mortensen v. Peters, 8 F.(J) 
93 (Scot.) under which courts are bound to give effect to duly passed legislation 
and are not to consider whether the law is contrary to international law. 
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where all parties concerned were Singaporean.38 The Maritime Convention 
(MC) Act 1911 (c57) (UK) was the relevant Act, and had been extended 
to Singapore during the time of British colonial rule. This imperial Act 
had been enacted to give effect to two conventions dealing with collisions 
between vessels and salvage, adopted at a conference in Brussels in 1910. 
On becoming independent, Singapore formally accepted these conventions.
The plaintiffs argued that the MC Act should be interpreted in line 
with the Convention since it had been enacted to give effect to it, and as 
such, should not apply to the case facts. This is because the collision did 
not involve two sea-going vessels or a sea-going vessel and vessel of inland 
navigation, as required under Article 1 of the 1910 Collision Convention.39 
In addition, Article 12 of the Convention provided that national law rather 
than the convention applied where all relevant parties belonged to the 
same State. 
However, the terms of the MC Act as enacted were broader than those 
in the Convention. Section 1(1) referred to “two or more vessels” without 
stipulating what type of vessels they must be while section 2(2) in dealing 
with loss of life or personal injuries referred to “any person” or “vessel” 
without qualification. Chao Hick Tin JC did not see any justification for the 
court to restrictively qualify “vessel” to require at least one be sea-going or 
that “any person” should mean one parties must hold different citizenship, 
given the plain and clear meaning of the words. In other words, although 
the MC Act was enacted to give effect to the two Conventions, Parlia-
ment could widen its scope to cover its own nationals or its own inland 
watercraft. Chao JC said “I know of no general principle of international 
law which forbids that;” while he accepted that “it is a principle of legal 
policy that an Act should be interpreted to conform with international law, 
there is nothing here in conflict between the MC Act and the Collision 
38 Tan Ah Yeo v. Seow Teck Ming, [1989] 1 SLR(R) 134 (HC) (Sing.).
39 1910 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Related 
to Collision between Vessels and Protocol Signature art. 1, Sept. 23, 1910, [1930] 
A.T.S. 14 reads: “[w]here a collision occurs between sea-going vessels or between 
seagoing vessels and vessels of inland navigation the compensation due . . . shall 
be settled in accordance with the following provisions in whatever waters the 
collision takes place.”
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Convention.”40 He clarified that in the event of a “real conflict”41 between 
international and national law, national law must prevail, citing various 
English cases. He approved a passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation 
of Statues (12th Ed, 1969) at page183:
Under the general presumption that the legislature does not intend 
to exceed its jurisdiction, every statute is interpreted, so far as its 
language permits, so as not to be inconsistent with the comity of 
nations or the established rules of international law, and the court 
will avoid a construction which would give rise to such inconsis-
tency unless compelled to adopt it by plain and unambiguous lan-
guage. But if the language of the statute is clear, it must be followed 
notwithstanding the conflict between municipal and international 
law which results.
He hastened to add that a state could not breach an international legal 
obligation with impunity and that he regarded state responsibility on the 
international plane as “a distinct and separate matter.”42
ii.  Scope of the Presumption of Concordance with International Law in 
Interpreting Domestic Legislation
Subsequent cases have affirmed the proposition that courts apply the 
presumption that Parliament intends to conform with international law 
or indeed, international comity: Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong.43 In 
The Sahand, Loh J. underscored that “the courts will always strive to give 
effect to Singapore’s international obligations within the strictures of our 
Constitution and laws.”44 In Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor, the Court 
of Appeal agreed that “domestic law, including the Singapore Constitu-
tion, should, as far as possible, be interpreted consistently with Singapore’s 
40 Tan Ah Yeo, 1 SLR(R), ¶¶ 13-14.
41 Id. ¶ 15. The Court of Appeal in Seow Teck Ming v. Tan Ah Yeo, [1991] 2 SLR(R) 
38 (CA) (Sing.) agreed at paragraph 18, noting that the scope of the Maritime 
Conventions Act 1911 was wider than that of the Convention but not in conflict 
with it. 
42 Tan Ah Yeo, 1 SLR(R), ¶ 16.
43 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), at 209.
44 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 33.
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international legal obligations.”45 Loh J. in The Sahand also briefly observed 
the “truism” that the executive could consider Singapore’s international 
obligations when exercising its legal discretion, provided “it is not ultra 
vires the empowering law or the Constitution.”46 Presumably, the adop-
tion of the Tripartite Declaration on Equal Remuneration for Men and 
Women Performing Work of Equal Value on November 6, 2002, to give 
effect to ILO Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration, which Singapore 
ratified in May 2002, was such an exercise of executive discretion by the 
Manpower Ministry.47
However, in Public Prosecutor v. Tan Cheng Yew, the High Court noted 
there were “defined limits” within which the canon of interpretation that 
courts would endeavor to interpret domestic statutes in accordance with a 
state’s international treaty obligations operated.48 The case itself concerned 
the rule of specialty and the basis on which Tan could be extradited from 
Germany to Singapore for criminal breach of trust, whether this was 
governed by the terms of the narrower Article VII, Singapore-Germany 
Extradition Treaty49 or the wider section 17(a) of the Singapore Extradi-
tion Act.50 The latter is broader in providing that a person surrendered by 
a foreign state may only be tried for “the offence to which the requisition 
of his surrender relates” (first proviso of section 17(a)) or under the broader 
limb, “any other offence of which he could be convicted upon proof of 
the facts on which that requisition was based.” (second proviso of section 
17(b)). Article VII may not be brought to trial “for any other crime or on 
account of any other matters than those for which the extradition shall 
have taken place.”
45 Yong Vui Kong v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2010] 3 SLR 489 (CA), ¶ 59 (Sing.).
46 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 35.
47 Indus. Arb. Ct., http://www.iac.gov.sg/collective-agreements/preparing-a-ca/
sample-clauses (last updated Nov. 20, 2014).
48 Pub. Prosecutor v. Tan Cheng Yew, [2013] 1 SLR 1095 (HC) (Sing.).
49 This has its roots in the United Kingdom-Germany Treaty for the Mutual Surrender 
of Fugitive Criminals 1872 was entered into in 1960 and extended to Singapore. 
The provisions for extradition between Singapore and Germany are set out in the 
Second Schedule of the Federal Republic of Germany (Extradition) Order 1960.
50 Singapore Extradition Act, 2000, c. 103 (Sing.).
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Because it was “trite law that Singapore follow[ed] a dualist position,” 
51 the High Court held that Singapore’s international law obligations under 
the Extradition Treaty did not give rise to individual rights and obligations 
in the domestic context “until and unless transposed into domestic law by 
legislation.”52 As such, the issue of whether Article VII or section 17(a) pre-
vailed did not arise, as “they exist on different planes.” As such, Article VII 
could not directly apply to circumscribe the prosecutor’s power to charge 
an extradited person as this was governed by the terms of the Extradition 
Act that “gives domestic effect to the entirety of Singapore’s obligations to 
other states” 53 under the various extradition treaties Singapore is party to.
As such, the High Court rejected the view that the scope of section 
17(a) be truncated by requiring it to be read consistently with Article VII, 
as the words in section 17(a) were not “abstruse”54 and should be given a 
natural meaning. In relation to the canon of interpretation of reading a 
domestic statute in accordance with international treaty obligation, Lee 
Seiu Kin J. approvingly cited Lord Diplock in the English Court of Appeal 
decision of Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise to the effect 
that the clear and unambiguous terms of legislation “must be given effect 
to, whether or not they carry out Her Majesty’s treaty obligations, for the 
sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties.”55 
As such, any remedy for an international wrong “lies in a forum other than 
Her Majesty’s own courts.”56 Where the terms of legislation are unclear 
and “reasonably capable of more than one meaning,” and “the treaty itself 
becomes relevant” as the prima facie presumption arises that Parliament 
“does not intend to act in breach of international law.”57
51 Tan Cheng Yew, 1 SLR, ¶ 56.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. ¶ 59.
55 Salomon v. Comm’rs of Customs & Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116 at 143E (Eng.) cited 
in Tan Cheng Yew, 1 SLR, ¶ 60.
56 Tan Cheng Yew, 1 SLR, ¶ 60.
57 Id.
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iii.  Scope of Prosecution Power in Extradition Cases: Governed by 
Treaty or Statutory Regime – Considerations Arising from Monist / 
Dualist Jurisdictions
Lee J. in Tan Cheng Yaw noted that the respondent was asking the court 
not to resolve an ambiguity but to ignore purportedly ambiguous words 
(“requisition” and “any other offence”).58 As extradition was an exercise 
of sovereign power or dominium of the sending state to surrender a fugi-
tive, rooted in “the Grotian tradition of territorial sovereignty”59 the Sin-
gapore court was not in a position to “go behind the discretion exercised 
by the Executive of another country.”60 It accepted as conclusive a verbal 
note confirming that the judicial and executive arms of Germany under 
their internal law base extradition not on the particular charge stated in 
the requisition but the factual circumstances surrounding the charge. 
There was nothing in the principle of comity between nations requiring 
a restrictive construction of section 17(a), which governed prosecution 
powers after extradition.
Lee J. noted obiter that comity in this context “must refer to the posi-
tion that the sending state takes on the specific extradition and subsequent 
prosecution of an individual.”61 He observed that the American specialty 
rule based on comity of nations and respect for foreign relations set out in 
treaty arrangements was based on protecting and prioritizing the position 
of the sending state “against abuse of its discretionary act of extradition.”62 
He noted that as America was a monist jurisdiction where ratified treaties 
were self-executing, US courts considered the interpretation and breach of 
extradition treaties directly “to determine if any individual rights”63 had 
been infringed, given that the treaty automatically gave rise to domestic 
rights and obligations. In contrast, courts in dualist countries approached 
the issue not from an “individual rights” model but a state centric one which 
58 Id. ¶ 61.
59 Id. ¶ 68.
60 Id. ¶ 40.
61 Id. ¶ 65.
62 Ouseley J., Welsh v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1281 
(Divisional Ct.) ¶ 37 (Eng.); Tan Cheng Yew, 1 SLR, ¶ 65.
63 Tan Cheng Yew 1 SLR, ¶ 66.
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asked “whether the prosecution is in conformity with domestic law.”64 That 
is, the focus is on the scope of statutory obligations owed by a state to an 
individual with the extradition treaty “only tangentially in issue.”65 It was 
clear that comity might be of immediate relevance in monist jurisdictions 
in determining whether a breach in an extradition treaty disabled prosecu-
tion for an offence; however, Lee J. noted it was “much more equivocal” 
how comity might apply to the different inquiry of whether prosecution 
conformed to domestic law.66 
He noted in passing a novel legal argument which would have “benefit-
ted from fuller argument,” which he described as an “individual rights” 
conception of the specialty rule.67 This drew from a statement in the English 
case of R v. Seddon68 that located the rationale for the principle of specialty 
principally in inter-state obligations though “it may owe something to the 
protection of the individual.”69 It was left open whether this was to inform a 
reading of section 17(a) or provide an independent ground of challenge. Lee 
J. offered a “tentative observation” that much of the theoretical debate was 
motivated by American jurisprudence addressing self-executing treaties 
and the question of whether extradited persons had standing drawn from 
an independent or derivative right in domestic courts to raise breaches 
of treaty specialty provisions.70 However, the issue of whether a specialty 
rule in an extradition treaty was additionally premised on an individual 
rights protection rationale was academic in Singapore as “any individual 
rights that can be asserted in domestic courts” had to be derived from 




67  Id. ¶ 69.
68 R v. Seddon, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2342 (AC) ¶ 68 (Eng.).
69 Tan Cheng Yew 1 SLR, ¶ 68.
70 Id. ¶ 69.
71 Id. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE INTERPRETIVE MATRIX
i.  Unincorporated Treaties & Judicial Review: Legitimate Expecta-
tions?
The English practice is to operate on a presumption that Parliament will 
not legislate contrary to an unincorporated treaty.72 This favors a certain 
interpretation in the event of statutory ambiguity, the one consonant with 
treaty terms.
The Australian High Court found that the Convention of the Rights of 
the Child, which Australia had ratified but not incorporated into domestic 
law still had “significance” in determining the residency permit of a Malay-
sian who had married and had three children with an Australian citizen in 
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affair v. Teoh.73 The relevant 
treaty norm related to the primary consideration of the best interests of 
the child in all actions concerning children. The High Court stated that 
international treaty norms which declare “universal fundamental rights” 
may be used by the courts “as a legitimate guide to developing the common 
law,” though caution was advocated lest such an interpretive approach be 
viewed as “a backdoor means of importing an unincorporated convention 
into Australian law.”74 It declared that the executive government had made 
a “positive statement” by ratifying the treaty that it intended to live up to 
its provisions, which provided an “adequate foundation for a legitimate 
expectation,” absent contrary statutory provisions.75 This went to finding 
that procedural fairness required that Teoh be given notice and a hearing 
before deported. Disgruntled, the Australian government issued executive 
statements76 that same year that sought to terminate the uncertainty the 
72 Regina v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1991] 1 A.C. 696 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.).
73 Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affair v. Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 
(Austl.). 
74 Id. ¶ 28.
75 Id. ¶ 34.
76 Susan Roberts, Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh: 
The High Court Decision and the Government’s Reaction to It, 2(1) Australian 
Journal of Human Rights 10 (1995), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
journals/AJHR/1995/10.html#fnB31.
16 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
Teoh decision had imported into government activity,77 thus precluding 
the finding of legitimate expectations based on ratified but unincorporated 
treaties,78 which would have had the effect of expanding the law regarding 
the effect of treaties.
There has been no Singapore case on the use of international law to 
ground legitimate expectations; Australian courts are perhaps more ready 
to refer to international law as a “legitimate and important influence on 
the development of the common law,” particularly where universal human 
rights are concerned.79
ii.  Reference to Convention Terms in Interpreting Statutory Terms
Section 9A(3) of the Interpretation Act80 permits reference to any treaty or 
international agreement referred to in the written law. In addition, Loh J. in 
The Sahand, noted that international law could fall within the compass of 
“extrinsic materials” which section 9A(2) of the Act stated was permissible 
to use in interpreting primary or subsidiary legislation if they assisted in 
ascertaining the meaning of the provisions. 81
77 Officials would need to know which treaty would be relevant and what their 
effect would be, in relation to a possibility that their discretionary powers must 
be exercised in accordance with a legitimate expectation. Government officials 
may not be aware of either the contents, or even existence of such treaties. Id. 
78 “The Court, although acknowledging that a treaty does not become part of 
municipal law, regarded the Convention as having legal effect, for why otherwise 
would government officials be required to act in a particular way, on pain of 
legal sanctions if they did not do so? If the decision is not to be regarded as 
self-contradictory, it must have created a new exception to the general rule 
regarding the effect of treaties that have not been incorporated by statute in the 
law of Australia.” See Sir Harry Gibbs, Chapter Seven: Teoh: Some Reflections, 15 
Upholding the Australian Constitution (2003), available at http://www.
samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume15/v15chap7.html.
79 Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.) (international human rights 
standards invoked as a challenge against racist conception of terra nullius upon 
which Crown Title rested).
80 Interpreting Act, 1985, c. 1 (Sing.).
81 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 6.
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In Ng Kwok Chun v. Public Prosecutor82 the court examined the mean-
ing of “import” in the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) to 
which Singapore acceded in 1973, to interpret the meaning of “import” 
within section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA),83 which was enacted to 
give effect to Convention obligations. They rejected the narrow reading of 
“import” in the mercantilist sense and preferred a wider reading as given 
by section 2 of the Interpretation Act.84 This meant “to bring or cause to be 
brought into Singapore by land, sea or air.”85 The Court noted the legisla-
tive intent of the Act was to control dangerous or harmful drugs, such that 
the Act was directed not simply at the control of the use and distribution 
of drugs in Singapore, but also the movement of drugs through Singapore 
for distribution elsewhere.86 The Court then referred to the definition of 
“import” in Article 1(1)(m) of the Convention (“the physical transfer of 
drugs from one state to another state …”) and found there was nothing in 
this giving “import” in section 7 of the MDA a narrower meaning than 
that ascribed to it by the Interpretation Act: “It is clear that Parliament 
intends to give effect to its international obligations, and ‘import’ in s 7 of 
the Act must have the same meaning as that given by the Interpretation 
Act (Cap 1).”87 Further, the Convention indicated that comity required 
Singapore to exert “every effort to prevent illegal movement of drugs,” in-
cluding where Singapore was used as the transit point for drug movement 
between countries. A narrow judicial reading of “import” would frustrate 
the legislative intent and policy to give “import” in the MDA the meaning 
given to it by the Interpretation Act.88
82 Ng Kwok Chun v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1992] 3 SLR(R) 256 (CA) (Sing.).
83 Misuse of Drugs Act, 2008, c. 185, § 7 (Sing.) (“Except as authorised by this Act 
or the regulations made thereunder, it shall be an offence for a person to import 
into or export from Singapore a controlled drug.”).
84 Interpreting Act, c. 1.
85 Id.
86 Ng Kwok Chun, 3 SLR(R), ¶¶ 12-13.
87 Id. ¶ 22.
88 Id. ¶ 35.
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iii.  Giving Effect to Security Council Resolutions within the Domestic 
Legal Order through Subsidiary Legislation
In the Sahand case, the court had to consider the effect of various binding 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929 
(“the Iran Resolutions”). Operative paragraphs 13-15 of Resolution 1737 
required all states to implement an assets freeze in relation to assets owned 
and controlled by designated entities as identified in the Annex, which 
were associated with supporting Iran’s nuclear proliferation activities. 
States were to ensure that their nationals or any persons or entities within 
their territories did not make economic resources available for designated 
entities. Certain exemptions were listed.
Singapore implemented these obligations through subsidiary legisla-
tion, namely, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Sanctions and Freez-
ing of Assets of Persons – Iran) Regulations 2007 (S 104/2007) (“the MAS 
Regulations”) and the United Nations (Sanctions – Iran) Regulations 2007 
(S 105/2007) (“the UN Regulations”). The UN regulations are designed to 
give effect to the Iran resolutions and apply to persons in and citizens of 
Singapore, excepting financial institutions subject to the directions of the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore under section 27A of the MAS Act. The 
Minister or designated person under regulation 14 of the UN regulations 
may by written notice exempt any person (which would be a body of cor-
porate or unincorporated persons under section 2(1) of the Interpretation 
Act) or activity from the operation of the regulations, provided this is 
consistent with the UN Security Council’s intent as expressed in its Resolu-
tions. The MAS regulations applies to all financial institutions in Singapore 
and seeks to give effect to the Iran Resolutions through regulations 5(1) 
and (2) which require any financial institution in possession or control 
of economic resources owned or controlled by any designated person to 
freeze such assets. Exemptions apply as regulation 5(3) provides, such as 
funds for basic expenses like food and rent or payment of professional or 
legal services fees, funds subject to any judicial, administrative or arbitral 
lien or any extraordinary expenses. This is subject to MAS determination 
which “would be sufficient in the domestic sphere.”89
The issue was whether certain vessels were subject to assets freeze 
under the terms of the Iran Resolutions. If so, the financial institutions 
89 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 44.
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covered by MAS regulations would not be able to receive any funds or 
financial assets from designated entities as consideration for furnishing 
a guarantee to secure the release of arrested vessels as such funds would 
have to be frozen once received. This would impact the arrest of vessels 
owned by designated entities.
On the facts, the defendants did not fall within the designated entities 
under the relevant Resolution and so there was no question of applying the 
implementing legislation directly or indirectly on them.90
iv.  Giving Indirect Effect to an Unenacted Chapter VII UN Charter Se-
curity Council Resolution Provision by a Common Law Presumption
Loh J. in the Sahand case stated obiter that it might be possible to give 
indirect effect to a Security Council Resolution paragraph which had not 
been enacted, in being used as an interpretive aid to explain domestic law 
obligations. In the instant case, operative paragraph 15 of the Security 
Council Resolution 1737 did not prevent a designated person from making 
a due payment under a contract entered prior to the listing of such person 
or entity, provided the relevant States determined the contract did not 
relate to any prohibited items or financial assistance. 
This was not expressly enacted in the MAS Regulations but Loh J. 
said the court could give “indirect effect” to paragraph 15 by applying a 
common law principle against retroactivity: “that Parliament is presumed 
not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and trans-
actions in a manner which is unfair to those concerned in them, unless 
a contrary intention appears,” as stated by Staughton L.J. in Secretary of 
State for Social Security v. Tunnicliffe.91 The presumption had to be applied 
consistently with the object of the MAS regulations, to give effect to the 
90 Id. ¶ 62.
91 Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. v. Tunnicliffe, [1991] 2 All E.R. 712 at 724 (Eng.), approved 
by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd. (No 2), [2004] 1 
A.C. 816 (H.L.) ¶ 19 (appeal taken from Eng.); The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 46. This 
presumption was considered applicable to subsidiary legislation, even if Staughton 
L.J. was referred to Acts of Parliament. Loh J. indicated it would be “helpful” 
from a judicial perspective for operative paragraphs 14 (payment of interest and 
earning to frozen accounts) and 15 (payment under existing contracts unrelated 
to nuclear proliferation activities) to be expressly enacted, given that the facts did 
not require him to reach a concluded view. The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 47.
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Iran resolutions. The presumption could not be applied with full force, 
as operative paragraph 15 itself only applied to certain payments under 
existing contracts; therefore, the common law presumption could apply 
insofar as the stated criteria in operative paragraph 15 had been met. Thus, 
“indirect effect” could be given to operative paragraph 15.92
IV.  THE IMPACT OF TREATY ON DOMESTIC LAW: BLUNTING THE IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
As far as the executive is concerned, there seems to be a presumption that 
the domestic legal framework suffices to discharge its international obliga-
tions when it becomes party to treaties which address individual rights. In 
relation to the Internationally Protected Persons Bill, enacted to give effect 
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons,93 a parliamentary question asked why 
Article 9 of the Convention dealing with the fair treatment of persons 
charged with such crimes was not included in the Statute. The response 
was that no specific provision was needed as anyone prosecuted under the 
Act “would be entitled to the rights of due process guaranteed under the 
Constitution and our other laws.”94
It is also clear that as far as executive policy is concerned, Singapore 
when acceding to a rights-oriented treaty such as the Convention on the 
92 The Sahand, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 46. Operative paragraph 15 allows payment under 
a contract provided (a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited 
items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial 
assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 
6 above; and (b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or 
entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above. The relevant state would need 
to inform the Committee of such intention to authorize payment at least ten 
working days beforehand.
93 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; 28 U.S.T. 
1975 (entered into force Feb. 20, 1977).
94 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (6 March 2008) vol 84 at col 2447 
“Internationally Protected Persons Bill” (Zainul Abidin Rasheed, Senior Minister 
of State (Foreign Affairs)).
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Rights of the Child (CRC)95 is of the view that it is not accepting rights 
“going beyond the limits” prescribed by the Constitution or accepting 
obligations to introduce new rights as Singapore laws provided “adequate 
protection and fundamental rights . . . in the best interests of the child.”96 
In addition, no dedicated child rights legislation was adopted to give ef-
fect to the CRC.
i.  Treaties that Singapore is a Party to
Despite the absence of dedicated legislation to give effect to the CRC, the 
apex Court of Appeal has made approving references to CRC norms where 
these reiterate domestic rules. The idea of joint parental responsibility, 
the court noted, is “deeply rooted in our family law jurisprudence.” It is 
embodied in section 46(1) of the Women’s Charter97 which “exhorts both 
parents to make equal co-operative efforts to care and provide for their 
children,” as noted in CX v. CY (minor: custody and access).98 The Court 
noted that Article 18 of the CRC “also endorses the view that both parents 
have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of their 
child.”99 The CRC was referenced merely to demonstrate the generality 
of joint parenting, with a nod to similar approaches in jurisdictions like 
England and Australia. Article 18 encapsulated “the universal human 
value that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing 
and development of their child.”100 The invocation of international law 
here serves to show how domestic law is harmonized with international 
(and comparative) standards, and is presented as a set of universal values 
or alternative legal considerations that frame the interpretive matrix. This 
reiterative approach minimizes the transformative potential of interna-
tional law on domestic law and policy. 
In AAG v. Estate of AAH, deceased, the Court of Appeal had to “re-
gretfully” dismiss an appeal made on behalf of two illegitimate daughters 
95 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, 
at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989). Singapore acceded to the CRC in 1995.
96 Instrument of Accession, Convention on the Rights of the Child ¶ 3 (Oct. 2, 1995).
97 Women’s Charter, 2009, c. 353 (Sing.).
98 CX v. CY, [2005] 3 SLR(R) 690 (CA), ¶ 26 (Sing.).
99 Id.
100 UW v. UX, [2007] SGDC 259, ¶ 10 (Sing.) (referring to CRC).
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for maintenance from the deceased’s estate under the Inheritance (Family 
Provisions) Act 1938 (U.K.).101 This law discriminated against illegitimate 
children, flowing from the unchanged value that “the family within mar-
riage was considered to be the only acceptable social grouping in which 
to raise children.”102 While adopting a dialogical approach in urging 
Parliament to consider legal reform to enable the illegitimate child of a 
deceased person to claim maintenance, the Court of Appeal noted that 
the CRC requires state parties “to use their best efforts to ensure recogni-
tion of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities” in 
raising a child.103 However, “nothing in the Convention compels Singapore 
to equate an illegitimate child with a legitimate child.”104 This shows how 
treaty norms may feature as a legal consideration in adjudication, or as a 
persuasive element deployed in a dialogical approach to Court-Parliament 
relations.
In the absence of incorporating legislation, Singapore courts are likely 
to follow the dualist approach of Malaysian courts, as reflected in Kok Wah 
Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan, where the High 
Court said it could not apply Article 40 (fair trial) of the CRC, to which 
Malaysia was a party, as it remained unincorporated and therefore in the 
realm of the Executive.105 It would be considered a matter of “judicial 
vandalism or judicial trespass” rather than interpretation, for the High 
Court to apply a provision from an unincorporated treaty.106 The Malaysian 
courts thus eschewed giving direct effect to a treaty by applying a treaty 
provision literally as a corrective, as this might set it in conflict vis-à-vis 
the Executive.
101 AAG v. Estate of AAH, deceased [2009] 1 SLR 769 (CA) ¶ 44 (Sing.).
102 Id. ¶ 23.
103 Id. ¶ 36.
104 Id.
105 Kok Wah Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, [2004] 5 MLJ 193 (HC) ¶ 93 (Malay.).
106 Id.
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Singapore, like Malaysia, acceded to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)107 in 1995.108 
It also did not adopt gender equality legislation and the government has 
insisted that sex discrimination would be covered by the general Article 12 
equality constitutional guarantee. In contrast, Malaysia amended Article 
8(2) of its Constitution in 2001 to include “gender” as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination.109
Malaysian jurisprudence in this respect is instructive, particularly 
since the Part IV Fundamental Liberties chapter of the Singapore Constitu-
tion is derived, with modifications, from Part II of the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution (1957).110 
Reference was made to CEDAW norms in interpreting and giving 
content to Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia by the High 
Court in Noorfadilla bt Ahmad Saikin v. Chayed bin Basirun.111 The case 
concerned the dismissal by a public authority of an education officer for 
being pregnant.
Zaleha Yusof J. noted that the word “gender” was incorporated into 
Article 8(2) to prohibit discrimination on grounds of gender, in fulfilment of 
Malaysia’s international obligations under CEDAW.112 Particular reference 
was made to the Article 1 definition of “discrimination against women”113 
107 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (Dec. 18, 1981). [hereinafter CEDAW].
108 States Parties, United Nations Treaties Collection, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (follow “Ratification, Accessions and 
Successions” hyperlink). 
109 Federal Constitution of Malaysia (2010 Reprint) Art 8(2).
110 The Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1980-1981] SLR 48 (PC), 
¶¶ 561-62 (Sing.) (noting that the eight article in Part IV were “identical with 
similar provisions in the Constitution of Malaysia”).
111 Noorfadilla bt Ahmad Saikin v. Chayed bin Basirun, [2012] 1 MLJ 832 (HC) 
(Malay.).
112 Id. at 833.
113 Id. (Article 1 of CEDAW defines “discrimination against women” as any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
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and the Article 11(1)(b) obligation of states to take appropriate measures 
to eliminate gender discrimination in the field of employment.114 Specifi-
cally, Article 11(2)(a) required state parties to take appropriate measures 
to prohibition dismissal on grounds of pregnancy.115 
The High Court endorsed the view, drawing from soft law instruments,116 
that it was obliged to consider Malaysia’s obligations under CEDAW in in-
terpreting Article 8(2) in relation to equality and gender discrimination.117 
It referenced the Australian case of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v. Teoh118 for the proposition that where legislation was ambiguous, 
the court should favor the interpretation which accords to a state’s treaty 
obligations, even if not legislatively incorporated. It concluded by holding 
that discrimination for pregnancy was a form of gender discrimination 
because of the “biological fact that only woman has the capacity to become 
pregnant.”119 This case was distinguished from the Beatrice Fernandez v. 
Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor120 where the Federal Court held that 
Article 8(2) did not apply to a private contract whereby an air stewardess 
was fired for becoming pregnant, as it did not have horizontal application. 
Article 2(e) of CEDAW is potentially intrusive, providing that as an 
implementation measures, state should take “all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or 
enterprise.”121 This reaches into the private realm; however, a statute would 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.). 
114 Id. at 841.
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 842-43 (The Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms (1988), produced by a high level judicial 
colloquium and the Putrajaya Declaration and Programme of Action on the 
Advancement of Women in Member Countries of the Non-Aligned Movement; 
Beijing Statement and Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.). 
117 Id. at 842.
118 Teoh, 183 CLR 273.
119 Noorfadilla bt Ahmad Saikin, 1 MLJ 832 (HC), ¶ 32.
120 Beatrice Fernandez v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor, [2005] 2 CLJ 713 
(Fed. Ct.) (Malay.).
121 CEDAW, supra note 107.
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be necessary to prohibit gender discrimination between private actors. 
CEDAW only applied in public law cases, where legislation or executive 
action contravened individual rights. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in AirA-
sia Berhad v. Rafizah Shima Binti Mohamad Aris,122 rejected the approach 
in Noorfadilla, pointing out that CEDAW did not have the force of law in 
Malaysia because it had not been enacted by local legislation.123 Unless 
treaties were domesticated, they could not be enforced. From a dualist 
perspective, the Court said this approach was necessary to serve as a “demo-
cratic check”, to mitigate the lack of “direct participation of parliament 
in treaty-making.”124 Treaties had to be incorporated as legislators “may 
regard it necessary to tailor the treaty, through an act of transformation, 
to match domestic circumstances.125 In addition, legislators may want to 
delay the implementation of parts of the treaty or limit direct application 
of certain provisions.126 
Nonetheless, the position in Malaysia is confused, given a later High 
Court judgment which followed the Noorfadilla approach, such that 
provisions in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Malaysia 
acceded to in 1995 were treated as incorporated into Malaysian common 
law.127 Articles 3 and 7 of the CRC were raised as the basis for the exercise 
of inherent judicial power to order the defendant to undergo DNA testing 
to determine the child’s paternity, as this was in the best interest of the 
child. Further, a minor’s right to know and be cared for by his or her par-
ents following Article 7 was not inconsistent with Malaysian law, and was 
based on the article 8 constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the 
law, which extended to knowing who his biological father was. The Court 
122 AirAsia Berhad v. Rafizah Shima Binti Mohamad Aris, [2014] MLJU 606 (CA) 
(Malay.).
123 The High Court in SIS Forum v. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid bin Syed Jaafar Albar 
(Menteri Dalam Negeri), [2010] 2 MLJ 378 (HC), ¶ 37 (Malay.) (noting that the 
Australian case of Teoh had received its “fair share of criticism,” and that the 
approach of Malaysian courts was not to directly accept norms of international 
law unless incorporated as part of municipal law).
124 AirAsia Berhad, MLJU 606 (CA), ¶ 52.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Lee Lai Ching v. Lim Hooi Teik, [2013] 4 MLJ 272 (HC), ¶ 30 (Malay.). 
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appeared to discard the precedent of Binsted v. Juvencia Autor Partosa128 
where forcing one to undergo a DNA test constituted causing voluntary 
hurt under the section 323 of the Penal Code; it also noted there were no 
specific statutory restrictions that allowed or disallowed DNA testing to 
prove paternity.129 The CRC as an unincorporated international treaty was 
thus resorted to, to interpret the content of equal protection and to depart 
from past precedent.
It is likely that Singapore courts will adopt the same domestic posture 
as Malaysian courts, given the dualist model for treaties and respect for 
the separation of powers. Singapore courts would certainly not adopt the 
activist approach of the Indian court in the noted case of Vishaka v. State 
of Rajasthan130 where CEDAW norms and even non-binding recommenda-
tions of the CEDAW Committee which has “no enforcement authority,”131 
were invoked to enlarge constitutional rights in reading the Article 21 right 
to life guarantee and the Article 19(1)(g) right to carry on trade safely, as 
well as the Articles 14-15 equality clauses. 
The case itself concerned a brutal gang rape of a social worker.132 In 
what might fairly be characterized as an act of judicial legislation, the Court 
in the absence of sexual harassment legislation referred to international 
law norms to read Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, 
to give content and to elaborate “implicit” sexual harassment safeguards 
supposedly located within these norms.133 It referred to Article 11 and 24 
of CEDAW and to the general recommendation on Article 11, concluding 
that gender equality included “protection from sexual harassment and 
right to work with dignity” which it considered “a universally recognized 
basic human right.”134
It issued a series of judicially crafted guidelines to prevent sexual 
harassment at the work places pursuant to Article 32 of the Constitution 
which requires effective redress of rights violations, to “fill the legislative 
128 Binsted v. Juvencia Autor Partosa, [2000] 2 MLJ 569 (HC) (Malay.).
129 Lee Lai Ching, 4 MLJ 272 (HC), ¶ 42.
130 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
131 AirAsia Berhad, MLJU 606, ¶ 34.
132 Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, ¶ 2.
133 Id. ¶ 7.
134 Id.
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vacuum.”135 These detailed guidelines which read like a framework law, were 
to be treated as the law, and to be applied to the public realm and private 
workplace “until a legislation is enacted for a purpose.”136 Citing cases like 
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affair v. Teoh, the expansive 
approach adopted by the Indian courts in the face of legislative failings was 
that international treaties and norms were to be read to elaborate the mean-
ing and content of fundamental rights “in the absence of enacted domestic 
law occupying the fields when there is no inconsistency between them.”137
In the face of legislative incompetence, Indian courts may step in to 
enact quasi-legislation, drawing on international norms to formulate the 
terms of such guidelines, which in this case declared “These directions 
would be binding and enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted 
to occupy the field.”138
This is an extraordinary use of international treaties by a domestic 
court to fashion domestic law.
ii. Treaties that Singapore is not Party to
When it comes to human rights treaties, Singapore courts do not give 
weight to treaties which Singapore is not a party to. In contrast, Philip-
pines courts have considered treaties the state is not a party to, such as the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances, to support actions for Amparo writs, regarding the treaty 
as if it embodied customary international law.139 
Singapore courts have consistently rejected right cases from foreign 
common law jurisdictions influenced by the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),140 
which generally accord more weight to fundamental rights.141 
135 Id.
136 Id. ¶ 16.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498 (S.C., Dec. 3, 2009) (Phil.).
140 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
141 Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs, [2006] 1 SLR 582 (HC) (Sing.).
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Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs concerned the scope of the 
freedom of speech and assembly as guaranteed in Article 14 of the Consti-
tution against public order considerations.142 The High Court rejected the 
more rights-protective proportionality standard of review of late adopted by 
English law, galvanized by the Human Rights Act (1998), which sought to 
give effect to the ECHR.143 This is contrasted with the enthusiastic embrace 
of the test of proportionality by Hong Kong courts, which regularly draw 
inspiration from the European Court of Human Rights and Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights standards.144 The Hong Kong courts’ inspiration is 
incorporated in accordance with Article 39 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 
Ordinance Cap 383 (the UK extended its application to Hong Kong while 
it was still under British rule.)145 Rajah J. underscored the distinctiveness 
of the Singapore context and constitutional text and the more restrictive 
formulation of the scope of free speech in Singapore.146 He noted that “the 
infiltration of European law into English law” had left more recent English 
public order decisions with “neither persuasive nor logical force,” as these 
applied “legal and political conditions that do not and cannot extend to 
Singapore.”147 Underscoring the need for an autochthonous approach, 
Rajah J. stressed that the proportionality standard of review was a feature 
of European jurisprudence rather than the common law and had never 
been part of Singapore law.148 He further noted there were no immutable 
“universal standards” given the disparate approaches towards acceptable 
public conduct, as the “margins of appreciation for public conduct vary 
from country to country as do their respective cultural, historical and 
142 Id.
143 Id. ¶ 5.
144 See, e.g., Leung Kwok Hung v. HKSAR, [2005] 8 H.K.C.F.A.R. 229 (C.F.A.) (where 
the ECHR and its cases as well as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights norms 
were cited.).
145 Id.
146 Free speech in Singapore is subject to restrictions on eight stipulated grounds 
which Parliament deems “necessary and expedient.” In contrast, article 10 of the 
ECHR requires that any restrictions be “necessary in a democratic society,” subject 
to a test of proportionality review. Chee Siok Chin, 1 SLR 582.
147 Chee Siok Chin, 1 SLR, ¶ 5.
148 Id. ¶ 87.
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political evolutions as well as circumstances.”149 This is because value judg-
ments are involved, and in the adjudicatory process, the court would be 
guided “by the manifest intent and purport of both the Constitution and 
domestic legislation.”150
In the field of human rights law, arguments based on international or 
regional norms are not a force for harmonization; instead, they are dis-
cussed to demonstrate difference and divergence of views, which is unsur-
prising, in a plural and postmodern world. Again, this shows the primacy 
of local particularities, including the supremacy of the constitutional text 
and of history, in the reading of rights.151 
V.  CONCLUSION ON TREATIES BEFORE SINGAPORE COURTS
What is striking about the approach of Singapore courts to treaty law 
is its state-centricity, both in terms of its dualist posture and the clear 
ranking of the supremacy of domestic law over treaties and international 
agreements.152 Nonetheless, while breaches of treaty norms may not incur 
domestic liability, it does not preclude international responsibility. Apart 
from legislative incorporation, treaty law will have minimal effect on the 
domestic legal system.
149 Id. ¶ 132.
150 Id. 
151 Although the ECHR applied to certain British colonies, including Singapore 
and the Federation of Malaya in 1953, it ceased to apply when these became 
independent. While former colonies in the Caribbean like Belize modeled their 
Constitutions after the ECHR, Singapore and Malaysia did not. Yong Vui Kong, 
3 SLR (CA), ¶ 61.
152 In Pub. Prosecutor v. Salwant Singh s/o Amer Singh, [2003] SGDC 146 (Sing.), 
an international agreement which sought to stipulate the maximum terms of 
imprisonment a foreign national which Singapore wanted to extradite and try 
was found to violate article 93 of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in 
independent courts. The executive agreement was found to contravene judicial 
sentencing powers.
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b.   Customary International Law
A distinctive approach is adopted towards customary international law 
(CIL), an unwritten source of international law, as compared to treaty 
norms that need to be statutorily incorporated to have domestic legal ef-
fect. As the constitution is silent on the reception and status of CIL within 
the municipal order,153 it falls to the courts to determine whether a general 
international law norm exists and what its content is.
The formation of CIL norms is governed by the finding of two compo-
nents: general, consistent state practice of sufficient duration, and opinio 
juris, which is the subject state belief that a norm is to be obeyed because 
it is legally binding. 
I.   Evidence of a Customary International Law Norm
A clearly established CIL norm may become part of Singapore law and it 
falls to the judiciary to ensure its juridical status as a binding legal obliga-
tion, as opposed to something de lege ferenda.
This is demonstrated in Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor154 with 
respect to the judicial attitude towards Article 36(1) of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations (VCCR) (1963),155 a treaty Singapore was not 
then a signatory to. This provision relates to the right of consular officers 
to visit a national of the sending State who is imprisoned or detained, and 
to arrange for their legal representation. Defense counsel argued that the 
VCCR applied to Singapore because it is CIL.156 In response the Prosecu-
tion stated Article 36 was not breached on the facts and was silent as to 
whether Article 36(1) was CIL.
The High Court found that Article 36(1) was CIL, noting that there was 
an “established practice” for a state detaining a foreign Australian national, 
153 In contrast, CIL is deemed “incorporated” into the Philippines legal system 
through the constitutional incorporation clause: Cont. (1987), art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.); 
Pharmaceutical & Health Care Ass’n v. Health Sec’y Francisco T. Duque III, G.R. 
No. 173034 (S.C. Oct. 9, 2007) (Phil.).
154 Pub. Prosecutor v. Nguyen Tuong Van, [2004] 2 SLR 328 (HC) (Sing.).
155 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 
596 U.N.T.S. 261, 21 U.S.T. 77 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967).
156 Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 55.
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to notify the consular officers of the accused person’s state.157 This was part 
of the “standard operating procedure” of the Central Narcotics Bureau; the 
court drew what it considered a reasonable inference that other Singapore 
law enforcement agencies would have similar directives.158 Kan Ting Chiu J. 
stated that the directive “suggests the acceptance of the obligations set out 
in Art 36(1)” which “applies in Singapore.”159 He noted that the Prosecution 
“which is in a good position to have knowledge of Singapore’s position on 
this issue, did not assert the contrary” and that “Singapore holds herself 
out as a responsible member of the international community and conforms 
with the prevailing norms of the conduct between states.”160 A form of tacit 
consent or opinio juris may be derived from the Prosecutor’s non-protest 
against the invocation of Article 36(1) as an applicable standard. The refer-
ence to prevailing inter-state norms of conduct suggests both generality 
and consistency of practice. 
Further state practice was referenced to ascertain the content of what 
“without delay” might mean.161 The High Court concluded that Article 36(1) 
was not breached on the facts; while it required consular notification, it did 
not stipulate a time period though this was to take place “without delay.”162 
In the immediate case, the time period between arrest and notification 
was about 20 hours.163 The High Court noted that Australia, for example, 
considered three days (72 hours) an adequate period for notification, as 
157 Id. ¶ 24.
158 Id. ¶ 35.
159  Id. ¶ 36.
160 Id. ¶¶ 30-39.
161 Id. ¶ 39.
162 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 155, art. 36(1)(b) (“if he 
so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, 
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a 
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending 
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the 
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be 
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform 
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.”).
163 Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 38.
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provided for in its 2000 Agreement on Consular Relations between Aus-
tralia and the People’s Republic of China.164
II.   Judicial Recognition as Precursor to Domestic Law Applicability
To become part of Singapore law, CIL norms do not have to be legislatively 
incorporated although these do not automatically apply without some 
receptive act. An established CIL norm only becomes part of Singapore 
law if there is judicial recognition of it first, absent which the CIL norm 
in question “would merely be f loating in the air.”165 The Court of Appeal 
in Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor endorsed the common law approach 
of Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung v. R166 under which international law 
has no validity “save in so far as its principles are accepted and adopted 
by our own domestic law.”167 The judicial role in any given case is first 
to ascertain the relevant rule of international law “which nations accept 
amongst themselves” and to treat it as incorporated into domestic law “so 
far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared 
by their tribunals.”168 Various jurists, including Brownlie, Oppenheim, and 
Akehurst were cited in support of this proposition.169
Thus, a Singapore court would need to determine that the relevant 
CIL rule is consistent with Singapore statute law or finally declared by 
Singapore courts, and “either declare that rule to be part of Singapore 
law or apply it as part of our law.”170 This declaration and application is 
needed to operationalize a CIL norm that is “not self-executing.”171 As I 
have elsewhere observed, this “suggests a dualist orientation towards CIL 
164 Id. ¶ 39. 
165 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 90.
166 Chung Chi Cheung v. R, [1939] A.C. 160 (P.C.), 167-68 (appeal taken from H.K.), 
cited in Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 94.
167 Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR (HC), ¶¶ 89-91.
168 Id.
169 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 89.
170 Id.
171 Id. ¶ 91.
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law and domestic law, with a monist sensibility in so far as the courts can 
directly apply CIL without legislative intervention.”172
This is consonant with the positivist theory that international legal 
obligation rests on state consent, whether express or tacit, and binds a 
sovereign state on the basis of auto-limitation. 
III.   Ranking CIL Norms
Arguments have been raised to the effect that CIL norms, where these 
inform constitutional interpretation, should be received and ranked as 
part of constitutional law i.e. at the apex of the domestic legal hierarchy.
If this was accepted, statutory or common law norms inconsistent with 
the Constitution would be void. This would be judicially enforceable and 
would open the door to international law playing a greater transformative 
role in the shaping of domestic law.
This argument was raised in Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor in 
relation to the meaning of “law” in Article 9 of the Singapore Constitution 
which provides that no one shall be deprived of life or personal liberty 
“save in accordance with the law.” 173 This hinged on “law” in Article 9 en-
compassing CIL, that is, Article 9 should be read such that the legislative 
acts of depriving a person of life or personal liberty must be accomplished 
in a manner inconsonant with customary international law. International 
standards would then be directly imported into constitutional construc-
tion, as part of the constitutional clause itself.
However, this was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Yong who as-
serted that once courts had incorporated CIL rules, “it becomes part of the 
common law,” as opposed to having constitutional status, and is thereby 
“subordinate to statute law.”174 To cloak a CIL norm with constitutional 
status would reverse the hierarchy of legal rules, which would “nullify any 
statute or any binding judicial precedent which is inconsistent with it.” 175 
172  Thio, A Treatise, supra note 2, at 602. This apparently is the Malaysian approach 
as well. See Chung Chi Cheung v. R, A.C. 160 (Malay.).
173 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 11.
174 Id.
175 Id. ¶ 90.
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Clearly, in the event of a conflict between a CIL rule and domestic statute, 
the latter prevails.176
IV.   Determining the Content of a Putative CIL Norm
The judicial approach in determining the content of a CIL norm is discussed 
in the section below (Part c).
c.   International Human Rights Law,  
the UDHR and Singapore Courts
At its inception, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 
adopted as a General Assembly Resolution, was a legally non-binding 
statement of moral aspirations. Today, many, perhaps all of its provisions, 
have become CIL.177 There is no harmony in the attitudes of various Asian 
courts towards the UDHR; indeed, there are divergent views within single 
jurisdictions.178
176 Nguyen Tuong Van v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2005] 1 SLR 103 (CA), ¶ 94 (Sing.); For 
a comment, see C.L. Lim, The Constitution and the Reception of Customary 
International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, Singapore Journal 
of Legal Studies 218, 218-33 (2005); See also Star Cruise Services Ltd. v. 
Overseas Union Bank Ltd., [1999] 2 SLR(R) 183 (HC) (Sing.) where the right of 
innocent passage was found to be a CIL norm but would, if relevant, be subject 
to the Common Gaming Houses Act. Other CIL norms Singapore courts have 
recognize include the width of territorial waters and immunity for non- enemy 
ambassadors: The Trade Resolve, [1999] 2 SLR(R) 107 (HC), ¶ 25 (Sing.) and Re 
Contraband Mails: ex MfcV Conte, [1949] MLJ 5 (Malay.), respectively.
177 Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 25 Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law 287 (1995); Kevin YL Tan, Fifty Years of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Singapore Reflection, 20 Singapore Law Review 
239, 271 (1998). 
178 In Mohd EzamMohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara, [2002] 4 MLJ 449 (Fed. Ct.), 514 
(Malay.), Siti Norma FCJ said the UDHR was not a convention and its principles 
were declaratory in nature, having no legal force and so not a part of municipal 
law. In Suzana bt Md Aris (claiming as administrator of the estate and a dependant 
of Mohd Anuar bin Sharip, deceased) v. DSP Ishak bin Hussain, [2011] 1 MLJ 
107 (HC), ¶ 27 (Malay.), the High Court stated: “The UDHR is part and parcel 
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Within the Singapore context, certain articles of the UDHR have been 
invoked for various reasons, as embodying customary human rights law. 
These include efforts to ground an independent cause of action or to influ-
ence and accentuate the interpretation of existing rights. Singapore courts 
have been careful to examine claims that a UDHR norm has the status of 
a CIL norm, based on evidence rather than bare assertion. 
There are generally four issues that are addressed where CIL norms 
are invoked to inform constitutional arguments. First, the status of the 
putative CIL norm must be ascertained and the courts required that this 
be “clearly and firmly established” before it is adopted.179 Second, the 
manner of reception of a CIL norm into the domestic legal order – it needs 
to receive judicial recognition or application, without need for legislative 
incorporation. Third, the content of the CIL norm must be identified, to 
see if it is breached on the facts. Last, its rank in the domestic hierarchy 
of legal sources.
A range of UDHR articles have been invoked by counsel to found or 
buttress claims, with vary degrees of cogency and success. These include 
matters relating to free speech and assembly (Articles 19 and 20, UDHR); 
the equal right to property (Articles 7, 17, UDHR), the right to vote (Article 
of our jurisprudence as the international norms in the UDHR are binding on 
all member countries unless they are inconsistent with the member countries’ 
constitutions.” In a Hong Kong case relating to the right to asylum, it was stated 
that the UDHR was “a proclamation of ethical values, rather than legal norms” 
and so subject to domestic law. See C v. Dir. of Immigration, [2008] H.K.E.C 281 
(C.F.I.) (H.K.). The Philippines court noted that its country could “rightfully take 
credit for the acceptance, as early as 1951, of the binding force of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights even if the rights and freedoms therein declared are 
considered by other jurisdictions as merely a statement of aspirations and not law 
until translated into the appropriate covenants. In the following cases decided in 
1951, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. Rep. 70 (S.C., July 30, 1949); Borovsky 
v. Comm’r of Immigration, 90 Phil. Rep. 107 (S.C., June 30, 1949); Chirskoff v. 
Comm’r of Immigration, 90 Phil. Rep. (S.C., Oct. 26, 1951); Andreu v. Comm’r of 
Immigration, 90 Phil. Rep. 347 (S.C., Oct. 31, 1951), the Supreme Court applied 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Jose Reyes v. Ramon Bagatsing, G.R. 
No. L-65366 (S.C., Nov. 9, 1983) (Phil.).
179 Nguyen Tuong Van (2005), 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 88.
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21)180 and the prohibition against torture, cruel and inhumane treatment 
(Article 5).
I.  ARTICLES 19 UDHR – FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In Yap Keng Ho v. Public Prosecutor, certain demonstrators, including 
opposition politician Chee Soon Juan, were arrested for holding a demon-
stration without a police permit after a failed attempt to get one, and were 
charged under the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) 
(Assemblies and Processions) Rules (Cap 184, R1, 2000 Rev Ed).181
It was argued that the police standing policy not to grant permits for 
outdoor demonstrations was unconstitutional for violating Article 14 of 
the Constitution (free speech, assembly) and inconsistent with Articles 19 
and 20 of the UDHR as customary human rights norms.182 It was argued 
that CIL does not tolerate “massive, arbitrary and disproportionate” bans 
on free expression.183
The High Court stated the proper recourse was an application for 
judicial review to challenge the police exercise of discretion in refusing a 
permit, rather than proceeding with the demonstration.184 Chee merely as-
serted that Articles 19 and 20 of the UDHR were binding as CIL norms.185 
In contrast, the Philippines Supreme Court had an evidential basis for 
concluding that article 19 of the UDHR was a CIL norm: 
Article 19 forms part of the UDHR principles that have been trans-
formed into binding norms. Moreover, many of the rights in the 
UDHR were included in and elaborated on in the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by over 
150 States, including the Philippines. The recognition of freedom 
180 In Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General, [2012] 2 SLR 1033 (HC) (Sing.), 
the issue was the scope of the Prime Minister’s discretion to call by-elections, which 
indirectly implicated the right to vote. Article 21 of the UDHR was raised but Pillai 
J noted that “[t]he UDHR, not having been enacted as Singapore legislation, is not 
domestic law to which these proceedings relate.”
181 Yap Keng Ho v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2011] 3 SLR 32 (HC) (Sing.). 
182 Id. ¶ 1. 
183 Id. ¶ 16.
184 Id. ¶ 6.
185 Id. ¶ 12.
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of expression is also found in regional human rights instruments, 
namely, the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), 
the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 9).186
II. ARTICLE 17 UDHR – RIGHT OF PROPERTY
In Chan Kin Foo v. City Developments Ltd., Chan, a minority shareholder, 
owned a unit in a block of apartments subject to en bloc collective sale, 
regulated under sections 84A and 84G of the Land Titles Strata Act (Cap 
158, 2009 Rev Ed).187 He argued that the sale violated the Article 12 equal 
guarantee clause as well as Articles 1, 7, and 17 of the UDHR as it discrimi-
nated against the right of the minority to own property.188 
Ang J. noted that the Singapore constitution did not contain a right to 
property and indeed, this had been omitted deliberately from the Indepen-
dence Constitution in 1965, owing to land scarcity.189 Article 13 of the right 
to property in the Malaysian Federal Constitution was deliberately left out 
when Singapore imported most of the Part II fundamental liberties into 
Part IV (Fundamental Liberties) of the Singapore Constitution. Because 
of this, it was incumbent upon Chan to provide reasons why Article 17 of 
the UDHR formed part of local law, and no submissions had been made 
on this. Ang J. made two observations, obiter. First, that if Article 17 of the 
UDHR were to have legal effect in Singapore, it must be show to form “part 
of customary international law.”190 He stated, “there is no state practice 
or opinio juris which supports a right to property.”191 Indeed “widespread 
state practice” is allowed for “collective sales by majority vote” in countries 
like Canada, Hong Kong, and America (Hawaii). Further, the existence of 
186 Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, n.27 (S.C., Feb. 15, 2008) (Phil.).
187 Chan Kin Foo v. City Devs. Ltd., [2013] 2 SLR 895 (HC) (Sing.). 
188 Id. ¶ 2.
189 The 1966 Report of the Constitutional Commission recommended the inclusion 
of a modified version but this was rejected: Singapore, Report of the Constitutional 
Commission 1966, (1966) (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin), ¶¶ 41-42; Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (15 March 1967) vol. 25 at 1295-97 (Lee 
Kuan Yew, Prime Minister).
190 Chan Kin Foo, 2 SLR (HC), ¶ 31.
191 Id.
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compulsory land acquisition legislation in Malaysia, India, South Australia, 
and Pakistan made “wholly untenable”192 the assertion that Article 17 of 
the UDHR was customary international law. Second, even if the right to 
property was a CIL norm, these were not self-executing and had first to 
be incorporated into Singapore law.193 No such right had been legislatively 
incorporated, such that the right to property was “wholly inconsistent” 
with the Land Titles (Strata) Act.194
III.  ARTICLE 10 OF THE UDHR
A peculiar argument was raised in Re Gavin Millar Q.C.195: a failed applica-
tion under the Legal Professions Act (Cap 161) to admit a foreign Queen’s 
Counsel to the Singapore bar to hear an allegedly complex liberal case 
involving senior politicians.196
It was argued that since the opposing side had a Senior Counsel, the 
court ought to give due regard to “the need for a level playing field between 
the parties to the defamation suits.”197 This was anchored by an appeal to 
Article 10 of the UDHR, which declares that “Everyone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations . . . .”198 It was 
contended that inherent in Article 10 was the principle of equality of arms, 
which would be breached “where there was disparity between the respec-
tive levels of legal representation.”199 Two decisions by the European Court 
of Human Rights were cited to support this propositional argument.200 
In addition, it was argued that as Singapore was a member of the United 
192 Id.
193 Id. ¶ 32.
194 Id. ¶¶ 28-33.
195 Re Gavin Millar Q.C., [2008] 1 SLR 297 (HC) (Sing.).
196 See Li-ann Thio, Reading Rights Rightly: The UDHR and Its Creeping Influence on 
the Development of Singapore Public Law, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 
264 (2008) (Sing.). 
197 Re Gavin Millar Q.C., 1 SLR (HC), ¶ 3.
198 Id. ¶ 8.
199 Id.
200 Id.
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Nations, it was bound by the UN Charter to respect UDHR standards.201 
While the UDHR was aspiration in origin, it is no ordinary General As-
sembly Resolution. Such resolutions are recommendatory in nature.
In Filartiga v. Pena Irala,202 which examined whether the prohibition 
against torture was CIL, it was observed of UN declarations that these were 
significant “because they specify with great precision the obligations of 
member nations under the Charter.”203 “Since their adoption, ‘[m]embers 
can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they 
promised in the Charter to promote.’”204 Indeed, some UN Declarations 
were “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when 
principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated.”205 As such, 
the UDHR “no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against 
‘non-binding pronouncement,’ but is rather an authoritative statement of 
the international community.”206 The UDHR created an “expectation of 
adherence,” and “insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State 
practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down 
rules binding upon the States.”207 The court noted that several commenta-
tors considered that the UDHR had totally become a part of binding CIL.208
No argument or evidence was put forward to support the view that 
Article 10 of the UDHR embodied CIL, nor did the High Court decide this 
question. As the Singapore Constitution does not contain an explicit right to 
a fair trial, one may speculate as to why Article 10 of the UDHR was invoked 
201 Id.
202 Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
203 Id. at 883.
204 Sohn, “A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights,” in The 
United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission (Commission 
to Study the Organization of Peace ed. 1968) cited in Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
205 Memorandum of Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. 
No. 8 (Vol. 15), U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/1/610 (1962) cited in Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
206 E. Schwelb, Human Rights and the International Community 70 (1964) cited in 
Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
207 Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d, ¶ 26.
208 Id.
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by counsel within the context of constitutional law argumentation.209 It was 
not invoked to inform the content of an existing constitutional right nor 
to accentuate the importance of an existing right. Perhaps it was raised to 
support an argument that there was an implicit right to a fair trial, drawing 
from conceptions of the rule of law210 as a constitutional principle.211 The 
European cases would then be used to formulate the content of a fair trial 
as encompassing the principle of equality of arms.212
Alternatively, if Article 10 of the UDHR is customary human rights 
law, it could have been invoked to establish a free-standing or independent 
civil right. There is no precedent on this point or whether courts would be 
receptive to such argument. 
IV.  ARTICLE 5 OF THE UDHR
The most illuminating cases in relation to the interpretation of international 
human rights norms in light of domestic constitutional rules have revolved 
around Article 5 of the UDHR. This reads: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”213 
209 Within the context of administrative law, human rights may well be a relevant 
consideration in the exercise of administrative discretion, as in decisions whether 
to admit foreign lawyers to the Singapore bar under the Legal Profession Act, 2009, 
c. 161 (Sing.).
210 Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs, [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (CA), ¶ 156B.
211 The Law Minister has stated that the right to vote in Singapore was an implied 
constitutional right, drawn from its system of representative democracy and 
articles 65 and 66 of the Constitution which provide for General Elections within 3 
months after Parliament is dissolved: Kong Chian Lee, Voting in Singapore: A right 
or a privilege?, Today (Singapore), Feb. 14, 2009, at 6. Implied freedoms derived 
from a system of representative democracy have been judicially declared in the 
Australian context. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106 (Austl.).
212 Interestingly, Tay J. in discussing the equality of arms principle seemed to focus 
on the complexity (or otherwise) of the case, rather than the equality of standing 
between opposing counsel. This is giving substantive content to the principle and 
implicitly, applying it, either as a relevant consideration in the administrative 
process, or a right, whether constitutional or common law, which is defeasible 
rather than absolute. Re Gavin Millar Q.C., 1 SLR (HC), ¶¶ 42-43. 
213 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7.
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It has been argued that “death by hanging” and the “mandatory death 
penalty” violate Article 5 of the UDHR before the Singapore courts.214
In Public Prosecutor v. Nguyen Tuong Van, it was argued that “law” 
in Article 9 of the Singapore Constitution should be read to incorporate 
Article 5 of the UDHR and further, that “death by hanging” was uncon-
stitutional as it was a cruel and inhumane method of execution.215 Kan J. 
noted that the UDHR “is not an international treaty”216 and that there was 
“no consensus” it codified CIL.217 In addition, it did not expressly refer to 
hanging.218 Even assuming that Article 5 of the UDHR codified CIL, the 
High Court pointed out it was “by no means a settled view”219 that hanging 
was in fact a cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment, pointing out the 
view of the United States Court of Appeals in Campbell v. Wood.220 Negative 
practice in the form of foreign case law was cited to show dissensus that 
hanging fell clearly into the ambit of Article 5 of the UDHR.
The Court of Appeal went beyond the High Court in finding that ar-
ticle 5 UDHR did embody CIL and that this was “quite widely accepted.”221 
Notably, the Prosecution did not make any contrary assertions. While 
accepting that Article 5 of the UDHR embodied CIL, the Court of Appeal 
found there was “simply not sufficient state practice” to indicate that this 
prohibition extended to the specific method of death by hanging.222 To 
demonstrate dissensus, the Court referred to a 2002 UN report from the 
Commission on Human Rights, which indicated the following in relation 
to the status of the death penalty worldwide as of 1 December 2002:223
214 Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR 328 (HC).
215 Id. ¶ 55.
216 Id. ¶ 106.
217  Id.
218  Id. 
219  Id. ¶ 107.
220  Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994).
221  Nguyen Tuong Van (2005), 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 91.
222  Id. ¶ 92.
223 Question of the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General submitted 
pursuant to Commission resolution 2002/77, UN ESCOR, 59th Sess, UN Doc E/
CN.4/2003/106 (2003), cited in Nguyen Tuong Van (2005), 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 92.
42 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
Number of retentionist countries 71
Number of completely abolitionist countries 77
Number of countries abolitionist for ordinary crimes only 15
Number of countries that can be considered de facto abolitionist 33
Even if death by hanging was cruel and inhuman punishment, the Misuse 
of Drugs Act which provided for such punishment would prevail over a 
CIL norm incorporated as part of the common law.
The constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty (MDP) under 
the Misuse of Drugs Act224 was challenged in the case of Yong Vui Kong v. 
Public Prosecutor,225 on the basis of two main arguments. First, the MDP 
was challenged on the basis of Article 9(1) of the Constitution and devel-
opments in Privy Council jurisprudence, that the MDP violated Article 
9(1) of the Singapore Constitution as being a deprivation of life not in 
accordance with “law.”226 The MDP constituted an inhumane method of 
punishment because it treated all guilty persons not as unique individu-
als with varying degrees of moral blameworthiness, but as a member of 
a “faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction 
of the penalty of death.”227 As such, the MDP legislation is inhuman and 
contrary to the right to life set out in Article 9(1), as not constituting “law” 
224 Misuse of Drugs Act, c.185. This provides for the MDP for crimes of trafficking 
certain amounts of prohibited drugs.
225 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA). For commentaries on this case, see Li-ann Thio, “It is a 
little known legal fact”: Originalism, customary human rights law and constitutional 
interpretation - Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor, Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 558 (2010); Yap Po Jen, Constitutionalising Capital Crimes: Judicial Virtue 
or ‘Originalism’ Sin?, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 281 (2011); Jack 
Lee, The Mandatory Death Penalty and a Sparsely Worded Constitution, 127 Law 
Quarterly Review 192 (2010); Arvind Ganesh, Insulating the Constitution: 
Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] SGCA 20, 10(2) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 273 (2010); Chen Siyuan, The Relationship 
between International Law and Domestic Law, 23 Singapore Academy of Law 
Journal 350 (2011).
226 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 87-99.
227 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976), referenced in Yong Vui 
Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 7.
Thio: International Law in the Courts of Singapore 43
within its terms.228 Privy Council decisions from the Caribbean did not 
deal with the meaning of the word “law” in analogues of Article 9, but in-
terpreted explicit constitutional clauses that prohibited torture, cruel and 
inhuman punishment, which the Singapore constitution did not have.229 
Lord Bingham in Reyes v. The Queen,230 a decision from Belize, said the 
MDP for convicted murderers “long predated any international arrange-
ments for the protection of human rights.”231 As such, the Singapore Privy 
Council decision from Singapore, Ong Ah Chuan v. PublicProsecutor232 
was made “at a time when international jurisprudence on human rights 
was rudimentary.”233 Various foreign cases from the US, Africa, and India 
considered that the MDP was inhuman punishment as it precluded judicial 
sentencing discretion, producing results that were not individualized and 
disproportionate.
Second, “law” was to be read as incorporating a system of law which did 
not impose inhumane punishment, drawing from Article 5 of the UDHR 
as a CIL norm. Article 5 itself did not provide much guidance as to what 
the content of “inhuman punishment” encompassed.
While affirming the general principle that domestic law should pre-
sumptively be interpreted in a manner consistent with Singapore’s interna-
tional human rights obligations,234 the Court of Appeal stated there were 
“inherent limits” to this approach, and identified two major obstacles in 
the form of the constitutional text and constitutional history. 
First, the constitutional text did not contain an express prohibition 
against inhuman punishment.235 This departed from the approach of 
various Caribbean constitutions that shared the same British legacy of the 
Westminster parliamentary system, which based their bill of rights on the 
ECHR. Malaysia and Singapore adopted a distinct constitutional trajectory 
in this respect. The Court emphasized the “little known legal fact” that 
228 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 99.
229 Id. ¶ 61.
230 Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Belize).
231 Id. ¶ 17. 
232 Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] AC 648, 674 (Sing.).
233 Reyes, 2 A.C. (P.C.), ¶ 17.
234  ong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 59.
235 Id. ¶ 61.
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the constitutional drafters must have been aware of the existence of such a 
inhuman punishment clause given that the ECHR had applied to Malaysia 
and Singapore in 1953, as well as to other British colonies by virtue of the 
UK’s declaration under Article 63 of the ECHR.236 
 Second, plunging deep into constitutional history, the Court of 
Appeal showed that the recommendation of the 1966 constitutional com-
mission to include a clause prohibiting torture and inhuman punishment, 
a new “Article 13,”237 which essentially was modeled after Article 5 of the 
UDHR238 and Article 3 of the ECHR.239 The court found, problematically,240 
that the government’s rejection of Article 13 was “unambiguous,” even if 
236 Id. 
237 The proposed Art. 13 reads: “No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading punishment or other treatment.” Clause 2 provided that nothing 
done “under the authority of any law” in relation to the infliction of punishment 
or treatment that as lawful prior to the Article came into force shall be held to be 
inconsistent with the proposed Article. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that 
the decision of R v. Hughes, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Caribbean) 
was not applicable as the Art 13(2) “savings” clause, similar to that considered in 
The Saint Lucia Constitution Order 1978, was not part of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint). Nonetheless, if it had been, they were of 
the opinion that the 1966 Constitutional Commission (Singapore, Report of the 
Constitutional Commission, 1966 (1966) (Chairman: Wee Chong Jin)) intended 
that the proposed Art 13(2) clause was designed to prevent arguments that pre-
existing lawful punishments would be in violation of Art 13 after the proposed 
Article 13 took effect. Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 70.
238 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7.
239 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953).
240 The reasons for not including Article 13 could be given an alternative reading. 
Perhaps the constitutional framers did not include it because they considered it 
was covered by article 9 insofar as such prohibition was intrinsic to the idea of 
“law” demanded by article 9(1). This would be independent of the Court of Appeal’s 
speculation that the constitutional commission recommended Article 13 because 
they did not believe it was covered within the ambit of article 9(1). See Yong Vui 
Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶¶ 71-72.
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the reasons for this were not clear.241 The deliberate exclusion of Article 13 
was equated with repealing an existing constitutional right.242 From this, 
the Court offered what it considered to be a reasonable assumption; that the 
Commission recommended a new Article 13 because it was not considered 
to overlap with the content of Article 9.243 Otherwise, its inclusion would 
be superfluous.
Thus, the court found it illegitimate to read into Article 9(1) the content 
of what would have been Article 13(1) given that this had been “decisively 
rejected” by the government in 1969, “especially given the historical context 
in which the right was rejected.”244 It was not legitimate to “expand via an 
interpretative exercise” the scope of Article 9(1) to include a prohibition 
against inhuman punishment.245 
The Court took note that the Singapore government had expressed the 
view that torture was wrong in the local context and that it was criminal-
ized under Penal Code provisions relating to offences affecting the human 
body.246 In “sharp contrast,” no government statement has stated that the 
MDP constitutes inhuman punishment. The Court observed that while 
the majority of states did not impose the MDP for drug and other serious 
offences, a “significant number of states” did.247 While counsel argued that 
only 14 countries in the world still retained the MDP for drug offences, the 
Attorney-General stated there were in fact 31 states who did so.248
241 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 72.
242 Id. ¶ 74.
243 Id. ¶ 72.
244 Id. ¶ 72.
245 Id.
246 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 July 1987) vol. 49, 1491–92 
(Prof. S Jayakumar, Minister for Home Affairs); Penal Code, 2008, c. XVI (Sing.), 
referenced in Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 75.
247 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 96.
248 In countries like India where the Supreme Court considered the MDP under 
section 303 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860) (India), to be 
unconstitutional, the practice was equivocal as the government subsequently 
enacted legislation which included the MDP, i.e., the Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985) (India) and the Scheduled 
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Thus, applying international legal rules of CIL formation, the Court 
of Appeal found insufficient state practice, which had to be “extensive 
and virtually uniform”249 to indicate that the substantive content of a CIL 
norm prohibiting inhuman punishment included a specific prohibition 
of the MDP.250 
This line of cases shows the reticence of Singapore courts in utilizing 
international law as a source for expanding or creating new rights; given 
its judicial modesty and aversion to the prospect of judicial legislation, 
the Court of Appeal refused to “legislate new rights” under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation.251 New rights would have to be the produce 
of parliamentary processes or constitutional amendment. The primacy of 
democracy and national sovereignty was further underscored in the 2015 
Court of Appeal decision of Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 
1129. Here, the court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the punish-
ment of caning amounted to ‘torture’. It noted that there was “strong evi-
dence” that the prohibition against torture was a peremptory international 
law norm, referencing local parliamentary debates, international tribunals 
and foreign decisions.252 It directly addressed the question of what ‘rank’ a 
jus cogens norm would have within the Singapore domestic order.
 Citing academic articles and reviewing the summary records of 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument that a jus cogens norm, which was a fundamental 
international norm, applied with constitutional force in the domestic 
context. It adopted a dualist position, noting that no authority had been 
provided “for the proposition that a peremptory norm of international 
law would automatically acquire the status of a constitutional norm when 
transposed into domestic law.” The Court of Appeal underscored that such 
a proposition would be “untenable” as it would mean that the content of 
the Singapore constitution “could be dictated by the views of other states, 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 (Act No. 33 
of 1989) (India); see Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶¶ 93-99.
249 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20), cited in 
Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 98.
250 Yong Vui Kong, 3 SLR (CA), ¶ 96.
251 Id. ¶ 59.
252 Yong Vui Kong, [2015] 2 SLR 1129 at 1143, [27].
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regardless of what the people of Singapore, expressing their will through 
their elected representatives, think.” Thus, it held that jus cogens norms 
could not override domestic statutes “whose meaning and effect is clear.”253 
Of course, if Singapore were to violate a jus cogens norm, this did not 
preclude it being held to account in an international forum, as the court 
acknowledged. The concept of jus cogens was meant to government inter-
national or inter-state relations, rather than to apply with “some special 
or extraordinary effect at the intra-state level.”254
d.   Soft International Law and International Comity
There have been instances where soft international law norms, in the sense 
of non- juridically binding international instruments, have been raised 
by counsel in cases in an attempt to influence the balancing process in 
adjudicating rights.255
For example, the Attorney-General in the contempt of court decision of 
Attorney-General v. Hertzberg Daniel and others referred to Articles 13 and 
14 of the UDHR,256 a document adopted by the private Inter-Action Council 
in 1998, in arguing that different countries guaranteed the right to freedom 
of expression in different ways such that local conditions were paramount, 
while foreign case law was not determinative in the local context.257 These 
253 Id, ¶ 38.
254 Id, ¶ 36.
255 Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law, 38 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 850 
(1989).
256 Article 13: “No politicians, public servants, business leaders, scientists, writers 
or artists are exempt from general ethical standards, nor are physicians, lawyers 
and other professionals who have special duties to clients. Professional and other 
codes of ethics should reflect the priority of general standards such as those of 
truthfulness and fairness.” Article 14: “The freedom of the media to inform the 
public and to criticize institutions of society and governmental actions, which 
is essential for a just society, must be used with responsibility and discretion. 
Freedom of the media carries a special responsibility for accurate and truthful 
reporting. Sensational reporting that degrades the human person or dignity must 
at all times be avoided.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7.
257 Attorney General v. Hertzberg Daniel, [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1103 (HC), ¶ 11 (Sing.). 
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articles related to codes of professional ethics and to the responsibility a 
free media had for accurate and truthful reporting. Soft international law 
was invoked as a counterpoint to rights-oriented readings of constitutional 
rights that valorized individual rights over competing rights, interests, 
and goods. In other common law jurisdictions, soft law documents may 
be invoked for the purpose of supporting a rights-expansive or protective 
reading of constitutions. For example, the Beijing Statement of Principles 
of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAWASIA Region, adopted by 
the Chief Justices of Asia on August 19, 1995 (including the Singapore Chief 
Justice), was invoked in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan.258 This included as 
an objective of the judiciary the promotion “within the proper limits of the 
judicial function, the observance and the attainment of human rights.”259 
This was invoked to support the extraordinary judicial role in “legislating” 
anti-sexual harassment guidelines in the absence of legislation.260 
The same Statement was raised by the defense counsel before the 
Singapore High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Nguyen Tuong Van, and was 
treated more dismissively.261 The defense sought to add force to its submis-
sions, challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in 
relation to the equal protection clause, and underlining the importance 
of the judicial role in death penalty cases.262 The statement declared the 
indispensable role of the judiciary in implementing rights under the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Singapore is not a party.263 
The judicial function was to promote the “attainment of human rights” and 
have jurisdiction over all justiciable issues, including sentencing.264 Thus, 
to afford the accused “the equal protection of the law,” sentence had to be 
passed by an independent, impartial tribunal.265 This was directed at the 
mandatory death penalty where courts have no discretion as to sentencing 
258 Vishaka, A.I.R. at 3011.
259 Id. ¶ 11. 
260 Id. 
261 Nguyen Tuong Van (2004), 2 SLR (HC).
262 Id. ¶ 72-73.
263 Id. ¶ 100.
264 Id.
265 Id.
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once guilt is found. Kan Ting Chiu J. briefly noted that nothing in the State-
ment related to death sentences or mandatory death sentences, and counsel 
failed to explain “how the Statement, which does not have the force of a 
treaty or a convention, assists the accused’s argument that mandatory death 
sentences are illegal.”266 The reference to a soft law instrument served only 
to be some sort of rhetorical flourish rather than a substantive argument.
Attempts to require statute to conform to norms contained in General 
Assembly resolutions have failed before Indian courts.267 In People’s Union 
for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2005), the argument was raised that 
the Protection of Human Rights Act (1993) governing the National Human 
Rights Commission fell short of the Paris Principles of National Human 
Rights Institutions, endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 
1993.268 Section 3(2)(d) provides that persons having “knowledge of, or 
practice experience in, matters relating to human rights” should be ap-
pointed commissioners.269
The People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) argued that the Paris 
Principles would be breached if a retired police officer was appointed to be 
a human rights commissioner, since the police were major human rights 
violators.270 The Court held that the Paris Principles did not exclude police 
personnel from sitting on national human rights commission (NHRC) 
and that the General Assembly Resolution could not be exalted to a status 
of a covenant at international law; even though India had supported the 
Resolution, this did not cast any binding legal obligation on it.271 Soft law 
norms could not be used to interpret domestic law without regard to the 
wording of the statutory text, which did not preclude policemen from 
becoming NHRC members. Soft international law contained in General 
Assembly resolutions could not be invoked to override express legislation.272
Clearly, none of these documents have legally binding force and their 
utility lies in the realm of their moral force; their power to influence is 
266 Id. ¶101.
267 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2005) 2 S.C.C. 436 (India).
268 Id.
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based on persuasion, not obligation. This is evident in the Malaysian case 
of Nor Anak Nyawai v. Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd, where Judge Ian 
Chin referred to the standards in the non-binding U.N. Draft Declaration 
on the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, although this decision played 
“no part in my decision” on the case issues as it did not form “part of the 
law of our land.”273 Declaration provisions, such as that relating to the right 
of indigenous people to protect them from forcible removal from their 
land and cultural genocide, were cited to serve an educative function. In 
particular, these standards “provide valuable insight as to how we should 
approach matters concerning the natives,” showing the defendant govern-
ment authorities their wrongful attitudes towards Sarawak natives and to 
instruct them concerning the “global attitude towards natives.”274 Thus, 
soft international human rights law was judicially referenced to serve the 
purposes of censuring and educating state officials as to global standards, 
with the hope of shaping future policy and conduct.
International soft law thus provides some sort of moral imperative 
for courts to acknowledge international standards and values, engaging 
domestic courts in dialogue with cosmopolitan values.
International comity is not a binding legal obligation but a matter of 
courtesy and goodwill. It has on occasion influenced judicial review where 
rights are concerned and is invoked along with some mention of state sov-
ereignty. For example, comity spoke to whether a corruption offence under 
the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed) based on 
a classification between citizens and non-citizens was a reasonable one, so 
as to meet the requirements of the Article 12 equal protection of the law 
guarantee in Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong.275
Section 37(1) of the PCA provides for the application of the PCA to 
Singapore citizens outside Singapore.276 A Singapore citizen in Hong Kong 
273 Id. at 298.
274 Id. at 297.
275 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA) 489.
276 “The provisions of this Act have effect, in relation to citizens of Singapore, outside 
as well as within Singapore; and where an offence under this Act is committed 
by a citizen of Singapore in any place outside Singapore, he may be dealt with in 
respect of that offence as if it had been committed in Singapore.” Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Rev Ed).
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was convicted for a corruption offence and argued that section 37(1) PCA 
was discriminatory as it would not extend to the same act committed in 
the same place, presumably with the same impact on Singapore, if the per-
petrator was a non-citizen. The classification was therefore under-inclusive 
and contrary to the Article 12 equal protection constitutional guarantee, 
bearing in mind the Act’s purpose to provide for the more effectual pre-
vention of corruption.
The Court of Appeal noted that a statute “generally operates within 
the territorial limits of the Parliament that enacted it” and would apply 
to all persons within that state including foreigners.277 It approved an 
English canon of construction to the effect that if any other construction 
were possible, an Act would not be construed as tos apply to acts done by 
foreigners outside the state.278 This rule was “based on international law by 
which one sovereign power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights 
of all other sovereign powers outside its own territory.”279 This territorial 
principle in criminal law served various rationales, including avoiding 
cases when other states may take offense if a country attempts to regulate 
matters taking place within their territories.280
The Court of Appeal noted that non-citizens were left out of the ambit 
of section 37(1) out of consideration of comity, and consequently, in consid-
ering the reasonableness of the classification, the Act’s objective “must be 
balanced against Parliament’s intention to observe international comity.”281 
Given the broad ambit of section 37(1) which would capture all corrupt acts 
independent of their harmful consequences in Singapore, the Court of Ap-
peal concluded it was “rational to draw the line at citizenship and leave out 
non-citizens so as to observe international comity and the sovereignty of 
other nations.”282 The court agreed with the Attorney-General that section 
37(1) PCA was “a piece of highly responsible legislation which took into 
account international norms and practices.”283 International law and comity 
277 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), ¶ 66.
278 Id. ¶¶ 66-68.
279 R v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425 at 430 (Eng.).
280 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), ¶ 69.
281 Id. ¶ 70.
282 Id. ¶ 75.
283 Id. ¶ 83.
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was thus a consideration in the application of the rational classification 
test to interpret the equal protection clause.284 Adopting a dialogical tone, 
the Court also suggested that Parliament adopt the effects test, which was 
recognized at international law,285 as the basis for its extra-territorial laws.286
e.   Issues of Recognition and State Immunity  
before Singapore Courts
Questions of recognition of putative states/government frequently arise in 
connection with claims of state immunity before courts, bringing to the 
fore the role of executive certificates. 
These issues arose before the Singapore courts in Civil Aeronautics 
Administration v. Singapore Airlines Ltd. in relation to an air accident 
when a Singapore Airlines flight took-off from Taipei Airport in Taiwan, 
which is run by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), a department 
under the Ministry of Transport and Communications of the government 
of Taiwan charged with the administration of civil aviation in the Repub-
lic of China.287 Injured passengers sued Singapore Airlines, who claimed 
indemnity from CAA and joined it as third parties to the suit. The CAA 
then invoked foreign state immunity under section 3(1) read with section 
16(1)(c) of Singapore’s State Immunity Act (SSIA) (Cap 313, 1979), in an 
attempt to set aside third party proceedings.288 
Under this Act, foreign states can claim immunity from the civil 
jurisdiction of Singapore courts.289 This is largely similar to the United 
Kingdom’s State Immunity Act (1978), which endorses a model of restrictive 
immunity, and was enacted to give effect to the 1972 European Convention 
284 Id.
285 E.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); United 
States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
286 Taw Cheng Kong, 2 SLR(R) (CA), ¶ 88.
287 Civil Aeronautics Admin. v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2004] 1 SLR 570 (CA), ¶ 14 
(Sing.).
288 Id. ¶ 9.
289 State Immunity Act, 2014, c. 313 (Sing.).
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on State Immunity, to which Singapore is not a party.290 As the Court of 
Appeal in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Singapore Airlines Ltd. has 
noted, sovereign immunity “is based on mutual respect and international 
comity . . . [requiring] every sovereign state to respect the independence 
and dignity of every other sovereign state” so as to “decline to exercise 
by means of its courts, territorial jurisdiction” over the person or public 
property of the sovereign.291 Thus, a sovereign state “could not be sued in 
the courts of another state unless the former submits to the jurisdiction 
of the latter.”292
Section 3(1) embodies a general principle of immunity from the juris-
diction of Singapore courts, with stated exceptions. Section 16(1) provides 
that reference to a state includes, inter alia, reference to “any department 
of that government.”293 Section 18 provides that an executive certificate 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) “shall be conclusive evidence” 
290 Law Minister EW Barker noted that there were certain provisions in the UK 
Act which were not appropriate to Singapore, “particularly those concerning 
the European Convention on State Immunity.” Thus, while the Singapore Act is 
based on the UK Act, it “has been modified to suit our needs and circumstances.” 
‘State Immunity Bill’, 39 Singapore Parliament Reports 7 Sept 1979 col 408 at 
409. None the less, while not being bound by the UK Parliament’s intention 
in adopting the State Immunity Act, references have been made to Hansard to 
interpret the scope of section 15 of the Singapore State Immunity Act which is 
in pari material with section 13(2)(b) of the UK Act. It emerged that an original 
provision to grant immunity for orders for security of costs was deleted from 
the final bill. Choo Han Teck J held that the Singapore Act does not curtail the 
court’s jurisdiction to order security for costs despite its silence, Such orders 
were not part of ‘enforcement jurisdiction’, which is distinct from ‘adjudicative 
jurisdiction’ – state consent to submit to the latter does not entail submission to 
the former. Security for cost orders were “a procedural condition precedent for the 
continuation of legal proceedings” and did not constitute an affront to the dignity 
of a foreign sovereign where asked to provide security for the costs of proceedings 
that sovereign has voluntarily institute in the forum court. See Ministry of Rural 
Dev., Fishery, Craft Indus. & Env’t of the Union of Comoros v. Chan Leng Leng, 
[2013] 3 SLR 214 (HC), ¶¶ 5, 8 (Sing.). 
291 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 14.
292 Id.
293 State Immunity Act, 2014, c. 313, § 16(1) (Sing.).
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on any question as to whether “any country is a State for the purposes of 
Part II . . . .”294
Counsel for both SIA and CAA wrote to the MFA requesting a posi-
tive response to the question of whether the MFA would issue a certificate 
confirming that Taiwan was a state for the purposes of the SIA. MFA re-
sponded to both with a letter stating “we are unable to issue the certificate 
pursuant to s18 of the State Immunity Act.”295
I.  PRIMACY OF STATE IMMUNITY ACT OR CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – THE TREATMENT OF EXECUTIVE 
CERTIFICATES
The High Court in Woo v. Singapore Airlines Limited and Civil Aeronautics 
Administration (joining), rejected counsel’s argument that the court should 
“follow the principles of international law and draw a distinction between 
‘de jure and de facto recognition,’ given the absence of official recognition 
of Taiwan as a state by the Singapore government.296 Counsel had argued 
that the court was entitled to determine whether there was a de facto rec-
ognition of the Republic of China if the Singapore government’s position 
on this point was unclear. Evidence was set forth before the High Court 
and on appeal in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Singapore Airlines Ltd. 
on the history of Singapore-Taiwan interactions, including the conclusion 
of a double-taxation treaty, investment and tourism agreements.297
However, the High Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, held that 
the refusal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to issue a certificate 
stating that the Singapore government recognized Taiwan as a state under 
the SSIA was conclusive and a clear indication of non-recognition, even 
if couched in “polite and diplomatic terms.”298 Since the SSIA did not 
distinguish between de jure or de facto recognition, it had to “be read as 
inclusive of both.”299
294 Id. § 18. 
295 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 10.
296 Woo v. Singapore Airlines Ltd., [2003] 3 SLR 688 (HC) (Sing.).
297 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶¶ 12-28, 34-35. 
298 Id. ¶ 11.
299 Woo, 3 SLR (HC), ¶ 7.
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Ultimately, the CAA was denied immunity from suit under the SSIA, 
based on the executive’s view rather than judicial determination of what 
international law required.300 Several justifications were given for this 
approach:
i.  “One Voice” Doctrine
The High Court emphasized that the recognition of statehood was some-
thing requiring “a common stand to be taken by all the organs of the rec-
ognizing state.”301 The SSIA thus requires the application of a “one voice” 
doctrine as it conferred upon the Executive the power to make a conclusive 
determination whether to recognize a state or government for the purposes 
of the Act. This requires judicial deferral to executive determinations as 
“[r]ecognition by the court follows recognition by the state to which that 
court belongs.”302
ii.  The Determinative Voice of the Executive
The question of whether Taiwan was entitled to immunity under the SSIA 
was to be determined by the views of the executive rather than international 
law. Irrespective of what the court views the status of Taiwan to be under 
general principles of international law, once the MFA says Taiwan is not a 
state for SSIA purposes, “the court should fall in line.”303 This reflects the 
“pre-eminence given to recognition”304 under section 18 SSIA. 
Citing a string of English cases, the Court of Appeal highlighted Lord 
Atkin’s judgment in Government of the Republic of Spain v. SS Arantzazu 
Mendi,305 which rejected earlier views that the court could examine sec-
300 One might argue that since the SSIA removed immunity from acta jure gestionis 
(non-sovereign acts of state) and placed the issue from the political to the legal 
sphere to be determined by the judicial application of international law, pursuant 
to the doctrine of restrictive immunity, that the SSIA should be construed subject 
to international law.
301 Woo, 3 SLR (HC), ¶ 6.
302 Id. ¶ 11.
303 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 14.
304 Id. ¶ 25.
305 Gov’t of the Republic of Spain v. SS Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256 (H.L.) at 
263-64 (Eng.).
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ondary evidence where the Crown declined to answer a question about 
statehood.306 He said “[o]ur state cannot speak with two voices . . . . Our 
Sovereign has to decide whom he will recognize as a fellow sovereign,” 
and the issue of foreign state immunities must flow from that decision.307
iii. Is there No Role for the Court? What about Ambiguity?
The door was left open as to whether the court could conduct its own 
independent inquiry308 based on other evidence about whether the Sin-
gapore government had recognized Taiwan as a state, de facto or de jure, 
where the MFA’s actions were ambiguous. In the instant case, the Court 
of Appeal asserted that the MFA’s reply was clear and had to be viewed in 
the context of the request, noting it was “not for the judiciary to criticize 
any obscurity” in the executive’s expression.309 By refusing to certify that 
Taiwan was a state for SSIA purposes, the “only logical conclusion” was 
that Taiwan was not a state within the meaning of the SSIA.310
Even if this was ambiguous, the preferred course of action would be 
to revert to the MFA for “a more specific answer.” The Court of Appeal 
underscored that the issue of recognition of statehood was a matter “wholly 
within the Executive’s domain,” 311 being not only a matter of fact but of 
policy.312 There was no room for the courts to “get themselves involved in 
international relations” which they were ill-equipped to deal with. The 
sensible option was to seek further clarification rather than second-guess 
the Executive or determine the answer based on evidence placed before 
306 Specifically, Lord Sumner’s views in Duff Dev. Co. v. Gov’t of Kelantan, [1924] 
A.C. 797 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
307 SS Arantzazu Mendi, A.C. at 264.
308 The CAA cited In re Al-Fin Corporation’s Patent, [1970] Ch. 160 where North 
Korea was recognized as a “state” for the purposes of section 24 of the UK Patents 
Act (1949), despite the government not recognizing it. “State” in this context was 
to be apprehended by the “objective conditions of statehood” as “state” under 
section 24 did not depend on recognition.
309 GUR Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd. & the Gov’t of Ciskei, [1986] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 451 (A.C.) (Eng.), cited at Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 12.
310 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 13.
311 Id. ¶ 15.
312 Id. ¶ 22.
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it. It was only when the Executive refused to respond to a request for an 
executive certificate, that the courts would take their own decision on the 
basis of customary international law.313
The different approach of the Canadian courts flowed from the fact 
that their statutory equivalent of section 18 SSIA indicated that a Canadian 
executive certificate was but one means of determining whether Taiwan 
was a state for the purposes of the Canadian Act. 314 In addition, where the 
executive’s reply is vague, the court could consider evidence and come to 
its own conclusion.315
II.  THE SPECIAL QUESTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS DISTINCT FROM 
STATEHOOD
The Court of Appeal in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Singapore 
Airlines Ltd. stressed that the question of sovereign immunity was “spe-
cial” and to be treated differently from the different question of whether 
a state had come into being. A state must first be recognized before it can 
be accorded state immunity.316
Singapore endorses the “declaratory” theory of statehood, that there 
are four conditions under customary international law for an entity to be 
a state: defined territory, permanent population, effective government, and 
the capacity to enter into relations with other states.317 Recognition in this 
conception is not constitutive of statehood but a mere acknowledgement 
of fact.
However, where sovereign immunity is concerned, “recognition is 
vital.”318 One cannot respect what one does not recognize. The court 
evaluated the evidence to see if Singapore had in fact recognized Taiwan 
313 Id. ¶¶ 27, 41.
314 See generally Olufemi A. Elias, The International Status of Taiwan in the Courts 
of Canada and Singapore, 8 Singapore Year Book of International Law 93 
(2004).
315 Parent v. Singapore Airlines Ltd. & Civil Aeronautics Admin., [2003] IIJ Can 7285 
(Can. Que.). 
316 Civil Aeronautics Admin., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 20.
317 Id. ¶ 30.
318 Id. ¶ 31. 
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as a sovereign state.319 The evidence was read in the light of Singapore’s 
one-China policy and the fact that Singapore had treated Taiwan different 
from other sovereign states.320 For example, Taiwan had no diplomatic 
representation, only a Trade Mission that was not allowed to use the title 
“republic of China” from 1990 when Singapore established formal relations 
with the PRC.321 The approach was consonant with treating Taiwan as “a 
political subdivision of another State.”322
While clear that Singapore was in “close co-operation” with Taiwan 
in various areas like tourism, tax and air services, this did not imply rec-
ognition as sovereign state.323 Recognition was intentional and could not 
be easily implied from actions; acts must leave “no doubt” of the intention 
to recognize, and the acts indicated Singapore had taken care to ensure its 
actions could not be construed as recognizing Taiwan’s status in a manner 
contrary to it’s one-China policy.324
III. CAN YOU SUE SOMETHING WHOSE EXISTENCE YOU DENY?
The Court of Appeal in Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Singapore 
Airlines Ltd. rejected the argument that if Taiwan was not a state for the 
purposes of SSIA, it could not be sued. Taiwan could be a state for other 
purposes and still have the capacity to sue and be sued, as determined by 
the law of Taiwan. American case law was cited for the proposition that 
unrecognized governments were not totally devoid of some legal status. 
Indeed, the House of Lords articulated a sensible approach insofar as non-
recognition could not be pushed to its “ultimate logical limit,” particularly 
where private acts or daily administrative acts were concerned.325 It was 
thus possible not to grant recognition to an entity for the purposes of state 
319 Id. ¶ 32.
320 Id. ¶ 34.
321 Id. ¶¶ 32-34.
322 If Taiwan had taken the stand that it should enjoy immunity as part of the People’s 
Republic of China, which Singapore recognizes as a state, this would have been 
“a serious argument.” Id. ¶ 8.
323 Id. ¶ 35.
324 Id. ¶ 36.
325 Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd. (No 2), [1967] 1 A.C. 853 (H.L.) 
(Eng.).
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immunity while permitting it to be sued for its acts, since non-recognition 
does not deny a foreign government exists, and denies only that it cannot 
represent the state on the international plane.326 As such, Taiwan existed 
and its government was in effective control over a specific area, and thus 
the CAA bore responsibility for its role in the tragedy.
4.   LIMITS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SINGAPORE COURTS AND 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
a.   Factors Restricting Judicial Review -  
Non-Justiciability/Act of State
Certain doctrines and principles, like the act of state doctrine and doctrine 
of non-justiciability operate to limit judicial review over issues that may 
engage international law. This implicates constitutional doctrines like the 
separation of powers.
It has been recognized that there are “clearly provinces of executive 
decision-making that are, and should be, immune from judicial review.”327 
This includes “high policy” matters pertaining to making treaties, recog-
nizing foreign governments, declaring war, the conduct of foreign affairs 
and international boundary disputes.328 The “one voice” policy is adopted 
to avoid embarrassing the executive in the conduct of foreign relations, 
locating this in the realm of politics rather than law. Certain issues were 
more suited to diplomatic settlement as opposed to judicial determination, 
particularly where highly politicized, complex and contested, placing the 
court in a “judicial no man’s land.”329
The act of state doctrine is a prudential one that limits the forum court 
from inquiring into the validity and propriety of the sovereign acts of a 
foreign state committed within its own territory. This immunizes the sover-
eign acts of a foreign state from judicial review as such acts are considered 
326 DW Grieg, The Carl-Zeiss Case and the Position of an Unrecognised Government 
in English Law, 83 Law Quarterly Review 96 (1967).
327 Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publ’g Co., [2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 (HC), ¶ 95 (Sing.).
328 Id. ¶ 96.
329 Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co., [2002] UKHL 19, [113]. 
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“automatically non-justiciable by reason of their sovereign nature.”330 This 
is distinct from the doctrine of sovereign immunity which raises question 
of jurisdiction, not prudence.
The act of state doctrine only applies if the relevant act is an act of the 
state, which must be done in the exercise of the supreme sovereign power 
of a state, as opposed to private acts.331 The subject matter of the act must 
be located within the foreign sovereign’s territory. It only applies to acts 
of foreign legislatures or governments, and not judicial acts,332 which were 
covered by the common law conflicts of law rules on the recognition of 
foreign judgments. One of its rationales, drawn from international law, is 
that respect is shown for the independence of other sovereign states when 
“the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another done within its own territory.”333
As Chao Hick Tin JA noted in Republic of the Philippines v. Maler 
Foundation, this understanding of act of state emphasizes “the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty” under which each state exercised “absolute power 
and sovereignty within its territorial boundaries.”334 He noted the Ameri-
can act of state doctrine was “initially conceived from this perspective as 
a matter of judicial restraint and comity,” much like the British approach 
towards non-justiciability/act of state, which Singapore appears to fol-
low.335 However, the American doctrine has since been established on a 
more constitutionalist basis, resting on the separation of powers.336 Under 
this model, it would be improper for courts to consider certain disputes 
between foreign sovereigns as judicial intervention might “hinder rather 
330 WestLB AG v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, [2012] 4 SLR 894 (HC), ¶¶ 38-39 (Sing.).
331 Maldives Airports Co. v. GMR Male Int’l Airport Pte Ltd, [2013] 2 SLR 449 (CA) 
(Sing.).
332 The Republic of the Philippines v. Maler Found., [2014] 1 SLR 1389 (CA) (Sing.).
333 Chief Justice Fuller, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), discussed in 
WestLB AG, 4 SLR (HC) at 894.
334 Maler Found., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 42 (referring to Underhill v. Hernandez., 168 U.S. 
250 (1897)).
335 Id.
336 Id. ¶ 48.
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than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the com-
munity of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”337
These doctrines of judicial restraint may be seen to uphold the inter-
national law concept of state sovereignty, in preserving to states the exclu-
sive competence to regulate people and activities within their territorial 
domains. This truncates the effect of international law as an influence on 
the development and content of domestic law. However, in English com-
mon law practice, exceptions have developed in relation to the act of state 
doctrine, where English courts will refuse to give effect to the acts and 
laws of foreign sovereign states where these represent gross human rights 
violations or violate fundamental principles of international law, such as 
the prohibition on the use of force, an accepted ius cogens norm.338 These 
sorts of issues have yet to arise in the Singapore context.
b.   Concluding Observations
Gone are the days where the “little island” mentality towards international 
law translated into judicial dismissiveness towards international law norms 
and arguments. This is not to say that Singapore courts see themselves as 
agents of the international community in the enforcement of international 
norms. Their focal point is more modest and nationalist. There is no fear 
of judicial over-reaching here in terms of jurisdictional assertions, as one 
might associate with Belgian courts and legislation, which at its zenith 
provided for universal jurisdiction for the commission of war crimes.339
Nonetheless, Singapore courts are well versed with international law, 
citing jurists more frequently and carefully distinguishing between lex 
lata and lex ferenda. International law is no longer an exotic creature but 
increasingly becoming part of the regular diet of judges. While their first 
337 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), quoted in Maler 
Found., 1 SLR (CA), ¶ 40. 
338 Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, [1976] A.C. 249 (H.L.) 277-78 (appeal taken from 
Eng.); Kuwait Airways Corp., [2002] UKHL 19. For a comment, see Li-ann 
Thio, English Public Policy, the Act of State Doctrine and Flagrant Violations of 
Fundamental International Law: Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Iraqi Airways Co. (2002), 
18 Connecticut Journal of International Law 585 (2003).
339 Michele Hirsch and Nathalie Kumps, The Belgian Law of Universal Jurisdiction 
Put to the Test, 35 Justice (2003) (Belg.). 
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frame of reference is Anglo-American case law, this is not applied whole-
sale but with discernment, with sensitivity shown to local values. It gives 
weight to particularism, without descending into the parochialism of the 
past where Singapore could be characterized as a “little island” whose 
courts were reactive in rejecting international law, at least when it came 
to public law.
It is clear that Singapore courts do not accord primacy to interna-
tional rules within the national legal system, thereby downplaying the 
transformative role international law could play in the domestic setting. 
Its dualist sensibility that prevents treaty law from being directly applied 
in concrete disputes reflects a vindication of state sovereignty in the form 
of the power to control “whether and how international rights should be 
enforced in that municipality.”340
The hierarchical superiority of the constitution and statutes to in-
ternational norms provide the court great latitude not to give effect to 
international rules. If CIL rules are received by judicial recognition (a form 
of state consent) as common law rules, they cannot invalidate statutes. 
This approach consolidates state sovereignty based on the Westphalian 
model rooted in territorial integrity and the non-interference of states in 
domestic affairs. In this conception, international law is applied provided 
it does not conflict with national law; therefore, it cannot pose a serious 
threat to national values.
340 David J. Bederman, Enforcement and Compliance, in The Spirit of International 
Law 186, 187-99 (2002).
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International Law in the Courts of India
V.G. Hegde1
1. INTRODUCTION
Domestic courts and tribunals have, in recent years, been taking frequent 
recourse to international law as a means to settle disputes. Two reasons 
can be adduced for this trend. Firstly, it could be that domestic courts and 
lawyers are increasingly exposed to or getting well-versed in international 
law and its principles. Secondly, due to globalization, there is an inevitable 
foreign element in majority of the disputes. Both factors are interrelated. 
Domestic courts are using international law through broad interpreta-
tions coupled with domestic constitutional and legal provisions. This is 
the prevailing perception about international law within various domestic 
legal jurisdictions.2 India is no exception.  
Domestic courts in various jurisdictions, including India, continue 
to rely and decide the cases primarily on the basis of their own laws or 
constitutions while using international law as a supplementary means to 
substantiate the arguments.3 Indian courts have been applying interna-
tional law to fill the gaps in the domestic law and policy.4 In some domestic 
1 Associate Professor, South Asian University, New Delhi, India.
2 See A.M. Slaughter & W. Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic 
(or, the European Way of Law), 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327 
(2006).
3 Soli Jehangir Sorabjee, Equality in the US and India, in Constitutionalism and 
Rights: The Influence of the US Constitution Abroad (L. Henkin& A.J. 
Rosenthal eds., 1990); P. Chandrasekhara Rao, The Indian Constitution 
and International Law(1995); V.G. Hegde, Indian Courts and International 
Law, 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 53(2010).
4 Sunil Kumar Agarwal, Implementation of International Law in India: Role of 
Judiciary 12 (June 14, 2010) available at http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/
SK_Agarwal.pdf. 
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jurisdictions, international legal norms are referred directly, though this 
is done subject to certain prior constitutional approvals and procedures.5
According to one view, this kind of international-law-dominance is 
inevitable considering the impact and reach of globalization process in 
various fields. The dire need for evolving the globally accepted norms to 
deal with certain kinds of transnational issues, transactions, and problems 
is increasing. States do accept such a need. However, they, especially the 
courts, are reluctant to cede their sovereign right to accept or reject such 
norms on an automatic basis.6 Regardless of States’ intent, international 
legal norms embodied through various treaties and agreements have in-
fluenced domestic legal framework.7
The other view is that international law is entering into domestic legal 
space through changes that had been brought about to give effect to obli-
gations undertaken under various treaties and agreements.8 In majority 
of the domestic legal systems, international law cannot be directly given 
effect to, or for that matter, it cannot be a stand-alone norm.9 The effective 
implementation of international law in the domestic sphere, therefore, is 
essentially an international legal question bringing to the fore the issues 
relating to the relationship between international law and municipal law.10
A distinction, however, will have to be made between application of 
substantive international legal norms and of taking recourse to certain for-
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Several new legislations have been enacted in India to give effect to its multilateral 
obligations. Courts will have to find ways and means to interpret some of these 
legislations. The obligations undertaken under the agreements of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are good examples. India has either enacted several new 
legislations or amended several existing legislations to give effect to its WTO 
obligations such as, for example, amendments to its various Intellectual Property 
Rights legislations, introducing several new legislations like the Geographical 
Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999, Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers Rights Act, 2001, Biological Diversity Act, 2002. Reference 
can also be made to Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 based on the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model.
8 Agarwal, supra note 4, at 1.
9 Id. 
10 Id.
Hegde: International Law in the Courts of India 65
eign legal elements. It could be safely asserted that customary international 
law, multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements that are in force 
could be regarded as constituting the core of substantive international legal 
norms. On the other hand, courts and other tribunals while dealing with 
various cases might be referring to or would rely on various legal principles 
and norms drawn from different legal systems. It could, for example, be 
a foreign law or legislation which could be used as a fact or as an analogy 
in a judgment. Any interpretation or placement of a foreign legal element 
could also be regarded as part of the usage of international law, although 
this could be strictly regarded as part of what could be termed as private 
international law. In the context of Indian courts at all levels, this interface 
between international law and private international law is a constant factor.
International law continues to be an exotic legal domain for the Indian 
courts, at least for certain level of courts. It can also be stated that questions 
of international law arise primarily at the level of higher judiciary.11 At the 
level of lower judiciary in the Indian context, the questions of international 
law seem to appear very rarely. However, there are certain designated areas 
of law, particularly with regard to procedural laws, wherein international 
legal norms and procedures become important, even within a limited 
context. Some of these areas in the Indian context at the level of lower 
judiciary can be identified such as, for example, ensuring observance of 
human rights in custody, enforcement of foreign judgments, implementa-
tion of foreign arbitral awards, matrimonial cases and issues concerning 
maintenance, bail application for foreign nationals with sureties, internet 
crimes, extradition matters, service of summons in foreign jurisdictions, 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, recognition and dissolution 
of marriages that had been solemnized in foreign jurisdictions, breach 
of contract suits, especially in cases where the suit has been dismissed in 
other foreign jurisdictions, inter-country adoptions, breach of contract 
by multinational companies, child custody and alimony rights, and envi-
ronmental issues and granting of injunctions. This list, in recent years, is 
expanding to include many new legal issues. 
Considering the above context, this article seeks to examine the ap-
plication and use of international law in the Indian courts. The specific 
focus of the study will be on higher judiciary and where necessary to lower 
11 Id. at 11.
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judiciary as well. The assumption is that it is the higher judiciary that is 
taking recourse to international law frequently. The first part of the study 
will outline the Indian constitutional and legal context for the applica-
tion of international law. The second part will deal with the evolution of 
the Indian court cases that had dealt with international legal issues with 
specific focus on applicability and acceptance of customary international 
law. The third part will focus on some important cases in recent years and 
will make an attempt to outline the future trends. The final part will end 
with conclusions. 
2.   INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE  
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
Article 51 of the Indian Constitution makes reference to “international law 
and treaty obligations.”12 This particular provision, however, is a general 
provision on the promotion of “international peace and security” followed 
by the Indian commitment to “maintain just and honourable relations 
between nations.”13 The last two paragraphs of Article 51 specifically 
refer to “international law and settlement of international disputes.”14 To 
be specific, Article 51(c) seeks to “foster respect for international law and 
treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; 
and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.”15
In the context of Article 51, there is an argument that it does not provide 
a priority to the application of international legal norms. It merely seeks 
to “exhort the Indian State to make all possible endeavours to adhere to 
and respect international law.”16 This argument comes essentially from the 
reasons that relate to the placement of Article 51 within the constitutional 
12 India Const. art. 51.
13 Id. (providing that “[t]he State shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace 
and security; (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster 
respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised 
peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes 
by arbitration”). 
14 Id.
15 Id. §§ (c), (d).
16 Id. art. 51.
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scheme. It appears in Part IV of the Indian Constitution which has been 
termed as “Directive Principles of State Policy.”17These Directives, unlike 
the Fundamental Rights which appear in Part III of the Constitution, are 
not enforceable by any court.18 However, they are “fundamental in the 
governance of the country.”19 The Indian State also has the duty to apply 
these principles that had been embodied in the Directives in making laws.20
The Fundamental Rights which appear in Part III of the Indian Consti-
tution are enforceable and any law made in contravention of fundamental 
rights is, to the extent of the contravention, shall be void.21 Fundamental 
rights grant some basic rights to all persons and citizens and they are to 
be respected. Without going into the extensive debates, discussions and 
numerous court cases that had saddled the Indian constitutional scheme 
about the primacy of Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive 
Principles of State Policy), it suffices to say that there seems to be a balance 
achieved between these two parts through various interpretations given 
by the higher judiciary.22
The drafting history of Article 51 of the Indian Constitution essentially 
reflects the approach of the Indian State to the issues concerning interna-
17 Id. Part IV.
18 India Const. art. 37 (Article 37, in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, provides that 
“[t]he Provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but 
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance 




21 India Const. art. 13(2) (providing inter alia, that “[t]he State shall not make any 
law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law 
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be 
void”). 
22 See India Const. art 31C, amended by The Constitution (Forty-second 
Amendment) Act, 1976. This issue specifically appeared with the amendment 
of the Indian Constitution in 1976. This was the Constitution (Forty-second 
Amendment) Act, 1976 by inserting Article 31C, which sought to provide that 
laws made pursuant to Part IV shall not be held void on the ground that it was 
inconsistent with Part III (specifically Article 14 – right to equality and Article 
19 – freedom of speech and expression).
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tional relations and the place of international law in that context. Some 
scholars have argued that the language of Article 51 was drawn mainly from 
the Havana Declaration adopted by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) on November 30, 1939.23 The soft approach to Article 51 is also at-
tributed to India’s hard engagements with its neighbours such as Kashmir, 
water sharing issues, boundary problems and host of other issues.24 India 
preferred a negotiation in settlement of most of these issues amicably or 
through arbitration, and sought to reflect that in its constitutional mandate. 
The soft constitutional mandate in Article 51 is clear from its references 
to such phrases as “[t]he State shall endeavour to” and “foster respect for 
international law.”25 As we have seen, Article 37 of the Indian Constitution 
requires that these mandates, including international legal obligations, in 
Part IV would have to be implemented through appropriate legislations.26 
In order to accomplish this, the Constitution provides for an implementa-
tion mechanism through Article 253 which inter alia, vests in the Parlia-
ment the power to make laws implementing international instruments to 
which India becomes a party.27 This provision appears in Part XI of the 
Indian Constitution which seeks to outline and determine the scope of 
23 Hegde, supra note 3, at 57; Rao, supra note 3. 
24 Some of the issues went to the ICJ. Right of Passage case, Pakistan’s preference to 
take Indus Water issue to the ICJ is well-known and documented. See Niranjan. 
D. Gulati, Indus Water Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation 
(1973); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses 
(2nd ed. 2007). 
25 India Const. art. 51.
26 Id. art. 37.
27 Id. art. 253 (providing that “[n]otwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions 
of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part 
of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention 
with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international 
conference, association or other body”).
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legislative powers shared between the Central Government and the Federal 
structures, i.e., States.28
Article 253 should be read along with Article 73 of the Indian Consti-
tution. Article 73 which is in Part V of the Constitution defining the scope 
of executive power of the Central Government provides that “the executive 
power of the Union shall extend – (a) to the matters with respect to which 
Parliament has power to make laws; and (b) to the exercise of such rights, 
authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India 
by virtue of any treaty or agreement.”29In Article 246, this legislative power 
is specified through three different lists, namely Union List, State List and 
Concurrent List which outline the areas of their respective dominance.30 
While Parliament has the sole power to legislate and deal with all subject 
matters that fall within the Union List, States have the power to legislate 
with regard to the subject matter within the State List. The subject mat-
ters within the Concurrent List overlap between the Union and the States. 
The Entry 14 in the Union List vests the Parliament with the power “to 
enter into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing 
of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries.”31 States 
28 See id. arts. 245-63. Part XI of the Indian Constitution (from Articles 245 to 263) 
is equally contentious as it seeks to demarcate the legislative powers between 
Union and the States. Under Article 245(1), the Parliament has power to make 
laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a 
State has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the state. Further, it 
provides that “[n]o law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the 
ground that it would have extra-territorial operation.” Reference should also be 
made to Article 260, which seeks to confer on the Central Government power to 
extend its executive, legislative, or judicial functions to territories outside India. 
This extension of jurisdiction is exercised through Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 
which, inter alia, provides for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of 
India over territories outside India in respect of which the Government of India 
has acquired jurisdiction by treaty, agreement, grant, usage, political sufferance, 
or other lawful means. 
29 Id. art. 73.
30 See id. art. 246. These Lists (I, II and III) are referred to Article 246 and the subject 
matters covered under these Lists are provided in the Seventh Schedule of the 
Indian Constitution. 
31 Id. Seventh Schedule, List I, Entry 14.
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(the Federal structures) have no authority to conclude treaties and agree-
ments. To put it broadly, States have no authority to undertake directly 
any international obligations or to implement such obligations sans the 
concurrence of the Central Government. 
There are at least ten topics in the Union List that refer to various kinds 
of subject matter that fall within the realm of international law and rela-
tions.32 These subject matters include: foreign affairs; diplomatic, consular 
and trade representation; United Nations; participation in international 
conferences, associations and other bodies and implementing of decisions 
concluded there; war and peace; foreign jurisdiction; citizenship; natural-
ization; extradition; passports and visas; piracy and crimes committed on 
the high seas or in the air; and offences against the law of nations.33
a.   Relationship between Articles 51, 253, and 246
As we have observed from the above discussion, there are mainly three 
provisions, namely Articles 51, 253, and 246 in the Indian Constitution, 
which deal with creation and observance of international law obligations.34 
What is the relationship between these three provisions? Do they altogether 
adhere to what is known either as transformation or incorporation doctrine 
in international law? Transformation doctrine requires international law 
to be specifically transformed into municipal law by the use of appropri-
ate constitutional machinery, such as an act of parliament.35 The Indian 
constitutional scheme under Article 73 and 253 recognises the fact that 
the making of a treaty is an executive act.36 However, if it involves, while 
32 See e.g., id. Entry 10, 19; id. Entry 25 (Maritime shipping and navigation); id. Entry 
37 (Foreign Loans); id. Entry 41(Trade and commerce with foreign countries, 
import and export across customs frontiers, and definition of customs frontiers; 
also overlapping with Entry 26 of the State List); id. Entry 49 (Patents, copyrights, 
designs and other forms of Intellectual Property Rights); id. Entry 25 (Fishing 
and fisheries beyond territorial waters; also overlapping with Entry 21 of the State 
List).
33 See id. Seventh Schedule, List I.
34 Id. arts. 51, 73, 246.
35  Brahm A. Agrawal, Enforcement of International Legal Obligations in a National 
Jurisdiction, All India Reporter 71 (2009).
36 See India Const. arts. 73, 253. 
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performing its obligations, an alteration of existing domestic law, it would 
require legislative action. 
The relationship between Articles 51, 73, 246, and 253 within the con-
stitutional scheme were first examined by the Supreme Court of India in 
Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India.37 The essential question in 
this case was about the adjustment of the boundary with another country 
and as to whether it could be done through an executive act or it required 
an amendment of the Constitution.38 While examining this issue, the 
Supreme Court referred to the constitutional scheme. The Court noted 
that according to Article 73, the executive power of the Union extended 
to matters in which the Parliament had power to make laws.39 It also noted 
that the Constitution made no provision making legislation a condition 
of entry into an international treaty in times of either war or peace. The 
Court noted that:
The executive is qua the State competent to represent the State in 
all matters international and may by agreement, convention or 
treaties incur obligations which in international law are binding 
upon the State. But the obligations arising under the agreement or 
treaties are not by their own force binding upon Indian nationals. 
The power to legislate in respect of treaties lies with the Parlia-
ment under Entries 10 and 14 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. But 
making of law under that authority is necessary when the treaty 
or agreement operates to restrict the rights of citizens or other or 
modifies the laws of the State.40
The Court concluded by stating that “[i]f the rights of the citizens or others 
which are justiciable are not affected, no legislative measure is needed to 
give effect to the agreement or treaty.”41 Accordingly, the Court pointed 
out that adjustment of a boundary which international law regards as valid 





41 Id.; see also Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 129, 151 (4th ed. 1997). 
Treaties concerning relatively unimportant administrative agreements which 
do not require ratification as they do not purport to alter municipal law need no 
intervening act of legislation.
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between two Nations, should be recognized by the Courts and its imple-
mentation can always be with the executive unless a clear case of cession 
is involved.42 In such cases, the Court further noted that a parliamentary 
intercession could be expected and should be had.43
The Maganbhai decision is crucial as it overruled Supreme Court’s 
own earlier opinion. The Court in an earlier advisory opinion upon refer-
ence by the President of India, In re The Berubari Union and Exchange of 
Enclaves (hereinafter “Berubari I”), had stated that a mere executive action 
is insufficient to alter boundaries.44 The Berubari I was about the exchange 
of certain enclaves between India and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) pur-
suant to an agreement between two prime ministers.45 The Government of 
India had argued that this agreement between two prime ministers could be 
“implemented by executive action alone without Parliamentary legislation 
whether with or without a constitutional amendment.”46
b.   Transiting from Transformation to Incorporation Doctrine
The Indian Supreme Court stayed with this transformation doctrine frame-
work for a very long time. However, in 1984 with Gramophone Co. of India 
v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, the Court seemed to have moved to recognise 
the incorporation doctrine.47 This doctrine treats international law as part 
of municipal law, particularly with reference to customary international 
law. The averment of the Court with regard to this needs reference.48 The 
Court stated, “[t]wo questions arise, first, whether international law is, of 
its own force, drawn into the law of the land without the aid of a municipal 
42 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783.
43 Id.
44 In re the Berubari Union and Exch. of Enclaves, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 250 (India).
45 Id. at 16.
46 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783 concluding that “[t]he decision 
to implement the Award by exchange of letters, treating the Award as an operative 
treaty after the boundary has been marked in this area, is within the competence 
of the Executive wing of Government and no Constitutional amendment is 
necessary”. 
47 Gramophone Co. of India v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667 
(India). 
48 Agrawal, supra note 35.
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statute and, second, whether so drawn, it overrides municipal law in case 
of conflict.”49 The court, however, noted that “[t]he doctrine of incorpo-
ration also recognises the position that the rules of international law are 
incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the national 
law, unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament.”50 The Court 
concluded that the national courts would endorse international law but 
not if it conflicts with national law.51
Although the Indian Supreme Court was trifle ambivalent in Gramo-
phone about the application of the incorporation doctrine, it took more 
than a decade for it to conclusively speak in its favour. In Vishaka v. State 
of Rajasthan, the Court, inter alia, stated that any international conven-
tion not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with 
its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and 
content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee.52
The Court, in fact, went a step ahead and formulated certain basic 
principles and guidelines based on available international instruments. 
According to the Court:
In … the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforce-
ment of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee 
against sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against 
sexual harassment at work places, we lay down the guidelines and 
norms specified hereinafter for due observance…until a legislation 
is enacted for the purpose.53
The Indian courts have usually attempted to balance their approach to-
wards both transformation and incorporation doctrines. In other words, 
the courts have always looked for a more harmonious construction of the 
provisions to be inclusive of international law. The Indian Supreme Court 
has consistently referred to more holistic and harmonious interpretation of 
international and municipal law, especially in the event of conflict. While 
acceding to the primacy of municipal law to international law in the event 
of inevitable conflict, it had been advocating for a more harmonious inter-
49 Gramophone Co. of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667, 671.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 673.
52 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).
53 Id.¶ 16.
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pretation. This approach was outlined in Maganbhai itself when the Court 
stated that “if there is any deficiency in the Constitutional system it has to 
be removed and the State must equip itself with the necessary power.”54 In 
another case, the Court noted:
[I]f there be a conflict between the municipal law on one side and 
the international law or the provisions of any treaty obligations 
on the other, the courts would give effect to municipal law. If, 
however, two constructions of the municipal law are possible, the 
courts should lean in favour of adopting such construction as would 
make the provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony with 
the international law or treaty obligations.55
The Indian constitutional scheme is essentially based on transformation 
doctrine. Article 253 read with Article 73, and Article 246 provides this 
basis.56 Article 51, as embodied in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, ap-
pears to be more aspirational and provides guidance to the construction 
of law and policy.57 However, as examined above, the Courts have been 
dealing with several cases outlining the relationship between international 
and municipal law in different contexts. In the initial years of India’s 
post-independent era, these cases predictably concerned with boundary 
and related issues. In the last two decades, the issues dealt by the courts 
have moved into newer areas such as international environment law and 
international trade law. There appears to be a change in the approach of 
the Courts as well as in dealing with some of these issues in the context 
of international law. We shall attempt to examine some of these in the 
next section. 
3.   CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHANGING PERCEPTIONS
A survey of cases dealt with by the Indian higher judiciary concerning in-
ternational law during the last five decades shows that there is a consistent 
54 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783.
55 A.D.M. Jabalpur v. S. S. Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (India). 
56 India Const. arts. 73, 253, 246.
57 Id. art. 51. 
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emphasis on transformation doctrine.58 Although in some cases, courts 
had shown some inclination to transit from transformation to incorpora-
tion doctrine particularly with regard to the application of customary 
international law, that was, however, subject to the adherence to basic 
constitutional guarantees.
As noted earlier, in Vishaka the Supreme Court was ready to accept any 
international convention not inconsistent with fundamental rights and in 
harmony with its spirit and to promote the object of constitutional guaran-
tee.59 The situation, however, would differ if a domestic norm conflicts with 
customary norm of international law. In such a scenario, the Indian courts 
have been suggesting many conciliatory approaches while maintaining that 
domestic law would prevail in case of a clear conflict. These conciliatory 
approaches are in the form of conflict-free interpretations of domestic 
law. The effort would be to not read conflict into the interpretations of the 
domestic law and to look for a harmonious interpretation. As mentioned 
in Maganbhai, “if there is any deficiency in the constitutional system it has 
to be removed and the State must equip itself with the necessary power.”60
The Indian Supreme Court had noted these changing perceptions that 
had taken place in other jurisdictions in its 1984 Gramophone decision 
itself.61 In this decision, the Court had gone on to examine the practices 
in the courts of United Kingdom and France.62 Referring to 1977 Trend-
tex decision of the Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom, the Indian 
Supreme Court in Gramophone had noted that Lord Denning, who had 
once accepted the transformation doctrine without question, later veered 
round to express a preference for the doctrine of incorporation and ex-
58 See Midnapore Zamindary Co. v. Province of Bengal,(1949) F.C.R. 309 (India); In 
re the Berubari Union and Exch. of Enclaves, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 250; Ram Kishore 
Sen v. Union of India,A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 644 (India); Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, 
A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783; Rev. Mons. Sebastiao Fransisco Xavier dos RemediosMonteiro 
v. State of Goa,A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 329 (India); Jabalpur, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207; Jolly 
George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470 (India); Gramophone 
Co. of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667; see also Shaw, supra note 41.
59 Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
60 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783.
61 Gramophone Co. of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667.
62 Id. at 672, 691.
76 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
plained how courts were justified in applying modern rules of international 
law when old rules of international law changed.63 Trendtex also referred 
to the changing nature of international law and the specific problems of 
ascertaining it.64 It also noted that this process created difficulties “in the 
way of adopting, or incorporating, or recognising as already incorporated, 
a new rule of international law.”65
The above difficulties of identifying and applying international law, 
specifically customary international law, exist within the Indian courts as 
well. There is also a notable change in the process and the mechanism of 
international law-making and the evolution of an international legal norm 
at the global level. The time lag for a norm to evolve and the concurrent 
State practice that is required to provide consistency to norm creation has 
also now transformed and considerably shortened. The subject matters that 
are being dealt with by international law are also now wide-ranging. The 
impact of international law on domestic laws, particularly with regard to 
implementation is a real issue.66 The Indian Supreme Court in several of 
the cases during the last two decades had to deal with these fast-changing 
63 Id. at 691; See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 
356 at 365 (Eng.). 
64 Trendtex Trading Corp., 2 W.L.R. 356 at 379.
65 Id.
66 Various implementing legislation that are required in the context of the 
Agreements under the auspices of World Trade Organization (WTO) is a case in 
point. India, like other member countries of WTO, is also at different stages of 
implementation by changing, amending or making new domestic laws. Similar 
examples emerge from various binding resolutions passed by the United Nations 
Security Council concerning International Terrorism. India, in a statement 
made to the Sixth Committee of the United Nations on the topic “Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism,” G.A. Res. 66/105, U.N. Doc. A/RES 66/105 
(Jan. 13, 2012), informed that it had also amended and strengthened its domestic 
legislation entitled Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, No. 37 of 1967, India Code (1967), integrating the sanctions 
regime of the Al Qaida Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolutions 
1267 and 1989. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 
1989, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011). India also noted that its amended 
domestic law incorporated provisions dealing with all aspects of terrorism 
including conspiracy and incitement to terrorism. See U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 
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and evolving international legal norms.67 Some of these areas are related 
to environment, human rights, international trade, maritime issues, ex-
tradition and terrorism. 
It was in Vellore Citizens that the Supreme Court had no hesitation in 
holding aspects relating to sustainable development as part of customary 
international law and consider them as part of domestic law.68 Once these 
principles were accepted as part of customary international law, the Court 
concluded, that there would be no difficulty in accepting them as part of 
1st mtg. Agenda Item 109, A/C.6/66/SR.1 (Oct. 3, 2011) available at https://www.
pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/37496ind1912.pdf. 
67 Some of the notable cases surveyed include the following: Vellore Citizens Welfare 
Forum v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2715 (India), dealt with environment-
related issues; A.P. Pollution Control Bd. v. M.V. Nayudu, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 812 
(India), dealt with issues relating to environmental degradation; the second case 
was decided in 2001, A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. M.V. Nayudu, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 
62 (India); M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath,(1997)1 S.C.C. 388 (India),laid down the 
basics of “Public Trust doctrine”; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 
(2000) 10 S.C.C. 664 (India), dealt with environment and rehabilitation issues; 
G. Bassi Reddy v. Int’l Crop Research Inst., (2003) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India),was about 
implementation through domestic legislation the UN Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities; N.D. Jayal v. Union of India,A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 867 (India), about 
the safety and environmental aspects of Tehri dam; Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh 
Samiti, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1834 (India), concerned laying down pipelines through 
a sanctuary; People’s Union of Civil Liberties,A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 456 (India), dealt 
with issues concerning terrorism; see also Madan Singh v. State of Bihar,[2004]
I.N.S.C.225 (India), on terrorism issues; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, 
A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1107 (India),challenged Indian Bilateral Taxation and Investment 
Agreement with Mauritius; see Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India,A.I.R. 
2005 S.C. 2920 (India), about illegal migrants and issues concerning aggression; 
Karnataka Industrial Areas Dev. Bd. v. C. Kenchappa, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 2038 
(India), was about environmental degradation and its consequences; Intellectual 
Forum v. State of A.P., (2006) 3 S.C.C. 549 (India), reiterated the “Public Trust 
doctrine”; Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 5 S.C.C. 634 (India),dealt with 
extradition issues; Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Indus. Ltd. v. Dir. of Income Tax, 
Mumbai, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 481 (India), examined Double Taxation Agreements and 
this followed by DIT (International Taxation); Mumbai v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
(2007) 7 S.C.C. 1 (India), on double taxation agreements.
68 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2715. 
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domestic law.69 Referring to the “precautionary principle” and the “polluter 
pays principle” the Court regarded them as part of the environmental law of 
the country noting that these principles were accepted as part of customary 
international law.70 However, the Court was not ready to grant a blanket 
primacy to customary international law and that was clear when the court 
noted that “…[i]t is almost accepted proposition of law that the rules of 
Customary International Law which are not contrary to the municipal law 
shall be deemed to have been incorporated in the domestic law and shall 
be followed by the Courts of Law.”71
In other words, the rules of customary international law that are not 
contrary to the municipal law would pass the muster, not otherwise. It took 
more than a decade for the Supreme Court to lay down some of the basic 
principles relating to the acceptance of customary international law as part 
of domestic law. This was done in M/s Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. 
v. M/s Super Cassette Industries Ltd.72 The main issue before the Court was 
about broadcasting of sound records through various FM radio stations 
without a valid license and payment of royalty.73 Appellants had asked for 
the issuance of compulsory license under Section 31 of the Indian Copy-
right Act.74 One of the main issues was also related to India’s obligations 
under various copyright-related international conventions.75 Examining 
both the domestic copyright law and also international conventions, the 
Court noted that the interpretation of a statute could not remain static.76 
The Court further noted that:
While India is a signatory to the International Covenants, the law 
should have been amended in terms thereof. If the ground realities 
changed, the interpretation should also change. Ground realities 




72 M/s Entm’t Network (India) Ltd. v. M/s Super Cassette Indus. Ltd., 2008 (9) 
S.C.A.L.E. 69 (India).
73 Id.
74 Id.; The Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India).
75 M/s Entm’t Network Ltd., 2008 (9) S.C.A.L.E. 69.
76 Id.
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societal conditions vis-à-vis the use of sound recording exten-
sively by a large public, but also keeping in view of the fact that 
the Government with its eyes wide open have become a signatory 
to International Conventions.77
The court moved a step further and sought to outline the role of interna-
tional law in the domestic legal sphere.78 These were - (a) as a means of in-
terpretation; (b) justification or fortification of stand taken; (c) to fulfill the 
spirit of international obligation which India has entered into, when they 
are not in conflict with existing domestic law; (d) to reflect international 
changes and reflect the wider civilization; (e) to provide a relief contained 
in a covenant, but not in a national law; and (f) to fill gaps in law.79 
While not conceding entirely the primacy of domestic law to inter-
national law in case of conflict, the Supreme Court was ready to accord 
maximum space to those international conventions that have been negoti-
ated, taking into account different societal conditions in different countries 
by laying down minimum norms. The Court was even prepared to follow 
those international conventions to which India was not a party, provided 
the norms emanating from those conventions were followed as part of an 
enactment or a Parliamentary statute or by way of an amendment to the 
existing enactment. 
In Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. v. Union of India,80 the Supreme 
Court had to consider the obligations created by the United Nations Con-
vention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)81 vis-à-vis its compatibility with the 
Maritime Zones Act, 1976,82 Customs Act, 1962,83 and the Customs Tariff 
Act, 1975.84 In fact, Indian domestic law was enacted much before the 
conclusion of the UNCLOS, 1982. Referring to earlier cases on the subject, 




80 Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. v. Union of India, 2008 (6) S.C.A.L.E. 128 (India).
81 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
82 The Maritime Zones of India Act, 1981, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1981 (India). 
83 The Customs Act, 1962, No. 52, Acts of Parliament, 1962 (India). 
84 The Customs Tariff Act, 1975, No. 51, Acts of Parliament, 1975 (India).
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the treaties/conventions can be looked into and enforced if they are not in 
conflict with the municipal law.”85
To sum up, the Indian Supreme Court is prepared to take into account 
customary international law and all the related interpretations as part of 
its law of the land as long as it does not conflict with any domestic law. 
In the absence of a clear legislation or an enactment, the touchstone of 
consistency lies within the constitutional guarantees. As long as the in-
ternational treaties and customary norms are broadly consistent with the 
basic structures of the Constitution, the Indian courts have no hesitation 
in applying these international legal norms. As regards the applicability 
of customary international law, the Indian Supreme Court continues to 
follow primarily transformation doctrine with some occasional tilt towards 
incorporation doctrine. 
4.   FUTURE TRENDS
Considering the operational complexities of various global regimes in 
several sectors and their impact on the structures of the Indian legal 
framework in recent years, it is inevitable that the Indian courts moved 
away from the doctrinal discourse concerning the implementation of in-
ternational law. Some recent decisions by the Indian Supreme Court had to 
deal with complex legal and technical issues in the realm of international 
law. Though doctrinal discourse is important for the domestic courts, the 
inevitability of applying `foreign’ element of a national or international 
legal aspect is real. It is pertinent to note that all of these cases in the Indian 
context, perhaps many more, do not refer to international legal norms per 
se. However, these cases involve some foreign legal and factual elements. 
The Indian courts seem to be comfortable dealing with them through 
available domestic legal formulations with the sprinkling of some aspects 
of international law. 
First, Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India86 raised 
complex array of facts with particular reference to corporate structures both 
within and outside India. In this case, the Indian Income-tax department 
had raised a tax demand on an overseas transaction concerning Indian 
85 Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd., 2008 (6) S.C.A.L.E. 128.
86 Vodafone Int’l Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 S.C.C. 613(India). 
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assets which had resulted in huge capital gain for one of the companies.87 In 
this case, the Supreme Court did not go into any of the basic international 
legal issues although the case had substantial foreign element in terms of 
investment issues, chain of command, structure and operation of some off 
shore and Indian companies.88 The decision, besides referring to and map-
ping complex structure of holding companies, made references to foreign 
direct investment and its impact on India.89 It also to an extent referred to 
the flow of foreign direct investment based on certain parameters by com-
panies.90 The case dealt with corporate governance, regulatory framework 
and its impact on Indian law.91
Republic of Italy v. Union of India92, was about the killing of two In-
dian fishermen off the coast of Kerala by two Italian Marines while on 
duty on an Italian ship who mistook them for pirates.93 These marines 
were arrested by Kerala State police.94 The matter went before both the 
High Court of Kerala and later to the Indian Supreme Court. The main 
contention before these Courts, including the Indian Supreme Court was 
that the State of Kerala being a federal unit had no jurisdiction to try the 
case.95 Italy argued before the Indian Supreme Court that taking into ac-
count the existing international legal principles the matter was essentially 
to be dealt with by two sovereign States.96 It was argued before the Court 
stating that “determination of international disputes and responsibilities 
as well as proceedings connected therewith, must necessarily be between 
87 Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
88 Id. ¶ 127.
89 Id. ¶ 68.
90 Id. ¶ 73.
91 Id. ¶ 47.
92 Republic of Italy v. Union of India, (2013) 4 S.C.C. 721 (India).
93 This incident happened at a distance of 20.5 nautical miles within the Indian Sea, 
i.e., within the contiguous zone. Id. ¶ 2.
94 Id.
95 Id. ¶ 20.
96 Id. ¶ 15.
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the Sovereign Governments of the two countries and not constituent ele-
ments of a Federal Structure.”97
The arrest of two Italian Marines for their act of shooting was regarded 
as violating customary international law.98 References were also made to 
the Principles of International Comity and Sovereign Equality amongst 
States with specific reference to Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter.99 The other important issue 
related to the determination of relationship between Indian Territorial 
Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime 
Zones Act, 1976 (Maritime Zones Act) and the United Nations Conven-
tion on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).100 The Maritime Zones Act, 1976 was 
enacted prior to the adoption of UNCLOS. Accordingly, it was argued 
that there was no harmony between the two.101Several key provisions of 
the Maritime Zones Act and the UNCLOS such as, for example, right of 
innocent passage, the rights of the coastal state in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone area, issues and measures taken to combat piracy both at the global 
and local level have all been discussed.102
The Court referring to Maganbhai and Gramophone decisions and 
the parameters outlined with regard to the extent of application of inter-
national law in the domestic sphere noted that the Maritime Zones Act 
is in harmony with the UNCLOS.103 Further, the Court noted that “it is 
[a] settled law in India that once a Convention of this kind is ratified, the 
municipal law on similar issues should be construed in harmony with the 
97 Id. ¶ 13.
98  Id. ¶ 14.
99  Id. 
100  UNCLOS, supra note 81.
101  Republic of Italy, 4 S.C.C. 721.
102  See id.
103  Id. 
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Convention, unless there were express provisions to the contrary.”104 The 
Court further noted 
Conventions, such as these, have not been adopted by legislation, 
the principles incorporated therein, are themselves derived from 
the common law of nations as embodying the felt necessities of 
international trade and are, therefore, a part of the common law 
of India and applicable for the enforcement of maritime claims 
against foreign ships.105
The Supreme Court decided the case of NovartisA.G v. Union of India which 
related to a patent for beta crystalline form of a chemical compound called 
Imatinib Mesylate on the basis of several technical grounds.106 This was 
a therapeutic drug for chronic myeloid leukemia and for certain kinds of 
tumours.107 It was marketed under the name Glivec.108 This patent held 
by Novartis in Switzerland and in other countries was refused grant of 
patent by the Indian Patent Office based on its interpretation of Section 
3(d) of the Indian Patents Act.109 Section 3(d) was included pursuant to an 
amendment to Patents Act in 2005.110 Section 3 of the Indian patent law 
broadly provided what kinds of subject matter that cannot be patented.111 
Section 3(d) was part of this and was more specific to disallow patenting of 
known substances which did not result in the enhancement of the known 
efficacy of the substance. It also disallowed mere discovery of any new 
104  Id. ¶ 34. 
105  Id. ¶ 39.
106 Novartis A.G. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311, ¶3 (India). 
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. ¶ 14.
110 Id. One major reason for introducing this provision was to disallow what has been 
termed as “ever-greening” of patents; Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, 
Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India). 
111 See Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
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property or new use for a known substance or mere use of known process, 
machine or apparatus.112
Novartis which held a patent for Glivec internationally was not happy 
with this provision and took a claim that it was in violation of the Agree-
ment on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)113 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.114 The Supreme 
Court examined in detail the history and evolution of Indian patent law 
and policy since its independence and also outlined the benefits it derived 
for the chemical and pharmaceutical industry.115 The case was, in fact, 
decided more on technical grounds interpreting the making and content 
of the drug. The case peripherally touched the issue of violations of TRIPs 
obligations and also its implementation mechanism.116The Supreme Court 
rejected the grant of patent more on the ground that how different processes 
112 “[T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result 
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery 
of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a 
known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new 
product or employs at least one new reactant. Explanation – For the purpose of 
this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, 
isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of 
known substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ 
significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.” Id. § 3(d). 
113 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
114 Novartis A.G., A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311.
115 Id.
116 This contention relating to TRIPs violation was discussed at length when the 
matter was before the Chennai High Court. The High Court had, however, 
taken the view that they would be bound by the domestic law, not by the TRIPs 
obligations. The Court had further noted that the application and interpretation 
of TRIPs fell outside the scope of its scrutiny. The Court also stated that it is for 
the States concerned to take up this issue at the WTO forum. For them, the Court 
reiterated, what mattered most was the domestic law on the subject. Novartis A.G., 
A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311.
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could produce Imatinib Mesylate.117 The Court sent back the case to Indian 
Patent Office for a fresh review and examination.118
The above three decisions by the Supreme Court of India, though 
discussed briefly, show that foreign elements come in the form of transna-
tional location of parties and the international dimensions of the subject 
matter of the cases. Vodafone119 traverses between tax and investment is-
sues. Substantial part of this decision attempts to explain the structure of 
several national and international companies that hold shares and as to 
how they seek to control the entire offshore transaction without attract-
ing any tax liability.120This also explains in a way how global corporate 
structures operate across several jurisdictions without violating any of 
the respective domestic laws. The decision also reflects as to how Indian 
courts could deal with such issues. 
Italian Marines121case has more direct references to implementation of 
a multilateral convention like UNCLOS and other related United Nations 
Conventions. The consistency of the Indian Maritime Zones Act, 1976, 
with the provisions of UNCLOS is also a crucial issue. Novartis case, like 
Vodafone, has both national and international dimensions.122Major part 
of the decision outlines the historical account of the Indian patent system 
and its policy options.123 This historical aspect of patents is examined by 
the Court while examining the relevancy of Section 3(d) provision in the 
Indian context.124 Technical aspects and interpretations of the subject mat-
117 Novartis A.G., A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311,¶ 157.
118 Id. ¶¶ 195-96.
119 Vodafone Int’l Holdings B.V.,6 S.C.C. 613.
120 Id.
121 Republic of Italy, 4 S.C.C. 721.
122 Novartis A.G., A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 1311.
123 Id. ¶¶ 26-30.
124 Id.
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ter take precedence over the more general aspect relating to Section 3(d) 
compatibility with TRIPs obligations and other related issues. 
5.   CONCLUSIONS
Indian courts in recent times have been taking recourse to international 
law frequently. Sometimes they would use international legal norms as a 
tool to meet the ends of justice when domestic law is of no help. In many 
other cases, the very nature of disputes would require them to apply in-
ternational legal norms. The scope of definition of international law needs 
to be broadened to include not only traditional areas, but also any foreign 
legal element that may need interpretation or application. Domestic courts 
usually do not apply international law directly. They would look for an 
implementing legislation to give effect to international law. This approach 
is based on the transformation doctrine. 
A majority of the States, including India, apply this doctrine. The 
doctrine of incorporation accepts international law as part of the law of the 
land. United Kingdom and many other jurisdictions prefer to apply inter-
national law directly. In the Indian context, there appears to be an effort to 
move from the transformation to incorporation doctrine. In Gramophone, 
Vishaka and later by M/s Entertainment Network (India) Ltd., Italian Ma-
rine cases, the Indian Supreme Court seem to transit from transformation 
to incorporation doctrine.125 These developments relating to the content, 
form and mode of reception of international law into India’s domestic legal 
space span almost three decades and more. In recent times, the Courts, 
particularly the Indian Supreme court appears to be more comfortable 
with the application of international legal norms in the absence of clear 
domestic law on the subject. 
In order to understand the evolutionary trajectory of the Indian ap-
proach it is crucial to understand the relationship between Articles 51, 73, 
and 253 of the Constitution. These provisions are read in conjunction with 
Article 246 which seeks to authorize the executive to enter into treaties 
and agreements. This relationship between these Articles of the Constitu-
tion has been examined in various cases of the Supreme Court from time 
to time. Maganbhai, Gramophone, Vishaka, Intellectual Forum, and M/s 
125 Gramophone Co. of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667; Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
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Entertainment Network Ltd are some of the key cases that deal with and 
interpret the Indian constitutional scheme.126 At the same time, these cases 
also deal with how courts would deal with the application of customary 
international law. There is one view that customary international law which 
is not inconsistent with the Indian Constitution could be applied directly. 
As we have seen in the study, Indian courts have been taking a cautious 
approach to directly implement customary norms. As long as these cus-
tomary norms are not in conflict with any domestic law or that they are 
consistent with the basic structures of the Constitution, the courts have 
found no difficulty in applying these norms directly.
In recent years, Indian courts are moving towards more specialized 
areas of international law. As shown in the study, through three impor-
tant cases of Vodafone, Novartis and Italian Marines, the courts have 
been examining and applying specialized and complex areas in the field 
of international trade and economic law, including intellectual property 
rights, international environmental law and natural resources law. Areas 
for regulation and application of subject matters are increasingly becom-
ing complex and technical. 
The courts will have to eventually specialize in applying complex issues 
of international law. With the development of technology and other related 
areas, several complex issues would arise and require specialized attention 
of the courts in applying international legal norms. It would, therefore, be 
essential for the Indian Courts to be responsive to the evolution of norms 
within the context of global legal framework and the judiciary. In this sense, 
Indian courts, as of now, should be regarded as conservative and tend to 
be cautious. However, that may not be possible in the future. While Lord 
Denning was ready to change his stance from the transformation to the 
incorporation doctrine to accommodate quickly to the changing nature 
of international law in his Trendtex decision127 (as quoted in Gramophone), 
the Indian courts and perhaps the Asian courts should exhibit flexibility 
to accommodate evolving and increasingly changing normative structures 
of international law. 
126 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 783; Gramophone Co. of India, 
A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 667; Vishaka, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011; Intellectual Forum, 3 S.C.C. 
549; M/s Entm’t Network (India) Ltd., 2008 (9) S.C.A.L.E. 69.
127 Trendtex Trading Corp., 2 W.L.R. 356.
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In 1901, at the brink of the establishment of a civil government in the 
Philippines, the present Supreme Court of the Philippines was born. Under 
American influence, the Philippine Commission instituted a new system 
modeled after the judicial system of the United States. Judicial powers of 
government were vested in the Supreme Court and other inferior courts, 
and the Court was entrusted with the power to issue writs and hear con-
troversies brought before it.2 
In the same year, one of the very first potential interfaces between 
international law and municipal law in the country could have happened. 
The Court was asked to rule on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus in In re the Application of John W. Calloway for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus.3 Justice Willard wrote that, at that time, no judge was 
1 S.J.D. Candidate (Grotius Fellow), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Professor 
of Law, Ateneo de Manila University School of Law; Professorial Lecturer of Public 
International Law, Far Eastern University Institute of Law; Senior Lecturer of 
Public International Law, Miriam College; Legal Adviser, Commission on Human 
Rights of the Philippines.
2 Institute of Developing Economies, The Philippine Judicial System 3 
(Raul C. Pangalangan ed., 2001).
3 In re the Application of John W. Calloway for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, G.R. No. 
456 (S.C., Aug. 28, 1901) (Phil.).
Temprosa: International Law in the Philippine Court 89
conferred with an authority to issue such a writ, and thus, the writ pre-
viously issued to free Calloway, who was arrested by virtue of military 
orders, was repealed.4 This started the inexorable march of international 
law jurisprudence into domestic law.
Years later, during the 1940s, the Court cited international law in a 
decision involving the freedom and detention of Filipinos who were dis-
placed from their homes by the United States military. In Raquiza v. Brad-
ford, decided in 1945—proximate in time to the Second World War—the 
Court, in further justifying their detention, said that the Filipinos might 
be considered as prisoners of war.5 It reasoned:
In volume II, Hyde International Law, page 345, section 676, we 
read:
It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the 
course of any operation in any locality . . . may also avail itself, 
of the right to make civilians prisoners of war.
The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contains circum-
stances under which civilians may be considered as prisoners of war. This 
enumeration includes:
(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the 
hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil officials, 
diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. . . . (Emphasis added)
We think that the petitioners would, prima facie, qualify as 
prisoners of war under the charges of “Espionage activity for 
Japanese,” “Active collaboration with the Japanese,” and “Active 
collaboration with the enemy.”6
There is a confluence of international law and municipal law on the bed of 
the Philippine judicial system. There have been ripples in this movement be-
fore. But increasingly, through the years, the Philippine Court has referred 
to international law—and have decided upon questions of international 
law—on many and different occasions, forming strong currents of disjoint 
and opposition at times. These movements give rise to implications, as well 
as questions on the application and operation of international law in the 
domestic courts of the Philippines. 
4 Id.
5 Raquiza v. Bradford, G.R. No. L-44, 75 Phil. Rep. 50 (S.C., Sept. 13, 1945) (Phil.). 
6 Charles Hyde, International Law Volume II 345 §676 (2nd ed. 1945).
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This article seeks to provide an overview of such application and opera-
tion of international law in the Philippine domestic court. In so doing, it 
lays down a baseline study on how the court has dealt with international 
law through cases until 2010. In particular, this article articulates a few 
observations on the Philippine Court’s interpretation of international trea-
ties, treatment and application of customary international law, including 
the nature of its application, its definition and interpretation in the local 
setting, the impact of international legal norms on the development of the 
domestic law, and as a special case, the interpretation of international hu-
man rights norms in light of domestic constitutional rules. However, this 
article by no means presents itself as a comprehensive treatise on the matter. 
Before answering those questions, the Philippine legal system and its 
judiciary must be discussed. This is crucial because the legal system of the 
Philippines stands unique in its own way, and it is against this backdrop 
that international law has operated. The judiciary, as an equally unique 
agent of the government, is the situs of the judge who decides on the ap-
plication or non-application of international law. 
2. THE BACKDROP AND AGENT OF THE (NON)APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PHILIPPINE COURTS
a.   A Hybrid Legal System
Due to its colonial history, the Philippines has an unusual admixture 
in its legal system. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State 
with a mixed civil and common law tradition. Primarily, Philippine law 
is based on the Spanish civil legal tradition. It has been, however, heavily 
influenced by the United States’ common law tradition, while Shari’ah law 
(personal law) applies to Muslims.7 The Philippines acquired the common 
law system from the United States, and the civil law system from Spain.8 
This resulted in the current hybrid system, but it is still largely rooted in 
the civil law tradition. 
7 Soliman M. Santos, Common Law Elements in the Philippine Mixed Legal System, 
2 Australian Journal of Asian Law 34 (2000).
8 Miriam Defensor-Santiago, International Law: With Philippine Cases 
and Materials, and ASEAN Instruments 31 (1999).
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Villanueva has opined that because of the mixed legal traditions, the 
Philippine legal system bears the underlying philosophies of the principle 
of stare decisis of the common law system, and the evolving principles of 
judicial precedents of the civil law system.9 As background, he writes that 
the Philippines has been subjugated, Christianized, and governed by Spain 
for more than 350 years until the end of the 19th century, and then further 
subjected to four decades of American domination.10 This blend of diverse 
cultures causes a unique hybrid legal scenario. The geographic location of 
the Philippines largely contributes to this uniqueness because the nation 
lies strategically as the gateway to and from Southeast Asia into the Pacific 
Ocean.11 The legal system is full of “elasticity and progressiveness” as the 
two great western legal systems confluence.12 
Others have regarded the amalgam as having a unique blend of not 
only civil law (Roman) and common law (Anglo-American), but also of 
Muslim (Islamic) and indigenous law.13 This is due to the presence, as stated 
above, of Shari’ah law in the system and some form or recognition of in-
digenous justice.14 Also, there had been desire to refashion the Philippine 
legal system to conform to the Filipino way and to make it responsive to 
the nation’s needs.15 Additionally, just as other developing countries, the 
9 Cesar Lapuz Villanueva, A Comparative Study of the Judicial Role and its Effect 
on the Theory on Judicial Precedents in the Philippine Hybrid Legal Systems, 65 
Philippine Law Journal 42, 45 (1990).
10 Id. at 42 (citing Pascual, The Legal System of the Philippines 7 (1970)).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Milagros Santos-Ong, Part 2: Philippine Legal Information Resources and Citations, 
Hauser Global Law School Program (Mar. 2015), http://www.nyulawglobal.
org/globalex/philippines1_part2.htm#Aviii2.
14 See The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, Rep. Act No. 8371, § 15, (Oct. 29, 1997) 
(Phil.) (“Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions and Peace Building 
Processes.- The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted 
justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or 
mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective 
communities and as may be compatible with the national legal system and with 
internationally recognized human rights.”). 
15 Villanueva, supra note 9, at 43.
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Philippines faces the challenge of developing its legal system into a more 
logical and structurally coherent one that is responsive to the complex 
needs of its diverse society.16 In all these, there was, however, a warning 
by Laurel in the 1930s of great confusion as the “cross-breeding of the 
Castilian lion and the American eagle had resulted in the evil birth of a 
phenomenal creature.”17 
As far as international law and its application in Philippine courts are 
concerned, Defensor-Santiago confirms that the unusual admixture in the 
legal system leads to the present constitutional provision that relates to 
international law.18 This constitutional provision, as discussed below (see, 
discussion infra Part 4.b), directly prescribes the relation between domestic 
law and international law. This bears an impact on how the courts have 
perceived international law and has applied the same. Feliciano makes a 
legal theory that Philippine internal or civil law is a formally complete 
system so that it enjoins the use of alternative bases for legal decisions 
(i.e., customary law and general principles of law). In short, there is no 
problem of non-liquet in internal law.19 There is always a rule or standard 
that applies to every controversy. 
b.   The ‘Gatekeeper’ Judiciary and Cases on International Law
A judicial system already existed in the Philippines prior to the Spanish 
conquest of the Philippines.20 During the Spanish rule, courts consisted of 
superior courts and inferior or lower courts. Appointments to the superior 
courts or Audencia were made by the King through a royal decree. Usually, 
the Governor General, who was the presiding officer, was given the power 
to appoint judges of lower courts and even to fill in the Audencia.21As pre-
16 Id.
17 Id. at 42-43 (citing Laurel, Assertive Nationalism 80 (1931)).
18 Defensor-Santiago, supra note 8.
19 Florentino Feliciano, On the Functions of Judicial Review and the Doctrine of 
Political Questions, 39 Philippine Law Journal 444, 455 (1964) (citing Civil 
Code, § 9-11, Rep. Act 386 (Phil.)).
20 Institute of Developing Economies, supra note 2, at 1.
21 Id. at 2 (citing Jose R. Bengson, The Philippine Judicial System 6).
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viously mentioned, the present judicial system was organized and formed 
with the advent of the American period. Changes occurred years after.
At present, under the regime of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power 
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be es-
tablished by law. This power includes “the duty of the courts of justice to 
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable 
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave 
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part 
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”22 Congress has the 
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of courts, but may 
not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over certain cases.23 One of 
those powers directly relates to international law: the power to review on 
appeal or certiorari, as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judg-
ments and orders of lower courts in cases in which the constitutionality or 
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement is in question.24 
What comes out of this is the natural predisposition of the Court to 
uphold the Constitution above all. It is the ultimate litmus test of the valid-
ity of an act, such as a treaty. It is but natural since as a domestic court, it 
applies—first, foremost, and solely in many times—domestic law. 
The high court already held this power of judicial review even before 
the 1987 Constitution; the 1935 Constitution had authorized the court to 
review all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, 
ordinance or executive order, or regulation was in question.25 Feliciano 
refers to judicial review as the “assaying by a court,” in an appropriate case, 
of the constitutional quality of a legislative or executive act.26 He suggests 
that at least three functions are performed by the Supreme Court in judi-
cial review: the checking function, the legitimating or validating function, 
and the symbolic or educational function.27 The first, namely, the checking 
function, is to read the constitutional map and to allocate the constitutional 
22 Const. (1987), art. VIII, sec. 1 (Phil.).
23 Id. art. VIII, sec. 2.
24 Id. art. VIII, sec. 5(2)(a).
25 Const. (1935), art. VIII, sec. 2(1) (Phil.).
26 Feliciano, supra note 19, at 444.
27 Id.
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authority among major structures of the government.28 The second, namely 
the legitimating or validating function, indicates that the courts’ sustain-
ing of an act or refraining from ruling on it, is equivalent to legitimating 
the act. Of course, the court’s power involves the power to reject the act 
as illegitimate.29 The third, namely the symbolic or educational function, 
happens when the Supreme Court discharges the parameters of when the 
court acts as the “pronouncer and guardian” of the more fundamental 
values that the community seeks.30 
In the realm of foreign relations, Bernas notes that most framers of 
the 1935 Constitution worked from the perspective of what they know of 
foreign relations in the United States.31 They captured the essence of the 
allocation of foreign relations powers from the American perspective.32 
Foreign relations are thus conducted by political departments, Congress 
and the executive President, or through the President’s bureaucracy.33
Does the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, have any role in 
this? Bernas rejoins that the Court has original jurisdiction over cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.34 More im-
portantly, courts can affect the course of foreign involvements through its 
aforementioned power of judicial review.35 When an official act is declared 
unconstitutional (invalid), the impact could be far reaching because the act 
becomes unenforceable in domestic law. Internationally, when it involves a 
treaty, the State is “faced with having an international obligation without 
the possibility of hiding behind an assertion of unconstitutionality.”36 
This is because as we know, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides, in Article 27, that a party may not invoke internal law as a justi-
28 Id.
29 Id. at 448.
30 Id. at 450.
31 Joaquin G. Bernas, Foreign Relations in Constitutional Law 100 (1995).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 122.
34 Id.; see Const. (1987), art. VIII, sec. 5(1) (Phil.).
35 Bernas, supra note 31.
36 Id. 
Temprosa: International Law in the Philippine Court 95
fication for failure to perform a treaty.37 Moreover, Malaya says that when 
the Court decides to act, far-reaching consequences include ordering the 
executive branch to renegotiate an implementing agreement.38
In practice, the Court is most hesitant in nullifying foreign relations 
actions (e.g., concluding treaties and executive agreements).39 People’s Move-
ment for Press Freedom v. Manglapus explained this reticent attitude.40 It 
stated as follows: “[t]he conduct of foreign relations of our Government 
especially the sensitive matter of negotiating a treaty with a foreign govern-
ment is lodged with the political Departments of the government… the 
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of their political powers is 
not subject to judicial inquiry.” 41 
For instance, when called upon to rule on an apparent conflict between 
international and municipal laws, as shown in cases below, the Court has 
tried to harmonize treaties with domestic law in cases of conflict. Some 
scholars argue that this hesitation to render these foreign relations acts as 
invalid or unconstitutional confuses the dichotomy between international 
law and municipal law in jurisprudence. 
In Bayan v. Zamora, the court considered the question of whether the 
constitutional requirement that the treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement 
with the United States, be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting 
state,” has been met.42 To recall, after the expiration in 1991 of the agree-
ment between the Philippines and the United States on military bases, 
foreign military bases, troops or facilities were not allowed in the Philip-
pines except under a treaty duly concurred by the Senate and, when the 
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people 
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty 
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
38 J. Eduardo Malaya, Conflict and Cooperation in the Crafting and Conduct of Foreign 
Policy, 55 Ateneo Law Journal 126, 138 (2010).
39 Bernas, supra note 31, at 123.
40 Peoples Movement for Press Freedom v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 84642 (S.C., Sept. 
13, 1988) (Phil.).
41 Id.
42 Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, 342 S.C.R.A. 449 (Oct. 10, 2000) (Phil.). 
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by the other contracting State.43 The bone of contention was the character 
of the agreement, which was undoubtedly an executive agreement. The 
Supreme Court, however, sustained the executive agreement as a treaty, 
which satisfies the constitutional requirement, citing the definition of treaty 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.44 
Magallona asserts that Bayan transports the meaning of “treaty” to the 
international plane, shifting the paradigm from the law of treaties under the 
Constitution to the law of treaties in objective international law.45 Evident 
from the Constitution is the intent to disallow executive agreements as 
means of concluding agreements on the visit of foreign troops. For Magal-
lona, there was a double shift: (1) the first shift is the interpretation of the 
term “treaty” from its constitutional meaning to its “ordinary” meaning;46 
and (2) the second shift is the transference of the interpretation of the 
concept of “treaty” from the national law to objective international law.47 
There have been spirited dissents on this and other similar cases.48 
Azcuna quotes the strong dissent by Chief Justice Puno which points out 
that the framers of the Constitution precisely wanted to end the “analo-
gous asymmetry” in treaties of the past when the other State signed a mere 
executive agreement.49 He contends that executive agreements are not as 
binding as treaties under international law.50
Nonetheless, the hesitation of the Court is not without legal basis 
since the caution is built into the present Constitution. Bernas states that 
the power of judicial review is extended to the determination of “whether 
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or 
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the 
43 Const. (1987), art. XVIII, sec. 25 (Phil.).
44 Bayan, G.R. No. 138570.
45 Merlin M. Magallona, The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and 
Approaches in Philippine Practice, 85 Philippine Law Journal 1 (2010).
46  Id. at 10.
47  Id.
48 Malaya, supra note 38, at 142.
49 Adolfo S. Azcuna, The Supreme Court and Public International Law, 46 Ateneo 
Law Journal 24, 27 (2001).
50 Id.
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Government.”51 The Court’s description of grave abuse of discretion—for 
example, as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent 
to lack of jurisdiction—narrows down what Bernas calls the “playing room 
for judicial action.” The Court would more likely apply the political ques-
tions doctrine to bar itself from ruling on contentious issues.52 
Additionally, since the final decision on disputes and cases rests upon 
the Court, it holds in its hands the key to determine whether a particular 
rule in international law becomes part of the domestic legal system, thereby 
capable of being applied by the Court. Almost always, the Court refers 
to the Constitution in its determination, particularly the provision that 
directly prescribes the relation between domestic law and international 
law. Evidently, international law per se is rarely, or almost never, directly 
utilized in inferior domestic courts. 
Indeed, the judiciary in the Philippines has played a definitive role 
throughout the years. Laws and jurisprudence since the first Philippine 
Republic are applicable until they are repealed or superseded.53 Under the 
Civil Code of the Philippines, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the 
laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system.54 Scholars 
assert that the courts have a role of creation in society. This creative role 
and the underlying theory on judicial precedents are attributable to five 
factors: (1) the adoption of the American court system; (2) the constitutional 
powers vested in the Supreme Court; (3) the transplant of Anglo-American 
principles in the Philippine legal system; (4) the continuing influence of 
civil law; and (5) the cultural, social, and economic demands of Philip-
pine society.55 These are the factors that influence the Philippine theory 
on judicial precedents.
The judiciary is the passive branch of Philippine government, or the 
least dangerous branch among the three. But, if and when it does act on mat-
ters of foreign affairs, the impact is ample,56 even drastic and disconcerting.
51 Bernas, supra note 31, at 122; see also Const. (1987) art. VIII, sec. 2(1) (Phil.).
52 Bernas, supra note 31, at 123-24.
53 Santos-Ong, supra note 13.
54 Civil Code, § 10, Rep. Act 386, as amended (Phil.).
55 Villanueva, supra note 9, at 45.
56 Malaya, supra note 38, at 141.
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3.   A BRIEF VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES  
IN THE PHILIPPINE COURT THROUGH THE YEARS 
What areas or themes in international law has the Supreme Court dealt 
with, directly or indirectly? In 2001, Azcuna surveyed leading cases de-
cided by the Court from 1945 to 2000 pertaining to international law. Two 
general observations were made: (1) that the Court adopts a situational 
approach of developing the law through a changing factual environment; 
and (2) that primacy is given to the Constitution, with special attention to 
the provision that “the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles 
of international law as part of the law of the land.”57 
Cases cited in this section are not a comprehensive list of decisions 
pertaining to international law during the respective periods below. Rather, 
they are presented only for the purposes of this paper. 
a.   1940s to 1950s
In the 1940s to the early 1950s, decisions had principles, such as the privi-
lege of extraterritoriality of a liberating army, the Hague Resolutions and 
the impact of war on private property, as issues therein. The treatment of 
an alien brought in by the belligerent occupant as a spy was also at issue.58 
It was understandable as the country was then reeling from the effects and 
incidents of the Second World War. These were concerns arising from the 
war. But Azcuna stated that the case of the alien spy paved the way for the 
opening up of international human rights law.59
Lockwood explains that, as might be expected, the Second World War 
opened a Pandora’s Box of legal troubles in the Philippines.60 The Govern-
ment struggled to solve the problems resulting from the war.61 The bench 
was confronted with problems that involved questions of municipal law 
57 Azcuna, supra note 49, at 26 (citing Const. (1987) art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.)).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 L.D. Lockwood, The Philippine Supreme Court and Postwar Problems of 
International Law, 3 Stanford Law Review 3, 3 (1950).
61 Id.
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only, while others involved that of international law.62 The most important 
ones, however, are purely international law questions, a subject which the 
Philippines had little to do with in the past.63 
In Raquiza v. Bradford, the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over 
the United States Army since a foreign army permitted to march through a 
friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government, 
was exempted from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the hosting nation.64 
Dissents argued that the Army was not foreign since the Philippines was 
then under American sovereignty.65 During the Japanese occupation, 
Haw Pia v. China Banking Corporation upheld the confiscation of mov-
ables belonging to the State susceptible of military use or occupation.66 A 
bank was declared as an enemy as it was controlled by enemies of Japan 
and incorporated in a country at war with Japan.67 Dissents opined that 
private property should be protected.68 Contrary to Haw Pia, the Court 
in Lo Ching Y So Sun Chong Co. enunciated the doctrine that a belligerent 
army had no right to confiscate private property in the territory invaded.69
Of particular note at this time is the 1949 case of Koroda v. Jalandoni, 
where the Court declared that the rules and principles of land warfare, 
contained in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, became a part of Philip-
pine law via the incorporation clause in the Constitution.70 Chief Justice 
Moran reasoned that the Constitution was general and extensive, and 
did not confine the recognition of international law rules to only those in 
treaties under which the Philippines is a party.71 
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Raquiza, G.R. No. L-44.
65 Id. (Ozaeta, J., dissenting).
66 Haw Pia v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. L-554, 80 Phil. Rep. 604 (S.C., Apr. 9, 
1948) (Phil.).
67 Id.
68 Id. (Hilado, J. dissenting).
69 Lo Ching Y So Sun Chong Co. v. Tribunal De Apelacion Y El Arzobispo Catolico 
Romano de Manila, G.R. No. L-1337, 81 Phil. Rep. 601 (S.C., Oct. 16, 1948) (Phil.). 
70 Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, 83 Phil. Rep. 171 (S.C., Mar. 26, 1949) 
(Phil.).
71 Id.
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Moreover, in Gibbs v. Rodriguez, the Court noted that decisions of 
municipal tribunals were subsidiary means for the determination of the 
rules of international law, citing Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.72 Courts are organs of the State which generally 
proclaims what it believes international law is. Furthermore, Mejoff v. 
Dir. of Prisons, a landmark habeas corpus case concerning the detention 
of a stateless person, referred, inter alia, to the incorporation clause in the 
1935 Constitution (see below) and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in finding that no one should be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.73 A few years later, however, the Court ruled in 
Inchong v. Hernandez that the Declaration contained nothing more than 
a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and nations.74 
b.   1950s to 1990s
Azcuna describes the Court of this time as charting a course through 
international obligations and national exigencies. An example of national 
importance is the case relating to the nationalization of retail trade. Other 
issues include the recognition of relations with other States, scope of trea-
ties on practice of professions, sovereign immunity from suit of foreign 
States and specialized international agencies, and the interpretation of the 
Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by Air.75
Questions affected trade and commerce. In Inchong, a statute on retail 
trade nationalization was questioned for violation of treaties and interna-
tional obligations, and the Court held that the UN Charter imposed no 
strict or legal obligations with regard to rights and freedoms of international 
actors.76 And, as previously mentioned, the UDHR contained mere recom-
72 Gibbs v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-1494, 84 Phil. Rep. 230 (S.C., Aug. 3, 1949) (Phil.).
73 Mejoff v. Dir. of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2855, 90 Phil. Rep. 70 (S.C., July 30, 1951) 
(Phil.). 
74 Inchong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, 101 Phil. Rep. 1155 (S.C., May 31, 1957) 
(Phil.).
75 Azcuna, supra note 49, at 26-27.
76 Inchong, G.R. No. L-7995.
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mendations or common standards of achievement.77 Gonzales v. Hechanova 
involved rice and corn importation through executive acts and contracts 
with Vietnam and Burma.78 Asaali v. Comm’n of Customs declared that 
customs laws applied to Philippine ships even outside Philippine territory.79 
There were issues on immunity. For example, World Health Org. v. 
Aquino held that where the plea of immunity was recognized and affirmed 
by the executive branch, the Court had to accept the immunity claim.80 It 
would not embarrass the executive. Other cases ruled that immunity from 
suit was inapplicable where a State entered into a contract of commercial 
nature;81 that the doctrine of State immunity from a lawsuit was not ap-
plicable to unauthorized acts for which private responsibility was sought;82 
and that immunity was also inapplicable to private acts.83 
A special note on Int’ l Catholic Migration Comm’n v. Calleja is in 
order.84 Like the case on immunity from local jurisdiction, the Intl’ l 
Catholic Migration Comm’n case determined whether the right of labor to 
petition for certification election was availing alongside claims of diplo-
matic immunity.85 It is also an application of the incorporation clause in 
the Constitution.
In a Memorandum of Agreement with the International Catholic 
Migration Commission (ICMC), the government granted ICMC the sta-
77 Id.
78 Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, 9 S.C.R.A. 230 (S.C., Oct. 22, 1963) 
(Phil.).
79 Aasali v. Comm’r of Customs, G.R. No. L-24170, 26 S.C.R.A. 382 (S.C., Dec. 16, 
1968) (Phil.).
80 World Health Org. v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, 48 S.C.R.A. 242 (S.C., Nov. 29, 
1972) (Phil.).
81 United States v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, 182 S.C.R.A. 644 (S.C., Feb. 26, 1990) 
(Phil.).
82 Shauf v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90314, 191 S.C.R.A. 713 (S.C., Nov. 27, 1990) 
(Phil.).
83 Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97765, 214 S.C.R.A. 242 (S.C., Sept. 24, 
1992) (Phil.).
84 Int’l Catholic Migration Comm’n v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, 190 S.C.R.A. 130 
(S.C., Sept. 28, 1990) (Phil.).
85 Id.
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tus of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and 
immunities.86 The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) supported the 
claim of immunity and held that an order to hold certification election 
violates this immunity.87 The Court ruled that specialized agencies are 
international organizations with functions in particular fields.88 ICMC 
enjoyed immunity as necessitated by its international character and recog-
nized purposes.89 Besides, the labor organizations had recourse to resolve 
disputes with management.90 
According to Magallona, a number of points militate against this. First, 
international organizations characterized as persons in law are intergovern-
mental organizations; the States establishing it in a multilateral treaty com-
prise its membership.91 ICMC, a non-governmental organization although 
international, was not created under international law as an international 
person.92 It is a private corporation composed of individuals.93 Second, it 
is through the Memorandum of Agreement that ICMC acquired its “sta-
tus of a specialized agency” or “similar to that of a specialized agency.”94 
Third, it is intriguing how the government can create a specialized agency 
out of ICMC by means of a Memorandum of Agreement and conjure 
unilaterally its coverage under the Convention on Specialized Agencies.95 
Fourth, despite the pretense that the Philippine government is capable of 
granting the status of specialized agency as well as “diplomatic privileges 
and immunities” by agreement, the problematic Memorandum of Agree-






91 Magallona, supra note 45, at 75.
92 Id. at 76.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 78.
96 Id.
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diplomatic immunity with international immunity were cited,97 such as 
Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration,98 Dep’t of 
Foreign Affairs v. Nat’ l Labor Relations Comm’n,99 and Se. Asian Fisheries 
Dev. Ctr.–Aquatic Dep’t v. Nat’ l Labor Relations Comm’n.100
c.   1990s to 2000s
During this time, according to Azcuma, cases dealt with the environment 
and human rights, and extradition.101 The question of the Visiting Forces 
Agreement with the United States was also at issue. Landmark cases include 
Laguna Lake Dev. Auth. v. Court of Appeals, which held in part as ratio 
that the right to health was a human right.102 Of course, there is the case of 
Oposa v. Factoran on intergenerational responsibility.103 These and other 
cases on the interface of international human rights law with municipal law 
are discussed in more detail in Part 4.d. As for extradition, Sec’y of Justice 
v. Lantion ruled that there was no right to notice and hearing during the 
evaluation stage of an extradition proceeding.104 
Azcuna’s categorization of the periods in which the Supreme Court of 
the Philippines have referred to, or decided upon, certain topics relating to 
international law, is by no means neat and exclusive of other topics within 
each epoch. It, however, provides an overall picture of how the court has 
applied international law given the changing discourses in Philippine 
society through the years. 
97 Id. at 81-85.
98 Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund for Natural Res. Exploration, G.R. Nos. 109095-
109107, 241 S.C.R.A. 681 (S.C., Feb. 23, 1995) (Phil.).
99 Dep’t of Foreign Affairs v. Nat’l Labor Relations Comm’n, G.R. No. 113191, 262 
S.C.R.A. 39 (S.C., Sept. 18, 1996) (Phil.).
100 Se. Asian Fisheries Dev. Ctr.–Aquatic Dep’t v. Nat’l Labor Relations Comm’n, G.R. 
No. 86773, 206 S.C.R.A. 283 (S.C., Feb. 14, 1992) (Phil.).
101 Azcuna, supra note 49.
102 Laguna Lake Dev. Auth. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110120, 231 S.C.R.A. 292 
(S.C., Mar. 16, 1994) (Phil.).
103 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 782 (S.C., July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
104 Sec’y of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 322 S.C.R.A. 160 (S.C., Jan. 18, 2000) 
(Phil.).
104 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
It must be noted that the Court has consistently grappled with the 
questions on the relationship between international law and municipal law 
(including the treatment of customary norms) and treaty interpretation. 
And, these are discussed in Part 4 below.
d.   2000s to 2010
The variety of the topics on international law discussed by the Court took 
on new heights during this decade. There was an increase in the number 
of cases interfacing international human rights law with municipal law (see 
Part 4.d). Likewise, the Court made pronouncements on the ratification of 
treaties and pacta sunt servanda. A case involved the extent of the power 
of the President in pursuing the peace process and other novel questions 
in international law. Questions in miscellany included obligations related 
to corruption and transnational crime, and again, the Visiting Forces 
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Cases dealt with treaty law. In Pimentel v. Exec. Sec’y, petitioners filed 
a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary 
and the DFA to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence 
pursuant to the Constitution.105 It was claimed that ratification of a treaty, 
under both domestic and international law, was a function of the Senate, 
hence it was the duty of the executive to transmit the signed copy to the 
Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. The Court, however, citing the 
President’s role as the sole organ and authority in external relations, said 
that it was not a ministerial duty to transmit the copy.106 Abaya v. Ebdane 
considered a provision in domestic law as embodying the fundamental 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.107 The case involved a loan agreement 
between Japan and the Philippines.108
One case involved a peace agreement and other novel issues in this 
jurisdiction. There were several pronouncements in Province of N. Cotabato 
105 Pimentel v. Exec. Sec’y, G.R. No. 158088, 462 S.C.R.A. 622 (S.C., July 6, 2005) 
(Phil.).
106 Id.
107 Abaya v. Ebdane, G.R. No. 167919, 515 S.C.R.A. 720 (S.C., Feb. 14, 2007) (Phil.).
108 Id.
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v. Gov’t of the Republic of the Phil. Panel which are related to international 
law.109 The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) 
identified as terms of reference, two local statutes (i.e., the Organic Act for 
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples 
Rights Act) and several international law instruments (e.g., ILO Conven-
tion No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous 
Peoples, and the UN Charter).110 The Court however ruled that the MOA-
AD, in its present form, was inconsistent with the Constitution and laws.111
The Court said that the objections against the MOA-AD generally 
focused on the extent of the powers conceded to the Bangsamoro Ju-
ridical Entity (BJE), the entity created under the agreement.112 A general 
idea that unifies the different provisions of the MOA-AD is international 
law’s concept of association. The Court, speaking through Justice Carpio-
Morales, said: 
 The nature of the “associative” relationship may have been in-
tended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Com-
prehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of 
“association” in international law, and the MOA-AD–by its inclu-
sion of international law instruments in its TOR–placed itself in 
an international legal context, that concept of association may be 
brought to bear in understanding the use of the term “associative” 
in the MOA-AD.
  Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed 
when  two  states  of unequal power voluntarily establish durable 
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain 
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its 
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle 
ground between integration and independence.
…
In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement 
has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies 
on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have 
109 Province of N. Cotabato v. Gov’t of the Republic of the Phil. Peace Panel, G.R. No. 
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passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase 
are  Antigua,  St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,  Dominica,  St. Lucia,  St. 
Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.
 Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are 
consistent with the international legal concept of association, spe-
cifically the following: the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic 
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the 
Central Government to ensure the BJE’s participation in meetings 
and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the 
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over exter-
nal defense. Moreover, the BJE’s right to participate in Philippine 
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, 
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to 
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part 
of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments 
of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. gov-
ernment on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
 These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, 
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated 
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.113 (Emphasis 
added)
Moreso, the concept of association is not recognized under the Constitu-
tion, says the Court, for it also implies the recognition of the associated 
entity  as a State.114 The Constitution does not contemplate any State in 
this jurisdiction, except the Philippine State. There is no provision for a 
transitory status towards independence.115 Mere concepts animating the 
agreement, though unsigned, require amendment of the Constitution for 
validity.116 Although the MOA-AD would not amount to an international 
agreement or unilateral declaration which binds the Philippines, the Court 
cautioned that the act of guaranteeing amendments was, by itself, already a 
constitutional violation that rendered the MOA-AD fatally defective.117 The 
aspects of the case on the relation between municipal and international 
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In miscellany, it was held that the control of movement of considerable 
foreign currency across borders was included in the UN Convention against 
Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime.118 In Nicolas v. Romulo, the Visiting Forces Agreement was once 
again questioned, this time as to a non-surrender agreement contained 
therein.119 The Court still sustained the agreement on similar reasons as 
Bayan. Magallona decries Nicolas as it “pursues the defense of the VFA 
by pursuing further the thesis that the United States Government has 
recognized it as a treaty as required by the Constitution.”120 
Vinuya v. Exec. Sec’y, pertained to the issue of whether the State could 
be compelled to espouse the claims of “comfort women” for official apol-
ogy and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International 
Court of Justice and other international tribunals.121 The Court held that 
the Philippines  was not under any international obligation to espouse 
the claims.122 The only means available for individuals to bring a claim 
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able 
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf.123 It 
is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted, but rather, the State’s 
own.124 Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations 
would not alter this.125 
After 2010, the array of questions answered by the Court widened, 
including matters related to the Law of the Sea, non-surrender agree-
ments, and the character of a national society of the Red Cross. Indeed, 
courts moved with the times. The Philippine domestic courts have moved 
from answering questions mainly confined within the laws of war to the 
present-day issues confronting State sovereignty. It is this postmodernity 
that is brought before the Court. Judicial review power has expanded with 
118 Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, G.R. No. 184849 (S.C., 
Feb. 13, 2009) (Phil.).
119 Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 176051, 578 S.C.R.A. 438 (S.C., Feb. 11, 2009) (Phil.).
120 Magallona, supra note 45, at 19.
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the advent of the 1987 Constitution. But, since the 1940s, the backdrop of 
a hybrid legal system has remained the same. 
4.   TREATY INTERPRETATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC LAW  
IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
 As evident in the discussions hitherto, the Court has dealt with ques-
tions on the interpretation of treaties, and the treatment of international 
customary law and international human rights in light of constitutional 
rules in different periods. Further reflections on these are thus in order.
a.   Interpretation of Treaties
Under the Constitution, no treaty or international agreement is valid and 
effective, unless it is concurred by at least two-thirds of the entire Senate.126 
By an act of the legislature, international law norms may be transformed 
into domestic law, or it may determine the specific terms by which treaty 
rules are to be applied or enforced as part of domestic law.127 Therefore, a 
treaty then assumes a double character, namely, as a source of international 
obligations and as domestic law.128 
How does the Court interpret treaties? The words, intent of the parties, 
and the object and purpose of a treaty are crucial. But, jurisprudence holds 
that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the 
text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions.129 
For instance, Senate concurrence on its own does not transform a treaty 
into domestic law if its provisions have not yet entered into force.130 Also, 
126 Const. (1987), art. VII, sec. 21 (Phil.).
127 Merlin M. Magallona, A Primer in International Law in Relation to 
Philippine Law 49 (1997).
128 Id. at 51.
129 Lim v. Exec. Sec’y, G.R. No, 151445 (S.C., Apr. 11, 2002) (Phil.) (“The Convention 
likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which 
it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into 
account alongside the aforesaid context.”).
130 Magallona, supra note 127.
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generally, only the concurrence is required for a treaty to be valid and ef-
fective. Magallona writes that, “the Supreme Court has applied treaties to 
which the Philippines is a party, as self-executing instruments, requiring 
no further prerequisite to their effectivity within Philippine jurisdiction.”131 
This is evident in the Tax Convention with Japan, the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Air Travel (Warsaw Convention), 
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies of the UN.132 It is also possible that a treaty itself may provide 
for its application or enforcement through an enactment of a legislative, 
executive or administrative act.133 Thus, without enactment, the treaty may 
not be enforced in the Philippines.134
Sec’y of Justice v. Lantion lays the rule that all treaties, including the 
Philippines-United States Extradition Treaty,  should be interpreted in 
light of the signatories’ intent.135 The Court stated that nothing less than 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Philippines 
is a party, provided that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”136 Because coun-
tries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to respond to dramatic 
increase in international and transnational crimes, the treaty calls for an 
interpretation that will minimize, if not prevent, the escape of an extradited 
person from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial.137 Withal, 
the Court emphasized that equally compelling factors to consider were 
the understanding of the parties themselves to the treaty and the general 
131 Id.
132 Id. at 54 (citing Marubeni v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 76573, 177 
S.C.R.A. 500 (S.C., Sept. 14, 1989) (Phil.); La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, G.R. 
No. L-63796-97, 129 S.C.R.A. 373 (S.C., May 2, 1984) (Phil.); KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-52153-54 (S.C., Nov. 17, 1980) (Phil.); 
Aquino, 48 S.C.R.A 242).
133 Id. at 55.
134 Id.
135 Lantion, G.R. No. 139465.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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interpretation of the issue by other countries with similar treaties with 
the Philippines.138 The meaning given to treaties by the government de-
partments particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is 
accorded great weight only.
Documents related to a treaty were resorted to aid interpretation. Case 
in point is ABS-CBN v. PMSI, where the Court ruled that “retransmis-
sion” as described in the Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat of the 
Working Committee on Copyright and Related Rights in relation to the 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961 Rome Convention), 
and as defined in the Convention, did not extend to cable retransmission.139
On several occasions, the Court had to rule on the meaning of reciproc-
ity or comity in a treaty regulating the practice of professions. In re Garcia 
held that such a treaty did not apply to a Filipino who seeks to practice his 
profession in the Philippines even if he was allowed by Spain.140 Obviously, 
the Court referred to the intent of the agreement. In a similar manner, the 
Warsaw Convention has been interpreted a few times. One such case is 
Alitalia v. Immediate Appellate Court, holding that the Convention limit-
ing the amount of recoverable damages did not apply where there was a 
special or extraordinary form of injury.141 Hence, it disregarded the literal 
import of the treaty.
The agreements of the Philippines with the United States on military 
bases and troops have been interpreted by the court again and again. In 
1948, Dizon v. Commanding Gen. held that the waiver of jurisdiction of 
courts under the Military Bases Agreement covered the area in question 
in the case.142 Petitioners contended that the General Court Martial had no 
jurisdiction over the alleged offense, which was committed in a place that 
138 Id.
139 ABS-CBN Broad. Corp. v. Phil. Multi-Media Sys., Inc., G.R. Nos. 175769-70 (S.C., 
Jan. 19, 2009) (Phil).
140 In re Petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for Admission to the Phil. Bar Without 
Taking Examination, 2 S.C.R.A. 984 (S.C., Aug. 15, 1961) (Phil.).
141 Alitalia v. Immediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71929, 192 S.C.R.A. 9 (S.C., Dec. 
4, 1990) (Phil.). 
142 Dizon v. Commanding Gen. of the Phil. Ryukus Command, G.R. No. L-2110, 81 
Phil. Rep. 286 (S.C., July 22, 1948) (Phil.).
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was not a base of the US Army within the meaning of the agreement.143 
But, the Court held that the main storage area outside the base qualified 
as a “temporary installation” under the same agreement.144 In Bayan, the 
Court was criticized for transporting the meaning of “treaty” to the inter-
national plane, shifting the paradigm from the law of treaties under the 
Constitution to the law of treaties in objective international law, supra.145 
It was alleged, as above, that Nicolas pursued this defense of the Visiting 
Forces Agreement.146
On the interpretation of treaties to which the Philippines is not a party, 
in Kuroda, the Court applied the Hague Convention on Rules and Regula-
tions Covering Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention even when it 
was not a party thereto.147 The Geneva Convention was signed only later 
on. The action was justified on the theory that the conventions were wholly 
based on the generally accepted principles of international law.
b.   Customary International Law Rules: 
The Incorporation Clause and Monist-Dualist Debate
The treatment and application of customary international law in Philip-
pine domestic law hinge on the question of whether the Philippines is a 
monist or dualist State. 
The first modern Constitution of the Philippines, or the 1899 Con-
stitution, did not contain any explicit reference to international law. The 
so-called ‘constitutionalism’ of international law is traceable to the 1935 
Constitution, which established the Commonwealth of the Philippines 
under American rule. Article II, Section 3 of the said constitution provides 
that, “[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, 
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part 
of the law of the Nation.”148
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Bayan, G.R. No. 138570. 
146 Nicolas, G.R. No. 176051.
147 Kuroda, G.R. No. L-2662.
148 Const. (1935), art. II, sec. 3 (Phil.).
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For our purposes, the second part of the provision is important. De-
sierto posits that the intent in relation to this provision apparently affirms 
the universalist orientation towards fundamental human dignity values 
and the Philippines’ responsible participation in international public order. 
She cites Aruego:
The second part of this declaration of principle --- the adoption 
of the generally accepted principles of international law as a part 
of the law of the Nation --- was borrowed from section 4 of the 
German Constitution and section 7 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Spain. 
The intention of the framers of the Constitution was to incor-
porate expressly into the system of municipal law the principles of 
international law, the observance of which would be necessary to 
the preservation of the family of nations which the Philippines was 
expected to join at the expiration of the Commonwealth period in 
the Tydings-McDuffie Law. 
This provision is a formal declaration of what is considered to 
be the primordial duty of every member of the family of nations, 
namely, to adjust its system of municipal law so as to enforce at 
least within its jurisdiction the generally accepted principles of 
international law.”149
Notably, many cases of international law were decided after the inclusion 
of the above provision in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They quoted 
the provision in detail. For instance, in Kuroda, the Court applied the two 
treaties even when the country was not a party thereto under the justifica-
tion that the two treaties were based on the generally accepted principles 
of international law.150
In the 1987 Constitution, the same tenor was included as Article II, 
Section 2. It reads: “[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of 
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international 
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equal-
ity, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”151 As to the 
149 Diane A. Desierto, A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, 
11 Historia Constitutional 427 (2010) available at  ht tp://w w w.
historiaconstitucional.com/index.php/historiaconstitucional/art icle/
download/277/244.
150 Kuroda, G.R. No. L-2662.
151 Const. (1987), art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.). 
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intent of the framers of the 1987 document, Bernas writes that it is a reit-
eration of both the 1935 and the 1973 constitutions.152 During the debates, 
when asked whether “generally accepted principles of international law” 
was part of statutory law or constitutional law, the sponsor’s answer was 
unclear. Rather, he seemed to suggest that at least provisions of the UN 
Charter were to form part of both constitutional and statutory law. In the 
period of amendment, it was clarified that the principles were to be part 
of statutory law only.153
There are opposing views among scholars as to whether this made the 
Philippines a monist or dualist State. No case law has thus far categorically 
stated the position of the Philippines. Also, another question lingers: What 
does the phrase “generally accepted principles of international law” mean? 
On the one hand, Defensor-Santiago argues that the Philippines is 
a monist State because of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Cases 
decided by the Court usually begin by quoting this provision, and then 
proceeding to apply international law directly, without finding any need 
to search for an enabling act of Congress.154 And, in most cases, the Court 
did not find any difficulty in reconciling international law with national 
law. The consequence is that all treaties have the status of national law. A 
treaty does not need affirming legislation from the Philippine Congress. 
International law is directly applicable in judicial litigation. Another result 
is that international law is equal to national law in the hierarchy of norms. 
In case of conflict, the last in point of time will control.155 In adding sup-
port to her argument, she stated that principle that the law of nations was 
part of the law of the land was adopted in the United States, even before 
the US Constitution was drafted, as it was stated in The Paquete Habana.156 
On the other, Bernas states that the Constitution manifested its adher-
ence to the dualist theory, and at the same time adopted the incorporation 
theory, and thereby made international law part of domestic law with 
152 Joaquin G. Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers 75-76 
(1995).
153 Id.
154 Defensor-Santiago, supra note 8, at 30.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 31; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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regard to customary law and treaties which had become customary law.157 
In the case of treaties as international law, they become part of the law of 
the land when concurred by the Senate in accordance with the Constitu-
tion, thereby transforming a treaty into binding municipal law.158 Thus, 
treaty law and customary international law are placed on the same level as 
statutes passed by the Congress.159 He once added that the provision made 
the Philippines one of the States which make a specific declaration that 
international law also has the force of domestic law. Similar provisions are 
found in the Austrian Constitution, Article 9: “[t]he generally recognized 
rules of international law shall be considered as component parts of the 
Federal Law,” and in Article 25 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany: “[t]he general rules of public international law are an integral 
part of federal law.”160
According to scholars, the provision has caused confusion in jurispru-
dence. Llamzon writes that the elements of international law, which become 
part of Philippine law by incorporation, are not uniformly applied.161 The 
distinction that only customary law “automatically” become part of the 
law of the land is sometimes blurred in some Philippine Supreme Court 
decisions.162 This is because since treaties become part of Philippine law 
only by ratification, the principle of incorporation applies only to customary 
law and to treaties which have become part of customary law.163 
Magallona adds a different dimension to the debate. According to 
him, with regard to the internalization of international law, only general 
international law is to be understood as forming part of the law of the 
land.164 This means not only customary law, but also general principles of 
157 Joaquin G. Bernas, An Introduction to Public International Law 57(2002).
158 Id.
159 Joaquin G. Bernas, The Philippine Constitution for Ladies, Gentlemen 
and Others 12 (2007).
160 Bernas, supra note 157, at 58.
161 Aloysius P. Llamzon, The Generally Accepted Principles of International Law: 
Towards a Structurally Consistent Use of Customary International Law in Philippine 
Courts, 47 Ateneo Law Journal 243 (2002).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Magallona, supra note 127, at 36-37.
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law.165 He cites that, at times, the attitude of the Court is not in line with 
the incorporation clause. For example, in obiter in at least two cases, treaty 
norms were considered to be covered by the clause.166 In Agustin v. Edu, 
the Court said that the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals was 
impressed with the character of generally accepted principles, which the 
Constitution adopted as part of the law of the land.167 Magallona opined 
that, in Marcos v. Manglapus, the Court that quoted certain rights under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, failed to mention 
that the Philippines was a party to the treaty, but found it necessary to 
explain that the right to return to one’s country was a generally accepted 
principle of international law which was part of the law of the land.168 
Aside from the treatment of customary law, several areas are affected 
by this ongoing debate, like the so-called shifting of concepts between the 
two spheres of international law and domestic law (as illustrated above). 
Also, the incorporation or reception of international law into domestic 
Philippine law can become a problem when international law, whether 
customary or conventional, comes into conflict with domestic law, whether 
constitutional or statutory.169 It could also affect the application or non-
application of human rights norms for the Court has often invoked certain 
human rights norms as custom in its decisions. This trend of a confused 
Court will reverberate in jurisprudence. 
Notwithstanding, through the years, the Court has consistently re-
ferred to a definition of international custom170 as a source of international 
law stated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It also re-
ferred to its two elements: (1) State practice, the objective element; and (2) 
opinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element.171 It made mention of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as attaining custom-
165 Id.
166 Id. at 38.
167 Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112, 88 S.C.R.A. 195 (S.C., Feb. 2, 1979) (Phil.).
168 Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 177 S.C.R.A. 668 (S.C., Sept. 15, 1989) 
(Phil.).
169 Bernas, supra note 157, at 60.
170 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. §102(2) (1987).
171 Id.
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ary status, and some even went further and stated that the prohibition of 
these crimes had attained the status of jus cogens.172 
c.   Interpretation of International Human Rights Norms in  
Light of Domestic Constitutional Rules
International human rights norms, like any other norms in international 
law, have been always tested as to constitutionality. Many norms have 
been applied on the strength that they are customary, through the incor-
poration clause found in the Constitution. For instance, in Mejoff v. Dir. 
of Prisons, the freedom from arbitrary detention of a stateless person was 
decided using the incorporation clause in the 1935 Constitution and the 
provisions of the UDHR.173
Evidently, human rights cases in the Philippines commonly take the 
form of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, or injunctions against the 
police and military. The cases do not deal with international human rights 
law, in itself, but with national human rights law found in the Philippine 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights in relation with international human rights 
law. The latter sometimes influences deportation cases against undesir-
able aliens and the application by non-nationals for admission to certain 
professions.174
As could be seen from a quick survey of the cases in international law 
in the past years, human rights, as enunciated in the UDHR, have been 
the subject of several cases before the Court, such as those that involved 
the right to political participation, freedom from undue detention and 
torture, and even violence.175 
A bifurcation exists, however, as to the treatment and application of 
civil and political rights, on the one hand, and of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, on the other. From the time that the Court decided on Ra-
quiza v. Bradford in 1945,176 a variety of cases involving civil and political 
172 Bayan, G.R. No. 138570. 
173 Mejoff, G.R. No. L-2855.
174 Defensor-Santiago, supra note 8, at 275.
175 E.g., Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, 125 S.C.R.A. 553 (S.C., Nov. 9, 1983) 
(Phil.); Phil. Assoc. of Labor Unions v. Sec’y of Labor, G.R. No. L-22228, 27 S.C.R.A. 
40 (S.C., Feb. 27, 1969) (Phil.). 
176 Raquiza, G.R. No. L-44. 
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rights had been decided. Deportation as inherent to sovereignty has been 
asserted.177 But, aliens are protected by the UDHR and the Bill of Rights 
of the Constitution, particularly as to civil and political rights.178
Desierto writes that over the last two decades since the promulgation of 
the 1987 Constitution, the Court has issued writs and/or resolved cases on 
fundamental civil liberties and basic constitutional rights guarantees using 
its expanded judicial review power, including, among others: nullifying 
administrative rules and regulations issued by the executive department 
that contravened the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program; 
affirming the constitutional right to a fair and a speedy trial; affirming a 
lower court judgment finding the government’s use of arrest, detention, or 
deportation orders to be illegal and arbitrary; enjoining the military and 
police’s conduct of warrantless arrests and searches, “aerial target zonings” 
or “saturation drives” in areas where alleged subversives were suppos-
edly hiding; declaring search warrants defective and the ensuing seizure 
of private properties to be illegal; acquitting a person whose conviction 
for murder was based largely on an inadmissible extrajudicial confession 
(obtained without the presence of counsel); upholding the dismissal of 
a criminal charge on the basis of the constitutional right against double 
jeopardy; acquittal of a public officer due to a violation of the constitutional 
right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his or her case; prohibiting 
the compelled donation of print media space to the Commission on Elec-
tions without payment of just compensation; and prohibiting governmental 
restrictions on the publication of election survey results for unconstitution-
ally abridging the freedom of speech, expression, and the press.179
This is no perplexity since civil and political rights are found in the Bill 
of Rights, and the Bill is self-executing. As emphasized earlier, the Court 
is in reality not applying international law, but domestic law. A mirror 
study of the Bill and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
177 Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, 162 S.C.R.A. 840 (S.C., June 28, 
1988) (Phil.).
178 Borovsky v. Comm’r of Immigration, G.R. No. L-4352, 90 Phil. Rep. 107 (S.C., 
Sept. 28, 1951) (Phil.); People v. Chan Fook, G.R. No. L-16968, 42 Phil. Rep. 230 
(S.C., Oct. 6, 1921) (Phil.).
179 Diane A. Desierto, Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights: Comparative Powers, 
Roles, and Practices in the Philippines and South Africa, 11 Asian-Pacific Law 
& Policy Journal 114, 129-30 (2009).
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Rights readily reveals the commonality in each of them. The ramification 
is that civil and political rights could be pleaded and decided upon by the 
domestic court. 
Meanwhile, economic, social and cultural rights are nowhere found in 
the Bill of Rights. Although they exist in other parts of the Constitution, 
many of them appear not to be self-executing. That being said, as a general 
rule, the provisions of the Constitution are still considered self-executing, 
and do not require further legislation for their enforcement. This is because 
if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental 
law can be easily nullified by inaction of Congress. However, some provi-
sions have already been categorically declared by the Court as non-self-
executing based on their tenor.180 The 1987 Constitution’s provisions on 
socio-economic rights are found in Article II (Declaration of Principles and 
State Policies), others in Articles XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), 
XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), and 
XV (The Family).181
In the 1990s, the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights 
was decided in a landmark case. In Oposa v. Factoran, Article II, Section 
15 (right to health) and Section 16 (right of the people to a balanced and 
healthful ecology) formed the constitutional basis for standing in a class 
suit seeking the cancellation of Timber License Agreements.182 The undi-
vided Court ruled that while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology 
was found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not 
under the Bill of Rights, it did not follow that it was less important than 
any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.183 Such a right 
belongs to an entirely different category of rights for it concerns nothing 
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, aptly and fittingly stressed 
by the petitioners, the advancement of which may even be said to predate 
all governments and constitutions.184 Another one is Laguna Lake Dev. 
180 Tondo Med. Ctr. Emps. Ass’n v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167324 (S.C., July 17, 
2007) (Phil.).
181 Desierto, supra note 179, at 134.
182 Oposa, G.R. No. 101083.
183 Id.
184 Id.
Temprosa: International Law in the Philippine Court 119
Auth. v. Court of Appeals.185 The Court asked, “[h]ow do we strike a balance 
between environmental protection, on the one hand, and the individual 
personal interests of people, on the other?”186
A string of other cases followed in recent times with regard to the 
health of the people, and the environment. The Court seems to take a rights-
based approach to these topics. In Metro Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned 
Residents of Manila Bay, the Court ordered concerned government agen-
cies to coordinate the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water 
quality of Manila Bay in line with the country’s development objective of 
attaining economic growth consistent with the protection, preservation, 
and revival of marine waters.187 Roma Drug v. Reg’l Trial Court of Guagua, 
Pampanga recognized the constitutional right to health, and declared 
that the provision of a law classifying “unregistered imported drugs” as 
“counterfeit drugs” and criminal penalties against its importation deprived 
Filipinos to choose a less expensive regime for their health care.188 In these 
cases, the Court considered the language of the provisions that animate the 
economic, social, or cultural right involved. It had to be authoritative—a 
mandate or an imperative—and self-executing in this regard.
Recently, the Court’s decisions on human rights cases also focus on 
writs for the protection of the right to life, liberty and security due to the 
issuance of the writs of Amparo, among others.189 For example, in Razon v. 
Tagitis, the Court reflected on the nature of Amparo— a protective remedy 
against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty 
and security.190  It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police 
agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappear-
ance of an individual.191 It does not determine guilt or pinpoint criminal 
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at 
185 Laguna Lake Dev. Auth., G.R. No. 110120. 
186 Id.
187 Metro Manila Dev. Auth. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-
48 (S.C., Dec. 18, 2008) (Phil.).
188 Roma Drug v. Reg’l Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, G.R. No. 149907 (S.C., 
Apr. 16, 2009) (Phil.). 
189 See Razon v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498 (S.C., Dec. 3, 2009) (Phil.).
190 Id.
191 Id.
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least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of impos-
ing appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.192 Other equally 
important writs may now issue, such as those on the environment and the 
right to information, affording the respect, protection, and fulfillment of 
rights. The rights of collective minorities have been also passed upon. In 
obiter, Province of North Cotabato pondered on the possibility of regarding 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as embodying 
customary law.193
Truly, a process of transformation implicitly underlies the whole frame-
work of the 1987 Constitution. This means that to bring about a regime of 
comprehensive human rights is the function of the entire political system 
established by the Constitution and the individual, and the collective efforts 
of the citizens to realize human rights in their social life is a supreme consti-
tutional responsibility. The provisions on human rights in the Constitution 
constitute the vehicle by which the people must transform themselves into 
a politically-conscious force and an agency for comprehensive democratic 
changes.194 And, international law is part of that process.
d.   Impact of International Legal Norms on the  
Development of Domestic Law
There are various ways in which international legal norms have aided the 
development of domestic law. Firstly, as stated above, the Court on occa-
sion made use of binding international law to settle domestic problems. 
Relevant to this are the cases of Mejoff and Agustin. International law, 
therefore, can be used by the Philippine Court to settle domestic disputes 
in much the same way that it would use the Civil Code, the Penal Code, 
or other laws passed by the Congress.195 Secondly, although not a party 
to the convention or treaty, the Court has used an underpinning treaty 
to resolve a legal question. This is evident in Kuroda. Corollary to this, it 
is reasonable to expect that the activist Court, reinvigorated by the not-
192 Id.
193 Province of N. Cotabato, G.R. No. 183591.
194 Merlin M. Magallona, International Law Issues in Perspective 150-51 
(1996).
195 Bernas, supra note 157, at 58-59.
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so-distant rapture of the political system, will play a role in appropriating 
international legal norms to develop the domestic. 
Conversely, it had been suggested also that judgments of the Philip-
pine domestic court could be of considerable practical importance for 
determining the right rule of international law. The Court said in Gibbs: 
“[a] decision of the Supreme Court of a small Republic of the Philippines 
is as much a source of International Law as a decision of the great Republic 
of the United States of America.”196
Procedurally, due to the Philippines’ incorporation clause, the cumula-
tive effect combined with the rule on judicial notice, is that no proof at all is 
needed for the application of generally accepted principles of international 
law. This results in ease and convenience for the courts of law with regard 
to the probative value of international legal norms.197
5.   CONCLUSION
There is a confluence of the two streams of national law and international law 
in the Philippine Court. The relation between them is complex, and at times, 
perplexing. This holds true from the earliest times when the Philippine Court 
dealt with international law in the 1940s, where much of the questions centered 
on the laws and exigencies of war, to the present where postmodernity neces-
sitates ruling on various areas of law, including human rights and technology. 
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, sitting as a national court, invariably 
applies domestic law, and tries to deliver its duty of fidelity to the Constitution 
of the Philippines as the fundamental law via the power of judicial review. 
Where concepts, postulates, and theories of international law form part of 
the domestic, the Court applies them as domestic law. 
However, there have been, at several points in time, divergence in 
and out of the Court as to what really is incorporated into Philippine law 
from international law. Further, the shifting of ideas from the two planes 
of law has been noted. The relation between the two in the application of 
customary law, human rights norms, and the development of domestic law 
through the enrichment thereof by international law, has been deliberatively 
vibrant and alive. These operate within the framework of a legal system 
that is unique, unusual, and evolving in time.
196 Gibbs, G.R. No. L-1494.
197 Magallona, supra note 127, at 39.
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The Consequences of the  
“Clean Hands” Concept in  
International Investment Arbitration
Jamal Seifi1 & Kamal Javadi2
1. INTRODUCTION
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of application of the Clean Hands 
doctrine resulted in its exclusion from the 2006 International Law Com-
mission (ILC) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.3 The Clean Hands 
doctrine was not even considered for inclusion in the ILC Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection as a matter of the progressive development of 
international law.4 This exclusion, in the view of a minority of members 
at the ILC, was in part due to a conceptual confusion as to the function of 
the Clean Hands doctrine in the context of diplomatic protection as dis-
tinguished from inter-State claims. In accordance with the aforementioned 
view, in the context of diplomatic protection, the Clean Hands doctrine 
operates as a precondition for the admissibility of claims, whereas in the 
broader context of inter-State claims, the Clean Hands doctrine is equated 
1 Judge, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Chair of Global Law (2015) & 
Distinguished Visiting Professor, Tilburg University; and of the Faculty of 
Law of Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran. A condensed version of this article 
was presented by this author at the panel on “Arbitration as a means of solving 
international disputes: Advantages and Risks” during the Spring Meeting of the 
Royal Netherlands Society of International Law, on April, 21 2015.
2 Legal Adviser, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
3 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
4 It would seem that the human rights aspect of international claims – the possibility 
of invoking the Clean Hands doctrine by respondent States to block access to 
international remedies – was also a relevant consideration. This point will be 
taken up later.
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with the principle of good faith and thus, does not create a procedural bar. 
However, as other members of the ILC (including the Special Rapporteur, 
Professor Dugard) have noted, the Clean Hands doctrine was not concerned 
with diplomatic protection alone, or even primarily.5 This latter view had 
been confirmed by a number of inter-State cases.
The ILC’s codification exercise revealed the existence of uncertainty 
as to the scope of application of the Clean Hands doctrine and crystal-
lized various points of contention. For example, more recently, the Yukos 
tribunal referred to the traditional meaning of the doctrine by referring 
to the argument advanced by Russia based on the Clean Hands doctrine 
as a bar to a claim as “the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine proper”.6
In the last decade, the jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitration 
has led to the application of the Clean Hands doctrine outside the context 
of diplomatic protection; it has been applied both in the context of the first 
strand, the “legality requirement” and in the context of the second strand, 
the “abuse of process” debate. These two strands should be considered 
as a reinvention of the Clean Hands doctrine as applied in international 
investment law. 
In the context of the first strand, the illegality of investment has op-
erated in some instances as a jurisdictional bar, rendering the consent 
of the host State invalid. As will be illustrated by the reviewed cases, in 
the context of the legality requirement case-law, only a limited version of 
the Clean Hands doctrine comes into play when the illegality of the in-
vestment operates as a jurisdictional bar. As such, the arbitral tribunal’s 
legality analysis will be limited to the establishment stage, i.e., the “mak-
ing” of an investment, as opposed to the post-establishment conduct of 
the investor, i.e., the alleged wrongdoing at the performance stage. In this 
limited sense, it has been well-established that the Clean Hands doctrine 
does not need treaty stipulation. Thus, investment arbitration tribunals 
5 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 
3, at 14.
6 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, Final Award of July 
18, 2014 (hereinafter, “Yukos Award”), para. 1361. Of course, in Yukos, the claim 
against Russia was an investor-State claim. In an investor-State claim, the investor 
has an international remedy of its own and for this reason, for the purposes of the 
clean hands doctrine analysis, an investor-State claim should be equated with an 
inter-State claim as distinguished from a diplomatic protection claim. 
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have found that, “a clean hands principle or legality requirement [may] be 
read into the [Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)]”;7 it “is implicit even when 
not expressly stated in the relevant [Bilateral Investment Treaty] (BIT)”8; 
and is “inherent in every BIT.”9
At the same time, beyond the initial stage of the making of an invest-
ment, non-compliance with the host State’s law is captured by the Clean 
Hands concept in its broad sense to be considered at the merits stage. Thus, 
the Yukos Tribunal, relied on Article 39 (Contribution to the injury) of 
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility and accordingly reduced 
the damages owed to the Claimants by 25% due to their violation of Rus-
sian tax law.10 More recently, the Mamidoil Tribunal, after rejecting the 
jurisdictional consequences of the legality requirement on the facts of the 
case, took the non-compliance with the domestic law of the host State into 
account at the merits stage to reject Claimants’ claim regarding the viola-
tion of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard.11
The second strand of the “unclean hands” case-law concerns the issue 
of “abuse of process,” which deals with the consequences of abusing the 
system of investment protection.12 This strand was initiated by Phoenix, 
where the tribunal highlighted the issue of abusing the system of invest-
ment protection and found that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction ratione 
materiae13 as a result of the abuse.14 Whereas the (first) legality requirement 
strand of the case-law is based on the domestic legality of the investment, 
the (second) “abuse of process” strand is based on international legality 
of the investment. In fact, the Phoenix Tribunal acknowledged that the 
investment had been made lawfully, such as, in accordance with the Czech 
7 Id. at 429.
8 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 101 
(Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Phoenix Award].
9 SAUR Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 306 (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter SAUR Award].
10 Yukos Award, supra note 6, at ¶ 1637.
11 Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Prod. Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/24, Award (Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Mamidoil Award]. 
12 See Phoenix Award, supra note 8, at ¶ 113.
13 Id. ¶ 54.
14 Id. ¶ 68.
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legal order.15 However, it considered the question whether “assets invested 
bona fide” as part of its jurisdiction ratione materiae inquiry.16 Thus, the 
Tribunal held that if the investor had “unclean hands” and the investment 
had been made in bad faith – solely to bring a pre-existing dispute under 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)/
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) dispute settlement mechanism – then 
the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae.17 Nevertheless, 
it would seem that going beyond the “Salini test” to accommodate abuse 
of process concerns has not been the only way to address the jurisdiction 
issue.18 For example, as evidenced by the Levy case, the tribunals have es-
tablished by case-law that they are precluded from exercising jurisdiction.19
This article examines the uncertainty surrounding the meaning and 
function of the Clean Hands doctrine as well as its legal status as part of 
general international law. Furthermore, it discusses various manifesta-
tions of the application of the Clean Hands concept in investment treaty 
arbitration. 
After a brief review of the treatment of the Clean Hands doctrine by 
the ILC in Section II, we will consider the application of the Clean Hands 
doctrine in investment treaty arbitration in Section III. Part A examines 
the first strand, the legality requirement and relevant case law. Part B will 
address the second strand, abuse of process. Two representative cases from 
the abuse of process case-law will be examined to illustrate the evolution 
of case-law within this strand. 
This article does not purport to try to bring coherence to a fast moving 
subject, rather, it seeks to examine different aspects of the application of 
the Clean Hands doctrine in international investment law.
15 Id. ¶ 134.
16 Id. ¶ 114.
17 Id. ¶ 144.
18 Id. ¶ 39.
19 See, e.g., Renée Rose Levy v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award 
(Jan. 9, 2015).
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2. THE TREATMENT OF THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE BY THE ILC
Generally, the Clean Hands doctrine is a positive defence based on equity 
and it is also recognized in the Common Law tradition. In accordance 
with the Clean Hands doctrine, one seeking equitable relief cannot take 
advantage of one’s own wrong.20 In the words of the ILC, “[a]ccording to 
the clean hands doctrine no action arises from willful [sic] wrongdoing: 
ex dolo malo non oritur actio.”21 In public international law, and in the 
context of diplomatic protection, the Clean Hands doctrine “is invoked 
to preclude a State from exercising diplomatic protection if the national it 
seeks to protect has suffered an injury in consequence of his or her own 
wrongful conduct.”22 
20 Clean Hands Doctrine, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines the Clean Hands doctrine as follows: “Under “clean hands” 
doctrine, equity will not grant relief to a party, who, as actor, seeks to set judicial 
machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, if such party in his prior conduct 
has violated conscience or good faith or other equitable principle.”). In his 
discussion of the possible consequences of the U.S. rescue mission in the context 
of the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Republic of 
Iran), Judgment (May 24, 1980), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6293.pdf, 
Oscar Schachter referred to the Clean Hands doctrine in the following terms:
The equitable doctrine of “clean hands” applied in domestic law provides an 
analogy. A plaintiff seeking relief from a Court may reasonably be denied 
such relief because of conduct that is contumacious or that interferes with 
the judicial process or anticipates its outcome. International tribunals have 
the same kind of authority and should exercise it whenever appropriate. 
Would it have been appropriate to do so in the hostage case because of the 
U.S. rescue mission (as in fact two dissenting judges proposed)? The decision 
of the majority of the Court to do no more than rebuke the United States 
was a more reasonable way of dealing with the problem.
 Oscar Schachter, International Law in the Hostage Crisis: Implications for Future 
Cases, in American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis 344 (Paul H. 
Kreisberg ed., 1985).
21 John R. Dugard (Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection), Sixth Rep. on 
Diplomatic Protection, ¶ 2, International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/546 
(Aug. 11, 2004).
22 Id.
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There is, however, uncertainty as to the scope of application of the 
Clean Hands doctrine. In this regard, Ian Brownlie has pointed out that 
the Clean Hands doctrine may also have substantive aspects:
[T]here will be a residue of instances in which questions of inadmis-
sibility and ‘substantive’ issues are difficult to distinguish. This is 
the case with the doctrine of ‘clean hands,’ according to which a 
claimant’s involvement in activity illegal under either municipal 
or international law may bar the claim.23
On two specific occasions the ILC declined the opportunity to regulate 
the Clean Hands doctrine, namely, during preparation of the Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility (2001) and the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection (2006).24
First, the Commission had the opportunity to elaborate on the Clean 
Hands doctrine during the course of preparing the Articles on State Re-
sponsibility but it did not do so. For instance, in Special Rapporteur, which 
is Professor Crawford’s Second Report, he noted that when dealing with 
the provisions on the “circumstances precluding wrongfulness”:
The doctrine has hardly been referred to in the Commission’s 
previous work on State responsibility. Special Rapporteur Garcia 
Amador dealt with it only in relation to ‘Fault on the part of the 
alien’, which is now subsumed in Part Two, article 42 (2), as a basis 
for limiting the amount of reparation due. To the extent that ‘clean 
hands’ may sometimes be a basis for rejecting a claim of diplomatic 
protection, the doctrine appears to operate as a ground of inadmis-
sibility rather than as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness or 
responsibility, and it can be left to be dealt with under the topic of 
diplomatic protection.25 
23 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 503 (7th ed. 2008).
24 International Law Commission,  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10) (Nov. 2001), http://www.
refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html; United Nations, Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection (2006), http://www.refworld.org/docid/525417fc4.html.
25 James Crawford (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. on 
State Responsibility, ¶ 333, International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498 
(Apr. 30, 1999). Referring to J. Salmon, the Second Report noted that even within 
the context of diplomatic protection, the authority supporting the existence of a 
doctrine of Clean Hands is “fairly long-standing and divided,” dealing largely with 
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While acknowledging that legal principles based on the underlying notion 
of good faith can play a role in international law, the Special Rapporteur 
was not convinced that new and vague maxims such as the Clean Hands 
doctrine should be included within the category of “circumstances pre-
cluding wrongfulness.”26 He also noted that the passage taken from Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice’s Hague Academy Lecture quoted in Judge Schwebel’s 
dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case was only concerned with ques-
tions such as locus standi or the admissibility of claims.27 In that passage 
– which Judge Schwebel relied on to conclude that Nicaragua’s claim 
should fail because Nicaragua had not come to Court with “clean hands” 
– Fitzmaurice opines that:
“[A] State which is guilty of illegal conduct may be deprived of the 
necessary locus standi in judicio for complaining of correspond-
ing illegalities on the part of other States, especially if these were 
consequential on or were embarked upon in order to counter its 
own illegality – in short, were provoked by it.”28  
For these reasons, the Special Rapporteur concluded that there was no basis 
for including the Clean Hands doctrine as a new “circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness.”29 At the same time, during the Commission’s discussions 
of the issue, “the view was expressed that the clean hands doctrine was 
a principle of positive international law. That principle came under the 
determination of responsibility because it had an impact on the scope of 
compensation.”30 Thus, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, the Clean Hands 
individuals involved in slave-trading and breach of neutrality. Id. ¶ 334. The Special 
Rapporteur further stated that the conclusion reached by Charles Rousseau that 
“it is not possible to consider the ‘clean hands’ theory as an institution of general 
customary law” still seemed to be valid. Id. ¶ 336.
26 Id. 
27 Dugard, supra note 21, at ¶ 5.
28 Id. ¶ 2.
29 Crawford, supra note 25, at ¶ 336.
30 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-First 
Session, [1999] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 85, ¶ 414, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1. 
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doctrine could be analysed subsequently in connection with the loss of the 
right to invoke State responsibility.31 
Nevertheless, when dealing with the provisions concerning determi-
nation of the form and amount of reparation (Articles 34-39 of the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility), no specific provision was allocated 
to the Clean Hands doctrine, although the terms of Article 3932 are drafted 
broadly so as not to exclude consideration of conduct falling under the 
Clean Hands doctrine with regards to reparation sought.33 Moreover, no 
place was given to the Clean Hands doctrine when drafting the provisions 
on “Admissibility of claims” and “Loss of the right to invoke responsibil-
ity” (Articles 44 and 45).34
Likewise, in the course of the ILC’s preparation of the Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection, the Special Rapporteur, Professor Dugard, did 
not include an article specifically addressing the Clean Hands doctrine. 
After the submission of the Fifth report, a suggestion was made to include 
the Clean Hands doctrine as a condition for admissibility of diplomatic 
31 Id. ¶ 415.
32 Crawford, supra note 25, at 109. 
 Article 39 - Contribution to the injury – In the determination of reparation, account 
shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by willful or negligent action or 
omission of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom reparation 
is sought.
33 As will be discussed below, the Yukos Tribunal in its recent award confirmed this 
point. 
34 Crawford, supra note 25, at 120-21. 
 Article 44 - Admissibility of claims – The responsibility of a State may not be 
invoked if: 
(a)  the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating 
to the nationality of claims; 
(b)  the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies 
and any available and effective local remedy has not been exhausted. 
 Article 45 - Loss of the right to invoke responsibility – The responsibility of a State 
may not be invoked if: 
(a)  the injured State has validly waived the claim; 
(b)  the injured State is to be considered as having, by reason of its conduct, 
validly acquiesced in the lapse of the claim.
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protection.35 This would mean that if an internationally wrongful act of 
a State that caused an injury to an alien resulted from this alien’s initial 
wrongful conduct, the alien’s State of nationality should be precluded from 
exercising diplomatic protection. As articulated by Alain Pellet during 
the ILC’s work on diplomatic protection, if the Clean Hands doctrine had 
any separate existence or real consequences at a procedural level, it could 
only be in connection with diplomatic protection.36 In this regard, Pellet 
drew the Commission’s attention to the pleadings submitted in the Oil 
Platforms37 case. 
It is worth mentioning that in Oil Platforms, the United States in its 
Counter-Memorial had argued that the Court should deny the relief sought 
by Iran because of Iran’s own allegedly illegal conduct.38 Iran observed that 
“the United States seems to invoke the ‘plaintiff’s own wrongful conduct” 
35 It should be noted that after the submission of the Third Report, the Commission 
considered suggestions for issues, including the Clean Hands doctrine, which could 
be included within the scope of its work. There was a division of opinion as to how 
to deal with the Clean Hands doctrine issue. Some members suggested that it would 
be better for the Commission not to take any position on the “clean hands” rule. 
The Special Rapporteur in his concluding remarks noted that the “clean hands” 
principle could arise in connection with the conduct of the injured person, the 
claimant-State or the respondent-State, so that it would be difficult to formulate a 
rule applicable to all cases. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on 
the Work of its Fifty-Fourth Session, [2002] 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2002/Add.1. 
36 Summary Records of the 2791st Meeting, [2004] 1 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2791.
37 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 177, ¶ 29 
(Nov. 6).
38 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Counter-Memorial and Counter-
Claim Submitted by the U.S. (June 23, 1997), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/90/8632.pdf. The United States contended that, “[n]otwithstanding its own 
manifestly illegal armed attacks against neutral shipping and neutral trade, Iran 
seeks in this case to invoke a treaty designed to regulate friendly relations between 
States.” Id. at 156.
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defence in Part V of its Counter-Memorial as both: a) a ground for inad-
missibility of the Iranian claim and b) a defence on the merits.”39
On the question of inadmissibility, Iran countered by arguing that the 
Clean Hands argument only operates as a procedural defence in the context 
of a diplomatic protection claim, as distinguished from an inter-State claim:
It is true that in another field of State responsibility, the clean hands 
concept appears as one of the prerequisites for the admissibility 
of State claims, namely those arising in the context of diplomatic 
protection. But, it must be stressed, the prerequisite is exclusively 
confined to that context, and hence it deals only with a foreign 
individual’s clean hands and not his own State’s. Therefore, one 
can only agree with the United States’ contention, supported by 
extensive jurisprudential and doctrinal quotations, according to 
which a citizen requesting diplomatic protection from his own 
State must present himself with clean hands. Yet this falls far short 
of demonstrating that such a principle is required in direct State-
to-State claims.40
As already noted, Iran acknowledged that issues broadly relating to the 
Clean Hands doctrine may, outside the specific context of diplomatic 
protection, be considered by an international judicial body at the merits 
stage.41 However, Iran argued that even under such a scenario, “the “clean 
hands” concept does not operate independently”42 and that “at most, the 
clean hands defence could have an effect in relation to the quantification 
of damages.”43 
The Court characterized the U.S.’s arguments in the nature of a defence 
on the merits. It noted that the U.S.’s arguments on this issue were first 
raised in its Counter-Memorial after the Court’s Judgment of December 
12, 1996 confirmed its jurisdiction.44 Despite detecting a degree of incon-
sistency in the arguments advanced by the U.S. on this issue as further 
39 Oil Platforms (Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim 
Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 178 (Mar. 10, 1999), http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/8630.pdf.
40 Id. at 179.
41 Id. at 181-82.
42 Id. at 182.
43 Id.
44 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 12).
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developed throughout subsequent pleadings and in oral argument – where 
the United States had presented its argument as having a preliminary 
character – the Court noted that:
The United States does not ask the Court to find Iran’s claim inad-
missible; it asks the Court to dismiss that claim. It does not argue 
that the Court should be debarred from examining the merits 
of the Iranian claim on the grounds of Iran’s conduct; rather it 
argues that Iran’s conduct is such that it “precludes it from any 
right to the relief it seeks from this Court”, or that it “should not 
be permitted to recover on its claim”. The United States invites the 
Court to make a finding “that the United States measures against 
the platforms were the consequence of Iran’s own unlawful uses of 
force” and submits that the “appropriate legal consequences should 
be attached to that finding”. The Court notes that in order to make 
that finding it would have to examine Iranian and United States 
actions in the Persian Gulf during the relevant period — which it 
has also to do in order to rule on the Iranian claim and the United 
States counter-claim.45    
In the course of the Commission’s discussions, Pellet went on to argue that 
“[t]he ‘clean hands’ doctrine was a specific legal institution inseparable 
from the question of diplomatic protection, and was only of relevance if 
the protected individual’s hands were ‘not clean’.”46 He further noted that:
The vague concept of “clean hands” was not very different from the 
general principle of good faith in the context of relations between 
States, and had no autonomous consequences and little practical 
effect on the general rules of international responsibility. However, 
in the context of diplomatic protection, which involved relations 
between States and individuals, the concept took on new signifi-
cance: it became functional, for in the absence of “clean hands” the 
exercise of diplomatic protection was paralysed.47 
Professor Dugard, however, while agreeing with Pellet on the importance 
of the Clean Hands doctrine, was not sure that it concerned diplomatic 
45 Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J., ¶ 29. The Court, thus, did not find it necessary to deal 
with the request of the United States to dismiss Iran’s claim. Id.
46 Summary Records of the 2791st Meeting, supra note 36, at ¶ 24.
47 Summary Records of the 2793rd Meeting, [2004] 1 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, ¶ 5. 
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protection alone, or even primarily.48 Professor Dugard further explained 
that the Clean Hands doctrine “had not arisen in connection with dip-
lomatic protection in the Oil Platforms case, or in the more recent Arrest 
Warrant case.”49 Accordingly, in view of Professor Dugard, “[i]t was the 
type of topic that might well be considered separately, and should not be 
included under diplomatic protection, because it extended well beyond it.”50 
Furthermore, Brownlie’s position as reflected in the Commission’s Re-
port was that “[t]here was little or no evidence of the existence of a doctrine 
in general international law called the “clean hands” doctrine, and even 
if there were, he agreed with the Special Rapporteur[, Professor Dugard,] 
that it had nothing to do with the exercise of diplomatic protection.”51 
While acknowledging that there are instances such as the Oil Platforms 
case where references to this doctrine may be found in international litiga-
tion, he pointed out that:
ICJ had shown no tendency to adopt or encourage references to 
the “clean hands” doctrine. Mr. Pellet had referred to a number of 
perfectly respectable principles of treaty law, and elements analo-
gous to the “clean hands” doctrine were indeed present in the law. 
The principle of “good faith” was related, but it was not the same 
thing: it had considerable authority behind it, whereas the “clean 
hands” doctrine did not. It would make life unnecessarily difficult 
for the Special Rapporteur if the Commission asked him to study 
the non-subject of “clean hands.”52
Pellet, highlighting once again the distinction between the particu-
lar meaning of the Clean Hands doctrine in the context of diplomatic 
protection (as an admissibility consideration) and its broader meaning 
in inter-State claims, noted that the cases referred to by Brownlie were 
related to inter-State claims and thus, Pellet did not find Brownlie’s argu-
ment persuasive.53 Pellet explained that the inter-State cases may not be 
cited for the proposition that the Clean Hands doctrine does not apply to 
48 Summary Records of the 2791st Meeting, supra note 36, at ¶ 32.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Summary Records of the 2793rd Meeting, supra note 47, at ¶ 42. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. ¶ 43.
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diplomatic protection.54 In fact, Pellet “agreed with Mr. Brownlie that in 
proceedings between States[,] the doctrine was inapplicable[,]” noting that 
“where a case involved an individual and a State via diplomatic protection, 
the doctrine was relevant.”55 
Human rights considerations relating to international claims were 
also referred to during the debate on this issue. Attention was drawn to 
the fact that commentators, based on the ruling of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Slivenko case, had spoken of banishing the Clean 
Hands doctrine from international cases involving the protection of hu-
man rights, arguing that the applicability of the doctrine would be highly 
controversial in this context.56
As a result, “the Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to 
consider whether the Clean Hands doctrine [was] relevant to the topic 
of Diplomatic protection and[,] if so[,] whether it should be reflected in 
the form of an article” in the Draft Articles.57 Ultimately, the ILC did not 
include the Clean Hands doctrine in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Pro-
tection adopted in 2006. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the evidence in 
favour of the Clean Hands doctrine was inconclusive. He concluded that:
In these circumstances the Special Rapporteur sees no reason to 
include a provision in the draft articles dealing with the clean 
hands doctrine. Such a provision would clearly not be an exercise 
in codification and is unwarranted as an exercise in progressive 
development in the light of the uncertainty relating to the very exis-
tence of the doctrine and its applicability to diplomatic protection.58 
54 Id. 
55 Id. Pellet also pointed out that, “[i]n the context of inter-State relations, the fact that 
two States were in violation of international law did not preclude the responsibility 
of both States being invoked.” Id. ¶ 2.
56 Id. ¶ 48. See Aleksandr Shapovalov, Should a Requirement of “Clean Hands” be a 
Prerequisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic Protection? Human Rights Implications 
of the International Law Commission’s Debate, 20 American University 
International Law Review 829 (2005).
57 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, 
¶ 54 (2004).
58 Dugard, supra note 21, at ¶ 18.
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It has been remarked that the decision of the ILC not to include the Clean 
Hands doctrine in the Draft Articles “is not to say that the principle is not 
part of international law; rather, this decision clarifies that the only conduct 
relevant to assessing the admissibility of claims under international law is 
that of the claimant itself.”59
It is worth noting in this regard that more recently, the Yukos Tribunal 
held that the Clean Hands doctrine as a bar to a claim does not exist as a 
principle of international law.60 In the Yukos case, Russia argued that the 
Claimants’ engagement in tax evasion arrangements in violation of Rus-
sian tax laws would trigger the Clean Hands doctrine, thus barring their 
claim.61 Consistent with the well-settled practice of investment arbitration 
tribunals, the Tribunal did not read into the ECT any legality requirement 
with respect to the performance of the investment (as opposed to the 
“making” of the investment) as a jurisdictional bar.62 As such, the Tribunal 
had to pronounce upon Russia’s proposition to the effect that the Clean 
Hands doctrine as a general principle of law would operate as a bar to the 
Claimants’ claim. In this regard, the Tribunal held that:
[A]s Claimants point out, despite what appears to have been an 
extensive review of jurisprudence, Respondent has been unable 
to cite a single majority decision where an international court or 
arbitral tribunal has applied the principle of “unclean hands” in 
an inter-State or investor-State dispute and concluded that, as a 
principle of international law, it operated as a bar to a claim.63 
The Tribunal thus concluded that “‘unclean hands’ does not exist as a gen-
eral principle of international law which would bar a claim by an investor.”64 
However, as will be discussed below, the Tribunal acknowledged that the 
59 Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in International Law, 8 
Transnational Dispute Management 4 (Special Issue) 1 (2011). 
60 Yukos Award, supra note 6, at ¶ 1373.
61 Id. ¶¶ 1281-1310.
62 Id. ¶¶ 1349-1356.
63 Id. ¶ 1362. Due to the fact that Judge Schwebel was a member of the Yukos Tribunal, 
Russia relied on his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case, as well as referred 
to “other dissenting ICJ and PCIJ opinions where the principle of ‘unclean hands’ 
was invoked (albeit often without referring to it by name).” Id. ¶ 1361. 
64 Id. ¶ 1363.
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Claimants’ illegal conduct during the performance of the investment could 
have an impact on the Tribunal’s analysis of liability and damages.65 
3.   THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE IN  
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
The idea that when individuals have access to an international remedy of 
their own the Clean Hands doctrine should be applicable to them directly 
can be found in the party submissions in private cases before the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal (hereinafter “the Iran-U.S. Tribunal”). In 
its pleading in the Aryeh case, Iran invoked the Clean Hands doctrine as 
follows:
The claim should be dismissed under the universal, equitable doc-
trine of ‘clean hands.’ The doctrine, which is supported by a vast 
and diverse body of international legal literature, State practice 
and international case-law, states that anybody wishing to bring a 
claim before an international court, must have acted properly and 
correctly prior to the claim . . . .66  
In Aryeh, Iran’s “clean hands” argument was based on an assertion regard-
ing the making and use of forged corporate documents by the Claimants 
to substantiate their claim for the expropriation of their shareholdings 
in a number of Iranian corporations.67 The Iran-U.S. Tribunal, however, 
held that the allegations of forgery required an enhanced standard of proof 
and should be proved by clear and convincing evidence.68 In light of this 
standard, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal found that no forgery was proven.69
65 Id. ¶ 1374.
66 Aryeh v. Republic of Iran, Respondent’s Hearing Memorial and Written Evidence, 
Case No. 842, 843, 844, 44 exhibit C (Iran U.S. Claims Trib., Mar. 23, 1993). 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Vera-Jo Miller Aryeh v. Republic of Iran, Award No. 581-842/843/844-1, 33 Iran-
U.S. C.T.R, at 317-18 (May 22, 1997). A discussion of other cases before the Tribunal 
involving the allegation of claimant-induced fraud, and raising the possibility 
of applying the Clean Hands doctrine. See W. Michael Reisman & Christina 
Parajon Skinner, Fraudulent Evidence before Public International 
Tribunals: The Dirty Stories of International Law 101 (2014).
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Professor Crawford has remarked that the ICJ has never applied the 
Clean Hands doctrine, even in cases such as Oil Platforms where it might 
have done so.70 However, in the context of investment treaty arbitration 
and referring to Inceysa,71 he points out that “[t]he only investment tribunal 
award to apply the clean hands doctrine did so on the basis of applicable 
national law.”72 In this context, and referring to the Hamester award as an 
example,73 Professor Crawford goes on to observe that “[g]eneric claims 
of wrongdoing have not succeeded.”74
At the same time, two investment treaty awards rendered in 2014 spe-
cifically referred to or discussed the Clean Hands doctrine. The Fraport 
Tribunal referred to the Clean Hands doctrine in obiter dictum in the 
context of its discussion of the legality requirement as applicable when 
the relevant BIT does not contain a legality clause.75 Moreover, the Yukos 
Tribunal did not apply the Clean Hands doctrine to the post-establishment 
illegalities and thus refused to treat Claimants’ “unclean hands” as a 
procedural hurdle.76 Yet, the Yukos Tribunal took the Claimants’ illegal 
conduct (“unclean hands”) into account in the assessment of damages.77 
Furthermore, in a recently rendered award, the Mamidoil Tribunal after 
70 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 701 
(8th ed. 2012).
71 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award (Aug. 2, 2006). 
72 Crawford, supra note 70.
73 Gustav F. W. Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, Award (June 18, 2010) [hereinafter Hamester Award].
74 Crawford, supra note 70. It should be noted, however, that the Hamester 
Tribunal rejected the Respondent’s objection to its jurisdiction based on the 
distinction between legality at the initiation of the investment, and legality 
during the performance of the investment. Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24. 
The Tribunal reasoned that the legality of the investor’s conduct during the 
performance of the investment is a merits issue, as opposed to a jurisdictional 
bar. Id. This will be discussed further below.
75 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, (Aug. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Fraport 2007 Award].
76 Yukos Award, supra note 6. 
77 Id. ¶ 1374.
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rejecting the jurisdictional consequences of the legality requirement on the 
facts of the case, took the Claimant’s non-compliance with the domestic 
law of the host State into account at the merits stage to reject its claim 
regarding the violation of the FET standard.78 
It should be noted that the “legality requirement” strand of the case-
law is only one avenue for considering the consequences of the Clean 
Hands doctrine by investment arbitration tribunals. The second strand 
of the “unclean hands” case-law concerns the issue of abuse of process, 
which deals with the consequences of abusing the system of investment 
protection. These two strands will be addressed respectively in subsections 
A and B below. 
a.   The Legality Requirement:  
Illegal Investments Are Not Covered by BIT Protection
Cases representative of the “legality requirement” case-law include Inceysa 
v. El Salvador, Fraport v. Philippines, and Mamidoil v. Republic of Albania.79 
They respectively include a jurisdictional decision based on a finding as 
to the illegality of the investment at the preliminary objections stage, a 
finding of lack of jurisdiction with the benefit of full briefing, and a hold-
ing rejecting the jurisdictional objection based on the illegality of the 
investment while dismissing the Claimant’s claim for the violation of the 
FET standard on the merits for its failure to comply with Albanian law.80 
I. INCEYSA V. EL SALVADOR81
Inceysa was an arbitration case under the ICSID Convention with the 
main consent instrument being the BIT concluded between Spain and El 
Salvador. At issue in this case were the Claimant’s allegations of contractual 
breach and expropriation on the part of El Salvador.82 
78 Mamidoil Award, supra note 11.
79 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26; Fraport 2007 Award, supra 
note 73; Mamidoil Award, supra note 11.
80 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26; Fraport 2007 Award, supra 
note 73; Mamidoil Award, supra note 11.
81 Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26. 
82 Id. ¶ 3.
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The dispute in Inceysa concerned a service contract for installation, 
management and operation of mechanical inspection stations for vehicles 
and for the provision of emission control services.83 In June 2000, the Min-
istry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) of El Salvador 
organized a bidding process for providing the aforementioned services.84 
Inceysa, a company incorporated under the laws of Spain, was the winning 
bidder.85 In November 2000, the contract between Inceysa and MARN 
(hereinafter “the Contract”) was signed86 and in December 2000, Inceysa 
acquired the land on which to perform the Contract.87 In February 2001, 
it bought additional parcels of land for this purpose.88 However, several 
problems arose between the parties in 2001, with reference to which Inc-
eysa sent a letter to the Minister at MARN referring to the BIT concluded 
between Spain and El Salvador.89  
In July and August 2002, Inceysa complained to MARN about con-
tractual breaches caused by the fact that MARN hired other companies 
to provide the services which Inceysa had been hired to provide, thus 
denying the exclusivity given to it under the Contract.90 Having not been 
provided with a satisfactory reaction from MARN, Inceysa ultimately 
filed its Request for Arbitration with the Centre on July 21, 2003, alleging 
contractual breach and expropriation.91 
For its part, El Salvador filed a civil lawsuit in a domestic court ask-
ing for the termination of the Contract.92 More importantly, and in the 
context of the ICSID arbitration, El Salvador, among other jurisdictional 
objections, countered that Inceysa had acted in the process of obtaining 
83 Id. 
84 Id. ¶ 23.
85 Id. ¶ 27.
86 Id. ¶ 30.
87 Id. ¶ 32.
88 Id.
89 Id. ¶ 33.
90 Id. ¶ 34.
91 Id. ¶¶ 1-3.
92 Id. ¶ 43.
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the Contract and thus could not claim the protection of the BIT.93 In its 
Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction, the Respondent argued that the 
BIT was only intended to extend its protection to the investments made 
legally in El Salvador, i.e., “in accordance with its laws.”94 
El Salvador asserted that it had clear evidence that the concession 
contract had been procured by fraud, including on the grounds of (1) 
the submission of false financial statements; (2) the submission of forged 
documents to misrepresent the experience of Mr. Lavado, Inceysa’s sole 
administer at the time; (3) misrepresentations and deceit surrounding 
evidence submitted regarding Inceysa’s prior experience in the field of 
vehicle inspections; (4) violation of bidding provisions by obfuscating the 
true association between Inceysa and another participant (ICASUR).95 It 
further argued that the BIT protects only legitimate investments and that 
the necessary condition for an investment to benefit from the BIT is that 
the investment should be made in accordance with the domestic legislation 
of the host State.96 It concluded that:
The Investment Treaty was meant to protect only investments made 
in accordance with the host State’s laws, and the parties consented 
to ICSID jurisdiction only over disputes arising from such legal 
investments.97
Given the objections to jurisdiction by the Respondent, the tribunal de-
clared the proceeding on the merits suspended.98 Inceysa denied that it 
fabricated its financial statements to secure the Contract.99 It also denied 
other grounds relied on by El Salvador to establish fraud and illegality, 
such as its failure to disclose its connection with ICASUR.100 The Tribunal, 
93 Id. ¶ 3.
94 Id. ¶ 45.
95 Id. ¶ 53.
96 Id. ¶¶ 46-48.
97 Id. ¶ 48.
98 Id. ¶ 13.
99 Id. ¶ 68.
100 Id. ¶¶ 68-71.
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however, found that based on the evidence on the record, the Respondent’s 
allegations of fraud were established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal.101 
In determining whether El Salvador’s consent to submit disputes to 
the jurisdiction of ICSID through the BIT covers illegal investments, the 
Tribunal characterized this issue as a question of jurisdiction ratione 
voluntatis.102 Inceysa argued that resolving this issue would involve the 
resolution of substantive issues on the merits of the matter.103 In rejecting 
the argument advanced by Inceysa, the Tribunal noted that: 
Article 41 of the ICSID Convention is clear when it indicates that 
‘The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence.’ Conse-
quently, the ICSID Convention recognizes the ‘Kompetenz-Kom-
petenz’ principle and imperatively obligates the Arbitral Tribunal 
to decide the issues formulated on this subject.
It is obvious that because the ICSID Convention obligates the 
Arbitral Tribunal to decide on its own competence, it implicitly 
gives the Tribunal the right to analyze all factual and legal matters 
that may be relevant in order to fulfill this obligation.104 
The Tribunal noted that in this context, the reference to the “merits issues” 
was imprecise.105 It observed that if in the process of determining its own 
competence, “the Arbitral Tribunal is obligated to analyse facts and sub-
stantive normative provisions that constitute premises for the definition 
of the scope of the Tribunal’s competence . . . it has no alternative but to 
deal with them.”106 It further explained that:
even though it might be considered that the analysis the Arbitral 
Tribunal is obligated to make involves the determination of issues 
of a substantive nature, such as the conformity of Inceysa’s invest-
ment with the laws of El Salvador, it is obvious that these issues 
constitute a premise that must necessarily be examined in order 
to decide the issue of the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal.107
101 Id. ¶ 97.
102 Id. ¶ 144.
103 Id. ¶ 146.
104 Id. ¶¶ 148-149.
105 Id. ¶ 154.
106 Id. ¶ 155.
107 Id. ¶ 157.
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In turning to the legality requirement, the Tribunal noted that as evidenced 
by the negotiating history of the BIT, El Salvador consistently expressed its 
intention that the scope of investment protection of the BIT be limited to 
investments made in accordance with its laws.108 In fact, one of the addi-
tions suggested by El Salvador to the draft text days before the entry into 
force of the BIT, was to qualify the word “investment” in Article 1(2) of 
the draft – which dealt with the definition of “investment” – by adding the 
phrase “ … in accordance with the laws in force in each of the Contracting 
Parties.”109 Spain, however, took the position that the proposed addition 
to Article 1 was not necessary due to the fact that the legality requirement 
was more closely related to the process of admission of the investment and 
that another article already contained such limitation.110 Spain admitted 
in its communication that compliance with the laws of the host State was 
a “necessary condition for an investment to benefit.”111
Accordingly, the Tribunal determined that the evident intent of the 
Contracting Parties was to include a limitation based on the legality re-
quirement despite the apparent absence of such a condition in Article 1(2) 
of the BIT.112 Accordingly, basing this limitation on the consent granted 
by Spain and El Salvador, the Tribunal concluded that:
[T]he disputes that arise from an investment made illegally are 
outside the consent granted by the parties, and, consequently, are 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Centre, and that this Tribunal is 
not competent to resolve them, for failure to meet the requirements 
of Article 25 of the Convention and those of the BIT.113 
The Tribunal then turned to Article XI, paragraph 3, of the BIT, which 
provided that the arbitration will be based, among other sources, on: 
“generally recognized rules and principles of International Law.”114 The 
Tribunal thus found it useful to consider Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the 
108 Id. ¶ 207.
109 Id. ¶ 192.
110 Id. ¶ 194.
111 Id. 
112 Id. ¶¶ 194-197.
113 Id. ¶ 207.
114 Id. ¶ 222.
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Statute of the ICJ, according to which “the general principles of law are an 
autonomous or direct source of International Law, along with international 
conventions and custom.”115 The Tribunal went on to analyze Inceysa’s 
investment in light of the general principles of law which it considered to 
be applicable to the case.116 First and foremost, the Tribunal found that In-
ceysa’s conduct during the public bidding process violated the principle of 
good faith, which was described by the Tribunal as a “supreme principle.”117 
The Tribunal concluded that:
By falsifying the facts, Inceysa violated the principle of good faith 
from the time it made its investment and, therefore, it did not make 
it in accordance with Salvadoran law. Faced with this situation, 
this Tribunal can only declare its incompetence to hear Inceysa’s 
complaint, since its investment cannot benefit from the protection 
of the BIT, as established by the parties during the negotiations and 
the execution of the agreement.118
In addition, applying a number of good-faith-related legal maxims, in-
cluding “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio” to the case at hand, the Tribunal 
held that the foreign investor cannot seek to benefit from an investment 
effectuated by means of one or several illegal acts and, consequently, enjoy 
the protection granted by the host State, such as access to international 
arbitration to resolve disputes.119 The Tribunal also found that Inceysa’s 
conduct violated international public policy, the “essential function” of 
which “is to preserve the values of the international legal system against 
actions contrary to it.”120 In the Tribunal’s view, sanctioning illegal acts, 
as contemplated by the inclusion of the “in accordance with law” clause in 
the BITs, was a clear manifestation of such a policy.121 Extending its legal-
ity requirement analysis to another consent instrument, i.e., the consent 
contained in the Investment Law of El Salvador, the Tribunal found that 
115 Id. ¶ 226.
116 Id. ¶ 229.
117 Id. ¶ 230.
118 Id. ¶ 239.
119 Id. ¶¶ 240-242.
120 Id. ¶ 245 (footnote omitted).
121 Id. ¶ 246.
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the legality requirement as contained in Article 96 of the Constitutional 
of El Salvador and the Foreigners Law, would produce the same result.122  
II.  FRAPORT V. PHILIPPINES123
This ICSID arbitration arose under the Germany-Philippines BIT.124 The 
dispute concerned a concession contract for the construction and opera-
tion of a new international passenger airport terminal in Manila.125 The 
Claimant’s investment was made in a Philippine company, later known as 
PIATCO in 1999.126 Fraport’s investment in PIATCO, both as a shareholder 
and lender, was influenced by the fact that the Respondent had, prior to 
the investment at issue, conferred upon PIATCO the concession rights for 
the construction and operation of a new international passenger airport 
terminal in Manila (hereinafter “the Terminal”).127 Following the collapse 
of Fraport’s investment in PIATCO, the taking over by the Philippine au-
thorities of the Terminal prior to its completion, and the May 1993 decision 
of the Philippine Supreme Court rendering the investment “null and void” 
on the basis of a “serious violation of Philippine law and public policy,”128 
Fraport filed its request for arbitration claiming violations of the BIT on 
September 17, 2003.129 
For its part, the Respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
and denied any liability under the Germany-Philippines BIT.130 In essence, 
the Respondent argued that the Claimant made its investment in PIATCO 
122 Id. ¶¶ 258-264.
123 Fraport 2007 Award, supra note 73; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide 
v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment 
(Dec. 23, 2010); Resubmitted Case: Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide 
v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12, Award (Dec. 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter Fraport 2014 Award].
124 Fraport 2014 Award, supra note 123.
125 Id. ¶ 2.
126 Id. 
127 Id.
128 Id. ¶ 217.
129 Id. ¶ 6.
130 Id. ¶ 4.
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in violation of the laws of the Philippines, in particular foreign ownership 
and control legislation laws, known as the Anti-Dummy Law (ADL).131 In 
this connection, the Respondent contended that the concession contract for 
the Terminal was a public utility project and thus, subject to the national-
ity restrictions of the Philippine Constitution and the ADL (in particular, 
a 40% foreign ownership limitation, as well as foreign management and 
control restrictions).132 
The Philippines contended that Fraport had knowingly made secret 
arrangements (secret Shareholders’ Agreements) to sidestep these restric-
tions.133 As a result, the Philippines argued that Fraport’s investment would 
fall outside the scope of the protection afforded by the Germany-Philippines 
BIT because “it was not made in compliance with Philippine law.”134 At 
the request and insistence of the Tribunal’s President, some of these secret 
Shareholders’ Agreements were made available to the Tribunal in January 
2006 during the hearing on jurisdiction and liability.135 
On the basis of the evidence on the record, including the Claimant’s 
own internal documents (the secret Shareholders’ Agreements), the Tri-
bunal found that the limitation on foreign management and control had 
been knowingly breached, in the sense that:
Fraport was consciously, intentionally and covertly structuring 
its investment in a way which it knew to be a violation of the 
ADL. Fraport’s equity investment in terms the statutorily limited 
percentage in [the Terminal] project was lawful under Philippine 
law. Fraport’s controlling and managing the investment was not. 
Despite having been advised and plainly understanding this, Fra-
port secretly designed its investment in the project so as to have 
that prohibited management and control, in particular by reserv-
ing to itself the ultimate authority as a shareholder in PIATCO to 
decide those matters set out in [ . . . ] Article 2.02 (2) (a) of the . . . 
Shareholders’ Agreement of 6 July 1999.136
131 Id.; An Act to Punish Acts of Evasion of the Laws on the Nationalization of Certain 
Rights, Franchises or Privileges, Comm. Act No. 108 (Oct. 30, 1936) (Phil.).
132 Fraport 2014 Award, supra note 123, at ¶ 287.
133 Id. ¶ 401.
134 Id. ¶ 285.
135 Id. ¶ 322.
136 Id. ¶ 323.
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In assessing the impact of the illegality of the investment, the Tribunal 
recalled that Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which provides, inter 
alia, the parameters of jurisdiction ratione materiae, does not define 
“investment.”137 The Tribunal’s rejection of Fraport’s contention that “the 
parties’ dispute in this arbitration [was] indeed about an ‘investment’ made 
pursuant to the BIT”138 was as follows:
With respect to a bilateral investment treaty that defines ‘invest-
ment’, it is possible that an economic transaction that might qualify 
factually and financially as an investment (i.e. be comprised of 
capital imported by a foreign entity into the economy of another 
state which is party to a BIT), falls, nonetheless, outside the juris-
diction of the tribunal established under the pertinent BIT, because 
legally it is not an “investment” within the meaning of the BIT. 
This will occur when the transaction that might otherwise qualify 
as an “investment” fails ratione temporis, as occurred in [Lucchetti 
v. Peru], or fails ratione personae, as occurred in Soufraki v. The 
United Arab Emirates. It will also occur when the transaction fails 
to qualify ratione materiae, as occurred in Inceysa Vallisoletana, 
S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador.139 
The Tribunal noted that the Germany-Philippines BIT had a jurisdictional 
limitation ratione materiae.140 Article 1(1) of the Germany-Philippines BIT 
contained a legality requirement, providing that “[t]he term ‘investment’ 
shall mean any kind of asset accepted in accordance with the respective 
laws and regulations of either Contracting State . . . .”141 Additionally, the 
Tribunal noted that Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Germany-Philippines 
BIT, an accompanying Protocol, as well as the Instrument of Ratification 
of the Republic of the Philippines (which was exchanged with Germany) 
contained references to the legality requirement.142 This, combined with 
the Tribunal’s factual finding regarding the breach of the ADL, resulted 
in a finding of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae by the Tribunal:
137 Id. ¶ 305.
138 Id. ¶ 298.
139 Id. ¶ 306 (footnotes omitted).
140 Id. ¶ 334.
141 Id. ¶ 335.
142 Id. ¶¶ 335-337.
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Compliance with the host state’s law is an explicit and hardly 
unreasonable requirement in the Treaty and its accompanying 
Protocol. Fraport’s ostensible purchase of shares in [the Terminal] 
project, which concealed a different type of unlawful investment, 
is not an ‘investment’ which is covered by the BIT. As the BIT is 
the basis of jurisdiction of this Tribunal, Fraport’s claim must be 
rejected for lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae.143 
In his Dissenting Opinion, Bernardo Cremades relied on the fact that Fra-
port was a shareholder in PIATCO in 1999 and argued that the fact that 
the Claimant’s asset may have engaged in illegal conduct in the Philippines 
“does not change the fact that its shareholdings are an asset accepted in 
accordance with Philippine law.”144 
After an ad hoc Committee rendered a decision annulling the Fraport 
Award on December 23, 2010 on due process grounds, the resubmitted case 
was decided on December 10, 2014. The new panel in an obiter referred 
to the Clean Hands doctrine in its analysis of the legality requirement, 
explaining that:
Investment treaty cases confirm that such treaties do not afford 
protection to illegal investments either based on clauses of the 
treaties, as in the present case [ . . . ], or, absent an express provi-
sion in the treaty, based on rules of international law, such as the 
‘clean hands’ doctrine or doctrines to the same effect. One of the 
first cases having ruled on this issue, Inceysa v. El Salvador, has 
held that ‘because Inceysa’s investment was made in a manner 
that was clearly illegal, it is not included in the scope of consent 
expressed by Spain and the Republic of El Salvador in the BIT and, 
consequently, the disputes arising from it are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.’145
The new tribunal noted that at the jurisdictional stage, its analysis would 
be limited to examining whether there was a violation of the ADL at the 
time of Fraport’s initial investment.146 The assessments of the new Tribunal 
were consistent with the original Tribunal’s assessments. Thus, a finding of 
the ADL violation by Fraport resulting from the secret Shareholders Agree-
143 Id. ¶ 404.
144 Id. ¶ 13 (Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Cremades).
145 Fraport 2014 Award, supra note 123, at ¶ 328 (footnotes omitted).
146 Id. ¶ 388.
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ments to secure control over the Terminal’s operations was confirmed; this 
finding reaffirmed that the “Pooling Agreement” entered into by Fraport 
with the Philippine shareholders in July 1999 established a block voting 
arrangement in favour of Fraport, allowing it to make binding recommen-
dations.147 In part replying to the point made in the Dissenting Opinion 
appended to the original Award, the Tribunal held that:
Fraport violated the ADL when making its Initial Investment, the 
latter being consequently excluded as investment protected by the 
BIT because of its illegality. The illegality of the investment at the 
time it is made goes to the root of the host State’s offer of arbitration 
under the treaty. [ . . . ] Lack of jurisdiction is founded in this case 
on the absence of consent to arbitration by the State for failure to 
satisfy an essential condition of its offer of this method of dispute 
settlement.148
Accordingly, the Tribunal found that there was “no legal dispute arising 
out of” an “investment” in the language of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention, and that the Respondent had not consented to the arbitration of 
Claimant’s claims with respect to its (factual) investment.149 
III.  MAMIDOIL V. REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA AND THE IMPACT OF THE LEGALITY 
REQUIREMENT AT THE MERITS STAGE150
Greek investors, Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products Societe S.A. 
(hereinafter “Mamidoil”), submitted to the ICSID an application for ar-
bitration against the Republic of Albania in connection with an alleged 
breach of the 1991 Greek-Albanian BIT.151 Mamidoil – whose main field 
of activity in Albania involved the construction and operation of an oil 
container terminal on a land plot in the Durres Port area (hereinafter 
“Durres Port project”)152 – claimed that by constructing and operating a 
“tank farm” in the port of Durres, it had made an investment in Albania.153 
147 Id. ¶ 395.
148 Id. ¶ 467.
149 Id. ¶ 468.
150 Mamidoil Award, supra note 11.
151 Id. ¶ 7.
152 Id.
153 Id. ¶ 279.
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It asserted that the measures taken by Albania to re-zone the site of the 
investor’s operations, and subsequent interruptions to and relocation of 
petroleum-related activities from the Durres Port area to other locations 
violated the terms of the Greek-Albanian BIT arrangements.154 
Mamidoil alleged that by rejecting any claim for compensation, Alba-
nia violated its own expressed commitments in relation to the relocation 
of Durres Port project.155 It claimed that its decision to go through with the 
construction of the Durres Port project in October 1999 was based on the 
substantive approval of the project by high-level Albanian governmental 
authorities, as expressed in the lease contract dated June 1999, as well 
as their consistent, oral endorsements of the Durres Port project; their 
assurances as to the regulatory requirements relating thereto, and their 
encouragement for the project to go ahead.156 
Mamidoil contended that its investment was made legally and in com-
pliance with all necessary permits and Governmental authorizations.157 
Mamidoil insisted that it applied for all, and received some, of the necessary 
governmental permits; those that it did not receive, or received belatedly, 
were due to failures by Albania.158 Relying on the award in Tokios Tokeles 
v. Ukraine (where the tribunal noted that “minor errors” and “a failure to 
observe the bureaucratic formalities of domestic law” would not amount 
to illegality), the Claimant asserted that mere formal failures, such as the 
failure to obtain a permit which would have been granted, are not sufficient 
to constitute illegality of an investment under international law.159 Rather, 
Claimant argued that only a serious violation of domestic law can lead to 
illegality of the investment.160
Albania did not contest the fact that the tank farm formed the basis 
of Mamidoil’s investment.161 However, Albania contested the legality of 
154 Id. ¶ 303.
155 Id. ¶ 159.
156 Id. ¶ 541.
157 Id. ¶ 295.
158 Id. ¶ 297.
159 Id. ¶ 304.
160 Id. ¶ 306.
161 Id. ¶ 282.
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the Mamidoil’s operations in Albania.162 Albania argued that, in spite of 
numerous notifications regarding the need to obtain necessary permits, 
Mamidoil failed to address in any way the receipt of government approvals, 
authorizations or permits that were necessary to conduct its investment 
(Durres Port project) pursuant to Albanian Law.163 As such, it asserted that 
the illegality of the investment constitutes a bar to jurisdiction because 
neither the BIT nor the ECT protects investments that are illegal or made 
in bad faith.164
Moreover, Albania claimed that Mamidoil had been informed of the 
decision regarding the re-zoning of the Durres Port area through a letter 
from the Durres Sea Port Authority dated November 17, 1999 (less than a 
year after the approval of the agreement to lease the land to the investor 
for the Durres Port project).165 
Albania argued that Mamidoil failed to exercise the necessary due 
diligence required for an investment of such scale, particularly in light 
of the publicized infrastructural developments scheduled in Albania and 
Albania’s cooperation with international development agencies such as 
the World Bank and other European institutions.166 Instead, Albania al-
leged that Mamidoil relied on undocumented, vague, oral assurances of 
support by certain government officials (Durres Port authority) as proof 
of a “general non-objection” to its investment.167 
The Tribunal identified the issue of the legality of the investment as 
a central issue in the dispute between Mamidoil and Albania, which was 
determinative for both jurisdiction over, and the merits of, the dispute.168 
The Tribunal also noted that the significance of legality at the jurisdictional 
level depended on the fact that States’ consent to investment arbitration 
largely due to the expectation that arbitral tribunals extend investment 
protection only to investments that have been made lawfully.169 Neverthe-
162 Id.
163 Id. ¶ 337.
164 Id. ¶ 324.
165 Id. ¶ 197.
166 Id. ¶ 196.
167 Id. ¶ 193.
168 Id. ¶ 289.
169 Id. ¶ 291.
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less, the Tribunal distinguished between the substantive and procedural 
dimensions of illegality of the investment as alleged by Albania.170
With respect to substantive illegality, the Tribunal noted that the de-
cisive moment for the appreciation of the investment’s substantive legality 
is when the investment is planned and made.171 It further noted that “not 
every type of non-compliance with national legislation bars the protection 
of an investment.”172 Reviewing the illegality jurisprudence, the Tribunal 
observed that investment arbitration tribunals “have stated that the illegal-
ity must be “serious” or “manifest,” and that “minor errors” and “a failure 
to observe the bureaucratic formalities of the domestic law” will not justify 
the denial of jurisdiction.”173  
At the same time, the Tribunal found that the Claimant’s failure to 
apply for all the necessary permits, and thus Albania’s non-issuance of 
the permits, was not just a minor issue.174 This finding was based on the 
significance on the domestic laws on Urban Planning, which actually re-
quired such permits.175 However, the Tribunal noted that, as established 
by the record, Albanian authorities consistently tried to cooperate with 
Claimant by repeatedly requesting and inviting it to submit the necessary 
applications accompanied by the necessary documentation.176 As a result, 
the Tribunal found that the Respondent, by its conduct, conveyed to the 
Claimant that these illegalities were curable.177 Based on this finding, the 
Tribunal observed that
It is true that a State cannot be expected to have consented to an 
arbitral dispute settlement mechanism for investments made in 
violation of its legislation. However, it can be expected to accept 
the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal when, in that State’s own 
appreciation, the illegality of the investment was susceptible of 
being cured, as that State’s own legalization offers show. In such 
170 Id. ¶ 371.
171 Id. ¶ 375.
172 Id. ¶ 481.
173 Id. ¶ 482 (footnotes omitted).
174 Id. ¶ 489.
175 Id. ¶ 407.
176 Id. ¶ 490.
177 Id. ¶ 493.
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circumstances, the legal significance of the absence of permits is 
to be determined as a question of merits – namely whether Re-
spondent’s international responsibility is engaged in the face of 
Claimant’s violation of Albanian law – rather than this Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.178
At the merits stage, the Tribunal took into account the violation of Albanian 
law in dealing with the Claimant’s claim for the violation of the FET stan-
dard, as formulated in Article 10.1 of the ECT, and Claimant’s legitimate 
expectations of the investment.179 In this regard, as a preliminary matter, 
the Tribunal held that legitimate expectations can only arise at the time 
the investment is made.180 
Although the Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction despite the absence 
of permits (i.e. illegality of the investment), it noted that, as previously ex-
plained, the complete absence of applications for the relevant permits had 
no bearing on jurisdiction.181 However this issue could not be overlooked 
at the merits stage.182 The incomplete applications for the relevant permits, 
rendered the Claimant’s operations illegal under Albanian law, including 
the Law on Urban Planning.183 The fact that Albania subsequently offered 
to help with the legalization of the situation was found by the Tribunal as 
not having a bearing on its legitimate expectations analysis.184  
The Tribunal reasoned that the conduct post-dated the totality of the 
investment process.185 As a result, the Tribunal ultimately dismissed the 
claim for the FET violation and found that the “Claimant [was] not en-
titled to rely on the perpetuation of its activities in illegal circumstances 
and cannot claim a violation of legitimate expectations with respect to the 
illegal operation of the tank farm.”186     
178 Id. ¶ 494.
179 Id. ¶ 496.
180 Id. ¶ 695.
181 Id. ¶ 712.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. ¶¶ 713-714.
185 Id. ¶¶ 712-714.
186 Id. ¶ 716.
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The dissenting arbitrator Hammond disagreed with the Majority’s 
approach to the issue of illegality. His core disagreement with the Major-
ity’s approach was on the question of permits and licenses, and his view of 
the fact that the “Claimant’s alleged failings with respect to permits and 
licenses had no relationship to Respondent’s laws on foreign investment.”187 
In this regard, Hammond noted the legality requirement analysis of the 
tribunal in the Saba Fakes case, wherein it was found that a violation of 
the regulations in the telecommunications sector or domestic competi-
tion law did not implicate a violation of the legality requirement.188 Ham-
mond argued that the same logic should be applied to the FET violation 
analysis.189 While he agreed with the Majority that the Claimant failed to 
comply with the Respondent’s domestic permit laws, in his view, the fact 
that Respondent failed to enforce the licensing norms throughout the entire 
period of Claimant’s operations, should have been taken into account in 
the Tribunal’s FET analysis.190 
IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE  
LEGALITY REQUIREMENT 
The previous subsections have highlighted the developments with regard 
to the applications of the requirement of legality of investments in invest-
ment disputes and their implications for the Clean Hands doctrine. In this 
regard, two additional observations may be made.
First, it must be noted that the legality requirement does not necessarily 
need to be stipulated in the relevant treaty. This point has been made by a 
number of tribunals. For example, in Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria,191 
the tribunal noted that the ECT does not include a provision calling for 
the investment’s conformity with a given law. The tribunal articulated its 
approach regarding this issue as follows:
Unlike a number of Bilateral Investment Treaties, the ECT does not 
contain a provision requiring the conformity of the Investment with 
187 Id. ¶ 126 (Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Hammond).
188 Id. ¶ 128 (footnote omitted).
189 Id.
190 Id. ¶ 131.
191 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Award (Aug. 27, 2008).
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a particular law. This does not mean, however, that the protections 
provided for by the ECT cover all kinds of investments, including 
those contrary to domestic or international law. [ . . . ] In accor-
dance with the introductory note to the ECT “[t]he fundamental 
aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law 
on energy issues . . . .” Consequently, the ECT should be interpreted 
in a manner consistent with the aim of encouraging respect for the 
rule of law. The Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the substantive 
protections of the ECT cannot apply to investments that are made 
contrary to law.192
Thus, Claimant’s misrepresentation in obtaining approval for the purchase 
of a Bulgarian entity was “contrary to the principle of good faith which is 
part not only of Bulgarian law” but also “of international law – as noted 
by the tribunal in the Inceysa case” and resulted in depriving Claimant’s 
investment in Bulgaria from the protections provided by the ECT.193 
It should be noted, however, that the Plama tribunal, confronted with 
a case of first impression –where for the first time a jurisdictional objection 
based on an allegation of misrepresentation and illegality in the context 
of the ECT was at issue – in its Decision on Jurisdiction in February 2005, 
held that “the Respondent’s allegation of misrepresentation by the Claimant 
does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction in this case.”194 Accordingly, 
the tribunal’s analysis in its 2008 Award in the passage quoted above was 
effectively a finding that Plama’s claim was inadmissible. This was reflected 
in paragraph 3 of the dispositif of the 2008 Award as follows: “Claimant is 
not entitled to any of the substantive protections afforded by the ECT”.195
192 Id. ¶¶ 138-139 (footnotes omitted).
193 Id. ¶ 144.
194 Id. ¶ 229.
195 Id. ¶ 325.
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In SAUR International v. Argentine Republic,196 the tribunal held that 
the legality requirement is “inherent in every BIT”.197 With regard to the 
interpretation of the BIT, the tribunal held that:
 The requirement of not having engaged in a serious violation of 
the legal regime is a tacit condition, inherent in every BIT, since 
it cannot be understood under any circumstance that a State is 
offering the benefit of protection through investment arbitration 
when the investor, to reach that protection, has committed an 
unlawful action.198  
On the facts, however, the tribunal found in favour of SAUR, holding 
that there was no evidence in the record that the investor had breached 
Argentine law.199 Relying on the findings of a domestic judicial process 
commenced against the investor in relation to the payments, the tribunal 
found that the money was indeed intended to pay salaries and that the 
payments were correctly recorded in the company’s accounts.200 
The Yukos Award further confirmed the Plama Tribunal’s approach 
regarding the issue of legality under the ECT.201 The Yukos Award, rendered 
196 SAUR Award, supra note 9. This case concerned an Argentine water concession 
awarded to the French company, SAUR International. SAUR claimed that the 
measures taken by the host State constituted indirect expropriation, as well as 
a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Among other things, 
Argentina objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal alleging that the investor had 
acted illegally in making a series of secret payments to certain parties. Countering 
this objection, SAUR pointed out that the France-Argentina BIT did not contain 





201 As is well-known, three cases were brought by two Cypriot companies (Hulley 
Enterprises and Veteran Petroleum) and Yukos Universal, a company organized 
under the laws of the Isle of Man, which collectively held just over 70% of the shares 
of the former Yukos Oil Company. The three arbitrations were held in parallel as a 
single set of proceedings, but due to the fact that the three Claimants maintained 
separate claims, three separate awards were rendered. In the following discussion 
reference is made to the most recent Yukos Award. See Yukos Award, supra note 
6.
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on July 18, 2014, did not characterize the legality-based objection in the 
context of the ECT. The Yukos Tribunal found that, under the circumstances 
of the case, it did not need to decide whether the legality requirement it read 
into the ECT operated as a bar to jurisdiction or, as suggested in Plama, 
as a deprivation of Claimants’ substantive protections under the ECT.202  
In answering the question of whether a Clear Hands doctrine or a 
legality requirement could be read into the ECT, the Tribunal agreed with 
the Plama Tribunal and held that:
In imposing obligations on States to treat investors in a fair and 
transparent fashion, investment treaties seek to encourage legal and 
bona fide investments. An investor who has obtained an invest-
ment in the host State only by acting in bad faith or in violation 
of the laws of the host State, has brought itself within the scope of 
application of the ECT through wrongful acts. Such an investor 
should not be allowed to benefit from the Treaty.203  
Turning to the second concluding observation, it must be noted there is 
supporting case law to the effect that the illegality of the investment may 
operate as a jurisdictional objection only if the alleged illegality is related 
to the initial stage of making an investment.
The important distinction between “the making of the investment” 
in the host State, as opposed to the post-establishment “performance of 
the investment,” and limiting the operation of the legality requirement as 
a jurisdictional bar to the former, was first articulated by the Hamester 
Tribunal as follows:
The Tribunal considers that a distinction has to be drawn between 
(1) legality as at the initiation of the investment . . . and (2) legal-
ity during the performance of the investment. [ . . . ] Thus, on the 
wording of this BIT, the legality of the creation of the investment is 
a jurisdictional issue; the legality of the investor’s conduct during 
the life of the investment is a merits issue.204 
More recently, the Yukos Tribunal further confirmed this approach as ap-
plied to the ECT by rejecting Russia’s contention “that the right to invoke 
the ECT must be denied to an investor not only in the case of illegality in 
202 Yukos Award, supra note 6, at ¶ 1353.
203 Id. ¶ 1352. 
204 Hamester Award, supra note 73, at ¶ 127.
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the making of the investment but also in its performance.”205 The Tribunal 
observed that there was no compelling reason to deny altogether the right 
to invoke the ECT in such circumstance.206 In the Tribunal’s view, the ap-
propriateness of the imposed domestic sanctions by the host State should 
remain under the scrutiny of investment tribunals:  
[I]f the investor believes these sanctions to be unjustified (as Claim-
ants do in the present case), it must have the possibility of chal-
lenging their validity in accordance with the applicable investment 
treaty. It would undermine the purpose and object of the ECT to 
deny the investor the right to make its case before an arbitral tri-
bunal based on the same alleged violations the existence of which 
the investor seeks to dispute on the merits.207
On the facts, the Tribunal did not find that the investment had been made 
in bad faith or in violation of the laws of the host State. However, it held 
that instances of Claimants’ illegal conduct during the performance of the 
investment could be considered at the merits stage:
The Tribunal concludes that Respondent’s ‘unclean hands’ argu-
ment fails as a preliminary objection. It does not operate to deprive 
the Tribunal of its jurisdiction in this arbitration, render inadmis-
sible any of the Claimant’s claims or otherwise bar Claimants from 
invoking the substantive protections of the ECT.
However, [ . . . ] some of the instances of Claimants’ ‘illegal and 
bad faith’ conduct complained of by Respondent in the context of 
this preliminary objection, could have an impact on the Tribunal’s 
assessment of liability and damages.208 
Addressing the issue of liability, the Tribunal found that the primary 
objective of the Russian Federation was not to collect taxes, but rather to 
bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its valuable assets.209 In particular, the 
Tribunal noted that:
Among the many incidents in this train of mistreatment that are 
within the remit of this Tribunal, two stand out: finding Yukos 
205 Yukos Award, supra note 6, at ¶ 1354.
206 Id. ¶ 1355.
207 Id. 
208 Id. ¶¶ 1373-1374.
209 Id. ¶ 1579.
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liable for the payment of more than 13 billion dollars in VAT in 
respect of oil that had been exported by the trading companies and 
should have been free of VAT and free of fines in respect of VAT; 
and the auction of YNG at a price that was far less than its value. 
But for these actions, for which the Russian Federation [ . . . ] was 
responsible, Yukos would have been able to pay the tax claims of 
the Russian Federation justified or not; it would not have been 
bankrupted and liquidated[].210
The Tribunal concluded that the Russian Federation violated its obligation 
under Article 13 (the expropriation provision) of the ECT.211 It held that 
although the Russian Federation did not explicitly expropriate Yukos or the 
holdings of its shareholders, the measures that it took in respect of Yukos 
had an effect “equivalent to nationalization or expropriation.”212 In light 
of the Tribunal’s assessments on expropriation, the Tribunal did not deem 
it necessary to consider whether Respondent’s actions were also in breach 
of the FET standard as contained in Article 10 of the ECT.213 
At the same time, relying particularly on Article 39 of the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility (Contribution to the injury), and based 
on its apportionment of responsibility, the Tribunal reduced the damages 
owed to the Claimants by 25% due to a finding of their contributory fault 
as a result of, inter alia, Yukos’ “tax optimization” misconduct in the Rus-
sian low-tax regions.214  
b.    Abuse of Process: Abusing the System of  
Investment Protection Under the ICSID Convention
Whereas the legality requirement strand of case-law is based on the do-
mestic legality of the investment, the abuse of process strand is based on 
international legality of the investment. In fact, as will be discussed below, 
the abuse of process inquiry is only triggered when the domestic legality 
hurdle is surmounted and the tribunal is satisfied that the investment has 
been made in compliance with the domestic law of the host State. This 
210 Id.
211 Id. ¶ 1888.
212 Id. ¶ 1580.
213 Id. ¶ 1585.
214 Id. ¶ 1637.
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second strand was initiated in Phoenix, where the Tribunal first dealt with 
the issue of abusing the system of investment protection, and found that 
as a result, it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
The Levy case represents a recent example of a departure from the 
Phoenix Tribunal’s approach. It would seem that going beyond the “Salini 
test” to accommodate abuse of process concerns has not been the only way 
to address the issue.     
I.  PHOENIX ACTION, LTD V. THE CZECH REPUBLIC215
Phoenix was an ICSID arbitration arising under the Israeli-Czech Republic 
BIT.216 The Claimant, an Israeli company registered under the laws of the 
State of Israel on October 14, 2001, was entirely owned by Mr. Vladimir 
Beno, a former Czech national.217 Phoenix complained about the treatment 
of its investment by the Czech Republic, its investment being two Czech 
companies, Benet Praha (hereinafter “BP”) and Benet Group (hereinafter 
“BG”).218 BP, and its subsidiary, BG, were involved in trading of ferroal-
loys.219 The Tribunal noted that in December 26, 2002, at the time when 
Phoenix purchased the two Czech companies, BP and BG were involved 
in ongoing legal disputes, BG with a Private party, BP with the Czech fis-
cal authorities.220 In fact, a criminal investigation related to a series of tax 
and custom duty evasion was commenced in April 2001 against Mr. Beno, 
who was at the time BP’s Executive Officer.221 The criminal investigation 
against Mr. Beno also involved the freezing of BP’s funds and the seizure of 
accounting business documents.222 The investigation resulted in an arrest 
warrant being issued against Mr. Beno.223 However, Mr. Beno escaped the 
Czech police and fled to Israel, where he thereafter, on October 14, 2001, 
215 Phoenix Award, supra note 8.
216 Id. ¶ 6.
217 Id. ¶ 22.
218 Id.
219 Id. ¶ 25.
220 Id. ¶ 28.
221 Id. ¶ 32.
222 Id. ¶ 33.
223 Id. ¶ 32.
160 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
registered a new company, Phoenix Action Ltd.224 The Tribunal noted that 
Mr. Beno created an Israeli company to buy the two Czech companies he 
owned as a Czech citizen living in the Czech Republic, after the actions 
taken by the Czech Republic against these companies.225
In its jurisdictional decision after the Tribunal decided to bifurcate 
the proceedings to deal with the jurisdictional objections raised by the 
Czech Republic, the Tribunal held that it was limited ratione temporis 
to judging only those acts and omissions occurring after the date of the 
investor’s purported investment.226 As a result, the Tribunal found that it 
lacked jurisdiction with respect to the acts directed against BP and BG 
that occurred before December 26, 2002.227 
The Tribunal next turned to the question whether it had jurisdiction 
ratione materiae, namely, whether there is a legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment.228 In its analysis, the Tribunal added more elements 
to the traditional elements mentioned in the “Salini test.”229 Accordingly, 
the Tribunal held that in order for it to have jurisdiction ratione materiae, 
the following six elements had to be taken into account: “1 – a contribu-
tion in money or other assets; 2 – a certain duration; 3 – an element of 
risk; 4 – an operation made in order to develop an economic activity in 
the host State; 5 – assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host 
State; 6 – assets invested bona fide.”230 
As far as the fifth element (the domestic legality) was concerned, the 
Tribunal found that there was no violation of a rule of the Czech Republic 
legal order, and not even the principle of good faith as embodied in the 
national legal order.231 In this regard the Tribunal noted that Phoenix 
224 Id.
225 Id. ¶ 137.
226 Id. ¶ 68.
227 Id. ¶ 71 (footnote omitted).
228 Id. ¶ 73.
229 Salini Construttori S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001).
230 Phoenix Award, supra note 8, at ¶ 114. 
231 Id. ¶ 134.
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duly registered its ownership of the two Czech companies in the Czech 
Republic.232 
However, with respect to the sixth element, namely, whether or not the 
investment was a bona fide investment, the Tribunal found that based on 
the totality of evidence, it was clear that the main aim of Phoenix was to 
bring the pre-existing dispute involving BP and BG before this Tribunal.233 
In fact, on December 26, 2002, Phoenix acquired an investment that was 
already burdened with the civil litigation as well as problems with the tax 
and customs authorities.234 In addition, the Tribunal noted that appar-
ently all transfers were merely done inside the family of Mr. Beno.235 The 
shares of BP were purchased from Mr. Beno’s wife, a Czech citizen; while 
the shares of BG, belonging to Yougo Alloys, were bought from Mr. Beno’s 
daughter.236 The Tribunal thus found that the Claimant made an invest-
ment for “the sole purpose of bringing international litigation against the 
Czech Republic.”237 Consequently, the Tribunal held that:
The conclusion of the Tribunal is therefore that the Claimant’s 
initiation and pursuit of this arbitration is an abuse of the system 
of international ICSID investment arbitration. If it were accepted 
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide Phoenix’s claim, then 
any pre-existing national dispute could be brought to an ICSID 
tribunal by a transfer of the national economic interests to a for-
eign company in an attempt to seek protections under a BIT. Such 
transfer from the domestic arena to the international scene would 
ipso facto constitute a “protected investment” – and the jurisdiction 
of BIT and ICSID tribunals would be virtually unlimited. It is the 
duty of the Tribunal not to protect such an abusive manipulation of 
the system of international investment protection under the ICSID 
Convention and the BITs. It is indeed the Tribunal’s view that to 
accept jurisdiction in this case would go against the basic objec-
tives underlying the ICSID Convention as well as those of bilateral 
investment treaties. The Tribunal has to ensure that the ICSID 
mechanism does not protect investments that it was not designed 
232 Id. 
233 Id. ¶ 144.
234 Id. ¶ 136. 
235 Id. ¶ 139.
236 Id. 
237 Id. ¶ 142. 
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for to protect, because they are in essence domestic investments 
disguised as international investments for the sole purpose of ac-
cess to this mechanism.238 
The Tribunal thus ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction 
ratione materiae over the claim because the Claimant’s purported invest-
ment did not qualify as a protected investment under the ICSID Convention 
and the Israeli/Czech BIT.239 In the course of its reasoning, the Tribunal 
noted that the situation in the instant case does not involve the violation 
of the national legal order of the host State and thus is distinguishable 
from Inceysa and Fraport.240 Rather, in its abuse of process analysis, the 
Phoenix Tribunal was merely concerned with the international principle 
of good faith.241 It noted that, “in most cases, but not in all, a violation of 
the international principle of good faith and a violation of the national 
principle of good faith go hand in hand.”242  
II. RENEE ROSE LEVY AND GREMCITEL S.A. V. REPUBLIC OF PERU243
Renee Rose Levy and Gremcitel S.A. (hereinafter “Levy”) was an ICSID 
arbitration arising under the France-Peru BIT.244 The Claimants were 
Ms. Levy, a French national, and Gremcitel, a company organized under 
the laws of Peru, with its offices in Lima.245 The dispute concerned three 
parcels of land, located along Peru’s Pacific coast near Lima, within the 
Municipality of Chorrillos.246 The three parcels of land were adjacent to 
the so-called “Morro Sollar,” an area which is claimed to be the site of one 
of the most important battles in Peruvian history, the Battle of San Juan 
238 Id. ¶ 144. 
239 Id. ¶ 145.
240 Id. ¶ 113.
241 Id.
242 Id. ¶ 109. 
243 Renee Rose Levy v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award (Jan. 9, 
2015).
244 Id. ¶ 1 (footnote omitted).
245 Id. ¶ 2.
246 Id. ¶ 7.
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and Chorrillos, which occurred in 1881 between Peru and Chile.247 In 
1995, the Municipality of Chorrillos held a public bidding process to sell 
the three parcels of land to private individuals on the basis of the projects 
proposed by the bidders for the development of the land.248 By December 
1995, Gremco, a Peruvian company (and part of the Levy Group),249 was 
the owner of the three projects, which were later consolidated into the 
“Costazul Project,” a tourism and real estate project.250 In July 2001, Gremco 
submitted a proposal for the historical delimitation of the Moro Solar to 
Peru’s National Institute of Culture (INC).251
Between 2003 and 2004 the Peruvian company, Gremcitel (part of the 
Levy Group), acquired the land and the rights relating to the development 
project.252 On March 22, 2006, Gremcitel applied for the Urban Develop-
ment Permit.253 On October 10, 2007, the INC issued a Resolution (herein-
after the “2007 Resolution”), which provided a precise delimitation of the 
boundaries of the Morro Sollar.254 There were also previous Resolutions 
related to Morro Sollar issued by the Peruvian authorities in 1977 and 
1986.255 However, the scope and importance of these earlier Resolutions, 
in particular, their impact on the crystallization of the controversy, were 
disputed between the Parties.256 More importantly for the purpose of the 
abuse of process analysis, in 2005, a Historical Commission was created 
entrusted with proposing the delimitation of the intangible historical area 
of Morro Solar.257 The findings of the Historical Commission contained in 
its 2005 Report was the basis for the 2007 Resolution.258  
247 Id. 
248 Id. ¶ 11 (footnotes omitted).
249 Id. ¶ 14 (footnote omitted).
250 Id. ¶ 18 (footnote omitted).
251 Id. ¶ 26 (footnote omitted).
252 Id. ¶ 20.
253 Id. ¶ 36.
254 Id. ¶ 37 (footnote omitted).
255 Id. ¶ 112.
256 Id.
257 Id. ¶ 35 (footnotes omitted).
258 Id.
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The Claimants claimed that the 2007 Resolution imposed on the land 
an intangibility status which did not exist until then and thus rendered 
the Costazul Project meaningless.259 For the Claimants, the 2007 Resolu-
tion was the measure that gave rise to the dispute.260 More specifically, 
the Claimants in the context of their FET argument contended that the 
Respondent frustrated their legitimate expectations that they would be able 
to develop the Costazul Project.261 As for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under 
the France-Peru BIT, the Claimants argued that they met the nationality 
requirement due to the fact that Ms. Levy was a French national and that 
she owned and controlled Gremcitel, a Peruvian company, indirectly since 
2005 (through the company Hart Industries Ltd.) and directly since 2007.262
For its part, Peru contested the fact that prior to the 2007 Resolution, 
there was no limitations on the development of the subject parcels of land.263 
The Respondent insisted that the Claimants could have no legitimate ex-
pectations that they could develop their land free from restrictions and 
that the 2007 Resolution should be seen as a mere confirmation of the legal 
framework established by the previous Resolutions dating back from 1986 
to 1977.264 Regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Respondent argued, 
among other things, that the hurried transfer of shares which made Ms. 
Levy the controlling shareholder of Gremcitel constituted an abuse of 
process,” having been carried out for the sole purpose of attracting the 
France-Peru BIT protection at a time when the dispute had either already 
arisen or was at least entirely foreseeable.265 
The Tribunal identified the central issue as one relating to the chrono-
logical crystallization of the dispute, which was determinative for both the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione temporis, and its abuse of process analysis.266 
The Tribunal noted that according to the Claimants, Ms. Levy had acquired 
indirect control over Gremcitel in 2005 (when she acquired just over 33% of 
259 Id. ¶ 37 (footnote omitted).
260 Id. 
261 Id. ¶ 65.
262 Id. ¶ 63.
263 Id. ¶ 71.
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Seifi & Javadi: ‘Clean Hands’ in International Investment Arbitration 165
the shares in Hart Industries, which was the main shareholder in Gremci-
tel) and direct control over Gremcitel in 2007 (when she acquired 58.82% 
of shares in Gremcitel), which also would turn Gremcitel into a French 
company for the purposes of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.267 
Aside from its abuse of process argument, Peru alleged that Ms. Levy 
had not put forward reliable evidence as to her shareholding.268 Based on 
evidence in the record, including the evidence addressed at the Hearing 
establishing instances of backdating with regard to the relevant corporate 
resolutions, the Tribunal found that the Claimants had not discharged their 
burden to prove their assertion as to Ms. Levy’s shareholding and indirect 
control in 2005.269 The Tribunal, however, found that the Claimants met 
their burden of proof as to the 2007 shareholding.270 As to the exact tim-
ing of the transfer, the Tribunal noted that it had already found that the 
dispute between the Parties ultimately crystallized by the 2007 Resolution 
of the INC, and more precisely, by the date of its publication in the Official 
Journal, i.e., October 18, 2007.271 Accordingly, the Tribunal found that it 
was satisfied that the second transfer (the 2007 transfer) had occurred on 
October 9, 2007, which was before the critical date, i.e., before October 18, 
2007, which would be enough for a finding that The Tribunal had jurisdic-
tion ratione temporis.272 This finding, in turn, satisfied the requirement of 
“foreign control” under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID and Article 8(3) of 
the France-Peru BIT, resulting in a finding that Gremcitel also satisfied 
the requirement of ratione temporis.273     
The Tribunal next dealt with the issue of abuse of process. As a pre-
liminary matter, it noted that the Parties had not expressly discussed the 
characterization of this objection.274 The Tribunal asked the question: “Is 
267 Id. ¶ 124.
268 Id. ¶ 69.
269 Id. ¶¶ 154-155.
270 Id. ¶ 161.
271 Id. ¶¶ 149-150.
272 Id. ¶ 161.
273 Id. ¶¶ 170-173.
274 Id. ¶ 180.
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it a matter of jurisdiction, admissibility, or something else?”275 However, 
the Tribunal did not think it was necessary to resolve the issue:
The Tribunal considers that the characterization of the abuse of 
process objection as a jurisdictional or as an admissibility issue 
can be left open in the present case. Under the circumstances of 
this dispute, such differentiation is, to use the words of the Pac 
Rim tribunal, ‘a distinction without a difference’, in the sense that 
it would have no impact on the outcome of the case.276
Turning to the substance of the objection, the Tribunal noted, as in par-
ticular articulated by the Phoenix Tribunal, that the doctrine of abuse of 
process or abuse of rights may be applicable in cases involving disputed 
corporate restructuring.277 Reviewing the relevant case-law, the Tribunal 
further explained that it had been well-established that an organization, 
or reorganization of a corporate structure designed to obtain investment 
treaty benefits (sometimes referred to as “treaty shopping”), was not il-
legitimate per se, including where this is done with a view to shielding the 
investment from possible future disputes with the host State.278 This, how-
ever, was not the case when a specific future dispute was about to crystalize: 
In this respect, the Tribunal agrees with the test suggested in Pac 
Rim whereby ‘a specific future dispute’ must be ‘forsee[able] [ . . . ] 
as a very high probability and not merely as a possible controversy’. 
In the Tribunal’s view, this test strikes a fair balance between the 
need to safeguard an investor’s right to invoke a BIT’s protection 
in the context of a legitimate corporate restructuring and the need 
to deny protection to abusive conduct.279
The Tribunal acknowledged that the threshold for a finding of abuse of 
process was high.280 However, based on the facts, it determined that the 
test was satisfied in the instant Case.281 This was due to the established 
fact that Gremcitel and Mr. Levy had learned about the content of the 
275 Id. 
276 Id. ¶ 181 (footnote omitted). 
277 Id. ¶ 183.
278  Id. ¶ 184. 
279  Id. ¶ 185 (footnote omitted). 
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2005 Report of the Historical Commission, on which the delimitation 
implemented through the 2007 Resolution was largely based, around the 
time of its issuance.282 This knowledge enabled them to come up with a 
family decision to transfer the majority of the shares to Ms. Levy, in order 
to secure protection under the BIT.283 Addressing Mr. Levy’s explanation 
that the transfer was motivated by the intention to internationalize the 
project, the Tribunal noted:
The Tribunal does not see how transferring shares to a family 
member with a foreign nationality would internationalize the 
project. What was sought to be internationalized was the soon-to-
be-crystalized domestic dispute. In other words, the only purpose 
of the transfer was to obtain access to ICSID/BIT arbitration, which 
was otherwise precluded.284 
The Tribunal therefore concluded that the corporate restructuring by 
which Ms. Levy became the main shareholder of Gremcitel on October 9, 
2007 constituted an abuse of process and thus, the Tribunal was precluded 
from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute.285    
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ABUSE OF PROCESS
This second strand was initiated by Phoenix, where the Tribunal high-
lighted the issue of abusing the system of investment protection and found 
that as a result, it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae.286 Nevertheless, it 
would seem that going beyond the “Salini test” to accommodate the abuse 
of process concerns has not been the only way to address the issue. For 
example, in Alapli287, the Majority of the Tribunal followed two lines of 
reasoning to reach the conclusion that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.288 
Subsequently, the Claimant based its application for annulment on this 
282  Id. ¶ 190.
283  Id. ¶ 191.
284  Id. ¶ 191.
285  Id. ¶ 195.
286  See Phoenix Award, supra note 8.
287  Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, Award 
(July 16, 2012).
288  Id. ¶ 313.
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very issue, claiming that there was a lack of a true majority. The Annul-
ment Committee quoted paragraph 315 of the original Award to illustrate 
these lines of reasoning as follows:
The Majority has found Claimant not entitled to protection under 
either the Energy Charter Treaty or the Netherlands-Turkey BIT. 
For Arbitrator Stern this conclusion derives from notions of tim-
ing and bona fides, considering that Claimant did not make an 
investment until after the root of the controversy was evident and 
dispute itself had become a high probability. For Arbitrator Park, 
the Claimant simply lacks the status of an investor, for want of any 
contribution to the Alapli Project.289
The Annulment Committee, however, observed that these lines of rea-
soning were not contradictory, but complementary, and that in any case, 
this situation would not affect the validity of the Award.290 As far as our 
discussion of the abuse of process strand is concerned, the central point is 
that while Arbitrator Stern, following the Phoenix line of reasoning, relied 
on the abusive nature of the corporate restructuring to deny jurisdic-
tion, Arbitrator Park’s way of dealing with the situation was to rely on a 
traditional Salini element, i.e., the investor’s failure to make any personal 
contribution to the Alapli Project. In any event, as evidenced by the Levy 
case, the case-law has also evolved into a holding by the tribunals that they 
are precluded from exercising jurisdiction, without necessarily character-
izing this issue as jurisdictional bar.
4. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the Clean Hands doctrine in its traditional sense was 
not included in the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, subse-
quent developments in international investment law illustrate the extent 
to which this doctrine has gained popularity. Indeed, the jurisprudence 
of investment treaty arbitration over the last decade has led to the applica-
tion of the Clean Hands doctrine in its broad sense, both in the context of 
the legality requirement and in the context of the abuse of process debate. 
Whereas the legality requirement strand is based on the domestic legality 
289 Id. ¶ 315.
290 Alapli Elektrik B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/13, Decision 
on Annulment, ¶ 165 (July 10, 2014). 
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of the investment, the abuse of process strand is based on international 
legality of the investment. 
These two strands should be considered as a reinvention of the Clean 
Hands doctrine as applied in international investment law.291 In the context 
of the legality requirement, the illegality of the investment has operated 
in some instances as a jurisdictional bar, rendering the consent of the 
291 It is worth pointing out that in Hesham Talaat Al-Warraq v. Indonesia (Hesham 
Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, Final Award, 15 December 
2014), the Tribunal read into Article 9 of the OIC Agreement the Clean Hands 
doctrine in its traditional sense. This Claim was brought by a national of Saudi 
Arabia against Indonesia under the Agreement on Promotion, Protection and 
Guarantee of Investments among Member States of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (the “OIC Agreement”). Article 9 of the OIC Agreement reads 
as follows:
The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force in the host 
state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb public order or morals 
or that may be prejudicial to the public interest. He is also to refrain from 
exercising restrictive practices and from trying to achieve gains through 
unlawful means.
 Referring to Article 9 of the OIC Agreement, the Tribunal noted at the outset that 
unlike most BITs, “the OIC Agreement contains an explicit provision that binds 
an investor to observe certain norms of conduct.” (Final Award, para. 631). The 
Tribunal further noted that the record establishes the Claimant’s involvement in 
six types of fraud, including uneconomical swap with his own entity and replacing 
valuable assets for trash. At the same time, the Claimant’s actions had occurred 
“after” the making of the investment. Equating the language of Article 9 of the 
OIC with the Clean Hands doctrine in its traditional sense, the Tribunal held that:
[I]t is established the Claimant has breached Article 9 of the OIC Agreement 
by failing to uphold the Indonesian laws and regulations and in acting in a 
manner prejudicial to the public interest. The Claimant’s actions were also 
prejudicial to the public interest. The Tribunal finds that the Claimant’s 
conduct falls within the scope of application of the “clean hands” doctrine, 
and therefore cannot benefit from the protection afforded by the OIC 
Agreement. (Final Award, Para. 647)
 The Tribunal thus found that the Claimant was not entitled to any damages 
in respect of the Respondent’s breaches of the FET standard due to his post-
establishment conduct. (Final Award, para. 683). 
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host State invalid. In some other instances, the Clean Hands doctrine has 
operated at the merits stage, where it has either (i) led to rejection of the 
claimant’s claim regarding the violation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard or (ii) has resulted in a proportionate reduction of the reparation 
awarded due to claimant’s conduct. In addition, the abuse of process strand, 
which began by the Phoenix Tribunal’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction 
ratione materiae, has evolved into a holding by tribunals that they are 
precluded from exercising jurisdiction, which leaves the characterization 
of the abuse of process objection open.
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Participation In Multilateral Treaties1
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION
This section records the participation of Asian states in open multilateral law-
making treaties which mostly aim at world-wide adherence. It updates the treaty 
sections of earlier Volumes until 31 December 2013. New data are preceded by a 
reference to the most recent previous entry in the multilateral treaties section of 
the Asian Yearbook of International Law. In case no new data are available, the 
title of the treaty is listed with a reference to the last Volume containing data on 
the treaty involved. For the purpose of this section, states broadly situated west 
of Iran, north of Mongolia, east of Papua New Guinea and south of Indonesia 
will not be covered. 
NOTE:
•  Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data were derived from 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, https://treaties.
un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx
•  Where reference is made to the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law (HccH), data were derived from https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions
•  Where reference is made to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
date were derived from http://ola.iaea.org/ola/treaties/multi.html 
•  Where reference is made to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), data were derived from <http://www.icao.int/Secretariat/Legal/
Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx>
•  Where reference is made to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), data were derived from <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/>
•  Where reference is made to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), data were derived from <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:1:0> 
•  Where reference is made to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
data were derived from <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Statu-
sOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx>
1 Compiled by Dr. Karin Arts, Professor of International Law and Development at the 
International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), based 
in The Hague, The Netherlands.
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•  Where reference is made to the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, data 
were derived from <http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e>
•  Where reference is made to the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), data were derived from <http://
portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html> 
• Where reference is made to WIPO, data were derived from <http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en>  
•  Where reference is made to the Worldbank, data were derived from 
<www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members#4> 
• Reservations and declarations made upon signature or ratification 
are not included.
•  Sig. = Signature; Cons. = Consent to be bound; Eff. date = Effective 
date; E.i.f. = Entry into force; Min. age spec. = Minimum age specified; 
Rat. = Ratification or accession
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ANTARCTICA
(Status as provided by the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty)
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959: see Vol. 6 p. 234.
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 99)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Myanmar  16 Apr 2013
CULTURAL PROPERTY 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, 1954: see Vol. 13 p. 263.
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, 1954: see Vol. 13 p. 263.
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 1972: see Vol. 18 p. 100.
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 2005: see Vol. 18 p. 100.
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 100)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Myanmar  5 Sep 2013
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 13 p. 263)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
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 State Sig. Cons.
 Cambodia  17 Sep 2013
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
2003
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 100)
(Status as provided by UNESCO)
 State Sig. Cons
 Malaysia   23 Jul 2013 
DEVELOPMENT MATTERS
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1982: see Vol. 7 pp. 
323-324.
Agreement to Establish the South Centre, 1994: see Vol. 7 p. 324.
Amendments to the Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 
1998: see Vol. 10 p. 267.
Multilateral Agreement for the Establishment of an International 
Think Tank for Landlocked Developing Countries, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 101)
Entry into force: not yet
 State Sig.  Cons
 Afghanistan 19 Oct 2011 20 Feb 2013
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, 1965: see Vol. 11 p. 245.
Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of 
the Court: see Vol. 18 p. 101.
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ENVIRONMENT, FAUNA AND FLORA
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
as amended, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1969: see Vol. 15 p. 215.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969: see Vol. 9 p. 284.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Wa-
terfowl Habitat, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, 1972, as amended: see Vol. 7 p. 325.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution 
by Substances Other Than Oil, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 239.
Protocol to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1976: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Protocol Relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships 1978, as amended: see Vol. 15 p. 225.
Protocol to amend the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1982: see Vol. 13 p. 265.
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985: see Vol. 15 p. 215.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987: see Vol. 16 
p. 161.
Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1987: see 
Vol. 13 p. 266.
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and 
Cooperation, 1990: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
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Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1990: see Vol. 15 p. 216.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: see Vol. 13 p. 266.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: see Vol. 14 p. 229.
Protocol to amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992: see Vol. 16 p. 161.
UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994: 
see Vol. 11 p. 247.
Amendment to the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995: see Vol. 12 p. 238.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Dam-
age, 2001: see Vol. 18 p. 104.
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1989
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 161)
 State Sig.   Rat.
 Afghanistan 22 Mar 1989 25 Mar 2013
Protocol to Amend the 1972 International Convention on the Estab-
lishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage
London, 27 November 1992
Entry into Force: 30 May 1996
(Status as provided by IMO)
 State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
 Brunei 31 Jan 2002 31 Jan 2003
 Cambodia 8 Jun 2001 8 Jun 2002
 China 5 Jan 1999 5 Jan 2000
 India 21 Jun 2000 21 Jun 2000
 Iran 5 Nov 2008 5 Nov 2009
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 Japan 24 Aug 1994 30 May 1996
 Korea (Rep.) 7 Mar 1997 16 May 1998
 Malaysia 9 Jun 2004 9 Jun 2005
 Maldives 20 May 2005 20 May 2006
 Papua New Guinea 23 Jan 2001 23 Jan 2002
 Philippines 7 Jul 1997 7 Jul 1998
 Singapore 31 Dec 1997 31 Dec 1998
 Sri Lanka 22 Jan 1999 22 Jan 2000
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 103)
 State  Cons.
 Papua New Guinea  12 Nov 2013
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 161)
 State Sig.  Cons.
 Afghanistan  25 Mar 2013
Rotterdam Convention on the  
Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain  
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 1998
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 162)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Afghanistan  6 Mar 2013
 Cambodia  1 Mar 2013
 Indonesia 11 Sep 1998 24 Sep 2013
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1999
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 103)
 State  Cons.
 Iran  14 Feb 2013
 Papua New Guinea  12 Nov 2013
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 217)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Afghanistan  20 Feb 2013
International Convention on the  
Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships
London, 5 Oct 2001
Entry into Force: 17 September 2008
(Status as provided by IMO)
 State Cons. (dep). E.i.f.
 China 7 Mar 2011 7 Jun 2011
 Japan 8 Jul 2003 17 Sep 2008
 Iran 6 Apr 2011 6 Jul 2011
 Korea (Rep.) 24 Jul 2008 24 Oct 2008
 Malaysia 27 Sep 2010 27 Dec 2010
 Mongolia 28 Sep 2011 28 Dec 2011
 Singapore  31 Dec 2009 31 Mar 2010
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001
(Continued from Vol. 15 pp. 217)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Afghanistan  20 Feb 2013
International Convention for the Control and  
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments
London, 13 February 2004
Entry into Force: not yet
(Status as provided by IMO)
 State Cons. (dep.)  E.i.f.
 Iran 6 Apr 2011
 Korea (Rep.) 10 Dec 2009
 Malaysia 27 Sep 2010
 Maldives 22 Jun 2005
 Mongolia 28 Sep 2012
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FAMILY MATTERS
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Main¬tenance, 1956: see Vol. 11 
p. 249.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards 
Children, 1956: see Vol.6 p. 244.
Convention on the Conflicts of Law Relating to the Form of Testamentary 
Dispositions, 1961: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 1962: see Vol. 8 p. 178.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, 1973: see 
Vol. 6 p. 244.
Convention on Protection of Children and  
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 1993
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 168).
 State Sig. Cons.
 Korea (Rep.) 24 May 2013
FINANCE
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 1965: see Vol. 7 
p. 327.
Convention Establishing the  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 240)
(Status as provided by the World Bank)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Myanmar  16 Dec 2013
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HEALTH
Protocol Concerning the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, 1946: 
see Vol. 6 p. 245.
World Health Organization Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control, 2003
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 105)
 State Sig. Rat.
 Tajikistan  21 Jun 2013
HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953: see Vol. 10 p. 273.
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957: see Vol. 10 p. 274.
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960: see Vol. 16 p. 164.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966: 
see Vol. 14 p. 231.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966: see Vol. 16 p. 165. 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, 1966: see Vol. 8 p. 179.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966, see: Vol. 15 p. 219.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 1979: see Vol. 11 p. 250.
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985: see Vol. 6 p. 248.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1989: 
see Vol. 18 p. 106.
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International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1992, see Vol. 12 p. 242.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, 1999: see Vol. 17 p. 170.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000: see 
Vol. 18 p. 106.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities, 2008: see Vol. 18 p. 107.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 2010: see Vol. 16 p. 166.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or  
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 106)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Vietnam  7 Nov 2013 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 106)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Mongolia  24 Sep 2013
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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2008
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 107).
 State Sig. Cons.
 Korea (DPR) 3 Jul 2013
 Papua New Guinea 2 Jun 2011 26 Sep 2013
 Singapore 30 Nov 2012 18 Jul 2013
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from En-
forced Disappearance, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 107)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Cambodia  27 Jun 2013
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, I-IV, 1949: 
see Vol. 11 p. 252.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
1977, see: Vol. 18 p. 107.
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 1977, see: Vol. 12 p. 244.
Protocol III Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 2005: 
see Vol. 17 p. 171.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as amended 
1979: see Vol. 18 p. 108.
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 as 
amended 1979: see Vol. 18 p. 108.
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Madrid Union Concerning the International Registration of Marks, includ-
ing the Madrid Agreement 1891 as amended in 1979, and the Madrid 
Protocol 1989: see Vol. 16 p. 168.
Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6 p. 251. 
Protocols 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: 
see Vol. 6 p. 251.
Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and 
Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 1957 as amended 
in 1979: see Vol. 13 p. 271.
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
1967: see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970 as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 
and 2001: see Vol. 15 p. 221.
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Un-
authorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright 
Royalties, 1979: see Vol. 6 p. 252.
Trademark Law Treaty, 1994: see Vol. 15 p. 222.
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996: see Vol. 18, p. 109.
Patent Law Treaty, 2000: see Vol. 17 p. 172.
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, 2006: see Vol. 18 p.110.
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Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970  
as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 and 2001
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 221)
(Status as provided by WIPO)
 State Party
 Iran 4 Jul 2013
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Slavery Convention, 1926 as amended in 1953: see Vol. 15 p. 223.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948: see Vol. 8 p. 182.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956: see Vol. 14 p. 236.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft, 1963: see Vol. 9 p. 289.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 1968: see Vol. 6 p. 254.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970: see 
Vol. 8 p. 289. 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, 1971: see Vol. 8 p. 290.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid, 1973: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973: see 
Vol. 14 p. 236
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979: see Vol. 
16 p. 171.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, 1988: see Vol. 18 p. 111.
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Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988: see Vol. 18 p. 112.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serv-
ing International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
1988, see Vol. 12 p. 247.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 254.
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec-
tion, 1991: see Vol. 15 p. 224.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
1994: see Vol. 11 p. 255.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997: 
see Vol. 14 p. 236.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998: see Vol. 16 p. 171.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism, 1999: see Vol. 15 p. 224.
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supple-
menting the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, 2000: see Vol. 15 p. 224.
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2001: see Vol. 17 p. 174.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2003: see Vol. 17 p. 175.
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United Nations Convention Against  
Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 112)
 State Sig. Rat.
 Maldives  4 Feb 2013
 Thailand 13 Dec 2000 17 Oct 2013
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 112)
 State Sig. Rat.
 Thailand 18 Dec 2001 17 Oct 2013
International Convention for the  
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 172) 
 State Sig. Rat.
 Afghanistan 29 Dec 2005 25 Mar 2013
INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
(see also: Privileges and Immunities)
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975: see Vol. 6 
p. 257.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 
1974: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: 
see Vol. 14 p. 239.
UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in 
Interna¬tional Trade, 1991: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
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United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts, 2005: see Vol. 16 p. 173.
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 1965: see Vol. 17 p. 176.
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION
Convention on Civil Procedure, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 258.
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents, 1961: see Vol. 17 p. 176.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965: see Vol. 9 p. 291.
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, 1970: see Vol. 16 p. 173. 
LABOUR
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (ILO Conv. 122): see Vol. 8 p. 186.
Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention 
(ILO Conv. 187), 2006: see Vol. 18 p. 114.
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ILO Conv. 29)
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 226)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
Freedom of Association and Protection of the  
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (ILO Conv. 87)
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 226)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
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Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining  
Convention, 1949 (ILO Conv. 98)
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 226)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (ILO Conv. 100)
(Continued from Vol. 14 p. 240)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ILO Conv. 105)
(Continued Vol. 12 p. 250)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 
(ILO Conv. 111)
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 250)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (ILO Conv. 138)
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 114)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. reg. Min. age spec.
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013 16
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Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (ILO Conv. 182)
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 174)
(Status as provided by the ILO)
 State Rat. registered
 Maldives 4 Jan 2013
 Myanmar 18 Dec 2013
NARCOTIC DRUGS
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Nar-
cotic Drugs, concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 
11 February 1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 
27 November 1931 and at Geneva on 26 June 1936, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal 
Trade in, and Use of, Prepared Opium and amended by Protocol, 1925, 
amended 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
International Opium Convention, 1925, amended by Protocol 1946: see 
Vol. 7 p. 334.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, 1931, amended 
by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribu-
tion of Narcotic Drugs, 1931, and amended by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 
7 p. 334.
Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope 
of the Convention of 1931, as amended by the Protocol of 1946: see 
Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 
1936, amended 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, 
the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of 
Opium, 1953: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
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Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by Protocol 1972: 
see Vol. 15 p. 227.
Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1972: see 
Vol. 15 p. 227.
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954: see Vol. 17 
p. 178.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980: see Vol. 
12 p. 252.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
concerning Acquisition of Nationality, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations con-
cerning Acquisition of Nationality, 1963: see Vol. 8 p. 187.
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963: see Vol. 17 p. 179.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980: see Vol. 
18 p. 116.
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and 
the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy), 1980: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994: see Vol. 18 p. 117.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997: 
see Vol. 16 p. 178.
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Protocol to Amend the 1963 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, 1997: see Vol. 17 p. 180.
Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, 2005: see Vol. 18 p. 117.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 117)
(Status as provided by IAEA) 
 State Sig. Cons. (deposit)
 Laos  10 May 2013
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radio-
logical Emergency, 1986
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 179) 
(Status as provided by IAEA) 
 State Sig. Cons. (deposit)
 Laos  10 May 2013
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 1997
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 116)
(Status as provided by IAEA) 
 State Sig Cons. (deposit)
 Vietnam  9 Oct 2013
OUTER SPACE
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, 1967: see Vol. 16 p. 178.
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Ce-
lestial Bodies, 1979: see Vol. 10 p. 284.
Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space, 1974: 
see Vol. 15 p. 229.
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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946: 
see Vol. 14 p. 242.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 
1947: see Vol. 7 p. 338.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations con-
cerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations con-
cerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, 2004: see Vol. 15 p. 230.
Convention on the Privileges  
and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946
(Continued from Vol. 14 p. 242)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Brunei  1 Aug 2013
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961
(Continued from Vol. 13 p. 277)
 State Sig.  Cons.
 Brunei   24 May 2013
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963
(Continued from Vol. 13 p. 278)
 State Sig.  Cons.
 Brunei   24 May 2013
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REFUGEES
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
ROAD TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention on Road Traffic, 1968: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968: see Vol. 7 p. 338.
SEA
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958: see 
Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 7 p. 339.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 272.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (…) relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, 1995:  see Vol. 18 p. 119.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 182)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Timor Leste  8 Jan 2013
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Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1994
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 182)
   State Sig. Cons.
 Timor Leste  8 Jan 2013
SEA TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORT
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels em-
ployed in Inland Navigation, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as 
amended: see Vol. 12 p. 255.
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966: see Vol. 15 p. 230.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969: see 
Vol. 15 p. 231.
Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 275.
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972: see Vol. 
10 p. 286.
Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973: 
see Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974: see Vol. 
6 p. 276.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974: see Vol. 15 p. 
231.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1974 as amended 1978: see Vol. 12 p. 256.
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1988: 
see Vol. 17 p. 183.
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Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea, 1988: see Vol. 18 p. 120.
Convention on the International Regulations for  
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 231)
(Status as provided by IMO) 
 State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
 Philippines 10 Jun 2013 10 Jun 2013
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972
(Continued from Vol. 10 p. 286)
(Status as provided by IMO) 
 State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
 Vietnam 30 Sep 2013 not yet
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, as amended, 1978.
London 7 July 1978
Entry into Force: 28 April 1984
(Status as provided by IMO) 
 State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
 Bangladesh 6 Nov 1981 28 Apr 1984
 Brunei  23 Oct 1986 23 Jan 1987
 Cambodia 8 Jun 2001 8 Sep 2001
 China 8 Jun 1981 28 Apr 1984
 India 16 Nov 1984 16 Feb 1985
 Indonesia 27 Jan 1987 27 Apr 1987
 Iran 1 Aug 1996 1 Nov 1996
 Japan 27 May 1982 28 Apr 1984
 Kazachstan 7 Mar 1994 7 Jun 1994
 Korea (DPR) 1 May 1985 1 Aug 1985
 Korea (Rep) 4 Apr 1985 4 Jul 1985
 Malaysia 30 Jan 1992 30 Apr 1992
 Maldives 22 Jan 1987 22 Apr 1987
 Mongolia 26 Jun 2002 26 Sep 2002
 Myanmar 4 May 1988 4 Aug 1988
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 Pakistan 10 Apr 1985 19 Jul 1985
 Papua New Guinea 28 Oct 1991 28 Jan 1992
 Philippines 22 Feb 1984 22 May 1984
 Singapore 1 May 1988 1 Aug 1988
 Sri Lanka 22 Jan 1987 22 Apr 1987
 Thailand 19 Jun 1997 19 Sep 1997
 Turkmenistan 4 Feb 2009 4 May 2009
 Vietnam 18 Dec 1990 18 Mar 1991
SOCIAL MATTERS
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 
1904, amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 
1910, amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 
1910, amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and 
Children, 1921: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 
1921, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and 
Traffic in Obscene Publications, 1923: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traffic in, Ob-
scene Publications, 1923, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of 
Full Age, 1933: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age, 1933, 
amended by Protocol, 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploi-
tation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
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Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: 
see Vol. 12 p. 257.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 1976: see Vol. 13 p. 280.
Amendment to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the Asia-
Pacific Telecommunity, 1981: see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendments to articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunity, 1991:  see Vol. 9 p. 298.
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Devel-
opment, 1977: see Vol. 10 p. 287.
Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources 
for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, 1998: see Vol. 15 p. 232.
Amendments to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for 
Broadcasting Development, 1999: see Vol. 10 p. 288.
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 2002: 
see Vol. 13 p. 280.
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization 
(INMARSAT), 1976 (as amended)
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 193)
(Status as provided by IMO) 
 State Sig. Cons.
 Korea (DPR) 15 Oct 2013 15 Oct 2013
TREATIES
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or Between International Organizations, 1986: 
see Vol. 6 p. 280.
Participation in Multilateral Treaties 199
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 258)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Timor Leste  8 Jan 2013
WEAPONS
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare, 1925: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space 
and Under Water, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: see Vol. 11 p. 
262.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and 
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 282.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, 1972: see Vol. 13 p. 281.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, 1976: see Vol. 12 p. 258.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to 
have Indiscriminate Effects, and Protocols, 1980: see Vol. 11 p. 263.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1993: see 
Vol. 12 p. 259.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997: see 
Vol. 13 p. 281.
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008: see Vol. 16 p. 259.
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 259)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Brunei  22 Jan 97 10 Jan 2013 
Amendment of Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons  
which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have  
Indiscriminate Effects, 2001
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 259)
 State Sig. Cons.
 Bangladesh   26 Sep 2013
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State Practice of Asian States in the  
Field of International Law
EDITORIAL NOTE
The Editorial Board has decided to reorganize the format of this section 
from Volume 16 (2010) onwards. Since the Yearbook’s inception, state 
practice has always been reported and written up as country reports. 
While this format has served us well in the intervening years, we felt that 
it would make a lot more sense if we reported state practice thematically, 
rather than geographically. This way, readers will have an opportunity 
to zoom in on a particular topic of interest and get a quick overview of 
developments within the region. Of course, this reorganization cannot 
address our lack of coverage in some Asian states. We aim to improve on 
this in forthcoming volumes and thank the contributors to this section 
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Air Law
CHINA
AIR LAW – ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION 
ZONE IN EAST CHINA SEA
On November 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s 
Republic of China issued a statement on establishing the East China Sea 
Air Defense Identification Zone. The full text is as follows:
Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
on Establishing the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone. Issued by the Ministry of National Defense on November 23.
The government of the People’s Republic of China announces the 
establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 
in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
National Defense (March 14, 1997), the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Civil Aviation (October 30, 1995) and the Basic Rules 
on Flight of the People’s Republic of China (July 27, 2001). 
The zone includes the airspace within the area enclosed by 
China’s outer limit of the territorial sea and the following six 
points: 33°11’N (North Latitude) and 121°47’E (East Longitude), 
33°11’N and 125°00’E, 31°00’N and 128°20’E, 25°38’N and 125°00’E, 
24°45’N and 123°00’E, 26°44’N and 120°58’E.1
On the same day, China’s Ministry of National Defense issued an an-
nouncement of the aircraft identification rules for the East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Republic of China. The full 
text is as follows:
Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the People’s Re-
public of China. Issued by the Ministry of National Defense on 
November 23.
1  Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing 




The Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of 
China, in accordance with the Statement by the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China on Establishing the East China 
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, now announces the Aircraft 
Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identifica-
tion Zone as follows:
First, aircraft f lying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone must abide by these rules.
Second, aircraft f lying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identifica-
tion Zone must provide the following means of identification:
1.  Flight plan identification. Aircrafts f lying in the East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone should report the 
f light plans to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China or the Civil Aviation Administration of 
China.
2.  Radio identification.  Aircrafts f lying in the East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must maintain 
the two-way radio communications, and respond in a timely 
and accurate manner to the identification inquiries from 
the administrative organ of the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone or the unit authorized by the organ. 
3.  Transponder identification. Aircrafts flying in the East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, if equipped with 
the secondary radar transponder, should keep the transpon-
der working throughout the entire course.
4.  Logo identification. Aircraft f lying in the East China 
Sea Air Defense Identification Zone must clearly mark their 
nationalities and the logo of their registration identification 
in accordance with related international treaties.
Third, aircraft[s] f lying in the East China Sea Air Defense Identi-
fication Zone should follow the instructions of the administrative 
organ of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone or 
the unit authorized by the organ. China’s armed forces will adopt 
defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not 
cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions.
Fourth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Re-
public of China is the administrative organ of the East China Sea 
Air Defense Identification Zone.
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Fifth, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic 
of China is responsible for the explanation of these rules.
Sixth, these rules will come into force at 10 am November 23, 
2013.2
INDONESIA
Agreement between the Government of  
the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space
On 2 October 2013, Indonesia and China signed an agreement relating to 
cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. Within the 
Agreement, both parties have agreed on the fact that outer space is one 
of the common heritages of mankind, meaning that outer space shall be 
used for the benefits of all countries and must not be exploited based on 
national interests. 
The Agreement is mainly focused on cooperation for peaceful pur-
poses such as scientific research and the development of new satellites; 
launch and control service of all satellites including the management and 
operation within the orbit; and the utilisation of satellites data. All of the 
activities that will be conducted by both parties will be held through a joint 
research and training with notable outer space experts and free-sharing 
scientific information through academic workshops or seminars for and 
by both parties. 
By establishing this Agreement, Indonesia and China are both aiming 
to achieve and strengthen the beneficial relationship through scientific 
and technology development within outer space based on mutual interest 
and lawful act.
2 Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense 






ACCEPTANCE OF REFUGEES – STATUS OF MYANMAR (ROHINGYA) 
REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH – UNDOCUMENTED FOREIGN 
NATIONALS – ACCEPTANCE OF REFUGEES ON HUMANITARIAN 
GROUNDS 
National Strategy on Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar 
Nationals 2013
The government of Bangladesh, in its Cabinet meeting of 9 September 
2013, adopted the National Strategy Paper on Myanmar Refugees and 
Undocumented Myanmar Nationals 2013 (the Strategy) in order to address 
the situation of the registered refugees as well as the undocumented Myan-
mar nationals living in Bangladesh. Being the first national initiative, this 
Strategy aims to provide a long-term solution to the challenges presented by 
the presence of a large number of undocumented Myanmar population in 
Bangladesh. The Strategy calls these people as “undocumented Myanmar 
nationals.” Myanmar does not, however, recognise them as its citizens/
nationals. Therefore, for all practical purposes, both the registered refugees 
and the undocumented Rohingyas are stateless people. 
One of the main purposes of this Strategy is to provide ‘temporary 
basic humanitarian relief ’ (e.g. health, food, water, sanitation, and nutri-
tion) to these people. Other key objectives of this Strategy have been to: 
(a) record or survey the undocumented Myanmar Nationals (UMNs), 
(b) strengthen Bangladesh-Myanmar border management, (c) to sustain 
diplomatic engagement with Myanmar at bilateral and multilateral levels, 
and (d) to establish a national-level coordination through a National Task 
Force (NTF) and a District Task Force (DTF). The Bangladesh government 
intends to  identify undocumented Rohingyas  living outside of the two 
official camps, and to collect data relating to their socio-economic condi-
tions, age, education, and occupation in the source-country, Myanmar. 
Bangladesh has not joined the 1951 Refugee Convention, but accepted 
some 250,877 Myanmar nationals (Rohingyas) in 1978 and 1991 as refugees 
out of ‘humanitarian considerations.’ In the following years, the vast ma-
jority of these Myanmar refugees were repatriated to Myanmar, following 
an “intense diplomatic engagement with the government of Myanmar” 
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and with the cooperation of the UN High Commission for Refugees. Ap-
proximately 30,000 registered refugees, however, have been living in the 
two official camps in Bangladesh since then. In addition to the registered 
refugees, around 300,000 to 500,000 undocumented Myanmar nationals 
have settled in villages and towns without intervention of the authorities 
(known as ‘self-settled’ Myanmar nationals). Notably, after the adoption 
of the abovementioned national Strategy, Bangladesh has been working 
in partnership with international organisations to implement several 
measures to protect Rohingyas refugees in Bangladesh. 
Diplomacy to resolve the problem of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
In 2013, Bangladesh launched a discussion in the Organisation of Islamic 
Council (OIC), with a view to establish and extend international support 
towards resolving the Rohingya refugee problems. On 13-16 November 
2013, the OIC Contact Group on Rohingya Muslims visited Myanmar to 
inspect the conditions of Rohingyas in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. 
Bangladesh joined as a member of this Contact Group.  
CHINA
ALIENS – REGULATION ON ADMINISTRATION OF EXIT AND ENTRY
On July 12, 2013, the State Council adopted the Regulations on Admin-
istration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners. This set of regulations has five 
chapters. Chapter 1 is about the general principles, Chapter 2 is about the 
categories of visas and the issuance of the visas, Chapter 3 is about the ad-
ministration of stay and residence, Chapter 4 is about the investigation and 
repatriation, and Chapter 5 is about supplementary rules.3 They are aimed 
to implement the Act on Administration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners 
adopted by the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress in 2012.
3  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chujing Rujing Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国税收
征收管理法 [Entry and Exit Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing 




Protocol to Implement the Eighth Package of 
Commitments on Air Transport Services Under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Service
Protocol to Implement the Eighth Package of Commitments on Air Trans-
port Services Under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services was 
signed on 20 December 2013 but has not entered into force. 
The Protocol itself aims to maximise cooperation among member states 
and liberalise trade in services. This Protocol referred to several ASEAN 
Agreements, such as the Protocol to implement previous packages com-
mitment and also the agreement relating to integration of priority sectors 
and the movement of natural persons that contained regulation about the 
trade in goods. The Indonesian Government, along with other member 
states, have agreed to use this Protocol and its annex as an integral part of 
the ASEAN Framework Agreement. 
Protocol to Amend Certain ASEAN  
Economic Agreements Related to Trade in Goods 
On March 8, 2013, a protocol to amend certain ASEAN Economic Agree-
ments related to Trade in Goods was signed and was soon after ratified 
through the Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2014. The Protocol went into 
force after all member states have successfully deposited their instruments 
of ratification or acceptance of the Protocol.
The Protocol itself amends or removes several clauses within the 
ASEAN Economic Agreements. Such amendments include the amend-
ment of Article 2(A)(2) of the Framework Agreement on Enhancing 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation, which was based on the amendment of 
the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and will be the new mechanism for 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In addition, Articles 6(1) and 14 of e-
ASEAN Framework Agreement were also amended. A major change within 
ASEAN Sectoral Integration Protocol is that the revised version consists 
of the elimination of import duties on Priority Integration Sectors and the 
revocation of Article 3 in every ASEAN Sectoral Protocol for agro-based 
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products, automotives, e-ASEAN, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-
based products, textiles and apparel products, and wood-based products. 
MALAYSIA
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – COUNTER TERRORISM – ASEAN 
CONVENTION ON COUNTER TERRORISM – FRAMEWORK FOR 
REGIONAL COOPERATION 
ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
Malaysia ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism on 11 
January 2013. This Convention provides a framework for regional co-
operation to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations. It is also aimed at strengthening cooperation among law 
enforcement agencies and relevant authorities in countering terrorism. 
Amongst the areas of cooperation iterated in the said Convention include 
provision of early warning through exchange of information; preventing 
and suppressing financing of terrorist acts and movement of terrorists 
between borders; capacity building such as trainings and technical co-
operation and regional meetings; promoting inter-faith and intra-faith 
dialogue; cross-border cooperation; exchanging intelligence; strengthening 
the capability and readiness to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism and any new form of terrorism; 
and undertaking research and development measures to counter terrorism.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
– AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ASEAN CENTRE 
FOR BIODIVERSITY – COORDINATION ON THE CONSERVATION 
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF BIODIVERSITY 
Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity
Malaysia ratified the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Cen-
tre for Biodiversity on 31 May 2013. As the title suggests, the Agreement 
establishes an ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity in the Philippines. The said 
Centre will facilitate cooperation and coordination among members of 
ASEAN, and with relevant national governments, regional and interna-
tional organisations, on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the 
use of such biodiversity in the ASEAN region. 
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TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF 
PERSONS – ASEAN AGREEMENT ON THE MOVEMENT OF NATURAL 
PERSON – IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES – PROTECTION OF 
BORDERS AND LABOUR FORCE OF ASEAN MEMBERS 
ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons
Malaysia ratified the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural 
Persons on 17 June 2013. The objectives of the Agreement are to facili-
tate the movement of natural persons engaged in the conduct of trade of 
goods, services and investment between ASEAN Member States; establish 
streamlined and transparent procedures for applications for immigration 
formalities for the temporary entry or stay of natural persons; and protect 
the integrity of the borders of and the domestic labour force and permanent 
employment of ASEAN Member States.
healthcare – medical device act – implementation of 
the asean agreement on medical device directive – 
conformity of medical devices in the asean region 
Medical Device Act 2012 
The Medical Device Act 2012 which came into force on 30 June 2013 was 
enacted to give effect to the ASEAN Agreement on Medical Device Direc-
tive; the said Directive requires ASEAN Member States to take measures to 
ensure that only medical devices that conform to the provisions in the said 
ASEAN Agreement may be placed in the markets of that Member State.
The Act was promulgated with a view to regulate medical devices and 
the industry. The definition of “medical device” in the Act mirrors the 
definition provided in the ASEAN Agreement on Medical Device Direc-
tive. In addition, the Act requires manufacturers to comply with prescribed 
principles of safety and performance; and ensure that medical devices are 
manufactured in accordance with any written directive and labelled, pack-
aged and marked in accordance with the prescribed manner.
The Act also requires all medical devices to be registered under the 
Act before it can be imported, exported, or placed in the market. Failure 
to register attracts a punishment (upon conviction) of a fine not exceeding 
MYR 200,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both.
privacy – personal data protection act 2010 – use of 
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personal data in commercial transactions 
Personal Data Protection Act 2010
The Personal Data Protection Act 2010 came into force on 15 November 
2013 and it has been said that the said Act was enacted as part of Malaysia’s 
commitment to establish an integrated ASEAN Economic Community by 
2015 – one of the priority actions for the ASEAN Economic Community 
2015 includes adopting the best practices/guidelines on cyber-law issues 
such as data privacy and consumer protection in order to support regional 
e-commerce activities.
The Act defines “personal data” as any information, in respect of com-
mercial transactions, which is being processed by means of equipment 
operating automatically in response to given instructions; or recorded 
with the intention of being processed or recorded as part of a relevant 
filing system. The data in question must relate directly or indirectly to a 
data subject who can be identified by or identifiable from that information, 
including any sensitive personal data and expression of opinion about the 
data subject. However, the data excludes information processed for credit 
reporting business.
The Act applies to any person who processes; and who has control over 
or authorises the processing of any personal data in respect of commercial 
transactions. It is based on seven Personal Data Protection Principles, i.e. 
the General Principle; the Notice and Choice Principle; the Disclosure 
Principle; the Security Principle; the Retention Principle; the Data Integrity 




The Philippines v. China Arbitration
On February 19, 2013, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Republic of the Philippines presented its compliments to the Department 
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and, with reference to the latter’s Note 
Verbale No. 13-0211 dated January 22, 2013, stated the following:
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The Position of China on the South China Sea issues has been 
consistent and clear. China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
Nanhai Islands and their adjacent waters. At the core of the disputes 
between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea are 
the territorial disputes over some islands and reefs of the Nansha 
Islands. The two countries also have overlapping jurisdictional 
claims over parts of the maritime area in the South China Sea. The 
direct cause of these disputes has been the illegal occupation by the 
Philippines of some islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands. 
China has been firmly opposed to such illegal occupation. 
The territorial disputes between China and the Philippines are 
still pending and unresolved, but both sides have agreed to settle 
the disputes through bilateral negotiations. By initiating arbitra-
tion proceedings, the Philippines runs counter to the agreement 
between the two countries, and also contravenes the principles and 
spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC), and particularly “to resolve their territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means . . . through friendly con-
sultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned.”  
The Notification and Statement of Claim (hereinafter referred 
to as “Notification”) attached to Note Verbale No. 13-0211 con-
tains grave errors both in fact and in law, and includes many false 
accusations against China. At some places, the Notification even 
seriously violates the “One China” principle, undermining the 
political foundation of the bilateral relationship between China 
and the Philippines. China firmly opposes to this. 
China therefore rejects and returns the Philippines’ Note Ver-
bale No. 13-0211 and the attached Notification. 
China has been committed to resolving disputes peacefully 
through bilateral negotiation, and has made every effort to main-
tain stability and to promote regional cooperation in the South 
China Sea. In March 2010, China made a formal proposal to the 
Philippines on establishing a bilateral regular consultation mecha-
nism on maritime issues, and China has also repeatedly proposed 
to the Philippines to resume the operation of the Confidence Build-
ing Measures Mechanism (CBMs) as established between the two 
countries. The Philippines has failed to respond to the proposals 
mentioned above. 
China hopes that the Philippines will revert to the right track 
of settling the disputes through bilateral negotiations. 
The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China avails itself of 
this opportunity to renew to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
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of the Republic of the Philippines the assurance of its highest 
consideration.4
On April 26, 2013, the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry made the 
following statement:
On 22 January 2013, the Philippines sent China a note verbale, 
attached with a notification, to initiate arbitration proceedings 
against China regarding issues of the South China Sea. On 19 
February, China stated its rejection of the request for arbitration 
by the Philippines and returned the latter’s note verbale and the 
attached notification. The position of China, as indicated above, 
will not change. 
Since the 1970s, the Philippines, in violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations and principles of international law, illegally 
occupied some islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands, in-
cluding Mahuan Dao, Feixin Dao, Zhongye Dao, Nanyao Dao, 
Beizi Dao, Xiyue Dao, Shuanghuang Shazhou and Siling Jiao. 
Firmly and consistently opposed to the illegal occupation by the 
Philippines, China hereby solemnly reiterates its demand that the 
Philippines withdraw all its nationals and facilities from China’s 
islands and reefs. 
The Philippines professed in the notification of 22 January 2013 
that it “does not seek . . . a determination of which Party enjoys 
sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them.” On 22 Janu-
ary, however, the Philippines publicly stated that the purpose for 
initiating the arbitration was to bring to “a durable solution” the 
Philippines-China disputes in the South China Sea. These state-
ments are simply self-contradictory. In addition, by initiating the 
arbitration on the basis of its illegal occupation of China’s islands 
and reefs, the Philippines has distorted the basic facts underlying 
the disputes between China and the Philippines. In so doing, the 
Philippines attempts to deny China’s territorial sovereignty and 
clothes its illegal occupation of China’s islands and reefs with a 
cloak of “legality”. The Philippines’ attempt to seek a so-called 
“durable solution” such as this and the means it has employed to 
that end are absolutely unacceptable to China. 
In accordance with international law, and especially the prin-
ciple of the law of the sea that “land dominates the sea”, determined 
4 Note Verbale from Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of 




territorial sovereignty is the precondition for, and basis of maritime 
delimitation. The claims for arbitration as raised by the Philippines 
are essentially concerned with maritime delimitation between the 
two countries in parts of the South China Sea, and thus inevitably 
involve the territorial sovereignty over certain relevant islands and 
reefs. However, such issues of territorial sovereignty are not the ones 
concerning the interpretation or application of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Therefore, given the fact that 
the Sino-Philippine territorial disputes still remain unresolved, 
the compulsory dispute settlement procedures as contained in 
UNCLOS should not apply to the claims for arbitration as raised 
by the Philippines. Moreover, in 2006, the Chinese Government 
made a declaration in pursuance of Article 298 of UNCLOS, exclud-
ing disputes regarding such matters as those related to maritime 
delimitation from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures, 
including arbitration. Therefore, the request for arbitration by 
the Philippines is manifestly unfounded. China’s rejection of the 
Philippines’ request for arbitration, consequently, has a solid basis 
in international law. 
In the interest of maintaining the Sino-Philippine relations and 
the peace and stability in the South China Sea, China has been 
persistent in pursuing bilateral negotiations and consultations with 
the Philippines to resolve relevant disputes. 
It is a commitment undertaken by all signatories, the Philip-
pines included, under the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC) that disputes relating to territorial 
and maritime rights and interests be resolved through negotia-
tions by sovereign states directly concerned therewith. The DOC 
should be implemented in a comprehensive and serious manner. 
China will adhere to the means of bilateral negotiations to resolve 
territorial and maritime delimitation disputes both in accordance 
with applicable rules of international law and in compliance with 
the spirit of the DOC.5
On August 1, 2013, China addressed a Note Verbale to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in which it reiterated its position that “it does not 
5 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Philippines’ Efforts 
in Pushing for the Establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal in Relation to the Disputes 
Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1035577.shtml.
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accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines” and stated that it was 
not participating in the proceedings.6
Courts and Tribunals
CHINA
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
LAW OF THE SEA (ITLOS)
On November 26, 2013, China filed a written statement with the ITLOS in 
the case of Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission (SRFC). China made the following submissions in 
response to the request by the SFRC (the Request):
(a)  That the conferment of advisory competence upon an in-
ternational court or tribunal, and subsequent variation of the 
competence, are to be based in agreement of the States Parties to 
the constituent treaty of the court or tribunal;
(b)  That there is, at present, no provision in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that can serve as a 
basis for the advisory competence of the full bench of the ITLOS;
(c)  That the applicability of the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction 
is confined to such competence that is both ancillary in nature and 
incidental to the primary jurisdiction of an international court 
or tribunal based in the constitutive instruments, and advisory 
competence belongs to the category of primary jurisdiction;
(d)  That the advisory competence of the full bench of the ITLOS 
may be acquired by way of amendment of UNCLOS;
(e)  That, supposing the full bench of the ITLOS had advisory 
competence, the Request still falls outside that competence; oth-
erwise, there are still factors in Case No. 21 that would require the 
full bench to decline to exercise its competence over the Request;
(f)  That there is much room for enhanced international coopera-
tion with the questions of the Request;
6 The South China Sea (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, at 13 (Perm Ct. 
Arb. 2013), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506.
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(g)  That the SRFC member States may also consider to avail 
themselves of measures recognized in relevant international agree-
ments; and
(h)  That the Chinese Government hereby reserves the right to 
make further comments in the proceedings of Case No. 21.7
On December 9, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement at the 
68th Session of the UNGA on the oceans and the law of the sea. He stated:
[A]s the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea handles more 
and more cases that touch upon ever wider areas, the Tribunal is 
enjoying growing influence and has entered a new phase of com-
prehensively fulfilling its mandate under the Convention. The 
Chinese delegation supports the Tribunal as it continues to play 
an important role in the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes, 
the maintenance of international maritime order and the dissemi-
nation of the law of the sea. We appreciate the active role played 
by the Tribunal in helping developing countries with capacity-
building. At the same time, we believe that neither UNCLOS nor 
the Tribunal’s statute confirm advisory competence upon the full 
Bench of the Tribunal. We hope that the Tribunal will take into full 
consideration the concerns of the various parties and deal carefully 
with Case No. 21, Request for an advisory opinion submitted by 
the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), in order to ensure 
the legitimacy and authority of its work.8
7 ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission: Written Statement of the People’s Republic of 
China 41-42 (2013), http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/
case_no.21/written_statements_round1/C21_8_China_orig_Eng.pdf.
8 U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 63rd plen. mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.63 (Dec. 9, 2013).
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Criminal Law 
BANGLADESH 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW – INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW – HUMAN RIGHTS – CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL (CRIMINAL) LAWS – STATUTES OF THE ICC, 
ICTY, AND ICTR – INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS – FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS 
Abdul Quader Molla v. Chief Prosecutor of International Crimes Tribunal 
[Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 2013; 22 BLT (2014) AD 8; Judgment Septem-
ber 17, 2013; Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh] 
Abdul Quader Mollah v. Chief Prosecutor of International Crimes Tribu-
nal, Bangladesh [22 BLT (2014) AD 541; Review Decision of December 
12, 2013; Appellate Division]
The Chief Prosecutor v. Abdul Quader Molla [ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 
2012; 65 DLR (2013) AD 1; Judgment February 5, 2013] 
In Abdul Quader Molla, the appellant was convicted by the International 
Crimes Tribunal (ICT) in 2013 on charges of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes committed by the convict in 1971 during the Bangladesh war 
of independence. Mr. Molla was sentenced to a life term. On appeal, the 
Appellate Division replaced the life imprisonment with the death penalty. 
A petition for review of the conviction and the death penalty was lodged 
with the Appellate Division, but was unsuccessful. The question before the 
Appellate Division was whether the ICT should have applied customary 
international law in the trial of international crimes under Bangladesh’s 
domestic law. The defence argued that the crimes under the International 
Crimes Tribunal Act 1973 of Bangladesh must be proved by applying the 
test of international criminal laws. 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Abdul Quader Molla 
came to a unanimous decision that, although the ICT is required to follow 
municipal laws as a domestic court, it could rely on customary interna-
tional law principle if there is a clear gap in the domestic law. The Court 
found the 1973 Act sufficient for the trial of war criminals (per Miah, 
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J.).9 The Court rejected the objection that international standards of fair 
trial were not followed by the ICT. Sinha, J. commented that “[t]here is no 
doubt that the trials [in ICTs] are held in accordance with international 
legal and human rights standards,”10 while Miah, J. held that “the essence 
of fair trial” is instilled into the 1973 Act.11 Chowdhury, J. also discussed 
the fair trial issues and found that the 1973 Act incorporated the global 
concept of due process. 
On the other hand, the trial court, the International Crimes Tribunal 
(ICT No. 2), remarked that the provisions of the 1973 Act are at par “with 
the rights of the accused as granted by Article 14 of the ICCPR” (quot-
ing the Appellate Division’s appellate judgment in Molla).12 The ICT No. 
2 discussed several decisions of different chambers of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons responsible for serious violations of International 
Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). This approach, which is quite appreciable, was overruled at the 
Appellate Division by Miah, J., who found no reason to look at international 
decisions while adjudicating under a domestic law.13 On this, Chowdhury, 
J.’s view that ratio or observation made by the international criminal tri-
bunals created by the United Nations may be relied on by “treating them 
as persuasive, rather than binding authorities”14 seems to be more logical. 
Regarding the applicability of international law in domestic jurisdic-
tion concerning war crimes trials, the majority view was that “there is no 
doubt” that the international laws and customs are applicable in the ICTs 
of Bangladesh, especially with regard to the offences not defined in the 
domestic law of 1973.15 In support of its reasoning, the Court cited previ-
ous decisions on the question of general application of international law in 
9 Abdul Quader Molla v. Chief Prosecutor of International Crimes Tribunal (2014) 
22 BLT (AD) 8, at 261. 
10 Id. at 77.
11 Id. at 273.
12 Id. at 515.
13 Id. at 261.
14 Id. at 575. 
15 Id. at 99.
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Bangladesh,16 as well as jurisprudence and practice of several international 
criminal tribunals, such as the ICTY, ICTR, and International Criminal 
Court (ICC). The Appellate Division further explained that the Act of 1973 
defines a number of offences including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, while also empowering the ICTs to try ‘any other crimes under 
international law.’ While it is not imperative for the tribunal to follow 
customary international law while trying the offences defined in the Act 
of 1973 such as the offence of crimes against humanity,17 a person charged 
with ‘any other crimes under international law’ is entitled to claim the ap-
plication by the tribunal of customary international law.
In its appellate judgment, the Appellate Division discussed customary 
international law principles and drew a vivid account of the development 
and evolution of international humanitarian law. The Court cited the 
1899 Conference for codifying the rules of land warfare, the Four Geneva 
Conventions, Hague Conventions, the Treaty of Versailles, the Nuremberg 
Charter, the statutes of the Tokyo Tribunal, ICTY, ICTR, and ICC. In 
endorsing the victim’s “right to punish” the perpetrators, the Court ap-
provingly quoted Hugo Grotius who wrote that, “the very commission of 
the crime creates a legal connection between the offender and the victim 
such as vests in the victim the right to punish the offender . . . .”18 
For the Court, there is no denial of the fact that the provisions of the 
Act of 1973 are in conformity with international standards and reflect “in-
ternational due process.”19 The provisions discussed the rise of international 
16 The cases cited were: Hossain Mohammad Ershad v. Bangladesh 21 BLD 
(AD) 69; Bangladesh v. Sheikh Hasina 60 DLR (AD) 90; and M/S. Supermax 
International Private Ltd. v. Samah Razor Blades Industries 2 ADC 593. 
17 On this, the Court held that “[i]t is also not correct to infer that the 
constituent elements of [c]rimes against [h]umanity as recognised under 
the international law must be present for convicting a person in respect of a 
charge of [c]rimes against [h]umanity,” because this offence was defined in 
the domestic law. Relevantly, it further observed that, “our tribunal which 
is a domestic judicial body . . . is not obliged by the provisions contained 
in the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute is not binding upon tribunal for 
resolving the issue of elements require[d] to constitute the offen[c]e of 
crime against humanity.” [(2013) 65 DLR (AD) 1, 27, ¶ 130].
18 Molla, 22 BLT (2014) AD 8 at 41-42. 
19 Id. at 87.
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criminal tribunals, citing them as a catalyst for the regime of domestic 
prosecution of individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.20 It endorsed the view of an international law scholar, Professor 
James Crawford, that ‘the vast majority of prosecutions for international 
crimes will take place at the domestic level’ because the ICC lacks the 
capacity to prosecute large members of accused.21 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW – 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY – RETROSPECTIVITY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW TO TRY INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
Murshedur Rahman Chowdhury v. Bangladesh and Others [67 DLR 
(2015) HCD 69; June 19, 2013; per M. Moazzam Husain, J. agreeing with 
Sheikh Hasan Arif, J.; High Court Division]
Facts
In this constitutional petition, the legality of section 3 of the International 
Crimes (Tribunal) (Amendment) Act 2009 was challenged. This amend-
ment expanded the jurisdiction of ICTs to try “any individual or group 
of individuals” for international crimes, including war crimes committed 
during the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971, and was given retrospec-
tive effect. Initially, the governing law of the ICTs provided only for trial 
of members of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces on charges of war 
crimes. The petitioner also challenged the legality of section 19 of the 
Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 2011 that expanded the ambit 
of exception to the rule against retrospectivity of criminal laws in article 
47(3) of the Bangladesh Constitution, which provided that constitutional 
validity of the prosecution of “any individual, group of individuals or or-
ganization” for war crimes could not be challenged. The central argument 
of the petitioner was that these amendments constituted a “colourable 
exercise of legislative power” and curtailed the guarantees of fundamental 
rights of the citizens. 
20 Id. at 90.
21 Id. 
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Decisions and Reasoning 
The High Court Division of the Supreme Court summarily rejected the 
petition, observing that the 2009 amendment to the International Crimes 
(Tribunals) Act 1973 was made to facilitate the trial of all perpetrators, 
either individuals or groups/organizations, for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes that are offences recognized in international law. 
The Court endorsed the 2009 amendment by stating that the introduction 
of the expression ‘any individual or group of individuals’ is nothing new 
and is compatible with international practices. The Court argued: 
[t]rial and punishment of individuals for committing war crimes 
and crimes against humanity are recognized in international law. 
Individual[s] cannot escape [the criminal] liability . . . . In all inter-
national tribunals including the Nuremberg [Tribunal], [the] ICTY 
and [the] ICTR[,] one thing [that] was done in common [was] the 
trial of individuals for war crimes and crimes against humanity. No 
question was ever raised disputing ‘individual [criminal] liability’ 
in [the prosecution of] war crimes or crime against humanity.  
To revert the petitioner’s argument on the ground of “rule against retroac-
tive legislation,” the Court resorted to Hans Kelsen’s theory, and observed 
as follows: 
The crime sought to be tried by the ICT is pre-existing under the 
international law. The international law is to be found not only in 
treatise[,] but also in the customs and practices of states[,] which 
gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general 
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by the military 
courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the 
needs of a changing world. The crimes under international law are 
found in the customary international law. And all the charters of 
trial of war crimes or crimes against humanity are the expression 
of the then existing customary international law. The Nuremberg 
trial is the first of its kind in the international level where [the] 
trial of crimes under international law took place. Therefore, the 
maxim “nullem crimen sine lege” (no punishment of crime without 
a pre-existing law) has no application [in case of ICT trials] . . . .
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INDONESIA
Law No. 13 of 2015 regarding Treaty on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
The Agreement between Indonesia and Vietnam relating to legal assis-
tance in criminal matters was signed in Jakarta on 27 June 2013 and soon 
was ratified into Law No. 13 of 2015. The close relationship between the 
parties triggered the establishment of mutual legal assistance relating to 
criminal matters. 
Specifically, the aim of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation in 
the field of investigation and prosecution of conviction, bearing in mind 
that assistance shall be carried out accordingly with each party’s mutual 
respect for the other’s sovereignty and based on their national regulations. 
Assistance can be carried out within the territory or jurisdiction of the 
requesting party. The scope of legal assistance between parties is the in-
vestigation for evidence (person and goods); the taking of evidence from 
both parties; the sharing of information relating to the matters at hand; 
the execution for search and seizure; the regulation of people who provide 
evidence to assist in investigation, prosecution and criminal proceedings; 
and other necessary measures. 
In regard to this Agreement being carried out, there is an exception on 
the applicability. This Agreement cannot be carried out to arrest or detain 
a person in extradition; to transfer the convict to enforce sentence; or to 
transfer the criminal proceedings. This Agreement does not provide the 
right to one of the parties to carry out the jurisdiction and to execute the 
function that were owned exclusively by related institutions.
MALAYSIA
CRIMINAL LAW– DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT 1952 – BRINGING 
DANGEROUS DRUGS INTO MALAYSIA IN TRANSIT – RELEVANCE OF 
THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS 1961 
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Isidro Leonardo Quito Cruz v. PP, Federal Court [Criminal Appeal No: 
05-75-2011(B). 9 January 2013]
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The appellant, a Peruvian, was detained at the Kuala Lumpur Interna-
tional Airport on arrival from Buenos Aires en route to Phuket, with 
790.6 grams of cocaine in his abdomen. The High Court found him guilty 
of drug trafficking pursuant to section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 
1952. The decision of the High Court was upheld by the Court of Appeal. 
Upon appeal to the Federal Court, the appellant submitted that he should 
be convicted under section 21(6) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 in Part 
V of the said Act and not section 39B of the same Act; the said section 
states that any person who brings any dangerous drug into Malaysia in 
transit otherwise than in accordance with this section shall be guilty of 
an offence against this Act.
The Federal Court considered the rationale behind Part V of the Dan-
gerous Drugs Act 1952 and the application of the United Nations Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, which Malaysia ratified on 20 April 
1978. The Federal Court held that Part V of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 
was enacted specifically to give effect to the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs 1961; the said Convention is an international treaty aimed at, inter 
alia, to “restrict the use of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes 
and to prevent their diversion and abuse, while at the same time ensuring 
their availability for legitimate purposes.” The Federal Court went further 
to explain that the aim of Part V was to regulate and control the entry 
and exit of such dangerous drugs for legitimate purposes and as such has 
no application to this case. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal and 
confirmed the conviction and sentence.
VIETNAM 
CRIMINAL LAW – LAW ENFORCEMENT – MUTUAL LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS – EXTRADITION
Treaty Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of 
Indonesia Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
On 27 June 2013, the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procu-
racy, Nguyen Hoa Binh, as the representative for the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam and the Minister of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Amir 
Syamasuddin, as the representative for the Republic of Indonesia, signed 
the Treaty Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of 
Indonesia Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (the 
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“Treaty”). The Treaty consists of 25 articles regarding the content, the 
implementation of the mutual legal assistance, as well as other relevant 
provisions to guarantee the efficiency of the mutual legal assistance in the 
process of investigation, prosecution, adjudication or other adjudicative 
proceedings regarding any crime.22
Over the years, the challenges for prosecutors and law enforcement 
authorities in every nation in combating crime are the issues of sover-
eignty, territorial borders and differences in legal systems between states. 
Criminal offenders are mobile and often seek to evade detection, arrest 
and punishment by operating across international borders. Such criminal 
offenders avoid being caught by taking advantage of international borders 
and playing on the frequent reluctance of law enforcement authorities to 
engage in complicated and expensive transnational investigations and 
prosecution. The struggle against transnational crime has been a catalyst 
for closer co-operation between states in criminal matters in the region. 
Both Vietnam and Indonesia are members of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Crimi-
nal Matters,23 which has been designed in accordance with international 
instruments such as the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC). It is expected that this bilateral Treaty will further 
improve and strengthen the cooperation in the subject matter between the 
competent authorities of the two states.
 Legal assistance granted under this Treaty shall include:24
• identifying persons or objects;
• examining objects and locations;
• service of documents, including the summons;
• providing information, documents, records, and evidence; 
• providing the original version or the notarised copy of rel-
evant documents, records, and evidence;
• providing objects, including the lending of evidence;
22 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Indon.-Viet., art. 1.1, 
June 27, 2013 [hereinafter MLAT].
23 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 29, 2004, 2336 
U.N.T.S. 271.
24 MLAT, supra note 22, art. 1.3.
226 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
• executing requests for search and seizure;
• taking evidence and obtaining statements of persons;
• locating the person in custody to the requesting party to 
provide evidence or assist the investigations, prosecution, 
adjudication or other adjudicative proceedings;
• facilitating the presence of the witness or the assistance of 
other persons in the process of investigation;
• searching, freezing, seizing, confiscating and returning the 
property, the proceeds of crime and the tools and means of 
crime;
• other assistance which is not prohibited by the laws of the 
requested party.
It should be noted, however, that the Treaty does not regulate some cases, 
including (i) arrest or detention of a person for the purpose of extradition; 
(ii) transfer of a person in custody for enforcement; and (iii) transfer of 
criminal adjudicative proceedings.25
A request for legal assistance may be refused, if a competent authority 
of the respective state is of the opinion that:26
• the execution of the request would prejudice the sovereignty, 
security, public order or other essential interests of the re-
quested party; 
• the request relates to a person who is officially stated to be 
innocent or granted amnesty;
• the request relates to the prosecution of a person who would 
be entitled to be discharged on the grounds of a previous 
acquittal or conviction; 
• the requested party has reasonable ground to believe that the 
legal assistance is to prosecute a person for his race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic group, political opinion, or other reasons 
to believe that person would not be treated equally in the 
criminal proceedings;
• the requesting party does not guarantee that the legal as-
sistance would not be used for other purposes except those 
25 Id. art. 2. 
26 Id. art. 5.1.
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specified in the request without the prior consent of the 
requested party; 
• the requesting party does not guarantee that the evidence 
collected for the legal assistance request which is consistent 
with this Treaty would be returned;
• the request relates to the investigation, prosecution or 
punishment of a person for an act, if it is committed in the 
territory of the requested party, does not constitute a crime 
pursuant to the law of the requested party, except the case 
when the requested party is still able to grant the legal as-
sistance without compliance with the dual criminality if its 
laws allow to do so.
• the request relates to an offence whose prescription is expired 
if the crime is committed in the authority of the requested 
party; and
• the request relates to an offence that is regarded by the re-
quested party as a military or political offence. 
The successful conclusion of the Treaty has a remarkable meaning in the 
context of friendly relations and the continuous, comprehensive coopera-
tion between Vietnam and Indonesia for over sixty years. The Treaty seeks 
to improve the effectiveness of rendering assistance by regularising and 
facilitating its procedures. It creates unambiguous and binding obligations 
and makes the mutual legal assistance process reliable and effective, as the 
provisions are tailored to the respective needs of the two states and can be 
customised to suit their respective needs. 
Treaty Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of 
Indonesia Concerning Extradition
On 27 June 2013, the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procu-
racy, Nguyen Hoa Binh, as the representative for the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, and the Minister of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, 
Amir Syamsuddin, as the representative for the Republic of Indonesia, 
signed the Treaty Between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the 
Republic of Indonesia Concerning Extradition. The Treaty includes 23 
articles regarding the extradition as requested by either party to promote 
the cooperation of both nations in the progress of preventing and fighting 
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against crime based on the principle of respecting the other’s sovereignty, 
equality and interests.
The crime to be extradited is the offence of which the custody period is 
at least ten years, or the offence which is more severe pursuant to the laws of 
both parties. The following are within the scope of extradition as prescribed 
in the Treaty: the preparation to commit a crime, incomplete commission 
of a crime, the planning, helping, inducing, guiding or organising for the 
commission of a crime, or the complicity to jointly commit a crime.27 
Extradition will be refused by either party if:28
• the request relates to an offence that is regarded as a politi-
cal offence;
• the requested party has the certain ground to believe that 
the extradition is made to prosecute or punish a person for 
his race, religion, nationality, ethnic group, political opinion 
or other reasons to believe that person would not be treated 
equally during the criminal proceedings;
• the request relates to an offence that is regarded as a military 
offence and is not within the applicable scope of common 
offense;
• the request relates to an offence whose prescription is expired 
or which is granted amnesty pursuant to the laws of the 
requesting party;
• the final judgment is effective regarding the person who is 
requested to be extradited for the crime which is within the 
scope for the extradition;
• pursuant to the laws of the requesting party, the offense 
which is requested for extradition condemns the death pen-
alty, while pursuant to the laws of the requested party, that 
offense does not condemned the death penalty, except the 
requesting party commits that the death penalty condemned 
would not be executed.
This is the first treaty concerning extradition that Vietnam has ever con-
cluded with an ASEAN country, which presents the determination and the 
27 Id. art. 2.2.
28 Id. art. 3.1.
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desire of both countries to promote the regional cooperation to prevent 
and fight against crimes, especially organised crimes.
Diplomatic and Consular
CHINA 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHINESE LAW
Act on Administration of Tax Collection Revised
On June 29, 2013, the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on Administration of 
Tax Collection of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gong-
heguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa). This is the second revision of this 
Act since its adoption in 1992. According to Article 91 of this revised Act, 
“[i]f there are different provisions between the treaties or agreements on tax 
collection concluded by the People’s Republic of China with foreign States 
and this Act, the provisions in those treaties or agreements shall prevail.”29
Act on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid 
Wastes Revised
On June 29, 2013, the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on the Prevention and 
Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes of the People’s Repub-
lic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guti FeiwuWuran Huanjing 
Fangzhi Fa). This is the second revision of this Act since its adoption in 
1995. According to Article 90 of this revised Act, “[i]f there are different 
provisions between the treaties on prevention and control of environmental 
pollution by solid wastes concluded or participated by the People’s Republic 
29 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa (中华人民共和
国税收征收管理法) [Tax Collection Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 2002, effective Oct. 15, 2002), art. 
91.
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of China and this Act, the provisions in those treaties shall prevail, unless 
otherwise reserved by the People’s Republic of China by declaration.”30
Act on Animal Epidemic Prevention Revised
On June 29, 2013, the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on Animal Epidemic 
Prevention of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gong-
heguo Dongwu Fangyi Fa). This is the second revision of this Act since 
its adoption in 1997. According to Article 28 of this revised Act, “[t]he 
competent authorities of veterinarian under the State Council shall timely 
communicate the occurrence and process of great animal epidemic to rel-
evant international organization or trading parties in accordance with the 
treaties or agreements concluded or participated by the People’s Republic 
of China.”31
Act on Trademark Revised
On August 30, 2013, the Fourth Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on Trade Mark of the 
People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa). 
This is the third revision of this Act since its adoption in 1982. According to 
Article 17 of this revised Act, “[t]he application for trademark registration 
from foreigners or foreign enterprises shall be dealt with in accordance with 
the international treaties concluded between their States and the People’s 
Republic of China, or the principle of reciprocity.”32
30 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guti FeiwuWuran Huanjing Fangzhi Fa (中华
人民共和国固体废物污染环境防治法) [Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 30, 1995, effective Apr. 1, 1996), art. 90.
31 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dongwu Fangyi Fa (中华人民共和国动物防疫
法) [Law on Animal Epidemic Prevention] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., July 3, 1997, effective Jan. 1, 1998), art. 28.
32 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Law on 
Trademark] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 
1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983), art. 17.
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Act on Fishery Revised
On December 28, 2013, the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on Fishery of the 
People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yuye Fa). This 
is the fourth revision of this Act since its adoption in 1986. According to 
Article 8 of this revised Act:
Any foreigner, foreign fishing ships entering into the waters under 
the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China must be approved 
by the relevant competent authorities of the State Council and 
observe this Act and other relevant acts and regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China in order to carry out fishery product or 
fishery resource investigation activities; if treaties or agreements 
were concluded with the People’s Republic of China, it shall be dealt 
with in accordance with such treaties or agreements.33
Act on Customs Revised
On December 28, 2013, the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Twelfth National People’s Congress revised the Act on Customs of the 
People’s Republic of China (ZhonghuaRenmin Gongheguo HaiguanFa). 
This is the third revision of this Act since its adoption in 1987. According 
to Article 56 of this revised Act:
Duty reduction or exemption shall be granted to the following 
import and export goods and inward and outward articles . . . (f) 
goods and articles specified as items subject to duty reduction or 
exemption by international treaties to which the People’s Republic 
of China either a contracting party or an acceding party.34
33 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yuye Fa (中华人民共和国渔业法) [Law 
on Fishery] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Jan. 20, 1986, effective July 1, 1986), art. 8.
34 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Haiguan Fa (中华人民共和国海关法) [Law on 
Customs] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 22, 
1987, effective July 1, 1987), art. 56.
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RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES
Palestine
On July 23, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement on the situa-
tion in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question at the UNSC. 
He stated:
China has consistently maintained that, through peace talks be-
tween Palestine and Israel, an independent State of Palestine can 
be established with complete sovereignty, based on the pre-1967 
borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, whereby the two 
States, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace and security, 
can facilitate peace and stability in the Middle East.35
Kosovo
On March 22, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement at the UNSC 
debate on Kosovo. He stated:
China has always maintained that Serbia’s sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity should be fully respected. Resolution 1244 (1999) 
is an important legal foundation for addressing the question of 
Kosovo. That task should be carried out within the framework 
of the relevant resolutions and through dialogue and negotiation 
between the parties concerned so as to reach a mutually accept-
able solution.36
Polar Regions – Arctic Council
On May 15, 2013, China was granted observer State status at the Ministe-
rial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Kiruna, Sweden. A foreign ministry 
spokesperson made the following remarks:
35 U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7007th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7007 (July 23, 2013).
36 Statement by Ambassador Li Baodong at the Security Council Open Debate on 
Kosovo, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1027483.htm; see Statement 
by Ambassador Wang Min at the Security Council Debate on Kosovo, Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (June 14, 2013), http://
www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1056581.htm; see also Statement by Ambassador 
Liu Jieyi at the Security Council Debate on Kosovo, Permanent Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the UN (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.china-un.
org/eng/hyyfy/t1073155.htm.
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China appreciates and welcomes the Arctic Council’s decision of 
granting China the official observer status. China supports the 
Council’s principles and purposes, recognizes Arctic countries’ 
sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic region 
as well as their leading role in the Council and respects the val-
ues, interests, culture and tradition of the indigenous people and 
other people living in the Arctic region. The decision made by the 
Council will facilitate China’s communication and cooperation 
with relevant parties on Arctic affairs within the framework of 
the Council, so as to make contribution to the work of the Council 
and promote peace, stability and sustainable development of the 
Arctic region.37
Polar Regions – Antarctic Treaty
On April 12, 2013, China submitted the Initial Environmental Evaluation 
for the Construction of Inland Summer Camp, Princess Elizabeth Land, 
Antarctica to the Thirty-Sixth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting-
Sixteenth Committee on Environmental Protection Meeting in Brussels, 
Belgium. In this document, China stated:
Full references have been considered for the preparation of this 
IEE. These references include some international public laws such 
as the Antarctic Treaty System, the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the Protocol of the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) and the Convention on the Dumping 
of Wastes at Sea, as well as China’s relevant laws and regulations.
1.3.1 International laws, standards and guidelines
The Antarctic Treaty (1959) came into force in 1961. Its measures, 
resolutions and decisions and a series of conventions relevant to 
Antarctica have shaped up the Antarctic Treaty System. China ac-
ceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and obtained its consultative 
party status in 1985. China ratified the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty in 1994. Compiling and submis-
sion of this IEE is an act of China to implement her obligations 
under the Protocol. 
37 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on China Being Accepted 
as an Observer of the Arctic Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China (May 15, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1040943.shtml.
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The international conventions such as the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (1993), the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 
(2005), the Protocol of the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) and the 
Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea (1975), to which 
China has become a contracting party, have established in differ-
ent aspects the requirements for environmental protection and 
sustainable development and have become important bases for the 
development of the IEE for the construction and operation of the 
Chinese new summer camp. 
The Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes 
(COMNAP) and the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(SCAR) are two international organizations involved in the Ant-
arctic affairs. They have developed a series of relevant guidelines 
and documents regarding the activities in Antarctica. Among them, 
the draft IEE has made reference mainly to the Guidelines for Oil 
Spill Contingency Planning (COMNAP, 1992), the Environmental 
Monitoring Manual in Antarctic (COMNAP, 2000), the Technical 
Standards for Environmental Monitoring in Antarctica (COMNAP, 
2000), the Practical Guidelines for the Development and Design of 
Environmental Monitoring Programs (COMNAP, 2005b) and the 
Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment in Antarctica 
(COMNAP/ATCM, 2005a), etc.
1.3.2 Domestic laws, standards and guidelines
The construction and operation of camp will enforce strictly 
relevant domestic environmental laws, standards as well as envi-
ronmental guidelines such as PRC Law on Environmental Protec-
tion, PRC Law on Marine Environmental Protection, PRC Law on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, PRC Law on energy saving, 
PRC Law on Renewable Energy, National Scheme for Emergent 
Environmental Incident, Regulations Concerning Environmental 
Monitoring Management, PRC Standards on Surface Water En-
vironmental Quality (GB3838-2002), Urban technology policy of 
sewage treatment and pollution control, Water Quality Standards 
for Using Regenerated Water for Urban Miscellaneous Uses (GB/
T18920-2002), PRC Technical Guidelines for Environmental Impact 
Assessment-Principals, etc. 
Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) developed 
a series of measures and standards for the management of the 
operation of the camp in order to guarantee the safe and effective 
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operation of the camp. The measures and standards will minimize 
the risks in Antarctic expedition and environmental impacts.38
INDONESIA 
The Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Government of the Republic of Moldova on Visa Exemption for 
Holders of Diplomatic and Service Passports. 
This Agreement has been signed in Chisinau on 10 December 2013 and 
was later ratified through Presidential Regulation No. 60 of 2014. The 
Agreement has been enacted for five years and could be extended as agreed 
upon by both parties. 
The purpose of the Agreement is to enhance the bilateral relation-
ship and cooperation between both parties. Both parties have agreed and 
readied upon their capability to enforce the Agreement on exempt visa 
obligation for people with diplomatic or service passport to enter either 
parties’ territories. This Agreement shall be carried out based on the par-
ties’ national regulations to which the people with diplomatic and service 
passports are bound to obey. Bear in mind, this Agreement’s validity 
period can be extended under the interest of both parties and can also be 
revised in future times.
Voluntary Partnership Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia 
and the European Union on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and 
Trade in Timber Products into the European Union
This Agreement has been signed in Brussels on 3 September 2013. Both 
parties then ratified the Agreement through the Presidential Regulation 
No. 21 of 2014. Bear in mind that this Agreement must be extended no 
later than five years period unless one of the parties decides otherwise. 
Through this Agreement, both parties have agreed to continue their 
cooperation in forestry. This Agreement aims to strengthen the parties’ 
commitment to preserve forests and the like and also to provide a legal 
framework to ensure that all imported goods from Indonesia’s forest to 
38 China, Initial Environmental Evaluation for the Construction 
of Inland Summer Camp, Princess Elizabeth Land, Antarctica 4 
(XXXVI Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting Brussels 2013), http://
www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM36/ip/ATCM36_ip021_e.doc.
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the EU will be produced legally in order to boost timber trade between 
the parties. In addition, this Agreement was established to be a platform 
for both parties to conduct dialogs as a form of facilitating and boosting 
the timber trade in their effort to cooperate in forestry. 
Joint Declaration of Intent Between the Ministry of Law and Human 
Rights of the Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Cooperation 
on Immigration Matters
The Agreement between Indonesia and Germany was signed in Beijing 
on 11 April 2013. In regard to this Agreement, there was no ratification 
needed. This Agreement came into force on 11 April 2013. 
As mandated on the Indonesia-Germany Joint Declaration for a Com-
prehensive Partnership, which is also known as the Jakarta Declaration, 
a bilateral cooperation between both parties is strongly needed. Referring 
to the Agreement, both parties have agreed upon the importance of im-
migration matters. Therefore, in order to attain a practical cooperation, 
both parties have agreed to cooperate in managing migration matters 
and supervising the territory border and to manage documents related to 
identification and course. In accordance to these duties, both parties must 
conduct a transparent system of information in order to ensure that the 
process is lawfully conducted. 
Framework Agreement on Trade and Investment Between the Minis-
try of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia and the Ministry of National 
Planning and Economic Development of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar
The Framework between Indonesia and Turkey was signed in Nay Pyi Taw 
on 23 April 2013 and subsequently ratified through the Presidential Regu-
lation No. 79 of 2015. The validity period of this Agreement will remain 
in effect until one or both parties decide otherwise. 
Realising the importance of international trade and investment, both 
parties have agreed upon the fact that private investment in domestic 
scope or in foreign scope will embrace economic growth, open a lot of 
job opportunities, and expand trade and commerce. The Framework was 
established to boost the relationship and to enhance the competitiveness 
between both parties. The Framework shall promote international trad-
ing and the economic relationship between both parties. In regards to 
State Practice 237
this Agreement and its high expectation, both parties will maintain their 
rights and obligations during the enforcement of the Agreement and the 
Agreement shall be enforced according to the law. 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
on the Establishment of the OECD Country Office in Indonesia
The Agreement between Indonesia and OECD was signed in Saint Peters-
burg on 5 September 2013 and ratified through the Presidential Regulation 
No. 174 of 2014. The Agreement also remains in effect until one or both 
parties decide to opt-out. 
The establishment of OECD Branch in Indonesia is to strengthen the 
cooperation and the enforcement of its mandate. OECD’s legal personal-
ity will allow them an access of authority to form a contract; OECD can 
open a bank account on behalf of the organisation and can be a party to 
legal proceedings. In regard to this, OECD has an immunity relating to 
its properties and assets; the representative office of OECD and its facili-
ties; and OECD archives. All of these components remain immune to any 
legal procedures unless OECD decides to let go of its properties and as-
sets. Besides immunity of its assets and properties, OECD may conduct 
its affairs in Indonesia and remain tax-free as long as the enforcement is 
conducted under the law.
The presence of the OECD Representative Office will mutually benefit 
both parties. As for Indonesia, it will enhance the competitiveness in trade 
and commerce, maintain a sustainable economic growth and provide a 
platform not only to Indonesia but to South East Asia as well.
KOREA
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / JURISDICTION – 
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION – IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION - 
COMPENSATION
Decision of Seoul High Court Concerning Compensation for Japanese 
Forced Labor
Seoul High Court – Judgment for the obligation of compensation payment 
by a Japanese company to the victim of compulsory manpower draft dur-
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ing the Japanese colonial era. Seoul Godeung beobwon [Seoul High Ct.], 
2012Na44947, July 10, 2013 (S. Kor.).39
Facts 
Korean victims who were forced to work in Nippon Iron Manufacture 
requested compensation for the illegal acts of “Sinil Iron Casting,” the de-
fendant. Sinil Iron Casting was formerly called Nippon Iron Manufacture 
(it has changed the company name) and has actively assisted the Japanese 
Government’s policy of compulsory manpower during the Japanese co-
lonial era. 
Legal Issues
This judgment is a follow-up on the Supreme Court decision on May 24, 
2012, which covers the following legal issues. (1) Whether the activity of the 
Nippon Iron Manufacturing falls under the illegal acts against humanity 
which directly relates to the illegal colonization to Korea and the fulfill-
ment of aggressive war; (2) whether the defendant can avoid responsibility 
under the argument of denying the same identity with formal Nippon 
Iron Manufacture or using decisions that was litigated in Japan by some 
of the plaintiffs, some portions of Japanese legislation, the Agreement on 
Reparation between Korea and Japan, statute of limitations, and so forth; 
(3) what is the standard for calculating the amount of compensation the 
defendant should pay. 
Judgment
The Court held that the defendants must pay 100,000,000 KRW to the 
plaintiffs. In this regard, the defendant must pay it at a 20 percent annual 
interest from June 19, 2013 to the day it is completely repaid. Firstly, the 
Court decided on the argument on the extinguishment of the protected 
right qualification according to the Agreement on Reparation between 
Korea and Japan and the plaintiff ’s assertion that it is against the effect of 
excluding further litigation. 
39 This judgment is a follow-up of the Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], 2009Da68620, May 
24, 2012 (S. Kor.) decision where the court denied the High Court’s decision on 
denying the defendant’s responsibility and remanded it, and follows and repeats 
the reasoning of the decision.
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Agreement on Reparation is not a negotiation to claim compensa-
tion on Japan’s colonization, but it is to solve the financial and civil 
claim obligation relationship between Korea and Japan according 
to the political agreement based on Article 4 of the San Francisco 
Treaty. The Korean and Japanese Government could not reach 
an agreement for the characteristic of the colonial ruling on the 
Korean peninsula as the economic corporation funds, which the 
Japanese Government paid to the Korean Government, have no 
legal compensational relation with the solution of right question 
in Article 2 according to Article 1 of the Agreement on Reparation. 
On the process of negotiating for the Agreement on Reparation, 
the Japanese Government did not admit its unlawfulness of the 
colonization and fundamentally denied the legal compensation 
for the damage by forceful labor. In this situation, it is difficult 
to see that a claim for damages for the unlawful act, that is like 
crimes against humanity and the unlawful act directly related to 
the colonization under Japan’s national power do not come under 
the application target for Agreement on Reparation. Therefore, for 
the plaintiff ’s claim for damages, the individual’s right of claim is 
not vitiated because of the Agreement on Reparation, and Korea’s 
diplomatic protection right is not given up as well.
Viewing under the regulation of the Korean Constitution, 
Japan’s ruling over Korea during the Japanese colonial era is not 
only an unlawful occupation from a normative perspective but 
also a legal relation caused by Japan’s unlawful ruling, which is 
incompatible with the spirit of Korean Constitution, should no 
longer be effective. If so, the reason for the judgment made by 
Japan is in direct conflict with the essential values of the Korean 
Constitution, which views a forceful manpower draft as unlawful in 
which it was used for the fulfillment of aggressive war. The denial 
of justification for aggressive war and the accomplishing acts is 
the common value of the civilized countries in the world, includ-
ing the Japanese Constitution. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the 
judgment made by Japan, where the reasons for the judgment is 
against such values, violates the fundamental moral principle that 
domestic law is maintained and preserved, even in consideration 
of the good custom and social order, a concept that contains inter-
nationality, as mentioned in the civil law above. Therefore, as the 
Japanese judgment on this case cannot be accepted and enforced in 
Korea, the defendant’s argument, that on the assumption that the 
plaintiff ’s claim against the effect of excluding further litigation 
of the Japanese judgment on this case can be approved in Korea, 
is without reason.
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Judging the following points by the previously mentioned legal 
principles, the denial of the defendants, who practically have the 
same legal status with the former Nippon Iron Manufacture, on 
the fulfillment of obligation to the plaintiffs with the contention 
on the expiration of the statute of limitations is unfair: after the 
former Nippon Japanese Iron Manufacture’s unlawful act, until the 
diplomatic relations between Korean and Japan was established, 
it was severed until June 22, 1965. Thus, the plaintiffs above were 
not able to administer justice against the defendants; although 
the diplomatic relations between Korean and Japan was normal-
ized in 1965, the individual’s claim of right of Korean nationals 
against Japan or Japanese nationals would be comprehensibly 
solved because the Agreement on Reparation is widely accepted 
in Korea; Japan has enacted property measure law as a follow-up 
measure of Agreement on Reparation to domestically extinguish 
the plaintiff ’s right of claim and the Agreement on Reparation 
and the property measure law was stated as an additional reason 
to dismiss the plaintiff ’s claim on the litigation in Japan; and the 
plaintiff ’s individual right of claim, especially a claim for damages 
on unlawful act against humanity where Japanese Government 
power is involved in or the unlawful act that is directly related to 
colonization is not extinguished from Agreement on Reparation 
stood out during that late 1990s, when the victims of the compul-
sory labor filed the suit. Therefore, this must not be allowed as it 
abuses rights, which is against the doctrine of good faith.
Based on this point of argument, the Court decided the scope of com-
pensation for the unlawful acts committed by Nippon Iron Manufacture.
The Court will consider the defendant’s attitude, who denies the 
responsibility for more than fifty years after the unlawful act de-
spite the degree of damages that the plaintiff received as a result 
of the degree of the unlawfulness of the act of violation and its 
intentionality, and the changes in income level of the citizen or 
currency value due to the passing of years after the time of the 
unlawful act to the time of defense termination. Accordingly, the 
compensation liabilities from the loss incurred by delay in con-
sideration of the difference in currency value between the time of 
the unlawful act and the time of defense termination exceptionally 
starts from the day of the defense termination, which is the base 
period for compensation assessment. Therefore, the compensation 
amount the defendant should pay is more than 100,000,000 KRW, 
despite the situation that there was a long-term delay from the time 
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of the unlawful act to the time of defense termination, and the loss 
incurred by the delay is not counted at all.
To sum up, the Court rendered a decision that Nippon Iron Manufacture, 
during the Japanese colonial era, must pay damages because its forceful 
manpower draft without paying wages was an unlawful act to the Korean 
laborers.
Decision of the Supreme Court Concerning Compensation for Japanese 
Forced Labor [ii] – Busan High Court – Judgment for the obligation of 
compensation payment by Mitsubishi to the victims of compulsory man-
power draft under the Japanese colonial era. Busan Godeung beobwon 
[Busan High Ct.], 2012NA4497, July 20, 2013 (S. Kor.).
Facts
Korean victims, who were forced to work in the Mitsubishi Machinery 
factory and shipbuilding yard, requested compensation for the unlawful 
acts from “Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Corporation,” which was formally 
Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Corporation, which actively assisted 
the Japanese Government’s policy of compulsory manpower during the 
Japanese colonial era. 
Legal Issues & Judgment
This case has similar legal issues to the 2012Na44947 judgment decided on 





On October 10, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement on the 
rule of law at the national and international levels at the 68th Session of 
the UNGA:
The Chinese delegation believes that the decision to resort to arbi-
trary or judicial institutions to settle international disputes should 
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be based on the principles of international rule of law and premised 
on equality and free will of states concerned. Any action to willfully 
refer disputes to arbitrary or judicial institutions in defiance of the 
will of the states concerned or provisions of international treaties 
constitutes a violation of the principles of international rule of law 
and is thus unacceptable to the Chinese government.40
Environmental Law
INDIA
Conservation of Asiatic Lion in India – National 
and International Law on Endangered Species – 
Anthropocentric and Eco-centric Approaches – 
Obligations under Convention on Internationally 
Endangered Species (CITES) and Convention on 
Biological Diversity
Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I v. Union of India & Others [Su-
preme Court of India, 15 April 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN]
Facts
The Court was called upon to decide the necessity of a second home for 
the Asiatic lion (Panthera leo persica), an endangered species, for its long 
term survival and to protect the species from extinction. The Court noted 
that the issue was “[r]ooted on eco-centrism, which supports the protec-
tion of all wildlife forms, not just those which are of instrumental value to 
humans but those which have intrinsic worth.” After considerable research 
at Gir Forest in the State of Gujarat since 1986, Ministry of Environment 
and Forests (MOEF) had come to the conclusion that for the long term 
conservation of Asiatic lions at Gir, the only habitat in the world for the 
lions, a second home for them was required. MOEF took the help of several 
specialized institutions and experts to decide on this issue. Field surveys of 
the potential sites were conducted during the winter as well as the summer 
40 Statement by H.E. Ambassador Wang Min on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels at the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Oct. 10, 2013), http://
www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1087084.htm.
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to assess water availability and the human impact on the habitat during the 
seasons.41 Also, the extent of the forest area in and adjoining the chosen 
protected areas was ascertained with the aim of establishing the contiguity 
of the forested habitat. As noted by the Court:
Attempts were also made to establish the relative abundance of wild 
ungulate prey in the three sites based on direct sightings as well as 
on indirect evidence. An assessment of the impact on the people and 
their livestock on habitat quality in all three sites was also made. 
Of the three sites surveyed, Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary (for short 
‘Kuno’)42 was found to be the most suitable site for reintroduction 
in establishing a free ranging population of Asiatic lions.
These attempts entailed the “diversion of 3720.9 hectare[s] of forest land 
for rehabilitation of 18 villages located inside the Kuno, subject to fulfill-
ment of certain conditions.” The State of Gujarat, where these lions were 
located in the Gir sanctuary, had several objections to this proposal. Gujarat 
pointed out several environmentally unsustainable issues with regard to the 
implementation of this project, such as climatic conditions, prey density 
and several others. The Court, after hearing these objections by Gujarat, 
asked the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) to consider the veracity of 
these objections. After conducting a detailed study, the NBWL supported 
the idea of a second home for the Asiatic lions of the Gir forest. The Court 
had to decide the contentions raised by the State of Gujarat against this 
Asiatic lion translocation project while the State of Madhya Pradesh was 
ready to host the lions in Kuno. The Court was requested to issue a writ 
of mandamus directing translocation of Asiatic lion from Gir to Kuno.
Summary of the Judgment
The Court first dealt with the constitutional and legal framework of India 
to examine the various issues that were before it. It noted that the Indian 
Parliament had passed The Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972 “to provide for 
41 “Three alternative sites for re-introduction of Asiatic lions were suggested for an 
intensive survey . . . : 1. Darrah-Jawaharsagar Wildlife Sanctuary (Rajasthan); 2. 
Sitamata Wildlife Sanctuary (Rajasthan); 3. Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary (Madhya 
Pradesh).”
42 This is located in the Central Indian State of Madhya Pradesh.
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the protection of wild animals and birds with a view to ensuring the eco-
logical and environmental security of the country.” The Court also noted: 
The Parliament vide Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 
inserted Article 48A w.e.f. 03.01.1977 in Part IV of the Constitu-
tion placing responsibility on the State “to endeavour to protect and 
improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life 
of the country.” Article 51A was also introduced in Part IVA by the 
above-mentioned amendment stating that “it shall be the duty of 
every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment 
including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion 
for living creatures.”43 [emphasis added] 
The Court further noted: 
This Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 10 SCC 
604 held that all efforts must be made to implement the spirit and 
provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; the provisions of 
which are salutary and are necessary to be implemented to main-
tain ecological chain and balance. The Stockholm Declaration, the 
Declaration of United Nations, Conventions on Human Environ-
ment signed in the year 1972, to which India is the signatory, have 
laid down the foundation of sustainable development and urged 
the nations to work together for the protection of the environment. 
Conventions on Biological Diversity, signed in the year 1992 at Rio 
Summit, recognized for the first time in International Law that the 
conservation of biological diversity is “a common concern of hu-
man kind” and is an integral part of the development process. The 
Parliament enacted the Biological Diversity Act in the year 2002 
followed by the National Biodiversity Rules in the year 2004. The 
main objective of the Act is the conservation of biological diversity, 
sustainable use of its components and fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. 
43 “The Parliament later vide Act 16 of 2003 inserted Section 5A w.e.f. 22.09.2003 
authorizing the Central Government to constitute the National Board for Wild Life 
(in short ‘NBWL’). NBWL is, therefore, the top most scientific body established 
to frame policies and advise the Central and State Governments on the ways and 
means of promoting wild life conservation and to review the progress in the field 
of wild life conservation in the country and suggesting measures for improvement 
thereto. The Central and the State Governments cannot brush aside its opinion 
without any cogent or acceptable reasons. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has 
conferred a duty on NBWL to provide conservation and development of wild life 
and forests.” 
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Bio-diversity and biological diversity includes all the organisms 
found on our planet i.e. plants, animals and micro-organisms, 
the genes they contain and the different eco-systems of which 
they form a part. The rapid deterioration of the ecology due to 
human interference is aiding the rapid disappearance of several 
wild animal species. Poaching and the wildlife trade, habitat loss, 
human-animal conflict, epidemic etc. are also some of the reasons 
which threaten and endanger some of the species.
The Court also noted: 
India is known for its rich heritage of biological diversity and has 
so far documented over 91,200 species of animals. In India’s bio-
graphic regions, 45,500 species of plants are documented as per 
IUCN Red List 2008. India has many critically threatened animal 
species. IUCN has noticed today the only living representative of 
lions once found throughout much of south-west Asia occurred in 
India’s Gir forest which has been noticed as a critically endangered 
species in IUCN Red List. The IUCN adopted a resolution of 1963 
by which a multi-lateral treaty was drafted as the Washington 
Convention also known as the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973. 
CITES entered into force on 1st July, 1975, which aims to ensure 
that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants 
does not threaten the survival of the species in the wild, and it ac-
cords varying degrees of protection to more than 33,000 species 
of animals and plants. Appendix 1 of CITES refers to 1200 species 
which are threatened with extinction. Asiatic lion is listed in Ap-
pendix 1 recognizing that species is threatened with extinction.
The Court asserted that: 
[F]or achieving the objectives of various conventions including 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and also for proper 
implementation of IUCN, CITES etc., and the provisions of the 
Wild Life (Protection) Act, Bio-diversity Act, Forest Conservation 
Act etc. in the light of Articles 48A and 51A(g), the Government of 
India has laid down various policies and action plans such as the 
National Forest Policy (NFP) 1988, National Environment Policy 
(NEP) 2006, National Bio-diversity Action Plan (NBAP) 2008, 
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) 2008 and the 
integrated development of wild life habitats and centrally sponsored 
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scheme framed in the year 2009 and integrated development of 
National Wild-life Action Plan (NWAP) 2002-2016.44
Referring to anthropocentric and eco-centric approaches, the Court noted 
the efforts at the international level to rebuild certain principles relating 
to Sustainable Development.45 It further elaborated:
Sustainable development, it has been argued by various eminent 
environmentalists, clearly postulates an anthropocentric bias, 
least concerned with the rights of other species which live on this 
earth. Anthropocentrism is always human interest focused think-
ing that non-human has only instrumental value to humans, in 
other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities 
to non-human are based on benefits to humans. Ecocentrism is 
nature-centred, where humans are part of nature and non-humans 
have intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does not take 
automatic precedence and humans have obligations to non-humans 
independently of human interest. Ecocentrism is, therefore, life-
centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans and 
non-humans . . . We re-iterate that while examining the necessity 
of a second home for the Asiatic lions, our approach should be eco-
centric and not anthropocentric and we must apply the “species best 
interest standard”, that is the best interest of the Asiatic lions. We 
must focus our attention to safeguard the interest of species, as spe-
cies has equal rights to exist on this earth. Asiatic Lion has become 
critically endangered because of human intervention. The specie 
originally existed in North Africa and South-West Asia formerly 
44 The Court noted that “India has a network of 99 national parks, 515 wildlife 
sanctuaries, 43 conservation reserves and 4 community reserves in different bio-
geographic zones. Many important habitats still exist outside those areas, which 
requires special attention from the point of view of conservation. The Centrally 
Sponsored Scheme also specifically refers to the recovery programmes for saving 
critically endangered species and habitats. Due to a variety of reasons, several 
species and their habitats have become critically endangered. The Snow Leopard, 
Great Indian Bustard, Kashmir Stag, Gangetic Dolphin, Nilgiri Tahr, Malabar 
Civet, marine turtles, etc. are few examples.”
45 The Court noted the definition of ‘sustainable development’ as defined by The 
United Nations Commission on Environment and Development: “Sustainable 
development is the development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (World 
Commission on Economic Development [WCED], 1987).
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stretched across the coastal forests of northern Africa and from 
northern Greece across south-west Asia to eastern India. Today 
the only living representatives of the lions once found throughout 
much of South-West Asia occur in India’s Gir Forest. Asiatic lion 
currently exists as a single sub-population and is thus vulnerable to 
extinction from unpredictable events, such as an epidemic or large 
forest fire etc. and we are committed to safeguard this endangered 
species because this species has a right to live on this earth, just 
like human beings.46
Decision
The Court noted that as human beings, we had “a duty to prevent the species 
from going extinct and had to advocate for an effective species protection 
regimes.” The Court referred to the research work of the wildlife biolo-
gists of WII on Gir Forests where they “noticed the necessity for long term 
conservation of Asiatic lion in Gir and also highlighted the necessity of a 
second natural habitat for its long term conservation.” The Court pointed 
out that “[s]everal migratory birds, mammals, and animals in wild cross 
national and international borders created by man and every nation had 
a duty and obligation to ensure their protection.” The Court asserted that 
“no nation or organisation could claim ownership or possession over them” 
and stated that:
[T]he Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild 
animals held at Bonn, 1979, supports this principle and the con-
46 The Court referring to ‘public trust’ doctrine as enunciated by it earlier, noted, 
“Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects not only the human rights but also 
casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a species becoming 
extinct, conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of 
right to life. In M. C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Others, (1997) 1 SCC 388 (India), 
this Court enunciated the doctrine of “public trust”, the thrust of that theory is 
that certain common properties such as rivers, seashores, forests and the air are 
held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the 
general public. The resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such great 
importance to the people as a whole, that it would be totally unjustified to make 
them a subject of private ownership. The State, as a custodian of the natural 
resources, has a duty to maintain them not merely for the benefit of the public, but 
for the best interest of flora and fauna, wildlife and so on. The doctrine of ‘public 
trust’ has to be addressed in that perspective.”
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vention recognises that wild animals in their innumerable forms 
are irreplaceable part of the earth; natural system and must be 
conserved for the good of the mankind. It has recognised that the 
states are and must be the protectors of the migratory species of 
wild animals that live within or pass through their national juris-
dictional boundaries. Convention highlights that conservation and 
effective management of migratory species of wild animals require 
the concerted action of all states within the national jurisdictional 
boundaries of which such species spend any part of their life cycle. 
India is also a signatory to that convention.
The Court held:
MoEF’s decision for re-introduction of Asiatic lion from Gir to 
Kuno was that of utmost importance so as to preserve the Asiatic 
lion, an endangered species which could not be delayed. Reintro-
duction of Asiatic lion, needless to say, the Court concluded, should 
be in accordance with the guidelines issued by IUCN and with 
the active participation of experts in the field of re-introduction 
of endangered species.
Norms Relating to Siting of a Nuclear Power Plant – 
Safety Measures to Operate a Nuclear Power Plant – 
National and International Legal Regimes relating to 
Nuclear Liability Issues – Balancing the Basic Principles 
Relating to Environment and Development
G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India & Others [Supreme Court of India, 6 
May 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN]
Facts
Appellants challenged the setting up of a nuclear power plant (NPP) at 
Kudankulam in the State of Tamil Nadu adjacent to a sea coast. This plant 
was being set up by India with the technological cooperation from Russia 
under an Indo-Russian agreement. The Court dealt with a host of issues, 
such as the safety and security of the NPP, obligations to international 
conventions and treaties, management and transportation of nuclear fu-
els, civil liabilities, and impact of radiation on the eco-system. The Court 
was requested to examine the extent of safeguards taken on the basis of 
recommendations made by the Task Force of the Government of India. 
Appellants argued that any lack of such safety measures in implementing 
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the project would affect their fundamental right to life under Article 21 
of the Indian Constitution. 
Appellants contended that “sufficient safeguards ha[d] not been taken 
for the safe disposal of the radioactive waste and no site had so far been 
identified for the safe handling of radioactive waste, failing which it might 
cause serious health hazard.” Appellants also pointed out that “even, at the 
plant site, there [was] no proper facility for storage of spent fuel and high 
level radioactive waste.” Appellants also argued that there were no adequate 
measures “to safeguard the life and property of the people in case of any 
potential disaster, in accordance with the Disaster Management Plan.” 
The Government of India, however, denied the Appellants’ allegations 
and asserted that the design of the NPP “incorporate[d] advance safety 
features complying with current standards of redundancy, reliability, in-
dependence and prevention of common cause failures in its safety system.” 
The design, the Government of India argued, had provisions for withstand-
ing external events like earthquake, tsunami/storm, tidal waves, cyclones, 
shock waves, aircraft impact on main buildings and fire.” The design also 
incorporated “various additional safety features like Quick Boron Injection 
System, Passive Heat Removal System, Second Stage Hydro Accumulators, 
Passive Hydrogen Re-combiners, Annulus Passive Filtering System (Passive 
System) and Core Catcher.” 
Summary of the Judgment
The Court outlined the existing Indian legal framework relating to atomic 
energy. It examined the context and the salient features of the Atomic En-
ergy Act, 1948. Subsequently, the Court noted, this enactment was repealed 
to pave the way for much more inclusive Atomic Energy Act, 1962. This 
enactment, the Court noted, had the ‘welfare’ of the people as one of the 
basic tenets. The Court also referred extensively to the existing energy mix 
relating to power generation, noting that the atomic energy provided for 
about three percent of the entire energy production in India. 
The Court also noted that “due to growing nuclear accidents and the 
resultant ecological and other dangers, many countries had started retreat-
ing from their forward nuclear programmes.” However, the Court indicated 
that “these issues [were] to be addressed to policy makers, not to courts 
because the destiny of a nation was shaped by the people’s representatives 
and not by a handful of judges, unless there [wa]s an attempt to tamper 
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with the fundamental Constitutional principles or basic structure of the 
Constitution.” However, the Court asserted that it was:
deeply concerned with the safety and security of the people of this 
country, its environment, its f lora and fauna, its marine life, ecol-
ogy, bio-diversity and so on which the policy makers cannot be on 
the guise of national policy, mutilate or rob of, in such an event the 
courts can unveil the mask and find out the truth for the safety, 
security and welfare of the people and the mother earth.
The Court noted that various codes and safety standards issued by the 
watch-dog body, namely, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), 
“mainly deal with siting, design, construction, operation, quality assur-
ance, decommissioning etc.” and that “[s]afety codes and safety standards 
were formulated on the basis of nationally and internationally accepted 
safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, 
systems, structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities.” 
The Court also noted that India had entered into various bilateral trea-
ties and was also a party to various international conventions on nuclear 
safety, physical protection of nuclear material, nuclear accident, radiological 
emergency and so on. India, the Court further noted, was also governed 
by the safety and security standards laid down by International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The Court briefly surveyed the bilateral and multilateral treaties to 
which India was or was not a party such as, for example, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which India was not a party and The Conven-
tion on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was adopted in 
1979 to which India was a party. The Court noted that these treaties made it 
“legally binding for States parties to protect nuclear facilities and material 
for peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport.” The survey done 
by the Court could be briefly summarized as follows:
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material … 
provides expanded cooperation between and among States regard-
ing rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear 
material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage and 
prevent and combat related offences. 
The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency was adopted by the General Conference 
at its special session 24-26.9.1986 and was opened for signature at 
Vienna on 26.9.1986 and at New York on 6.10.1986. 
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The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted on 17.6.1994 by 
a Diplomatic Conference convened by IAEA at its Headquarters 
from 14-17.6.1994. The Convention was opened for signature on 
20.9.1994. 
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the first 
legal instrument to directly address these issues on a global scale, 
was opened for signature on 29.9.1997 and entered into force on 
8.6.2001. 
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents which have 
the potential for international trans-boundary release that could 
be of radiological safety significance for another State. Date of 
adoption is 26.9.1986. 
India has also entered into various Bilateral Civil Nuclear Co-
operations. India has entered into a cooperation agreement with 
France for the construction of ERR Power Plants (10,000 MWe) at 
Jethapur site in Maharashtra, which also comprises of cooperation 
in the areas of research, safety and security, waste management, 
education etc., followed by various other commercial contracts as 
well. India and Canada have finalized the terms for their nuclear 
deal paving the way for Canadian firms to export Uranium to India 
in the year 2010. Discussions are on for safe nuclear cooperation 
as well with Canada. 
India has also signed civil nuclear deal with Mongolia for supply 
of uranium to India. MOUs on the Development of Cooperation 
on Peaceful Uses of Radioactive Minerals and Nuclear Energy by 
senior officials of the Department of Atomic Energy of both the 
countries. India has also entered into agreements with Namibia 
including one on civil nuclear energy which allows for supply of 
uranium from Namibia. India-Namibian Agreement for Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy allows for supply of uranium for setting 
up of nuclear reactors. India-Kazakhstan have also signed a pact 
on nuclear cooperation in April 2011 and agreed to have collabora-
tion in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Discussions are on to 
execute a civil nuclear agreement with Argentina. 
India-U.S. issued an Inter U.S. Joint Statement at Washington 
on 18.7.2005 which has located the final broad policy so as to 
actually facilitate and also outline the broad contours of a legally 
binding agreement. Some of the policy frameworks relate to pre-
venting WMD Proliferation, goals of prompting nuclear power and 
achieving nuclear energy, expeditious consideration of fuel steps 
for safeguarded nuclear reactors etc. Nuclear 2007 – an agreement 
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for co-operation between India and U.S. concerning peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy (2007 Co-operation Agreement) laid down 
certain binding obligations between the two countries. Though, 
India is not a party to any of the Liability Conventions, specifically, 
IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
India has enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 
2010 (Nuclear Liability Act) which aims to provide a civil liability 
for nuclear damage and prompt compensation to the victims of 
a nuclear accident through No-Fault Liability to the operators.47
Referring to the IAEA, the Court noted that: 
India is in partnership with the IAEA and has incorporated many 
of its directives in the code of practice framed by the AERB, hence 
there could be no compromise on safety and security of the NPPs in 
the country. We have elaborately discussed the Safety and Security 
Code of Practices laid down by AERB, IAEA and its supports so as 
to allay the apprehension or fears expressed from various quarters 
on the safety and security of KKNPP and its effect on human life, 
property and environment and we notice that adequate and effec-
tive protection measures are in place.
The Court, referring to the implementation issues of some of these guide-
lines, noted that:
Various Codes of Practice, safety guidelines, extensively discussed 
above and the decision taken in various international conventions 
and the guidelines laid down by various international agencies fol-
lowed by India are meant to protect the life and property of people 
including the environment, guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India. 
Besides these safety guidelines, the Court also turned to “the problem 
of potential damage, which might flow from a nuclear catastrophe.” It also 
noted the legislations on civil and criminal liability adopted by several 
nuclear energy generating countries, such as “[t]he U.S. Price-Anderson 
Act, 1957, the German Atomic Energy Act, 1959, the Swiss Federal Law 
on the Exploitation of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes and Protec-
47 The Court also elaborately referred to the structure and function of the IAEA, 
noting that it had the responsibility to help member States to put in place the 
necessary infrastructure needed to develop nuclear energy safely, securely and 
peacefully and that it worked with member States to coordinate research to design 
reactors that were economical, safe and proliferation-resistant.
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tion from Radiation, 1959 and the Japanese Law on the Compensation of 
Nuclear Damage, 1961.” The Court noted that these legislative endeavors 
by these countries “followed the basic principle of imposing legal liability 
on a strict liability basis on the operator of a nuclear installation coupled 
with the limitation on liability.” The Court also referred to two of the exist-
ing international conventions on this issue and its implementation in the 
context of India. It, inter alia, stated, 
Currently, there are two main conventions on third-party liability 
in the field of nuclear energy. The first is the Paris Convention of 
1960, which was supplemented by the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention Act, 1963. IAEA’s Vienna Convention on Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage, 1963 is yet another convention. India’s Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 or the Nuclear Liability 
Act mainly rests on the above Conventions, though India is not a 
signatory to those conventions. India’s Nuclear Liability Act aims to 
provide a civil liability for nuclear damage and prompt compensa-
tion to victims of a nuclear incident through a No Fault Liability to 
the operator, appointment of Claims Commissioner, establishment 
of Nuclear Damage Claims Commission, Nuclear Liability Fund 
and other matters connected therewith.48 
The Court briefly surveyed the Indian liability regime as embodied 
in various cases decided by it in the last two decades.49 Despite this juris-
48 While on this, the Court also noted, “The constitutional validity of the said Act is 
under challenge before this Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 464 of 2011. Various 
prayers have been made in the above mentioned writ petition, but this Court issued 
the notice only with regard to the prayer clause no. (e), i.e. to declare the act as 
unconstitutional and void ab initio.” The court also noted that the India’s Nuclear 
Liability Act sought to limit the liability of the operator to the tune of Rs.1500 crores 
and the maximum liability to rupee equivalent of 300 millions SDR’s, though the 
Act, spoke of no fault liability. The Court also felt it to be unnecessary to examine 
the scope of various provisions contained in the Act as the constitutional validity 
of the Act was under challenge before it.
49 The Court began with the constitutional validity of the U.S. Price-Anderson Act 
1957 which was challenged in the year 1978 before the U.S. Supreme Court in Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). It was urged before the 
U.S. Supreme Court that the Act did not ensure adequate compensation for victims 
of accidents and it violated Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment 
by treating the nuclear accidents differently from other accidents etc. The U.S. 
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prudence on liability, the Court referred to the limitations that exist and 
particularly referred to the 1984 Bhopal Union Carbide incident50 as to 
how it shaped the Indian approach to liability claims. Considering these 
complexities of India’s population density and the national policy for set-
ting up of various NPPs, safety and security of the plants, the Court noted, 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act holding that it was lawful, in that 
there was adequate justification for treating nuclear accidents different to other 
claims; that Act provides a reasonably just substitute for the common law or state 
tort law remedies it replaces and that it cannot be said that the Act encouraged 
irresponsibility in the matter of safety and environmental protection. Having 
examined this U.S Supreme Court case, the Court went on to outline the cases 
decided by itself. It noted that the Strict Liability Principle had been examined in 
the environmental point of view in several judgments. In M. C. Mehta v. Union of 
India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (India), (Oleum Gas Leakage case), it had been held that 
the industries which were engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, 
possess serious threat to health and safety of persons and had an absolute and 
non-delegable duty to ensure that no harm was caused to the life and safety of the 
people. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 SCC 
212 (India), the Court had held that once the activity carried on in hazardous or 
inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity was liable to make 
good losses caused to any other person by his activity, irrespective of the fact that 
he took reasonable care while carrying on his activity. In Vellore Citizens Welfare 
Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647 (India), the Court had held that once 
the activity carried on is hazardous or potential hazardous, the person carrying 
on such activity was liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by 
his activity, irrespective of the fact that he took reasonable care. The absolute 
liability extended not only to compensate the victims of pollution, but also the 
cost of restoring environmental degradation. In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum, 
the Court reiterated the “polluter pays principles.” 
50 The Court in Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 540 (India), 
based on an earlier settlement, directed the Union Carbide to pay US $ 470 
million to the Union of India in full and final settlement of all claims, rights and 
liabilities related to and arising out of Bhopal Gas Tragedy. Following that, it was 
ordered that all civil proceedings arising out of Bhopal Gas Disaster, shall stand 
concluded in terms of the settlement and all criminal proceedings related to and 
arising out of the disaster shall stand quashed, wherever they were pending. Later, 
this Court modified that order upholding the settlement except the condition of 
quashing criminal charges in Union Carbide Corp, v. Union of India, AIR 1992 
SC 248 (India).
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were of extreme importance; lest, it continued, “a nuclear accident can 
cause immense damage both in terms of human life as well as environ-
ment destruction.” The Court also asserted that provisions would have to 
be made for remedying or compensating environmental damages caused 
by the accidents, without merely limiting it to personal injuries and dam-
ages to property.
The Court noted that the problem was to strike a balance between the 
benefits of rising standard of living and its costs in terms of deteriorations 
of the physical environment and the quality of life. In this context referring 
to 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment at Stockholm 
(Stockholm Conference) and other subsequent international conventions 
on environment, the Court, in fact, did a survey of range of these conven-
tions and it is briefly noted:
Stockholm Conference not only brought into focus the human 
rights approach to the problem of environmental protection but also 
recognized the linkage between the development and environment 
from which the concept of “sustainable development” has emerged 
. . . . The responsibility of the people to protect and improve the 
environment for the present and the future generations was also 
recognized. Later the Nairobi Conference and Declaration 1982 
re-stated the principles of Stockholm Conference and high-lighted 
the importance of intensifying the efforts at the global, regional and 
national levels to protect and improve environment. The United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in October 1982 adopted 
“The World Charter for Nature” and laid down general principles 
of environmental protection, action plan and implementation of 
scheme which high-lighted the conservation principles. New Delhi 
hosted the Delhi International Conference on Environmental 
Education 1982 where the International Community called for 
massive programme of environmental research and monitoring. 
The Conference suggested that environmental education should 
start from childhood and it should be both formal and informal. 
The United Nations General Assembly vide Resolution 38/161, 
in the year 1983 suggested the creation of “The World Commission 
on Environment and Development” for suggesting and recom-
mending legal principles based on Stockholm Conference and 
Nairobi Conference and many other, then existing International 
Conventions and General Assembly Resolutions. The World Com-
mission submitted its report in year 1987 which indicated that 
politicians, industrial leaders and environmental groups around 
the world had endorsed “sustainable development” i.e. meeting the 
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needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. United Nations convened a 
conference in the year 1983 at Vienna for protection of Ozone layer 
which provided foundation for global multilateral undertakings 
to protect the environment and public health from the potential 
adverse effects of depletion of Stratospheric Ozone. 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) convened 
a Conference at Plenipotentiaries in Montreal in the year 1987, 
called the Montreal Protocol 1987, which highlighted the neces-
sity of limiting and reducing the use of chlorofluro carbons and 
other chemicals that deplete ozone. India has acceded to both the 
Vienna Convention 1985 and the related Montreal Protocol, 1987, 
in the year 1992. 
Following the Stockholm Conference the second landmark on 
environmental protection and development was “United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 1992 
(Rio Summit) . . . . Rio declaration sets out general non-binding 
commands for “sustainable development” i.e. “human beings 
who are at the centre of sustainable development concerns have 
to exercise their right to healthy and productive life in harmony 
with nature.” The Rio Conference also high-lighted the principle of 
inter generational equity. Principles like “precautionary principle” 
so as to prevent the environmental degradation and the principle 
of “polluter pays” i.e. to bear the cost of pollution with due regard 
to public interest” were high-lighted. The Conference resulted in 
conclusion of a treaty on climate change with a general recogni-
tion of the importance of curbing emission of green house gases, 
another treaty on bio-diversity aiming at the preservation of f lora 
and fauna was also concluded. The Rio Conference also adopted 
Agenda 21. Section II of that Agenda deals with topics like protec-
tion of the atmosphere, land resources, deforestation, sustainable 
agriculture and rural development, conservation of biodiversity, 
protection of oceans, fresh water, toxic chemicals management, 
hazardous waste management, solid waste management and ra-
dioactive waste management. 
An international instrument expressing international concern 
for the protection of global environment was the convention on the 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992. The Convention high-lighted 
the necessity to reduce emissions of green-house gases believed to 
be contributing to global warming. Yet another, convention was 
The Biodiversity Convention, 1992 which sought to ensure that 
animals, plants and micro-organisms as well as genetic variety 
and ecosystem, water, land and air, in which they live are property 
State Practice 257
protected. It obligates the countries to promote the protection of 
ecosystems, natural habitat and the maintenance of viable popula-
tions of species in natural surroundings. Following the Rio Summit 
a Special Session of UNFA held in June 1997 in New York to review 
the progress of Rio Earth Summit called “Earth Summit+5” which 
adopted a comprehensive document titled “Programme For Further 
Implementation of Agenda 21.” The Conference noticed that since 
the Rio Conference, global environment had continued to deterio-
rate with rising level of polluting emissions, notably of green house 
gases, toxic substances and waste volumes and at operational levels, 
including the lowest administrative levels. 
UN Millennium Declaration, 2000 articulated that prudence 
must be shown in the management of all living species and natural 
resources, based on the principle of “sustainable development” 
and that only then, can the immeasurable riches provided to us 
by the nature be preserved for posterity. Further it was declared 
that current unsustainable pattern of production and consumption 
must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and that of 
our descendants.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) following the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21 created a Commission on Sustainable 
Development under the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil to ensure the effective implementation at the local, national, 
regional and international levels of what had been agreed at the 
Rio Conference, to ensure follow up of Rio Summit, to enhance 
adequate international, scientific and technological cooperation 
to catalyse inter-governmental decision making capacity to en-
sure regular and effective reporting on the Agenda 21 and at the 
national, regional and global levels.
The Delhi Sustainable Development Summit (DSDS) held 
in February 2002 at New Delhi, examined and elaborated the 
dynamics of concept of sustainable development, with a view to 
make recommendations for consideration at the World Summit at 
sustainable development to be held in Johannesburg. Delhi Summit 
sought to focus on poverty alleviation as the overriding concern to 
achieve sustainable development.
The World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg 
Summit) 2002 convened under the auspices of commission of 
sustainable development recommended various steps for further 
implementation of Rio Principles and Agenda 21. The Summit 
recognized that the reduction of poverty is the greatest global 
challenge facing the world, for which the World Solidarity Fund 
was required to be established to eradicate poverty and to promote 
258 (2013) 19 Asian Yearbook of International Law
social and human development in various developing countries. 
Further, Conference also noticed that since oceans, seas, islands 
and coastal areas form an integrated and essential component of 
earth’s ecosystem and are crucial for global food security and for 
sustaining economic prosperity and the well-being of many na-
tional economies, particularly, developing countries, it is necessary 
to ensure sustainable development of the oceans.
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio 
+20 took place in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, which also took 
forward looking decisions on a number of thematic areas including 
energy, food security, oceans, cities etc. Conference also focused 
its attention on green economy in the context of sustainable devel-
opment, poverty eradication and an institutional framework for 
sustainable development.
The Court further held that in fact the nuclear power plant in question 
had been set and was made functional on the touchstone of sustainable 
development and taking into account its impact on ecology by following 
all national and international environmental principles. Reference was 
also made by the Court to the various provisions of the IAEA Convention 
on Nuclear Safety adopted in June 1994, to which India was a party, in 
particular its Preamble which, inter alia, stated that “the use of nuclear 
energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally sound.” The Court 
also noted that this Convention laid down “the priority to nuclear safety, 
comprehensive and systematic safety assessments at all stages, including 
the life span of the plants, verification by analysis, surveillance, testing 
and inspection, regard being had to the safety requirements, emergency 
planning and preparedness to take care of the people in the vicinity of 
the nuclear installation, necessary engineering and technical support in 
all safety related fields available throughout the life time of the nuclear 
installation, constant reporting by the operator to the regulatory body 
pertaining to safety and the handling of radioactive waste resulting from 
the operation and the measures of safety carried thereon.”51
Decision 
51 The Court also referred to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 1997 to which 
India was not party. This Convention, the Court noted, dealt with public safety 
and also provided for safety of spent fuel management and safety or Radioactive 
Waste Management.
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The Court, in its decision noted that: 
[T]he appellant, by this Public Interest Litigation, has, in a way, 
invoked and aroused the conscience/concern of the court to such 
an issue. True it is, the prayer is for the total closure of the plant and 
the Court has not acceded to the said prayer but his noble effort is 
appreciated to put forth the grievance of the local people and the 
necessity of adequate safety measures as is perceived. When such 
cause comes up before this Court, it is the bounden duty to remind 
the authorities “Be alert, remain always alert and duty calls you to 
nurture constant and sustained vigilance and nation warns you not 
to be complacent and get into a mild slumber.” The AERB as the 
regulatory authority and the MoEF are obliged to perform their 
duty that safety measures are adequately taken before the plant 
commences its operation. That is the trust of the people in the au-
thorities which they can ill afford to betray, and it shall not be an 
exaggeration to state that safety in a case of this nature in any one’s 
hand has to be placed on the pedestal of “Constitutional Trust.”
The Court also issued several directions to the Government and the agen-
cies that dealt with the setting up of NPPs to (a) to ensure the quality of 
various components and systems; (b) compliance with all the conditions 
for environmental clearance before the plant was made operational; (c) 
ensure protection of human health and environment from the undue effect 
of ionizing radiation now and future, for which sufficient surveillance and 
monitoring programme have to be evolved and implemented; (d) ensure 
that the radioactive discharges to the environmental aquatic atmosphere 
and terrestrial route shall not cross the limits prescribed by the Regula-
tory Body; (e) take measures to minimize the impact on environment due 
to storage of nuclear fuel; (f) proper management and transportation of 
spent nuclear fuel strictly in accordance with Code of Practices laid down 
by the AERB following the norms and regulations laid down by IAEA; (g) 
to implement the National Disaster Management Guidelines, 2009 and 
also carry out the periodical emergency exercises on and off site; and (h) 
report on the implementation process to be filed before the Court before 
commissioning of the plant.
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Extradition
INDONESIA
Extradition Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam
On 27 June 2013, the Republic of Indonesia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam established a bilateral treaty. It was then ratified by the Indonesian 
Government through Law No. 5 of 2015 and subsequently entered into 
force. The establishment of the Treaty was for both parties to cooperate in 
preventing and eradicating criminal offences. The Treaty is to be conducted 
with respect to both sovereign and equal parties. 
Within the Treaty, both parties have agreed upon several key factors, 
such as the obligation to request extradition; the classification of crimi-
nal offences that can be extradited; and the applied exception within the 
Treaty. As for the first key point, each party has the obligation to request 
an extradition for any criminal perpetrator to the requested party for 
the purpose of continuing the legal proceedings. An important notice 
regarding this Treaty is that extradition can be requested before or after 
this Treaty is entered into force. A party can request for an extradition 
for several crimes, such as crimes punishable up to one year or more in 
prison; organised crimes; and an unlawful act related to taxes, customs 
duty, foreign exchange, or other unlawful acts. Regarding the classification 
of unlawful acts, an exception was made. As for crimes related to political 
or military affairs, an extradition cannot be requested.
Extradition Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Indepen-
dent State of Papua New Guinea
The extradition Treaty between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea was 
established and signed on 17 June 2013. The Treaty was soon ratified 
through Law No. 6 of 2015. The Treaty itself went into force after a written 
announcement was submitted to each party regarding the completion of 
each party’s national requirements.
Extradition shall be requested by one of the parties in accordance 
with its national regulation. Every perpetrator that remains in one of the 
territories shall be returned to his nation to continue with the prosecu-
tion and trial. According to the Treaty, if the crime was committed where 
the extradition was requested outside the territory of each party or if the 
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perpetrator, whose extradition is requested, is a citizen of the requesting 
party or not a citizen of the requesting party, the requested party may grant 
an extradition under its own discretion. Extradition can be requested for 
crimes that have a conviction of one year or more prison charges. For any 
crime related to political affairs, for example, threatening or endangering 
the life of the president or the head of the government, an extradition can-
not be requested. The same applies to any terrorism activities or crimes 
related to military affairs. 
Aiming to strengthen the relationship between Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea, both parties have agreed upon the assistance on eradicating 
and preventing criminal action through an extradition treaty. Both parties 
believed that the establishment of this Treaty will be beneficial and will 
increase mutual respect between the parties. 
KOREA
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / EXTRADITION – 
EXTRADITABLE OFFENCE – POLITICAL OFFENCE
Decision of District Court Concerning Extradition
Seoul High Court – Request for Extradition Examination (Request for 
Extradition of Yasukuni Shrine Arsonist). Seoul Godeung beobwon [Seoul 
High Ct.], January 3, 2013. 2012Toe1, Jan. 3, 2013 (S. Kor.).
Facts 
This case dealt with the Japanese Government’s request to the Korean 
Government for extradition of criminal A52 according to the agreement 
52 The criminal in this case is a Chinese national. His grandmother is a Korean victim 
of the Japanese Military Sexual Slavery (known as the ‘Comfort Women’) and 
his grandfather is a Chinese soldier who died during the anti-Japanese struggle. 
Under this family background, he protested against the Japanese Government’s 
lack of historical awareness by attempting arson on the Yashukuni Shrine in 
December 26, 2011. He damaged parts of the Shrine door with the specific intent 
to influence the related internal and external policies. However, in fact, his act of 
arson did not create material damages. Afterwards, the criminal entered South 
Korea and threw firebombs to the Japanese Embassy as he was outraged by the 
attitude of the Japanese Government, who did not apologize for the ‘Comfort 
Women’ issue. He was sentenced to ten months in prison by the Korean Court. 
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on extradition for criminals between the Republic of Korea and Japan. 
Criminal A has a Chinese nationality and is currently imprisoned in Korea 
after being convicted of creating public danger by damaging the Yasukuni 
Shrine by arson.
Legal Issues 
(1) What are the applicable laws that determine whether Korea has an 
obligation to extradite a criminal to Japan? (2) What is the standard that 
determines the definition and types of political crime that falls into the 
principle of criminal non-extradition, and what kinds of crimes are po-
litical crimes? (3) Does the meaning of political crimes and the so-called 
‘relative political crimes’ defined in Article 3 of the Criminal Extradition 
Treaty between Korea and Japan fall into this situation?
Judgment
The Court held that, when deciding whether Korea has an obligation to 
extradite criminals to Japan, the general principle of interpretation of the 
law is applied, such as the principle of prioritizing new laws and the prin-
ciple of prioritizing special laws, because the Criminal Extradition Treaty 
between Korea and Japan, signed on April 8, 2002 and put into effect on 
June 21, 2002, was ratified by Congress, giving it the same effect as a legisla-
tion. Furthermore, this Extradition Treaty is applied primary to Criminal 
Extradition Law based on Article 3, No. 2 of the Criminal Extradition Law, 
and the Criminal Extradition Law is applied as a supplement. Meanwhile, 
the Court said that for criminal extradition procedure, political crimes are 
divided into absolute political crime or pure political crime, and relative 
political crime. In the case of relative political crime, an international 
standard is not established to be regarded as a political crime, but each 
country has developed different customs. The Court proposes the stan-
dard, provided below, to decide when relative crimes are political crimes:
(1) Whether the intent of the crime is not to gain personal benefits 
but to favor or oppose the purpose of the political organization or 
the institution pursues; (2) whether the intent of crime is to abandon 
or destroy the political structure of a country or to pressure or give 
After the execution, the Japanese Government requested an extradition based on 
the Criminal Extradition Treaty between Korea and Japan.
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an impact to change the major domestic and foreign policies of that 
country; (3) what are the characteristics of the targeted victim and 
what the characteristics symbolize; (4) whether there is a systematic 
relationship as a means of fulfilling the political purpose which the 
criminal pursues; (5) what are the legal and factual characteristics 
of the crime; (6) the brutalities of the crime, in other words, look to 
whether it involves the act of grave violence that is against life, limb, 
and freedom of a person, and whether there is balance between the 
social injury caused by the crime and its political purpose. 
The overall sentence is determined by rationally considering 
the subjective or objective situations that are in favor of or against 
the criminal in relation to the criminal extradition principle. 
Consideration should be given to the purpose and background of 
the crime  — whether it is a general crime or a a political crime; 
the background between the extradition requesting country and 
requested country;  and the political situation.
Based on such standard of review, the Court clarified that “political crime” 
in Article 3(c) of the Extradition Treaty has the same meaning as “the crime 
which has political characteristic or related to the political characteristic,” 
which is identified in Article 8, Section 1 of the Extradition Act. In addi-
tion, it should not only be interpreted as an absolute political crime but also 
should include a concept of relative political crime. Eventually, the Court 
decided that the crime by the Chinese Criminal A, who is now imprisoned 
in Korea and whom the Japanese Government requested for extradition, 
corresponds to political crime that is defined in Article 3, No. 3 of the 
Extradition Treaty. The Court further stated that there is no exceptional 
reason to guide the criminal for the following reasons:
(1) Criminal A’s intent for committing the crime was caused by 
A’s anger toward the Japanese Government’s lack of historical 
awareness on historical events and the related policies, thus, A 
had no intent to gain personal benefits for himself; (2) Criminal 
A’s intent for the crime was to change the policies of the Japanese 
Government or to give influence by pressuring the Government, 
in which the Government has the opposite political belief and view 
of Criminal A; (3) although the Yasukuni Shrine is legally an asset 
to the religious association, it is also regarded to have a political 
symbolism that corresponds to national facilities; (4) the crime was 
committed for political justification and the systematic relation-
ship between the crime and the political purpose is established; (5) 
although the legal characteristic of the crime is arson on a general 
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object, the characteristic is close to destruction and the danger to 
the public was not that great; (6) crime allowable for extradition 
is a relative political crime that has more political characteristics 
than general criminal characteristics, which is arson as a  general 
matter when considering (i) the historical background of Japan, 
the requesting country, Korea, the requested country, and China, 
the criminal’s nationality, (ii) the political situation such as the 
differences in political awareness and confrontation of opinions 
about historical facts, and (iii) the pursuit for universal values by 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and the 
most civilized countries. Moreover, there was no human casualty 
caused by the crime and the property damage was not material.
To sum up, the Court held that the non-extradition of a political offender 
is the established principle of International Law (Refer to Daebeowon [S. 
Ct.], 84 Do39, May 22, 1988 (S. Kor.)) and stated that the political crime 
of Criminal Extradition Treaty between Korea and Japan is not only in-
terpreted as an absolute political crime, but also interpreted as a concept 
that includes the relative political crime. Therefore, the Court decided not 
to allow the extradition of the criminal to Japan, the requesting country, 
after considering the Criminal A’s intent for and purpose of committing 
the crime, the characteristics of the targeted object, and the relationship 
to the crime and to the principle of non-extradition of a political offender.
Human Rights 
BANGLADESH
LABOUR STANDARDS – COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS/AGENCIES TO IMPROVE WORK CONDITIONS AND 
SAFETY AT WORK IN THE GARMENTS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
On 22 October 2013, Bangladesh signed an agreement with the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO), with a view to initiate certain measures 
to improve working conditions in the Bangladesh readymade garments 
sector (RMG sector). This initiative came after the worst-ever industrial 
disaster in Bangladesh in April 2013, when a commercial building (RANA 
PLAZA) collapsed in a Dhaka suburb, killing more than 1,200 workers 
who were employed in several garments manufacturing factories that were 
housed in the building. Later in 2013, the government of Bangladesh signed 
State Practice 265
a trilateral pact, called the Sustainability Compact, with the EU and ILO 
to elevate the conditions of ready-made garments industries to the level of 
international labour standards.  
HUMAN RIGHTS – PROHIBITION OF TORTURE – CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 
Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013 [Act 50 of 2013] 
- an Act to provide for punishments for torture, including killing in 
custodies.
The above Act came into force on 27 October 2014, when the President 
signed the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Bill (a private mem-
ber Bill proposed in 2009) passed by the Bangladesh Parliament. Torture 
is expressly prohibited in article 35(5) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
There was, however, no statutory law prohibiting and criminalising 
“torture,” specifically, torture by law-enforcement agencies that became 
endemic in Bangladesh. The 2013 Act has sought to fill in this gap, and 
it has been premised on the normative framework of the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), which Bangladesh ratified in 1998. The preamble of 
the Act categorically mentions Bangladesh’s obligations both under this 
Convention and the national constitution.
Although it did not fully cover the definition of ‘torture’ in the CAT, 
the Act’s definition of torture (sec. 2(6)-(7)) is fairly wide. Torture has been 
defined as both physical and mental torture by, among others, law enforce-
ment agencies, including what is known as ‘custodial torture’ and ‘custodial 
death.’ The definition has been extended to non-judicial or extra-judicial 
punishments in any form. Accordingly, torture in the name of issuing fatwa 
(religious edicts) or corporal punishment of school children is covered 
within the ambit of this law. Moreover, torture inflicted during the time 
of war or emergency and torture committed by a custodian against any 
detainee/internee would also constitute an offence (secs. 12-13).
This Act criminalises torture and provides for differentiated punish-
ments for the offence of torture, depending on the gravity of the offence. 
In case of the death in custody resulting from torture, the custodian on 
conviction is liable for a life term and for paying compensation of Ban-
gladeshi taka 200,000.00 to the victim’s family members (secs. 14-15). A 
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senior criminal court (Court of Sessions) has jurisdiction to try offence 
under this Act.  
A limitation of the anti-torture Act of 2013 is that its overriding clause 
(sec. 3) (that this law shall take effect notwithstanding any other law) does 
not seem to be in terms with article 1.2 of the CAT. Article 1.2 speaks for 
the application of the Convention, which is without prejudice to any in-
ternational instrument or national legislation which does or may contain 
provisions of wider application. In contrast, the overriding clause of the 
2013 Act may potentially outweigh any provisions that are more beneficial, 
which may have been enacted in other laws.
The Act has sought to widen the access to justice by providing that, 
when the offence of torture is committed by any person, the victim or any 
third party (e.g. a relative or a friend) may directly lodge a complaint with 
a competent court, in addition to registering a case with the police. There 
are ancillary provisions that provide for the court’s power to inspect the 
place of torture, to mandate medical examination of the victim, and to 
order inquiry into the allegation (secs. 5-6). The Act also empowers the 
court to make any appropriate order for the protection and security of the 
complainant (sec. 11). On the other hand, when the offence of torture has 
occurred because of any public servant’s negligence, the burden of proof 
lies upon the accused to prove that he or she was not negligent (sec. 19).  
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION – SMUGGLING OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS – LABOUR TRAFFICKING – HUMAN TRAFFICKING – 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS AND THE MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES 1990 – 
BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO PROTECT MIGRANT WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS 
The Overseas Employment and Migrants Act 2013 [Act No. VLVIII of 
2013] – enacted to promote opportunities for overseas employment, es-
tablish a safe and fair system of migration, and ensure rights and welfare 
of migrant workers and members of their families. 
On 27 October 2013, the President of Bangladesh gave assent to the Overseas 
Employment and Migrants Act 2013 (the OEM Act). The Act seeks to be 
in line with, and indeed complies with, International Convention on the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families 1990 (the 
ICRMW), which Bangladesh ratified on 24 August 2011. The preamble of 
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the Act categorically cites the ICRMW, and sets out as its objective, the 
establishment of a safe and rights-based regime for international labour 
migration from Bangladesh.
The Act seeks to establish a control of irregular migration and to pre-
vent trafficking and smuggling of human beings in the name of overseas 
employment. It complements the existing laws relating to passports, im-
migration, international relationship on the issue of employment of migrant 
workers, control of foreign nationals, money-laundering, and human traf-
ficking. The OEM Act has nine chapters and 49 sections in total. Keeping 
terms with the definition of a migrant worker under the ICRMW, the Act 
defines a “migrant worker” as a citizen of Bangladesh who has migrated 
to a foreign country for the purpose of overseas employment in any work 
or profession for wages. The definition includes a migrant worker who (a) 
is preparing to migrate or is departing to any foreign country for work; 
(b) is employed in a trade or profession in any foreign country; or (c) has 
returned to Bangladesh at the end of the tenure of employment or without 
having completed the tenure of employment in a trade or profession from 
a foreign country.
Like the ICRMW, the OEM Act excludes certain categories of persons 
from the definition of a migrant worker, such as students, persons emigrat-
ing for employment in a foreign government or international or multilateral 
organisation, or public servants emigrating on an official duty or for the 
purposes of education or training. 
Salient features of the OEMA Act 2013 can be summarised as follows:
(1) The power to recruit Bangladeshi workers for overseas 
employment is vested in the government or its authorised 
agencies, such as the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and 
Training (BMET). Private recruitment agents, licensed under 
this Act, may engage in the business of recruiting aspirant 
workers for employment in foreign countries (secs. 3, 9, 15).
(2) In conformity with the 1990 Convention, section 6 of the 
OEM Act 2013 establishes the norm of equality and non-
discrimination in regard to all activities concerning overseas 
employment of Bangladeshi migrant workers.
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(3) The rights of migrant workers under the OEM Act include: 
right to information (sec. 26), right to legal aid (sec. 27), right 
to file civil suit (sec. 28), and right to return home (sec. 29). 
(4) To ensure safe migration, the law requires the out-bound 
workers to first obtain a migration clearance certificate, with-
out which emigration is not lawful. For the same purpose, the 
Act has established a mechanism of controlling the private 
recruitment agents. Under section 42, for example, any officer 
authorised may inspect any place or any transport in order 
to prevent irregular migration from Bangladesh. 
(5) The private recruitment agents have a duty to arrange for the 
conclusion of an employment contract between the recruited 
worker and the employer, to protect the interest of migrant 
workers, to employ the worker recruited in the job offered, 
and to provide wages and other benefits agreed to (secs. 19, 
22).
(6) Bangladesh Missions abroad, especially the Labour Welfare 
Wings, are given a duty to protect the rights of migrant 
workers of Bangladesh that are employed in their respective 
country of employment. Labour attachés have a duty, for this 
purpose, to inspect the place of work, to communicate with 
the authorities or foreign employers, if needed, to render 
legal and other assistance to migrant workers in distress, 
and to make an annual report, along with necessary recom-
mendations on the condition of Bangladeshi migrant workers 
working in the concerned country (sec. 24). 
(7) The government is authorised to enter into any bilateral 
agreements or memorandums of understanding on migration 
with any country of employment to further protect migrant 
workers’ rights (sec. 25). 
(8) The Act criminalises a number of activities relating to migra-
tion with a view to ensuring safe migration of Bangladeshi 
citizens for overseas works. It criminalises, for example, 
migration through unlawful and unauthorised means, charg-
ing by recruitment agents of unauthorised amount of fees, 
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and other fraudulent activities (secs. 31-35). Along with the 
criminal provisions, the Act has also enacted provisions for 
settlement of disputes relating to contracts between a migrant 
worker and the recruitment agent who acts on behalf, and as 
an agent, of the foreign employer (sec. 41). 
Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration 
On 3-4 October 2013, the UN General Assembly held the second High-level 
Dialogue on International Migration (UN-HLD) in New York. Following 
the dialogue, a Declaration was adopted, in the preparation and finalization 
of which Bangladesh played an active role. Bangladesh participated in the 
negotiation meetings and the relevant side-events before the HLD was held. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Bangladesh and Iraq of 2013 
Regarding the Employment of Bangladeshi Workers in Iraq (MoU)
On 31 August 2013, the government of Bangladesh entered into the MoU to 
ensure rights of Bangladeshi workers employed in Iraq. The MoU provided 
for the renewal of employment contracts of migrant workers, their access 
to justice, and the resolution of migrant workers’ disputes with employers. 
It also provided that the migrant workers from Bangladesh would have 
the details of the job description well in advance and that they would be 
entitled to, among others, health care facilities at the cost of the employers 
and leave from work.
HUMAN RIGHTS – RIGHTS OF DOMESTIC WORKERS – 
ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORM OF THE CHILD LABOUR 
CONVENTION (ILO CONVENTION NO. 182)
Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association (BNWLA) v. Ban-
gladesh [17 MLR (2012) HCD 121; 31 BLD (2011) HCD 265; Judgment 
February 11, 2011]
The BNWLA, a human rights NGO, lodged a constitutional petition before 
the High Court Division of the Supreme Court with a view to improving 
the plights of child domestic workers in Bangladesh. The Court issued a 
10-point directive against the government agencies, aiming for the protec-
tion of children employed as domestic workers. Writing the judgment for 
the Court, M. Imman Ali, J. relied on article 3(d) of the ILO Convention 
No. 182, ratified by Bangladesh but not implemented in its municipal law, 
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in defining ‘hazardous child labour.’ The Court directed the government 
to stop employment of children under the age of twelve in any work includ-
ing in the household sector. The Court asked the responsible authorities 
to ensure for the domestic workers’ facilities, such as education, training, 
medical treatment, working hours, recreation, family reunion, wages, 
and so on, and the mandatory registration of all domestic workers by the 
employers. The Court stopped short of recommending the incorporation 
of the ILO Convention No. 182 into Bangladesh’s domestic law. The Court 
did not cite or mention the ILO Convention Concerning Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers 2011 (ILO Convention No. 189), which has not been 
ratified by Bangladesh. Appreciably, however, it observed that the inclu-
sion of the domestic workers within the definition of ‘workers’ under the 
Bangladesh Labour Act 2006 would entitle this vulnerable group of people 
to the same rights and benefits as other workers. The Court stated, in its 
own words, “[o]nly then will the mandate of the Constitution [of Bangla-
desh] be fulfilled.” 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS – APPLICATION AND INCORPORATION 
OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1989 – 
CUSTODY AND WELFARE OF CHILDREN – THE PRINCIPLE OF BEST 
INTEREST OF THE CHILD; UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM 
RULES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Anika Ali v. Rezwanul Ahsan [17 MLR (2012) AD 49; Judgment June 9, 
2012]
Facts
In this decision, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangla-
desh relied upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989, 
which the country ratified in August 1990. Anika Ali involved a dispute 
between the separated parents of a boy child regarding, among other things, 
his custody and guardianship. Initially, in 2005, two opposing suits were 
instituted by the divorced couple, pursuant to which they arrived at two 
compromises. Later, however, a series of proceedings, including a con-
stitutional petition to restore the custody of the child to the father, were 
initiated. Ultimately, the matter of the Family Court went all the way up 
to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 
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Decision and Reasoning
The Appellate Division observed that: 
[C]ustody of a child should never be presumed to be inscribed in 
stone. Matters such as custody must always remain f luid since 
change in circumstances may at any time require the terms of the 
custody of a child to be varied upon a fresh application in order to 
comply with the age-old principle that the welfare of the child is a 
paramount consideration . . . .
The Court categorically cited articles 3 and 12 of the CRC, which provide 
that the choice and preference of the child should be given due consideration 
by decision-making bodies when his/her interest is at stake. 
The Court made a significant distinction between cases in which minor 
children decide to leave their parents’ house for the sake of their paramour 
and the cases in which they are the victims of a broken marriage of their 
parents. It observed that since the decision of custody of a child, when 
wrongly made, might result in “indelible psychological damage” to the 
child, it is wise to allow the child to freely express his or her views so that 
the judge can make a better decision in the best interest of the child. It was 
further observed that, in adjudicating a matter of the custody of children, 
the concerned courts should keep in mind the provision of article 9 of the 
CRC, that is, the right of the child to maintain regular contacts with both 
parents. By citing an old dictum, the Court emphasised that unless the 
provisions of any international instruments are contrary to Bangladesh’s 
domestic laws, “the beneficial provisions may profitably be referred to and 
implemented in appropriate cases.”53
The Children Act 2013 [Act 24 of 2013] – an Act to provide for a new law 
relating to children for the purpose of implementing the United Nations 
Child Rights Convention.
The Children Act 2013 received assent of the President on 20 June 2013, 
and was given effect from 21 August 2013. The Act was passed by the 
Parliament of Bangladesh with a view to bringing the country in line with 
the CRC and other international instruments, such as the UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘the Beijing 
53 State v. Metropolitan Police Comm’r (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 660.  
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Rules’). Bangladesh ratified the CRC in 1990. As such, the Act of 2013 has 
replaced the earlier Children Act 1974 that was a pre-CRC instrument.  
With 11 chapters and 100 sections in total, the Children Act is a special 
law with overriding effect (sec. 3). It seeks to provide for a legal regime 
to deal with the children in conflict with the law, the children in contact 
with the law, and the disadvantaged children who are in need of care. The 
2013 Act is premised on the notion of “the best interests of the children” 
as enshrined in article 3 of the CRC, although the law has not specifi-
cally mentioned this. Keeping in mind the idea of the best interests of the 
children, however, the Act allocates powers, duties, and responsibilities 
to Children’s Court, Children Affairs Police Officer, and the Probation 
Officer. Importantly, in line with article 1 of the CRC, the Act defines a 
child to be a person who has not turned the age of eighteen (sec. 4). This 
has been a radical change from Bangladesh’s position that a child should 
be defined as one who is of the age of sixteen. 
Salient features of the Children Act 2013 are as follows: 
The Act establishes a specialist Children’s Court, one in each dis-
trict and metropolitan area, with the exclusive jurisdiction to deal 
with the children in conflict or contact with the law. The Act also 
makes provisions for a number of children-friendly procedures and 
institutional mechanisms, such as probation officers (secs. 5-6), 
child-friendly police-desk (secs. 13-15), and social inquiry report 
(sec. 31), with a view to ensuring a children-friendly justice delivery 
system (secs. 19, 26, 28-29). The Children’s Court is responsible for 
assessment and determination of the age of the children, when it 
is in doubt (secs. 20-21), and is empowered to order an individual 
proven guilty of any offence against a child to pay a suitable com-
pensation so that the money could be spent for the benefit of the 
child victim (sec. 38).
In conformity with article 12 of the CRC, section 22 of the Act 
ensures the right of the children to participate in person in all stages 
of the judicial process, while the attendance of the concerned child 
in court may be dispensed with in the best interest of the child 
(sec. 25). It is not lawful for a court to proceed with a trial without 
legal representation on behalf of a child, who is either in contact or 
in conflict with the law (secs. 55-58). On the other hand, the Act 
protects the right of privacy of the child concerned, by criminalis-
ing the publication/circulation of any information that directly or 
indirectly identifies a child involved in a trial.
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The Act provides for the establishment of a Child Welfare 
Boards at the national, district, and sub-district levels for the pur-
pose of monitoring, co-coordinating, reviewing, and evaluating the 
activities of several institutions that work under the Act (secs. 7-12). 
Such a Welfare Board is also tasked to provide guidance for reha-
bilitation and reintegration of the children in conflict with the law.
Importantly, the Act provides for diversionary measures to be 
taken with regard to the children in conflict with the law. Chil-
dren may be diverted from the formal criminal justice system at 
any time after arrest and throughout the trial process. Diversion 
involves, for example, placement of children under the supervision 
of probation officers for proper monitoring. The use of family con-
ference to settle a problem created by any child is also regarded as 
a diversionary measure. The Act (sec. 49) also has introduced the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism for the settle-
ment of less serious offences by children (sec. 37).
The Act prohibits imprisonment of children and the death pen-
alty for children. It only allows the detaining of children in a Child 
Development Centre (CDC) or privately run Certified Institutes 
(secs. 59-69). A child found guilty of an offence punishable with 
death or imprisonment for life may be detained in such a centre 
or institute for up to three years. The Act further provides for the 
arrangement of alternative care (secs. 84-94) for the disadvantaged 
children, as well as the children that are in contact with the law. 
Alternative care may be arranged with a view to ensuring the 
overall welfare and the best interest of the children who need spe-
cial protection, nursing, and care, in the context of their familial, 
social, cultural, financial, ethnic, psychological, and educational 
background. 
The Act prohibits certain activities with regard to children and 
criminalises those actions or omissions of such actions. Offences in 
respect to children include cruelty to child, engagement of a child in 
begging, being drunk while in charge of a child, giving intoxicating 
liquor or harmful medicine to a child, permitting a child to enter 
places where liquor or dangerous drugs are sold, inciting a child 
to bet or borrow, taking on a pledge or buying articles from the 
child, allowing a child to be in a brothel, and so on. 
DISABILITY RIGHTS – CONVENTION ON THE  
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The Rights and Protection of the Persons with Disabilities Act 2013 [Act 
39 of 2013] – an Act to enact provisions to better protect the rights of 
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the persons with disabilities and to provide for certain welfare measures 
for them.
This Act provides for provisions in compliance with the 2006 UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Bangladesh 
Parliament enacted this important law on disability rights in 2013, with a 
view to ensuring the rights and protection of the persons with disabilities, 
replacing (by sec. 44) an earlier law on the subject (the Bangladesh Welfare 
of Persons with Disability Act 2001). Except for sections 31 and 36, the Act 
came into force on 9 October 2013. 
Although it has not incorporated the CRPD in its entirety, the Act 
undoubtedly aims at reflecting, through its provisions, the Convention on 
Disability Rights. The preamble of the Act cites Bangladesh’s ratification 
of the CRPD as one of the reasons for its enactment.54
The salient features of the Act are as follows: 
The Act provides for a number of rights (twenty-one heads of 
rights), to which persons with disabilities of any sort are entitled, 
depending on the nature of disability, requiring the concerned 
authorities (private and public) to ensure reasonable accommoda-
tion for the persons with disabilities (sec. 16(1)). The major rights 
of these people include the right to be employed, the right to not 
be removed from work on the ground of disability, and, among 
other rights, the right to participate in social, economic, and rec-
reational activities. 
It prohibits any kind of discrimination (sec. 16) or the creation 
of obstruction against persons with disabilities (PWDs) with re-
gard to their employment in any work according to their eligibility 
(secs. 16(2), 35).
It requires all public places to have facilities that would be acces-
sible to the PWDs (sec. 34), to keep certain seats reserved in public 
and private transportation for PWDs, and to remove disparity in 
admissions to educational institutions (secs. 32-33).
To ensure the implementation of the objectives of the law and 
to provide guidance for its better application, the Act establishes a 
National Co-ordination Committee (NCC) and a National Execu-
tive Committee on the rights of the PWDs. The law also provides 
for similar committees at the rural and municipal levels. A major 
function of the NCC is to coordinate the activities of different 
54 Bangladesh signed the Convention on 9 May 2007 and ratified it on 30 
November 2007. 
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ministries, agencies, and national-level private entities for the pro-
tection of rights of the PWDs. The National Executive Committee 
has the responsibility to implement the actions recommended by 
the government or the NCC for the better realisation of the rights 
of the PWDs (secs. 17-20).
The Act requires all government, private, and local authorities 
to play their role in implementing its objectives, and to render as-
sistance to the committees established under the law.  
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW – HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT 
– HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT – SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT; RIO DECLARATION (AGENDA 21) STOCKHOLM 
DECLARATION 
Metro Makers and Developers Ltd. v. Bangladesh Environmental Law-
yers’ Association (BELA) and Others [65 DLR (2013) AD 181; Judgment 
August 7, 2012]
Facts
This constitutional challenge involved the legality of a development project 
undertaken by a private real estate developer, Metro Makers. The project, 
which was selling plots of land to the consumers, was situated in a Dhaka 
suburb (Ameen Bazar) identified by the government as a Sub-Flood Flow 
Zone, where development of land for housing or commercial purposes was 
banned in order to protect the city from environmental hazards. Moreover, 
the developer company allegedly did not receive permission from the con-
cerned authorities, such as RAJUK (Capital City Development Authority), 
but rather breached their Master Plan of Dhaka and Dhaka Metropolitan 
Integrated Development Plans (DMDP), in which the concerned project 
area was declared as a protected area. Given this state of affairs, the leading 
environmental organisation, BELA, filed a constitutional petition before 
the High Court Division seeking an injunction against and the closure of 
the Metro Makers’ project. The Court issued an injunction against new 
sale of land under the project, but held that the bona fide purchasers of 
lands from the development project should not be compelled to return 
their lands. In the context of this curious decision, the petitioner and the 
developer company appealed to the Appellate Division.
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Decision and Reasoning  
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh declared the 
whole project of Metro Makers unlawful and ordered an environmental 
restoration. The real estate developer, Metro Makers, was directed to restore 
the wetland to its original state, and to refund the purchasers of plots of 
land, double the money they paid for the lands, including the legal costs 
they spent (per Syed Mahmud Hossain, J. with whom five Justices, includ-
ing the Chief Justice, agreed).
The Court held that the company in question misrepresented to the 
consumers and concealed necessary environmental information and le-
gal requirements when selling plots of lands. It explained that the idea of 
protecting the ‘bona fide purchasers for value without notice’ is applicable 
in case of conflict of ownerships of property, and that this principle of 
equitable relief will not override the statutory provisions protecting the 
environment and lands located in the Sub-Flood Flow Zone, where the 
Metro Makers was carrying out its commercial project. The Court further 
stressed that individuals and organisations should have access to informa-
tion relating to environment and development, including information on 
products/activities that have or are likely to have a significant impact on 
the environmental protection measures. The Court approvingly cited the 
Rio Declaration’s statement that “[wherever] there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”
Further, the Court considered the protection of environment and hu-
man rights inseparable from each other and focused on the people’s right 
to healthy environment, as found in many international instruments. On 
the issue of right to environment and sustainable development, it cited, 
specifically, article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights (1994), article 24(2)(c) of the CRC, and ar-
ticle 24(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981. The 
Court also noted Stockholm Declaration and the UN General Assembly 
Resolution No. 45/94 in order to emphasize the citizens’ right ‘to live in 
an environment adequate for their health and well-being.’55
55 Metro Makers and Developers Ltd. v. BELA (2013) 65 DLR (AD) 181, at 60.
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The Appellate Division also held that the right to life established in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh includes the right to protection and improve-
ment of environment and ecology. As the Court reasoned, the government 
has a duty to ensure that all public and private entities do follow the notion 
of sustainable development that requires human rights to be upheld while 
undertaking any development project. To buttress its argument, the Court 
cited the Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (or Agenda 21 that consisted 
of twenty-seven principles adopted at the Earth Summit), the Report of the 
Brundtland Commission, environmental law cases of the Indian Supreme 
Court, and scholarly works on sustainable development. It specifically cited 
the UN General Assembly’s 1990 Declaration on International Economic 
Co-operation, in which it recognized that “[e]conomic development must 
be environmentally sound and sustainable.”
In his opinion, Sinha, J. noted that as the environment and human 
rights are inextricably linked, the impact of environmental degradation on 
human health has to be adjusted or mitigated through national policies. By 
invoking the doctrine of public trust, the Court held that the environmental 
conservation is a public duty and the government is a public trustee of the 
nature and environment. According to the Court, “the doctrine enjoins 
upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the 
general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or 
commercial purposes.”
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REPORT (UPR) – HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 
BY BANGLADESH – SUBMITTED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS (DISTRIBUTED BY  
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 7 FEBRUARY 2013;  
REVIEW HELD ON 29 APRIL 2013
Bangladesh submitted its National Report on Human Rights in accordance 
with paragraph 5 of the annex to the Human Rights Council Resolution 
No. 16/2110. The report was drafted in 2012 through a wide civic engage-
ment. Specially, the Human Rights Forum Bangladesh, a consortium of 
nineteen human rights and development organizations, actively partici-
pated with the process of UPR and made their own recommendations. The 
Review of the 2nd Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review by Bangladesh 
was held on 29 April 2013 at Geneva, in the 16th session of the Human 
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Rights Council’s Working Group on the Universal Periodic Report from 
22 April to 3 May 2013. 
Bangladesh submitted its first UPR in 2009. In its 2nd UPR, Bangla-
desh stated that the government undertook a series of reforms since 2009 
in order to strengthen its legislative, institutional, and policy mechanisms, 
for the protection and promotion of human rights. In its 2013 UPR, Ban-
gladesh reported measures that it implemented to protect and promote 
civil and political rights, social, economic, and cultural rights, rights of 
the vulnerable people in order to strengthen democracy, good governance, 
and transparency.
CHINA
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW –  
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW
On January 14, 2013, the Human Rights Council selected the following 
group of rapporteurs (troika) to facilitate the review of China in the second 
cycle of universal periodic review: Poland, Sierra Leone and the United 
Arab Emirates. On August 5, 2013, the Chinese government submitted the 
second national report to the Human Rights Council. The second national 
report focuses on introducing the policies and practices undertaken to 
promote and protect human rights in China, including the Mainland, 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Macao Special 
Administrative Region since the first-cycle universal periodic review in 
2009, as well as the implementation of recommendations accepted at the 
time of the first-cycle review, the challenges remaining, and future goals 
for human rights work. In accordance with the principle of “One Country, 
Two Systems,” Parts V and VI of the second national report respectively 
introduced the corresponding conditions in the Hong Kong and Macao 
Special Administrative Regions of China, and were separately compiled 
by the governments of those regions. On the morning of October 22, 2013, 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review reviewed China at 
the 3rd meeting of the Seventeenth Session of the Human Rights Council. 
During the interactive dialogue, 137 delegations made statements. The 
Human Rights Council made 252 recommendations to China. China will 
examine and respond to the recommendations in due course, but no later 
than by the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council in March 
State Practice 279
2014. At its 10th meeting held on October 25, 2013, the Working Group 
adopted the report on China.56
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW – INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)
The Human Rights Committee considered the initial report of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China at its 
2962nd and 2963rd meetings held on March 18-19, 2013. This is the first 
report for Macao, which was submitted by the People’s Republic of China, 
following the return of Macao to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 
1999. At its 2975th meeting held on March 27, 2013, the Committee adopted 
its concluding observations.57
The Human Rights Committee considered the third periodic report 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China at its 2954th and 2955th meetings, which were held on March 
12-13, 2013. This is the third report submitted by the People’s Republic of 
China after the return of Hong Kong, China, to Chinese sovereignty on 
July 1, 1997. At its 2974th meeting, held on March 26, 2013, the Committee 
adopted its concluding observations.58
56 Rep. of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Rev of Its Twenty-Fifth 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/5, at 3 (Dec. 4, 2013).
57 H.R. Comm., Rep. on Concluding Observations on the Initial Report 
of Macao, China, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHN-MAC/CO/1 (Apr. 29, 2013), 
ht tp://tbinternet .ohchr.org/_ layouts/treat ybodyexterna l/Download.
aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fCHN-MAC%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en.
58 H.R. Comm., Rep. on Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic 
Report of Hong Kong, China, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3 (Apr. 29, 
2013), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.
aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fCHN-HKG%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en.
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW – CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT (CAT)
On June 20, 2013, China submitted its sixth report under the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. This report is composed of three parts, which respectively 
introduces the new measures and development adopted by the Chinese 
central government, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and Ma-
cau Special Administrative Region in implementation of the Convention 
from 2008 to 2012.59
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW – CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (CRC)
On September 26-27, 2013, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
considered the combined third and fourth periodic reports of China,60 
including Hong Kong Special Administrative Region61 and Macau Special 
Administrative Region,62 at its 1833rd to 1835th meetings,63 and adopted the 
concluding observations at its 1845th meeting held on October 4, 2013.64
59 Comm. Against Torture, Rep. on Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/
CHN/5 (Apr. 4, 2013), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fCHN%2f5&Lang=en.
60 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on Combined Third and Fourth Periodic 
Reports of China, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHN/3-4 (Oct. 29, 2013); see also Comm. 
on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on Article 44 Submitted by States Parties of the 
Convention, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHN/3-4/Corr.1 (Jan. 31, 2013).
61 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on Article 44 Submitted by States Parties 
of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHN-HKG/2 (Oct. 25, 2012).
62 Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Rep. on Article 44 Submitted by States Parties 
of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHN-MAC/2 (Oct. 25, 2012).
63 See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 64th Sess., 1833d mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/
SR.1833 (Nov. 8, 2013); see also Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 64th Sess., 
1834th mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.1834 (Oct. 3, 2013); see also Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child, 64th Sess., 1835th mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.1835 (Nov. 19, 
2013).
64 Statement by Mr. Liang Heng of the Chinese delegation at the Third Committee of 
the 68th Session of the General Assembly on Agenda Item 66: Rights of Indigenous 
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International Human Rights Law – Action Plan For Fighting Human 
Trafficking (2013-2020)
On March 2, 2013, the General Office of the State Council issued the 
Action Plan for Fighting Human Trafficking (2013–2020), and ordered 
provincial governments and ministries to carry out this action plan. This 
is the second action plan to fight human trafficking in China. The first 
action plan (2008–2012) was issued in 2008.
INDIA
Rights of Scheduled Tribes and Primitive Tribes Living 
in Harmony with Their Forest Land – Community Rights, 
Religious and Sacred Rights of Primitive and Scheduled 
Tribes – Their Rights under International Conventions 
and Treaties of the United Nations
Orissa Mining Corporation vs. Ministry of Environment & Forests & 
Others [Supreme Court of India, 18 April 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN] 
Facts
This case related to environment clearance, under the Indian Environ-
ment Protection Act 1986, for the Lanjigarh Bauxite Mining Project in the 
State of Orissa, which covered an area of 723 hectares of forest land. The 
environment clearance for this project was subject to certain conditions 
and precautionary measures to be taken during the mining operation with 
a view to conserve and protect f lora and fauna of the area. Specialized 
institutes such as the Wildlife Institute of India (WII) and several expert 
committees were involved in examining the proposal for the environment 
clearance for this project. In 2008, the Ministry of Environment, Forest 
and Climate Change (MOEF) granted conditional clearance for the project. 
The matter went up to the Supreme Court of India, which agreed to the 
conditional clearance of the project and insisted upon mandatory adher-
ence to these conditions before the project was launched.65 
peoples, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 
(Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1091938.htm.
65 The Supreme Court had clearly stated that, “We may, at the outset, point out that 
there cannot be any doubt that this Court in Vedanta case had given liberty to 
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MOEF did not agree to clear the additional forest land without the 
fulfilling of certain prescribed conditions by the mining companies. In 
order to streamline its assessment, MOEF constituted the Forest Advisory 
Committee (FAC) and submitted a report before the FAC, in which MOEF 
stated:
[T]he Primitive Tribal Groups were not consulted in the process 
of seeking project clearance and also noticed the violation of the 
provisions of Forest Rights Act, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, 
Environmental Protection Act, 1986 and also the impact on ecologi-
cal and biodiversity values of the Niyamgiri hills upon which the 
Dongaria Kondh and Kutia Kondh [tribes] depend. FAC opined that 
it was a fit case for applying the precautionary principle to obviate 
the irreparable damage to the affected people and recommended 
for the temporary withdrawal of the in-principle/State I approval 
accorded. FAC recommended that the State Government be heard 
before a final decision is taken by the MoEF.66
Further, this case raised issues relating to the individual and community 
rights of Tribals and also made references to their religious or spiritual 
rights protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution. The 
case also raised issues as to who would own these rights under the Forest 
Rights Act of India such as, for example, the Gram Sabha67 or the Tribals 
as a community. It was argued that under the Forest Rights Act “concerned 
forest dwellers be treated not merely as right holders as statutorily empow-
Sterlite to move this Court if they were agreeable to the “suggested rehabilitation 
package” in the order of this Court, in the event of which it was ordered that this 
Court might consider granting clearance to the project, but not to Vedanta. This 
Court in Vedanta case had opined that this Court was not against the project in 
principle, but only sought safeguards by which the Court would be able to protect 
the nature and sub-serve development.”
66 MOEF further held that “The primary responsibility of any Ministry is to enforce 
the laws that have been passed by Parliament. For the MoE&F, this means enforcing 
the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986, the 
Scheduled Tribes and Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act, 2006 and other laws. It is in this spirit that this decision has been taken.”
67 Grama Sabha is a village committee (elected in the normal course) which has the 
power to take the decision on its designated land area that comprises not only 
of the village also those lands and forests that are traditionally connected to the 
village itself.
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ered with the authority to protect the Niyamgiri hills.” It was also argued 
that the Forest Rights Act “recognize[d] the right to community tenures 
of habitat and habitation for “primitive tribal groups” and that Dongaria 
Kondh tribes ha[d] the right to grazing and the collection of mineral forest 
of the hills and that they ha[d] the customary right to worship the moun-
tains in exercise of their traditional rights, which would be robed [sic] of 
if mining is permitted in Niyamgiri hills.”
Summary of the Judgment
The Court noted that there were two projects, namely, Alumina Refinery 
Project and Bauxite Mining Project and both were “interdependent and 
inseparably linked together and, hence, any wrong doing by Alumina 
Refinery Project” might “cast a reflection on the Bauxite Mining Project” 
and might be “a relevant consideration for denial of Stage II clearance 
to the Bauxite Mining Project.” The Court further noted that “[i]n this 
Judgment, [it did] not propose to make any final pronouncement on that 
issue but [it] would keep the focus mainly on the rights of the “Scheduled 
Tribes” (STs) and the “Traditional Forest Dwellers” (TFDs) under the Forest 
Rights Act.” While examining these rights, the Court referred to various 
international legal instruments and stated:
The customary and cultural rights of indigenous people have also 
been the subject matter of various international conventions. In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Indigenous 
and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No.107) was the first 
comprehensive international instrument setting forth the rights 
of indigenous and tribal populations which emphasized the ne-
cessity for the protection of social, political and cultural rights of 
indigenous people. Following that there were two other conven-
tions ILO Convention (No.169) and Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention, 1989 and United Nations Declaration on the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, India is a signatory only to 
the ILO Convention (No. 107).
The Court, continuing with its reference to international law and related 
legal instruments, added:
Apart from giving legitimacy to the cultural rights by 1957 Con-
vention, the Convention on the Biological Diversity (CBD) adopted 
at the Earth Summit (1992) highlighted necessity to preserve and 
maintain knowledge, innovation and practices of the local commu-
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nities relevant for conservation and sustainable use of bio-diversity, 
India is a signatory to CBA. Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development Agenda 21 and Forestry principle also encourage the 
promotion of customary practices conducive to conservation. The 
necessity to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples which derive from their political, economic and social 
structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories 
and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories 
and resources have also been recognized by United Nations in the 
United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples. STs 
and other TFDs residing in the Scheduled Areas have a right to 
maintain their distinctive spiritual relationship with their tradi-
tionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands.
Referring to the conditions of STs and TFDs, the Court noted that many 
of them were “totally unaware of their rights” and that “[t]hey also expe-
rienced lot of difficulties in obtaining effective access to justice because of 
their distinct culture and limited contact with mainstream society.” The 
Court also pointed out how “many a times, they [did] not have financial 
resources to engage in any legal actions against development projects 
undertaken in their abode or the forest in which they stay.” According to 
the Court, it had a “vital role to play in the environmental management 
and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.” 
Therefore, the Court continued, States “[have the] duty to recognize and 
duly support their identity, culture and interest so that they can effectively 
participate in achieving sustainable development.”
The Court pointed out that the Forest Rights Act had been “enacted 
conferring powers on the Gram Sabhas . . . to protect the community 
resources, individual rights, cultural and religious rights.” The Court fur-
ther noted that the recognized rights of the forest dwelling communities 
“include the responsibilities and authority for sustainable use, conserva-
tion of bio-diversity and maintenance of ecological balance and thereby 
strengthening the conservation regime of the forests while ensuring liveli-
hood and food security of the forest dwelling” communities.
Decision
The Court, accordingly, held that “Gram Sabha had a role to play in safe-
guarding the customary and religious rights” of the forest dwelling com-
munities under the Forest Rights Act. Further, according to the Court, 
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these Gram Sabhas would determine the nature and extent of “individual” 
or “community rights.” The Court, thus, concluded:
We are, therefore, of the view that the question whether STs and 
other TFDs, like Dongaria Kondh, Kutia Kandha and others, have 
got any religious rights i.e. rights of worship over the Niyamgiri 
hills, known as Nimagiri, near Hundaljali, which is the hill top 
known as Niyam-Raja, have to be considered by the Gram Sabha. 
Gram Sabha can also examine whether the proposed mining area 
Niyama Danger, 10 km away from the peak, would in any way af-
fect the abode of Niyam-Raja. Needless to say, if the BMP, in any 
way, affects their religious rights, especially their right to worship 
their deity, known as Niyam Raja, in the hills top of the Niyamgiri 
range of hills, that right has to be preserved and protected. . . . The 
Gram Sabha is also free to consider all the community, individual 
as well as cultural and religious claims, over and above the claims 
which have already been received from Rayagada and Kalahandi 
Districts . . . . We are, therefore, inclined to give a direction to the 
State of Orissa to place these issues before the Gram Sabha with 
notice to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India 
and the Gram Sabha would take a decision on them within three 
months and communicate the same to the MOEF, through the 
State Government. 
Statement by India on Agenda Item 69 – “Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (A) Implementation of Human Rights Instruments, (D) 
Comprehensive Implementation of and follow-up to the Vienna Decla-
ration and Programme of Action” at the Third Committee of the 68th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 October 201368
 India thanked the UN Secretary-General for his reports as well as the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteurs for 
their reports under this agenda item relating to ‘protection and promotion 
of human rights.’ It was further noted that: 
Human rights are at the core of any free democratic society. They 
form an important institutional pillar of the United Nations. The 
promotion and protection of human rights within the United Na-
68 Rajani Patil, Member of Parliamanet & Member of the Indian Delegation, 
Statement on Agenda Item 69, at the Third Committee on the 68th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 22, 2013) (transcript available in https://
www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/77903pmi102.pdf). 
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tions was put on a firm footing with the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Since then, we 
have come a long way in our collective endeavour to promote and 
protect human rights.
Noting that this year marked the 20th anniversary of the establishment 
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
India pointed out that the Council had the responsibility to demonstrate 
that it was independent and impartial by being open, fair, transparent and 
accountable to all stakeholders. India also added that it was important 
to maintain the representative character and financial independence of 
this office and that it remained a matter of concern that only one-third 
of OHCHR funding came from the regular budget, whereas two-third of 
the funding came from voluntary contributions. Referring to the human 
rights compliance mechanisms, India stated that: 
The mechanism of the Universal Periodic Review has emerged as 
an extremely useful mechanism for the Human Rights Council 
and the international community to engage in an open discussion 
on human rights in member countries. This unique Member-State 
driven process of peer review, enriched by contributions from the 
civil society, has been a successful collaborative and constructive 
endeavour.
As we commemorate the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action this year, India sought to recall 
that the Vienna Declaration had reaffirmed the Right to Development as a 
universal and inalienable right, as well as an integral part of fundamental 
rights. Further, it added: 
At RIO+20, the international community renewed its commitment 
to sustainable development, recognizing poverty eradication to 
be the greatest global challenge. While States have the primary 
responsibility to promote the Right to Development, one cannot 
disregard the imperative of international cooperation, which is 
essential for the purpose of creating a supporting environment for 
the genuine realization of the Right to Development.
Noting its commitment to uphold human rights, India highlighted some 
important measures taken in giving effect to some of the obligations un-
dertaken under various human rights instruments. It pointed out that: 
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The Right to Information Act 2005 has empowered the ordinary 
citizens through access to information on government action 
leading to a more transparent and accountable governance. The 
government has enacted several landmark legislations guaranteeing 
basic rights in the areas of work and employment, education and 
food security. These include the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act of 2005, the Right to Education Act of 
2009 and most recently, the National Food Security Act of 2013. 
The innovative mechanism of public interest litigations crafted 
by the judiciary ensured that even the most vulnerable sections 
of society, who may not be able to approach courts otherwise, 
can seek justice via a public-spirited person or organization. This 
mechanism has been extremely effective in providing remedies to 
vulnerable groups.
JAPAN
TREATIES AND COVENANTS – IMPLENTATION – CONVENTION ON 
THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction (Act No. 48, June 19, 2013)
Prior to the ratification of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction (the Hague Convention), the 183rd Diet 
promulgated the “Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (Act No. 48 of June 19, 2013)” 
to achieve the aims of the Convention such as “the return of a child to the 
state where the child held his/her habitual residence, etc. in the case of his/
her wrongful removal or retention”.
The Act designates the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the central 
authority in charge of a request for assistance and the return of children 
(Article 3) and sets forth two family courts (Tokyo Family Court and Osaka 
Family Court (Article 32) as the forums for dispute settlement related to 
the return of children.
The Act has two phases. The first phase is to facilitate and give, a person 
who has the rights of custody of a child or children, the way to find their 
taken child or children and to get their child or children back through 
non-confrontational means. For example, Article 5 provides assistance in 
identifying the location of children. Article 9 provides for the voluntary 
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return of children upon agreements. Article 16 facilitates contact with 
the taken child or children with the person who has the right of custody.
The second phase permits a person who has the right of custody of a 
child or children to invoke judicial or quasi-judicial measures if the use 
of force is necessary to return the child. The Act provides “the return of a 
child to the state where the child held his/her habitual residence, etc. in the 
case of his/her wrongful removal or retention (Article 1)”, based on the idea 
that a judgment as to which one of the parents has the right of custody of 
a child or children should be made in the state of their habitual residence, 
considering relevant information of such a child or children. Therefore, the 
denial of return of such a child or children is allowed in rather exceptional 
circumstances and subject to strict examinations of the courts, based on 
the provision that “the court shall not order the return of the child when 
it finds” that the child might be subject to physical violence, psychologi-
cal harm and difficulties to be taken care of (Article 28). To ensure such 
procedures are effective, during the court’s deliberations, the child may 
be prohibited from departing Japan (“Where there is a risk that a party to 
the case seeking the return of child has the child depart from Japan, the 
family court before which the case seeking the return of child is pending, 
upon petition by either party to the case, may order the other party not to 
have the child depart from Japan.” (Article 122(1)).
The Act provides the procedures for the first instance (Article 70-100) 
and the procedures for appeal (Article 101-116). Parties may reach “settle-
ment” instead of receiving judicial decisions (Article 100) and pursue other 
forms of dispute settlement such as mediation (Article 144).
The Act provides for compulsory procedures to ensure that the deci-
sions made by the above are enforced (Article 134-143). Before invoking 
the compulsory execution procedure, however, the Act induces the relevant 
parties to carry out decisions by themselves. The Act defines such induce-
ment as “indirect compulsory execution” and provides that “a petition for 
the execution by substitute of the return of child may not be filed until two 
weeks have elapsed from the day on which the order under the provision of 
Article 172 (1) of the Civil Execution Act became final and binding (Article 
136).”  After such indirect compulsory execution fails or is not invoked dur-
ing certain periods (two weeks in most cases), direct compulsory execution 
procedures can be invoked pursuant to the provision of Article 171(1) and 
172(2) of the Civil Execution Act (Act No. 4 of 1979) (Article134). 
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DISABILITY RIGHTS – DISCRIMINATION AGAINST  
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Act on the Elimination of Discrimination against Persons with Dis-
abilities (Act No. 65, June 19, 2013)
In preparation for the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, the 183rd Diet passed the Act on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against persons with Disabilities (Act No.65) on June 
19, 2013. This Act adopted two main principles: “prohibition of undue 
treatment” and “provision of reasonable accommodation” to the persons 
with disabilities. 
The Act defines a person with disabilities as a person who has a physical 
disability, intellectual disability, or mental developmental disability who 
suffers from one of these disabilities and faces barriers in society.
First, the Act prohibits the undue treatment of persons with disabilities 
without a justifiable reason. This includes denial of service, limitation of 
service, and conditional service because the person is disabled. The Act 
also prohibits the disabled from being ignored when a service provider 
communicates only with the disabled person’s escort or denies service 
unless an escort accompanies the disabled person.
The Act also requires the national and local authorities to promote 
“reasonable accommodation,” to meet the disabled’s request to remove a 
barrier in the society. For example, it includes special allocation of seats to 
view sign language, writing upon the disabled’s request, utilizing drawings, 
photos, tablets, and PCs for communication, and installing ramps instead 
of steps for facilitating the disabled’s access.
This Act is comprehensively enacted to implement the Convention 
beyond the Basic Act for Persons with Disabilities (Act No. 84 of 1970, 
Amendment: Act No. 90 of 2011).
FAMILY LAW – NORMALIZATION RELATED TO THE 
DIFFERENTIATED TREATMENT OF INHERITANCE RELATED TO 
CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
Supreme Court Judgment and Subsequent Revision of Civil Code
On September 4, 2013, the grand bench of the Supreme Court ruled that 
the provision of differentiated treatment concerning inheritance between 
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a child born in wedlock and child born out of wedlock, is unconstitutional 
and quashed and remanded the Tokyo high court’s decision which held 
that the first half of provisory clause of Art. 900(iv) was constitutional. 
The Supreme Court also held that the inheritance distribution was un-
dertaken based on the unconstitutionality of Art. 900(iv) (2012ku) 984, 
Minshu vol. 67, No. 6.
Concerning the relevant treaties, the Supreme Court referred to the 
ICCPR and the Convention of Rights of the Child, which provides that each 
child should not be discriminated against because of the circumstances of 
the child’s birth. The Supreme Court pointed out that in 1993, the Human 
Rights Committee recommended Japan to delete provisions differentiat-
ing children born out of wedlock and include the recommendations made 
by relevant committees relating to nationality, family registration, and 
inheritance.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that discrimination related to 
nationality and family registration has been already resolved. In case of 
family registration, a child out of wedlock is registered just as a “child” (for 
example, “first-born son” or “first born-daughter,” etc.) born in wedlock. 
In the case of nationality, the Nationality Act was revised in regards to the 
acquisition of nationality, a child born out of wedlock is treated the same 
as a child born in wedlock.
The Supreme Court then examined its previous judgment of 1995 
(1991(ku)143, Minshu Vol. 49, No. 7), which held that Article 900(iv) is not 
in violation of Article 14(1) of the Constitution on the following grounds:
The aim of enactment of the Provision is understood to be to respect 
the status of the legitimate child who was born between spouses 
who are married by law, and at the same time, paying due atten-
tion to the status of the illegitimate child, grant a statutory share 
of one-half of the legitimate child’s share in order to protect the 
illegitimate child, and thus balance the respect of marriage by law 
and the protection of the illegitimate child. In other words, since 
the Civil Code has adopted the system of marriage by law, insofar 
as the statutory inheritance share is concerned, the legitimate child 
has to be given preference. On the other hand, the illegitimate 
child was allowed some share and it was intended to protect the 
illegitimate child. 
Since the Civil Code has adopted the system of marriage by law, 
the reason of enactment of the Provision has a reasonable ground. 
The fact that the Provision set out the statutory inheritance share of 
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an illegitimate child at one-half that of the legitimate child cannot 
be regarded as excessively unreasonable in relation to the reason 
of enactment, and exceeded the scope of reasonable discretion 
granted to the legislature. The Provision cannot be regarded as an 
unreasonable discrimination and is against Article 14, paragraph 1 
of the Constitution.” (quoted from a translation from the Japanese 
Supreme Court’s website)
However, this time the Court reached the opposite conclusion that such 
differentiation is unconstitutional based on the changing trends of people’s 
perception in Japan and other countries, the content of the treaties rati-
fied by Japan and the criticism given by the committees set up under these 
treaties, and changes in Japanese legal system, and so on.
The Court held that “even if the legal marriage system itself is en-
trenched in Japan, it is now impermissible, as a result of such change in 
the recognition, to cause prejudice to children by reason of the fact that 
their mother and father were not in a legal marriage when they were born-a 
matter that the children themselves had no choice or chance to correct.” 
(quoted from a translation from the Japanese Supreme Court‘s website)
Consequently, the Court determined that “it must be said that even in 
consideration of the discretionary power vested in the legislative body, the 
distinction in terms of the statutory share in inheritance between children 
born in wedlock and children born out of wedlock had lost reasonable 
grounds” by the time when the inheritance of the appellant’s father com-
menced as of July 2001, and the Provision was in violation of Article 14, 
paragraph 1 of the Constitution as of July 2001, at the latest. (quoted from 
a translation from the Japanese Supreme Court‘s website)
On October 28, 2013, the Tokyo District Court followed the above 
judgment and held that the child out of wedlock, like the other two children 
born in wedlock, should receive one-third amount of the total inheritance 
since Article 900(iv) was unconstitutional at the time the inheritance was 
to be given. The Court referred to Article 2(1), 24(1) and 26 of the ICCPR 
and reiterated that there such a differentiation between a child of wedlock 
and a child out of wedlock was unconstitutional and Japan has been repeat-
edly been recommended to abolish such a differentiation by the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and Committee on the Rights of the Child among others.
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On December 5, the 185th Diet passed the revised Civil Code (Amend-
ment: Act No. 94 of 2013), deleting the first half of Art. 900(iv). This amend-
ment was promulgated and enforced shortly after December 11, 2013.
FAMILY LAW – GENDER CHANGE – STATUS OF CHILDREN
The Supreme Court’s decision concerning whether a child conceived by a 
wife during marriage with a person who has received a ruling of change 
in gender from female to male (2013(Kyo)5, Minshu Vol. 67, No. 9)
On December 10, 2013, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the 
Tokyo High Court holding that “a child conceived by a wife during mar-
riage with a person who has who received judicial confirmation designat-
ing their gender from female to male under Article 3, paragraph (1) of the 
Act on Special Cases in Handling Gender for People with Gender Identity 
Disorder can be presumed to be a child born in wedlock in accordance 
with Article 772 of the Civil Code,” even if it is clear that a such person 
cannot have any child through the actual sexual relations. Article 772(1) 
provides as follows: (1) A child conceived by a wife during marriage shall 
be presumed to be a child of her husband.
In this case, although the child was born by artificial insemination by 
a third-party donor and thus had no blood relation to the husband, the 
Supreme Court held that the child should be admitted to be registered as 
a child in wedlock on their family registration.
This is the first judgment of the Supreme Court to identify that a child 
born from a father who changed his gender as a legitimate child within 
wedlock.
New Developments Related To The Recognition Of Minamata Disease
In 2013, The Supreme Court ruled on two past judgments that enlarged 
the extent of approval of recognition for Minamata disease, although the 
Court did not hold that the 1977 standard of approval was itself illegal.
Case 1 (2012(Gyo-Hi)202, Shyumin, No. 243) 
Chie Mizoguchi, who ate fish from Minamata Bay and suffered from an 
abnormality of the nervous system, made an application to Kumamoto 
prefecture for recognition as a victim of Minamata disease. Her applica-
tion was rejected and then she appealed the decision to the Kumamoto 
District Court. Though the Kumamoto District Court denied her claim, 
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the Fukuoka High Court held that Mizoguchi’s should be approved and 
that she be given recognition as a victim of Minamata disease based on 
her comprehensive examination based on medical knowledge, though it 
did not meet the 1977 standard of approval. 
The Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice Itsuro Terada 
upheld the decision of the high court that Mizoguchi should be approved 
as a victim. The Supreme Court did not question the validity of the 1977 
standard of approval. However, it clearly held that it was possible to make 
a determination of Minamata disease on the basis of the existence of seri-
ous disorders even if the diagnosis was not accompanied by the presence 
of other symptoms as the 1977 standard of approval requires.
The Supreme Court held that judicial review concerning approval 
of Minamata disease (1) should be carried out through a comprehensive 
examination of “the circumstances concerned and the relevant evidence 
on a case-by-case basis and in light of the rule of thumb”; (2) should look 
into “whether or not there is any individual causal relationship between 
individual specific symptoms and the causative substance” and; (3) should 
determine on each basis whether or not to approve the symptoms as Mina-
mata disease.
Chie Mizoguchi died in 1977 at the age of 77. Her relatives subse-
quently pursued the claim and Chie Mizoguchi was approved as a victim 
of Minamata disease posthumously.
Case 2 (2012 (Gyo-Hi) 245, Minshu, No. 67, Vol. 4)
A woman living in Toyonaka, Osaka, requested the court to approve her 
application to consider her as a victim of Minamata disease. While the 
first court, the Osaka District Court approved her symptoms as Mina-
mata disease in 2010, the Osaka High Court turned over the ruling of the 
Osaka District Court and denied her request to be recognized as a victim 
of Minamata disease in 2012. 
The Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court decided to send the case 
back to the Osaka high court for more deliberation. The Supreme Court 
reiterated judicial review concerning approval of Minamata disease should 
be done as shown in the case above. The Supreme Court denied the approach 
taken by the Osaka High Court, in which the court merely examined the 
reasonableness of the 1977 standards of approval and the administrative 
disposition of Kumamoto Prefecture.
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The claimant died in March 2013 at the age of 87 just before the Su-
preme Court decision. With respect to this decision, Kumamoto Prefecture 
decided to withdraw its appeal. Therefore, the judgment of the 2010 Osaka 
District Court became final and the woman was approved as a victim of 
Minamata disease posthumously.
KOREA
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / HUMAN RIGHTS – 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES - LGBT
Decision of Seoul Administrative Court 
Seoul Administrative Court – Revocation of Refugee disapproval. Seoul 
Haengjeong beobwon [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2012Gu-Hap32581, April 25 (S. 
Kor.).
Facts 
The plaintiff, a 27-years-old female with Ugandan nationality, entered 
Korea with a temporary Commercial Visa and applied for refugee approval 
after one month and fifteen days because of the risk of persecution for be-
ing a homosexual in Uganda. The plaintiff ’s application was rejected and 
she had instead received a permission of humanitarian stay. Accordingly, 
the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the head of Seoul Immigration Office 
and requested for approval of refugee status.
Legal Issues
What is the method for deciding the credibility of a refugee applicant’s 
testimony on proving ‘sufficient reasonably fear’ from her experience with 
persecution, which is the requirement for refugee acceptance, and whether 
there can be ‘sufficient reasonable fear’ of being persecuted because of one’s 
Membership of a Particular Social Group status as homosexual?
Judgment
Taken together, No. 3 of Article 2, Subsection 1 No. 2 of Article 76, 
and Article 1 on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and Article 1 on Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees suggest 
that the administrative authority should acknowledge the foreigner 
in Korea as a refugee when one is not protected from or does not 
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want protection from its own country because of a reasonable fear 
of being persecuted for their race, religion, nationality, or status 
by a Membership of a Particular Social Group or political opinion. 
“Persecution,” which is the requirement for refugee acceptance, is 
defined as “acts that threaten life, limb, and freedom that signifi-
cantly invade or discriminate against a human being’s fundamental 
dignity” and the foreign applicant of refugee acceptance must prove 
‘sufficient reasonable fear’ from persecution. By considering the 
refugee’s special circumstances, “persecution” can be proved when 
an applicant’s testimony is consistent and persuasive, and the ac-
ceptance of such testimony is reasonable in view of the credibility 
of the overall statement, such as the entry route, the length of time 
between the entry date and the application date, details of refugee 
application, the situation of the land of citizenship, the objective 
level of fear, political, social and cultural circumstances of the 
region where the applicant lives, and the level of fear a normal 
inhabitant feels in the same circumstances. (Refer to the judgment 
Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], 2007Du3930, July 24, 2008 (S. Kor.)).
The Court held that the sentence of this case is illegal based on the result of 
the examination and the purpose of the whole argument. The Court stated: 
[T]he plaintiff is a homosexual and the villagers warned the plain-
tiff ’s mother to expel the plaintiff out of the village; two months 
later, the plaintiff ’s house was burned and the plaintiff ’s mother 
and sister died from the incident; the Ugandan Government is 
persecuting homosexuals, and the Government does not effectively 
protect the plaintiff from persecution of the villagers. Thus, there is 
‘sufficient reasonable fear’ of persecution because of the plaintiff ’s 
‘Membership of a Particular Social Group Status.’ Therefore, the 
disposition of this case is illegal.
Legislation And Administrative Regulations / 
Human Rights - Refugee
Enactment of Refugee Law Enforcement Regulation June 28, 2013 Pro-
nouncement, Ministry of Justice No. 7958
As the Refugee Law was enacted (Legislation No. 11298, February 2, 2012. 
Pronouncement, July 1, 2013. Enforcement) with the purpose to prescribe 
the detailed items about the status and treatment of refugees to promote 
the harmony between domestic law, and Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee, which Korea 
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became a party in December 1992, the Regulation is enacted with the 
purpose to decide the legislation and delegated items by enforcement 
ordinance, such as the application method and procedure for the refugee 
acceptance, management of refugee committee, and the required items 
for the enactment.
MALAYSIA
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS – EQUAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN THE 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND RELIGION OF THEIR CHILDREN – 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS – EQUAL RIGHTS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
LIFE – FREEDOM OF RELIGION – UNILATERAL CONVERSION OF 
MINOR CHILDREN TO ISLAM – APPLICATION OF CEDAW, CRC, AND 
UDHR IN MALAYSIA
Indira Gandhi d/p Mutho v Perak Registrar of Converts, Perak Islamic 
Religious Department, State Government of Perak, Ministry of Educa-
tion, Government of Malaysia, & Pathmanathan s/o Krishnan High Court 
Malaya [Judicial Review No: 25-10-2009. 25 July 2013] 
The applicant Indira Gandhi and the respondent, Pathmanathan, were 
married in a civil marriage in 1993 and when the marriage fell apart in 
2009, the respondent took the applicant’s youngest child (eleven months 
old) away from her. The applicant later found out that her husband had 
converted to Islam and he had also converted their three children to Is-
lam without her knowledge or permission; the children were not present 
during the conversion. She challenged the conversion of her children for 
non-compliance with various laws and for violating her right to gender 
equality and freedom of religion, guaranteed in the Federal Constitution.
In the judicial review hearing in 2013, the Court interpreted the word 
“parent” in article 12(4) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution to mean 
both father and mother to reflect the equal rights of both parents in de-
termining the religion of the children. In this instance, the High Court 
was guided by the provisions in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as Malaysia has rati-
fied CEDAW and the government had pledged commitment to CEDAW 
through public statements. 
The Court also discussed the application of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) stating that the UDHR is part of the corpus of 
Malaysian law by way of section 4(4) of the Human Rights Commission 
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of Malaysia Act 1999, which requires the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia (SUHAKAM) to have “regard to the UDHR to the extent that it 
is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.” The learned High Court 
judge held that the relevant articles in the UDHR (articles 18, 26, and 29) 
were not inconsistent with the Malaysian Federal Constitution and as such, 
articles 8(1)-(2) and 12(4) of the Federal Constitution vest equal rights to 
both parents in the religious upbringing and in determining the religion 
of their children.
The High Court referred to articles 18 and 30 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) and held that the unilateral conversion of the 
three children without the applicant’s knowledge or consent deprived her 
of her right as a guardian of the children and also deprived the children 
of their right to decide which of their parent’s religion to embrace when 
they attain eighteen years of age. 
 Accordingly, the High Court nullified the certificate of conver-
sion and held that the conversion of the children without the applicant’s 
knowledge of consent violated articles 3(1), 5(1), and 11 of the Federal 
Constitution and international norms and conventions.
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS – CHILD PROTECTION – APPLICATION TO 
VARY DECREE NISI – CHILD OF MARRIAGE SEXUALLY ABUSED BY 
GRANDFATHER – IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRC IN MALAYSIA – 
VIEWS OF THE CHILD SHOULD BE GIVEN DUE WEIGHT 
Kevin Goldman v. Geraldine Audrey Herrera, High Court Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur [Divorce Petition No: 33-1817-2010. 21 November 2012]
Both parties to the proceedings were married and had a daughter (M) but 
they subsequently filed for mutual divorce in November 2010. Part of the 
decree nisi was that both parties would share equal joint custody of M; M 
would live with her father (PH) and her father’s parents continuously for 
three weeks and then with her mother (PW) for three weeks. Subsequently, 
PH remarried and moved out of his parents’ home but M continued to be 
left in the care of PH’s parents for the entire day; PH would pick M up at 
night and take her back to his home.
 It was consequently discovered that PH’s father was sexually abus-
ing M over a period of two years. PH’s father was arrested and charged with 
four counts under section 354 of the Penal Code. As a result, PW applied 
for ancillary relief to vary the terms of the decree nisi and the agreement, in 
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particular, for PW to be given sole guardianship, custody, care and control 
of M and for PH to be denied access to M. PH counterclaimed and filed 
committal proceedings for breach of the terms of the decree nisi and the 
agreement and claimed for care, custody and control of M.
In determining custody, the learned High Court judge took into con-
sideration the wishes of M and what she (M) said at the interview with 
the learned judge. In this regard, the Court relied on section 88(2)(b) of 
the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 and article 12 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was acceded by Malaysia, 
both of which require that the wishes of the child be taken into account 
when deciding on matters that would affect the child. The Court allowed 
PW’s application, inter alia, that the terms of the decree nisi be varied 
wherein the sole guardianship, custody, care and control of M be given 
to PW; PH was denied access to M until the final disposal of the criminal 
charges against PH’s father; and PH was prohibited from exposing M to 
his family members.
freedom of speech and expression – legitimate 
restrictions to freedom of speech and expression – 
constitutionality of the sedition act 1948 – application 
of international human rights treaties and other 
regional human rights instruments in Malaysia 
Mat Shuhaimi Shafiei v. PP; Court of Appeal [Criminal Appeal No: 
B-09-212-09-2011. 26 December 2013] 
The appellant was charged with publishing statements of a seditious ten-
dency, which is an offence under section 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948. 
The impugned statements were published on the Internet and were the 
appellant’s views on the Laws of the Constitution of Selangor 1959. Before 
the commencement of the trial, the appellant filed an application where he 
sought, inter alia, an order that the criminal prosecution against him be 
struck out, set aside, quashed or stayed, on the grounds that section 4(1)(c) 
of the Sedition Act was unconstitutional for two main reasons. Namely, that 
section 4(1)(c) was inconsistent with article 10 of the Federal Constitution 
and offended the reasonableness test; and that it also violated the right to 
equality in article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution and therefore offended 
the proportionality test.
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In the judgement, the Court of Appeal gave due accord to the right to 
freedom of speech and expression in article 19 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, article 13 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and article 9 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights. 
Specifically on the limits to freedom of speech and expression, the 
Court of Appeal referred to article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and concluded that even at the international human rights 
level there are restrictions to freedom of speech and expression. As such, 
the said Court held that the Sedition Act fell squarely within the restric-
tions in article 10(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution and “its valid-
ity and constitutionality cannot be challenged.” The Court also held that 
section 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948 did not violate the reasonable and 
proportionality tests.
human rights – disability rights – treaty to facilitate 
access to published works by visually impaired persons 
and persons with print disabilities – access to special 
format materials 
Statement by Malaysia at the Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a 
Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired 
Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities, Marrakech, 17-28 June 2013
Malaysia hailed the conclusion of the treaty as a milestone as it will benefit 
millions of visually impaired persons throughout the world, by enhancing 
the availability of special format materials for visually impaired persons.
The treaty not only protects the right holders’ interest but equally im-
portant, it facilitates access and use of copyright works by visually impaired 
persons. The copyright law in Malaysia has incorporated the former where 
the law requires issuing copies of any work into a format, which meets the 
needs of visually impaired persons.
Malaysia reiterated its support and commitment to the treaty and hoped 
that further cooperation and engagement would continue in this area.
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human rights – universal periodic review – human 
rights council – millennium development goals 
Outcome of Malaysia’s Second Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the 
17th Session of the UPR Working Group of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council Geneva, Switzerland, 31 October 2013
Upon the conclusion of Malaysia’s second UPR on 24 October 2013 at the 
UN Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, Malaysia (through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) issued a press release with a summary of recommenda-
tions that were addressed to Malaysia.
 In the statement, Malaysia emphasised its progress in achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals, in particular, measures undertaken 
to improve the status of women and the civil and political rights of Ma-
laysians, to provide free primary and secondary education and to combat 
HIV/AIDS. Malaysia’s measures also include the withdrawal from certain 
recommendations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). 
 Malaysia also took cognisance of the recommendations to improve 
in the area of the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and associa-
tion, freedom of religion, situation of the indigenous peoples and migrants, 
access to housing, health and education, empowerment of women, children 
and persons with disabilities, application of the death penalty, statelessness 
and misconduct of law enforcement officials.
SRI LANKA
HUMAN RIGHTS – PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Impeachment of the Chief Justice
The Chief Justice was impeached under Presidential warrant. Article 107(3) 
of the Constitution provides that the procedure for impeachment of the 
higher judiciary shall be by standing orders of parliament or by law. The 
Parliamentary Select Committee concluded that the Chief Justice was guilty 
of misconduct and adopted the report in Parliament. The Chief Justice 
and several others sought to quash this report by way of a writ petition 
before the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal in C.A (Writ) Applica-
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tion N0.411/2012 quashed the report on the basis that the procedure for 
impeachment of the judiciary can be provided for only by law, consequent 
to the decision in Chandra Jayaratne v Anura Yapa and others SC Reference 
3/2012; C.A. (Writ) Application No.358/2012. On 13 January 2013 however, 
the President impeached the Chief Justice disregarding the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal. 
Legislative amendment extending period of detention of persons accused 
of identified crimes - Code of Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) 
Act No 2 of 2013
Code of Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Act No 2 of 2013
The period of detention without an arrest warrant for offences such as 
murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rape, kidnapping 
and theft, was extended from 24 hours to 48 hours.  
HUMAN RIGHTS – TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
OHCHR Report ‘Advice and Technical Assistance for the GOSL on 
Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in SL’ - A/HRC/22/38
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
A report was issued by the OHCHR on the request of the Human Rights 
Council under resolution 19/2 titled ‘Advice and Technical Assistance for 
the GOSL on Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in SL’.  The 
report addressed a wide range of human rights violations that had been 
alleged in Sri Lanka in the context of the internal armed conflict and 
related issues. The OHCHR observations and recommendations included 
those in relation to independence of the judiciary, in the aftermath of the 
impeachment of the Chief Justice in January 2013, and the reconstruc-
tion and resettlement programme for internally displaced persons.  The 
report noted that adequate remedies have not been provided for the family 
members of persons missing during the last stages of the war. The report 
recommended that independent and impartial investigations be carried out 
regarding the allegations of violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in Sri Lanka.  
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HUMAN RIGHTS – UN SYSTEM
Visit of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Sri Lanka
The High Commissioner paid a visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013.  She 
commended the Government for its progress in relation to reconstruction 
and resettlement, the proposal to criminalise disappearances in the Penal 
Code, the establishment of a Court of inquiry by the Army to investigate 
allegations of civilian casualties and summary executions, the transfer of 
police powers from the Ministry of Defence to a new Ministry of Law and 
Order, and the proposal to introduce legislation to criminalise hate speech. 
However, the High Commissioner raised concerns about the independence 
of the judiciary subsequent to the impeachment of the Chief Justice, the 
limited mandate of the then appointed Commission to inquire into Disap-
pearances and the involvement of military personnel in civilian activities.
Oral Update by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the UN 
HRC on Sri Lanka
The High Commissioner commended the Government for the invitations 
extended to the Special Rapporteur for Internally Displaced Persons and the 
Special Rapporteur on Education. She noted that the majority of internally 
displaced persons have been returned or resettled and that infrastructure 
development has been commendable.  The National Plan of Action for 
implementing the recommendations of the LLRC was welcomed and the 
High Commissioner noted the progress with regard to rehabilitation and 
reintegration of detainees.  She noted with concern the impeachment of 
the Chief Justice and the allegations of the excessive use of force in the 
suppression of a protest resulting in at least one death. 
Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka A/
HRC/22/L.1/Rev.1 (Adopted by a vote on 21 March 2013, 25 in favour, 13 
against, 8 abstentions)
This resolution followed the resolution adopted in 2012 by the Council 
in calling for the implementation of the recommendations of the Les-
sons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, a domestic and presidential 
commission. It called on the Government to conduct ‘independent and 
credible’ investigations regarding allegations of violations of human rights 
law and international humanitarian law during the armed conflict in Sri 
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Lanka. Furthermore the resolution encouraged the government to cooper-
ate with UN special procedures mandate holders by responding to their 
requests for invitations, to increase its dialogues and cooperation with the 
OHCHR and to implement the recommendations made by the OHCHR 
in the report of 2013. 
Universal Periodic Review
In March 2013, the Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of the 
UPR in Sri Lanka. In doing so it noted that Sri Lanka had accepted 113 
out of the 204 recommendations that it received and made 19 voluntary 
commitments specifically towards the protection of the rights of women 
and children, the advancement of the reconciliation process, and the re-
integration of ex-combatants in society.
Visit by UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons
The Special Rapporteur concluded a successful visit from 2nd to 6th De-
cember 2013. He commended the Government for working in partnership 
with humanitarian organizations to return or resettle more than 450 000 
persons who were internally displaced due to the internal armed conflict. 
The rapid infrastructure development including in the areas affected by 
the armed conflict was appreciated. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the 
agreement to conduct a Joint Needs Assessment with humanitarian and 
development partners  and noted that it would be essential for establish-
ing jointly agreed sets of statistical data on the number of IDPs that have 
been returned or resettled.  
HUMAN RIGHTS – INDIGENOUS PERSONS
Rights of Indigenous Persons
At the 24th Session of the Human Rights Council, Sri Lanka stated that it 
has initiated a three year project to develop legislation to protect the hu-
man rights of indigenous persons including measures to conserve their 
traditional knowledge and traditional medicines, and support to establish a 
museum on their heritage, among others. In order to create greater aware-
ness about the indigenous community, which is instrumental towards the 
preservation of their lifestyle, the Government has also established several 
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cultural centres and documented the history of the community and their 
way of life. 
VIETNAM
HUMAN RIGHTS – PROTECTION AGAINST TORTURE 
Signing of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 7 November 2013
The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984. It came into force on 26 
June 1987, 30 days after it had been ratified by 20 states.69 Today, it has 83 
signatories and 159 states parties.70
CAT is the most comprehensive international treaty that deals with tor-
ture. It establishes the definition of torture71 along with the non-derogable 
nature of the individual right not to be tortured under any circumstances, 
including war or the threat of war, political instability, combating terrorism 
or any other emergency.72 The convention obliges state parties to take effec-
tive legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to prevent tor-
ture.73 It obliges state parties to establish jurisdiction, prosecute or extradite 
for prosecution any person found in their territories who is alleged to have 
committed torture, regardless of whether the crime is committed outside 
their borders and regardless of the alleged perpetrator’s nationality.74 It also 
requires states parties to train their officials about the prohibition against 
69 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art. 27(1), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]. 
70 Status of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, United Nations Treaty Collection, https://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetai ls.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
71 CAT, supra note 69, art. 1(1). 
72 Id. art. 2(2).
73 Id. art. 2(1).
74 Id. art. 5-8.
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torture,75 conduct prompt and impartial investigation whenever there is 
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed 
in any territory under its jurisdiction,76 and ensure that victims of torture 
have the right to complain and to have their case investigated promptly 
and impartially, as well as to receive redress and compensation.77
Like many other international human rights treaties, CAT has es-
tablished a treaty body, the Committee against Torture, to monitor the 
implementation of states parties.78 The Committee considers and makes 
comments on reports of states parties on the measures they have taken 
to implement the Convention.79 The Committee can make a confidential 
inquiry to examine information indicating that torture is being systemati-
cally practiced in a state party and, if necessary, make comments or sug-
gestions it deems appropriate in the view of the situation.80 The Committee 
can also consider state claims and individual communications on alleged 
violations of the Convention if the concerned state parties recognise its 
competence to do so.81
Nearly 30 years after the adoption of CAT, Vietnam finally signed the 
convention on 7 November 2013.82 The decision to sign CAT was made 
by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam on 15 
October 2013.83 CAT is subject to ratification84 and Vietnam still needed 
to ratify the treaty in order to formally become a state party. By signing 
75 Id. art. 11.
76 Id. art. 12.
77 Id. art. 13-14.
78 Id. art. 17-24.
79 Id. art. 19.
80 Id. art. 20.
81 Id. art. 21-22.
82 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 70.
83 Thông báo nội dung phiên họp thứ 22 của Uỷ ban thường vụ Quốc hội [Result 
of the 22nd Session of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly], 
Quốc hội nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [Nat’l Assembly 
of the Socialist Republic of Viet.], http://quochoi.vn/hoatdongcuaquochoi/
cacphienhopUBTVQH/quochoikhoaXIII/phienhopthu22/Pages/thong-bao-ket-
luan.aspx?ItemID=23873.
84 CAT, supra note 69, art. 25(2).
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CAT, however, Vietnam is already obliged to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.85 Against that background, 
the signing of CAT represents a step forward for the country in terms of 
participating into the international legal framework on human rights pro-
tection, although it remains to be seen whether that would substantially 
improve the State’s behaviour in the protection against torture.
Humanitarian Law
SRI LANKA
DISPLACED PERSONS – INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
Registration of Electors (Special Provisions) Bill – judicial reference to 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
The Special Determination on the Registration of Electors (Special Provi-
sions) Bill86 considered the constitutionality of a bill that sought to recognize 
the right to vote of persons who had been displaced due to the internal 
armed conflict and their children. After an examination of the proposed 
provisions, the Court determined that the Bill was constitutional. The 
Court endorses the definition of an IDP in the Bill while noting its similar-
ity to the definition employed in the Introduction to the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement. 
International Economic Law
BANGLADESH
WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS AGREEMENT) – WTO 
The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) 
Act 2013 [Act 54 of 2013] - an Act to provide for the protection of geo-
graphically special goods and products of Bangladesh or foreign origins.
85 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
86 Registration of Electors (Special Provisions) Bill SC (SD) 16/2013 reported in 217(5) 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 5 June 2013 382.
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The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Bill 
2013, passed by the Bangladesh Parliament, was signed into law on 10 No-
vember 2013. The Geographical Indications (GI) Act of 2013 was enacted to 
provide for the protection of geographical indications in Bangladesh, that 
is, for the protection of locality-based goods. As a member of the WTO, 
Bangladesh enacted this law to comply with the provisions concerning the 
geographical indications of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, although there is no direct mention of this 
in the Act.
The GI Act 2013 has established a mechanism for registering products 
of local origin to ensure protection against any fallacious claims by other 
nations or territories. The law would ensure that products from other GI 
countries would also be protected in a similar way, if they are identified 
and recognised as GI products belonging to those countries/territories. 
The Act contains detailed provisions concerning the application for 
the registration of GI of any product, the process of such registration, and 
the modes of disputes or objections to any applications for the registra-
tion of GI of any product. It also sets out procedures of appeal against 
any decisions of the Registrar and provisions relating to cancellation or 
rectification of any registration. 
Other salient features of the GI Act 2013 are as follows: 
(a) ‘Geographical indication of goods’ has been defined as a geographi-
cal indication of agricultural, natural, or manufactured goods that 
identifies the product’s originating country or territory, or a region 
or locality of that country or territory, where any specific quality, 
reputation, or other characteristic of the goods is essentially at-
tributable to the geographical origin (sec. 2(9)).
(b) The Act establishes a Geographical Indication Unit within the 
Department of Patent, Design and Trademarks to carry out all 
the functions relating to the registration and protection of geo-
graphical indication of goods (sec. 4). The Department of Patents, 
Designs, and Trademarks began receiving applications for the 
registration of GI of goods from 1 September 2015.
(c) The Act provides for the protection of geographical indications, 
irrespective of registration and its definite territory, region, or 
locality, against the geographical indications that falsely repre-
sent the origin of goods to the public (sec. 6). For the purpose of 
registration, the classification of the goods will be in accordance 
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with the international classification of goods. Section 7 provides 
for the registration of homonymous geographical indications for 
the same class of goods, for which an equitable treatment and 
protection to every producer of such goods shall be accorded for 
each indication.
(d) The Act prohibits registration of certain geographical indications 
when their use would result in deception of, or cause confusion 
among, the consumers, would hurt the religious susceptibilities 
of any citizens of Bangladesh, or when they represent a false geo-
graphical indication (sec. 8).
(e) The Act provides that procedural fairness shall be maintained 
with respect to all affected/relevant parties when registering or 
refusing to register a geographical indication, or when cancelling 
a registration (secs. 9, 11-15).
(f) Upon registration of a GI, a registered authorized user is given the 
right to use the geographical indication of goods and to obtain 
relief for its infringements (sec. 18). However, section 19 prohibits 
the alienation of the rights conferred through registration by the 
way of assignment, transfer, and license.
(g) Section 28 defines certain acts as infringements of protected geo-
graphical indication. The acts which would constitute an infringe-
ment of geographical indication rights include, inter alia, (i) any 
misleading use of geographical indication, (ii) an act constituting 
unfair competition, including passing off, (iii) use of geographical 
indication to mislead the true origin by using wrong translations of 
the true origin or expressions such as “kind,” “style,” “imitation,” 
and so on. When the right relating to GI is breached, the aggrieved 
person, including any interested persons, producers, or consum-
ers, may initiate a civil action in the competent district court. 
The available civil remedies for infringements include injunction, 
compensation, or any other appropriate remedies of civil nature 
that would be commensurate with the nature of infringements.
(h) The Act also criminalises certain acts relating to geographical 
indications and the methods of registering any GIs (secs. 29–33). 
The offences under this Act are triable by a magistrate’s court. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE – GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS 
AND TRADE 1994 – INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW – 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND 
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS – PRINCIPLE OF STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORIAL WATERS 
Transcom Cables Ltd v. The Commissioner of Customs [18 MLR (2014) 
HCD 97; Judgment May 24, 2012]
Facts
Two issues were involved in this case. The first issue was whether the Pre-
Shipment Inspection (PSI) Agent rightfully assessed the imported goods 
in question and issued the Clean Report Finding (CRF) value, which is 
approximately thirty percent additional valuation over the invoice value 
of the goods, in favour of the petitioner. The second issue was whether, 
upon arrival of the goods in Bangladesh, the Commissioner of Customs 
acted illegally by refusing to accept a bank guarantee for the difference of 
the CRF value and transaction value of the goods.
Decision and Reasoning 
In arriving at a conclusion on these questions, the Court relied on the 
international legal standards on customs valuation that were incorporated 
in the relevant municipal law of Bangladesh, namely the Assessment of 
Duties (Valuation of Imported Goods) Rules 2000. The Court accepted 
the argument that the Valuation Rules of 2000 were in conformity with 
the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1994. It was 
observed that rule 15 of the Valuation Rules 2000 specifically complies with 
the Agreement on Implementation of article VII of the GATT 1994 (‘the 
Valuation Agreement’). In order to provide a fair and uniform customs 
valuation system, this Valuation Agreement bases the customs value on 
the transaction value of the imported goods, which is the price actually 
paid or payable for the goods when sold for export. According to the court, 
this Agreement provides for the international law governing the customs 
valuation around the world. Taking into consideration the fact that Bangla-
desh is a party to the GATT 1994, the Court then extensively discussed the 
genesis, rationale, provisions, and development of article VII of the GATT 
that provides the rules to determine the valuation of the goods for customs 
purposes. Noting the different methods of customs valuation according 
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to the Valuation Agreement, the Court finally declared that the Customs 
Authority of Bangladesh acted illegally and arbitrarily by failing to comply 
with the Valuation Rules 2007 and ordered to reassess the customs valu-
ation according to international rules on the subject.  
Md. Ibrahim v. Bangladesh [Writ Petition No. 2640 of 2011; 18 BLC 
(2013) HCD 415; Judgment October 16, 2012]
Facts
The petitioner challenged the non-delivery by the Customs and Chittagong 
Port Authorities of his imported goods, despite the production of relevant 
documents and payment of customs duties and other charges. By referring 
to section 82A of the Customs Act 1969, the petitioner argued that the 
authorities had a duty to release the goods within three days after making 
an assessment of them. The authorities sought to defend their decision to 
release the goods on the ground that the relevant transport documents 
were legally deficient. The Court referred to article 24 of ICC Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (‘the UCP 600’) that deals 
with road, rail, or inland waterway transport documents. The UCP 600, 
which came into force on 1 July 2007, governs the operation of letters of 
credit and, inter alia, requires the transport document to be signed by the 
carrier of goods or a named agent for, or on behalf of, the carrier. In this 
case, the transport document (the house bill of lading) was signed neither 
by the carrier nor by a named agent for the carrier. Therefore, the Court 
held that the house bill of lading submitted by the petitioner was not a 
legal bill of lading as per article 24 of the UCP 600. Also, the question of 
whether the Bangladeshi law would be applicable for the foreign vessels and 
cargos entering the territorial waters of Bangladesh was raised in this case. 
Decision and Reasoning 
Relying on the internationally recognized principle of state sovereignty 
over territorial waters, the Court observed that when a vessel f lying the 
f lag of any other country enters the territorial waters of Bangladesh, “the 
vessel and cargo becomes subject to the municipal laws of Bangladesh” 
according to section 3(3) of the Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act 
1974. It may be noted that this 1974 Act embodied international principles 
relating to the jurisdiction over territorial waters.  
State Practice 311
Novorossiysk Shipping Co., USSR v. Lever Brothers Bangladesh Ltd. and 
Others [19 BLC (2014) HCD 344; Judgment May 27, 2012]
Facts
This case involved the application of international trade law and practice 
in a private international law dispute before the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Lever Brothers Bangladesh Ltd. imported 
two consignments of inedible tallow from Auckland, New Zealand, on the 
vessel MT Antares VII, for which the carrier was Novorossiysk Shipping. 
The vessel with the cargo in bulk arrived at the Port of Chittagong on 6 
January 1993. Three days later, the vessel discharged the cargo into the 
shore tanks under the supervision of the surveyors appointed by the con-
cerned parties to the contract. The survey, which was carried out by NA 
Survey and Inspection, showed that on board the ship, an ullage survey87 
was conducted on the day of discharging the cargo, i.e. 9 January 1993. 
According to the ullage survey, a quantity of 5.984 metric tons was found 
allegedly short of the total consignment of 1948.265 metric tons. On the 
other hand, according to the shore tank survey report, a quantity of 32.001 
metric tons of tallow was short when the consignment was discharged from 
the vessel MT Antares VII into the shore tanks. 
Decisions and Reasoning
To recover the loss from shortage of tallow in bulk, estimated to be BDT 
7,40,538.36, Lever Brothers Bangladesh Ltd. sued the Novorossiysk Ship-
ping Co. in the primary civil court (Court of Joint District Judge). The 
claimant argued that the defendant (Novorossiysk Shipping Co.), among 
other defendants, was liable for the shortage of tallow in bulk and should 
be bound to compensate the loss sustained by it. The Court of Joint District 
Judge decided the claim in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant claimed 
that it was not liable for the loss and appealed the decision to the High 
Court Division in 1998.
The High Court Division sustained the appeal by Novorossiysk Ship-
ping Co., and held that, according to international trade and practice, 
the cargo carrier Novorossiysk Shipping Co. was entitled to one percent 
87 Ullage Survey is one of the typical measuring methods for cargo on board the 
ship (OBS) or board quantity (OBQ). 
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ocean allowance as ‘inevitable loss’ while carrying bulk cargo like tallow. 
An alleged shortage of 5.984 metric tons of tallow, as the ullage survey 
report showed, was covered by the one percent ocean allowance available 
to Novorossiysk Shipping Co. Considering the evaporating nature of the 
cargo of tallow, the Court further held that in the event of conflict between 
the ullage survey report and the shore tank survey report, the former must 
get priority over the latter. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the carrier 
Novorossiysk Shipping Co. would not be liable for the alleged shortage of 
cargo under international trade law and practice, as well as Bangladesh’s 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1925.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT – BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
Bangladesh – USA Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement 
(TICFA), 25 November 2013, Dhaka 
On 25 November 2013, Bangladesh entered into a bilateral agreement with 
the U.S. with a view to provide for a mechanism for both governments 
to discuss trade and investment issues and areas of cooperation. TICFA 
aims at establishing an annual forum to identify and address obstacles to 
bilateral trade and investment. The first TICFA meeting was held in Dhaka 
in 2014 and the second in Washington, D.C. in 2015.
As the U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman remarked after sign-
ing the agreement, under the TICFA, both countries “will more regularly 
work together to address issues of concern” in their trade and investment 
relationship. The U.S. government hoped, for example, that it would also 
be able to track and discuss Bangladeshi efforts to improve worker safety 
and worker rights, especially in its ready-made garment sector.
VIETNAM
IMPORT-EXPORT – WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM – ANTI-
DUMPING LAW AND PRACTICES – SHRIMP II DISPUTE 
United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet 
Nam (WT/DS429/12)
On 17 January 2013, Vietnam officially requested the World Trade Orga-
nization (the “WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) to establish 
a Panel to settle the trade dispute with the United States in relation to its 
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application of anti-dumping measures against certain shrimp imports 
from Vietnam (the case “DS 429”). The Panel was established by the DSB 
on 28 January 2013 to examine the dispute.88 China, the European Union, 
Japan, Norway, Thailand, and Ecuador have applied to be third-parties 
in the proceeding. Following the agreement of the parties, the Panel was 
composed on 12 July 2013.
Vietnam initiated the lawsuit following unsuccessful consultations 
with the U.S. concerning a number of anti-dumping measures on certain 
frozen warm-water shrimp from Vietnam, as well as certain U.S. laws or 
practices concerning the imposition of anti-dumping measures since the 
beginning of 2012 in accordance with the requirement of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. 89
Vietnam requested a review of the implementation of the DSB’s ruling 
on a similar case from 2010, DS 404, and made claims with respect to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s use of the “simple zeroing” methodology, 
the assignment of a rate to the non-market economy-wide entity, and the 
sampling of Vietnamese shrimp imports. The Panel in DS 404 case voiced 
support for two out of the three issues raised by Vietnam and demanded 
that the U.S. government align its regulations with the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, saying 
that the zeroing methodology is inconsistent with the WTO regulations 
and should be banned.90 Since then, the Vietnamese Government has asked 
the U.S. side to abide by the Panel’s ruling in DS 404 and revise laws on 
the calculation of anti-dumping margins on Vietnam’s shrimp imports.
On 31 July 2013, upon receipt of notification from the DSB on the 
Panel’s establishment and prior to Vietnam’s first written submission, the 
U.S. submitted a request to the Panel, raising its objection to the inclusion 
of certain claims and measures in Vietnam’s panel request, amongst which 
is that the sixth administrative review and the “use of zeroing in original 
88 Dispute DS429: United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds404_e.
htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2013). 
89 Id.
90 Dispute DS404: United States — Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds429_e.
htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
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investigations, new shipper reviews and changed circumstances reviews” 
are not measures within the Panel’s terms of reference.91 Subsequently, 
Vietnam provided comments on the U.S.’ reply and on 27 August 2013, 
Vietnam filed its first written submission.92
On 26 September 2013, the Panel issued a preliminary ruling in which 
it rejected the U.S.’ argument and declined to make any ruling with respect 
to the remaining objections raised by the U.S. in light of Vietnam’s indica-
tion that it was not pursuing the corresponding claims.93 The final rulings 
of DS 429 are expected to be released by the Panel by the end of 2014.
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
MALAYSIA
LABOUR LAW – TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP – DISMISSAL FROM A 
PARTICULAR INDUSTRY – RIGHT TO ORGANISE AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING CONVENTION 1949 (ILO CONVENTION NO. 98) – 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TRADE UNIONS ACT 1959, SEC. 26(1) – 
CONFLICT BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Ors v. Ketua Pengarah 
Kesatuan Sekerja & Ors, High Court Malaya, Kuala Lumpur [Originat-
ing Summons No: R4(R2)-24-51-2008. 10 October 2013]
Mr. Solomon, the General Secretary of the plaintiff was dismissed from 
employment with nine other members of the first plaintiff by CIMB Bank 
Berhad for unlawful picketing. Mr. Solomon and the other members chal-
lenged the dismissal and a representation was made to the Industrial Court 
pursuant to section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The issue before 
the Court was the interpretation of section 26(1) of the Trade Unions Act 
1959 in particular whether an employee loses his membership of the trade 
union of that industry if he/she has been dismissed and his/her dismissal 
is being challenged in court. 
91 Panel Report, United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam, Annex A-3, ¶ 1.1(b)-(c), WTO Doc. WT/DS429/R/Add.1 (Nov. 17, 2014) 
(emphasis added). 
92 Id. ¶ 1.2. 
93 Id. ¶ ¶ 6.1-6.3.
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One of the issues discussed by the Court was whether there was a con-
flict between the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (ILO Convention No. 98), 
which Malaysia ratified in 1961. The learned judge stated that although 
it is the duty of the Court to give effect to national law in this instance 
as per the case of Seow Teck Ming & Anor v. Tan Ah Yeo & Anor [1991] 3 
CLJ 2731, the Court also recognised Lord Diplock’s proposition in Solo-
man v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise [1967] 2 QB 11, that there is a 
“prima facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach 
of international law, including therein specific treaty obligations; and if 
one of the meanings which can reasonably be ascribed to the legislation is 
consonant with the treaty obligations and another and others are not, the 
meaning which is consonant is to be preferred.”
The High Court ultimately held that a member of the union who was 
terminated from their employment is not automatically stripped of their 
membership; the purpose of section 26(1A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 
was not to restrict membership of a particular union to only persons em-
ployed in that particular type of trade or occupation or industry. To allow 
such an interpretation of section 26(1A) would arbitrarily increase the 
powers of the Director General of Trade Unions.
VIETNAM
LABOUR RIGHTS – PROTECTION OF SEAFARERS’ RIGHTS – 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF SHIPPING 
Ratification of the Maritime Labour Convention, 10 April 2013
The 2006 Maritime Labour Convention, widely known as the “seafarers’ 
bill of rights,” is an international labour treaty adopted under the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) to establish international standards for 
the protection of seafarers, ensure their decent work, and secure economic 
interests of quality ship owners.94 The Convention covers every aspect of 
seafarers’ work and life on board, including minimum age, seafarers’ em-
ployment agreements, hours of work or rest, payment of wages, paid annual 
94 Basic Facts on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, International Labour 
Organization, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-
convention/WCMS_219665/lang--en/index.htm. 
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leave, repatriation at the end of contract, onboard medical care, the use 
of licensed private recruitment and placement services, accommodation, 
food and catering, health and safety protection and accident prevention, 
and seafarers’ complaint handling. The Convention entered into force on 
20 August 2013.95 It currently has seventy-seven states parties, covering 
more than ninety percent of the world’s gross tonnage of ships.96
Vietnam ratified the Convention on 22 March 2013 by the President’s 
Decision No. 47/2103/QD-CTN.97 It submitted the instrument of ratifica-
tion to the Director-General of the International Labour Office on 10 April 
2013.98 On 25 July 2013, the Prime Minister then adopted Decision No. 1221/
QD-TTg approving the Plan for the Implementation of the Convention. The 
Government’s plan requires comprehensive assessment and certification for 
all ships; establishment of a tripartite consultation mechanism involving 
representatives of the Government, shipowners and seafarers in 2013; an 
overall upgrading of relevant laws by 2015; and investment in public infor-
mation and entertainment structures for seafarers at sea ports by 2020.99




97 Chủ tịch nước ra quyết định về việc gia nhập Công ước Lao động Hàng hải 2006 
(MLC2006) [President Decides on Ratification of the Maritime Labour Convention, 
2006], Công Ty Cổ Phần TM và Vận Tải Biển Châu Khang [Chau Kang 
Shipping and Transport Joint Stock Company] (Apr. 19, 2013), http://
chaukhang.vn/tin-tuc/su-kien/chu-tich-nuoc-ra-quyet-dinh-ve-viec-gia-nhap-
cong-uoc-lao-dong-hang-hai-2006-mlc2006.html. 
98 Ratifications of MLC, 2006 - Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, supra note 83. 






Statement by India on Agenda Item 81 – Report of the 
International Law Commission – Part III at the Sixth 
Committee of the 65th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly on 4 November 2013100 
Congratulating the Special Rapporteur Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina for 
submitting the sixth report on the topic, “Protection of persons in the 
event of disasters,” India noted that it elaborated the draft article 5 ter 
(Cooperation for disaster risk reduction); and the draft article 16 (Duty 
to reduce the risk of disasters). India also noted with appreciation that 
the Commission had adopted the commentaries to all the draft articles 
adopted so far. Restricting its comments to the draft articles 5 ter and 16, 
India noted and welcomed the Special Rapporteur’s shift from response-
centric model to focus also on prevention and preparedness. India also 
noted with interest that the Commission had relied upon variety of sources 
of law in order to identify the duty to reduce the risk of disasters, includ-
ing international agreements and instruments (such as the 2005 Hyogo 
Framework for Action), regional and national laws on prevention, prepa-
ration and mitigation, which also included India’s Disaster Management 
Act, 2005. Regarding the draft article 16, India pointed out that it obliged 
each State to take measures, including through laws and regulations, to 
prevent, mitigate and prepare for disasters. The scope of the topic would 
thus, India pointed out, comprise not only the disaster phase but also the 
pre- and post-disaster phases. However, according to India, it was unclear 
whether the same would be applicable to industrial disaster situations. 
India further added that: 
As a State’s undertaking of rights and obligations during pre-
disaster phase is largely linked with that State’s economical develop-
ment, technical know-how and human resources, we would stress 
for a balance to ensure that the interests of developing States are 
100 P. Rajeeve, Member of Parliament & Member of Indian Delegation, Statement 
on Agenda Item 81, at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (Nov. 04, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.
pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/16849pmi116.pdf). 
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not affected by the rights and obligations under this draft article. 
Similarly, ‘the principle of common but differentiated responsibil-
ity’ envisaged under environmental law for developing States need 
to be considered and respected while determining the character-
istics with regard to ‘due diligence.’
 Turning to the topic, “Formation and evidence of customary international 
law,” India agreed that the purpose of the work on the topic should be to 
provide practical assistance to the practitioners of international law as well 
as to the judges and lawyers in the domestic jurisdictions, who might not 
be well-versed in public international law but are nevertheless called upon 
to examine and decide on matters involving aspects of international law. 
India also added that this purpose would be better served if, as agreed in 
the Commission, the outcome of the work would be in the form of non-
prescriptive “conclusions” and commentary that would provide guidance 
to States. 
India shared the view that the substance of the rules of customary 
international law would not fall within the scope of the topic. It agreed 
that “ jus cogens” would not also fall within the scope of the topic, as the 
peculiarity of non-derogation distinguished it from the customary inter-
national law rules. 
Appropriately terming the change of the title of the topic to “Identifi-
cation of customary international law,” India pointed out that this study 
would also include the dynamic process of formation, with special focus 
on the objective evidence of the rules of customary international law. India 
stressed on the study of the existence and formation of regional custom-
ary international law. While the dynamic relationship between customary 
international law and treaties would form parts of the study of the topic, 
India stated that it looks forward to the study of the relationship between 
customary international law and other sources of international law, espe-
cially, general international law.  
Further, India added that it would like to see that both elements, the 
State practice and opinio juris, were given equal importance in the study. 
India further noted that: 
The practice of States from all regions should be taken into account. 
In this regard, the developing States, which do not publish digests 
of their practice should be encouraged and assisted to submit 
their State practice including their statements at international and 
regional fora, and the case-law, etc. At the same time, we urge the 
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Commission to exercise utmost caution in taking into account 
the arguments and positions advanced by the States before inter-
national adjudicative bodies and, should not be detached from or 
devoid of the context in which they were made.
 Welcoming and appreciating the first report on the topic of “Provisional 
application of treaties by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Juan Manuel Gomez-
Robledo, India stressed that since the provisional application was a sort 
of formal application, it would be relevant if the study addressed various 
legal implications of provisional application and relations between the State 
parties to it, including the extent of international responsibility incurred 
by a State vis-a-vis other State parties for violation of an obligation under 
a provisionally applied treaty. India agreed with the idea that the pres-
ent study should be in the form of guidelines with commentaries for the 
guidance of States. 
Statement by India on the Agenda Item 81 – Report of the International 
Law Commission – Part II at the Sixth Committee of the 65th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly on 1 November 2013101
 India noted that the “Reservations to Treaties” was a topic which the 
Commission had been discussing since 1995. It also appreciated the work 
done so far and found that the “Guide to Practice” was very detailed and 
nuanced work, which tried to cover all possible situations relating to res-
ervation to treaties, and was based on an in-depth and exhaustive analysis 
of State practice and case law. India also noted that it contained very useful 
materials, doctrinal discussions, and valuable examples by ways of eluci-
dation of the guidelines and that such tools were sure to be invaluable for 
government legal advisers as well as practitioners in resolving problems 
posed by reservations to treaties and interpretative declarations. 
India, referring to the adoption of the annex to the Guide to Prac-
tice namely the “reservations dialogue” as well as a recommendation on 
“mechanisms of assistance in relation to reservations,” stated that it sup-
ported the recommendations of the General Assembly, calling upon States 
and international organisations as well as monitoring bodies, to initiate 
101 Neeru Chadha, Joint Secretary, Statement on Agenda Item 81, at the Sixth 
Committee of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Nov. 
01, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/
uploadpdf/25032pmi121.pdf). 
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and pursue such a reservations dialogue in a pragmatic and transparent 
manner. As regards the proposal for a Reservation Assistance Mechanism, 
India was willing to take this recommendation forward and was of the 
view that the suggestion to create a small group of experts within the Sixth 
Committee was worth further examination. India was, however, not for 
any compulsory procedure in this regard as it would not be acceptable to 
the States.  
India was ready to accept these guidelines as a useful contribution 
to the process of international law-making. India also noted that these 
guidelines were likely to give rise to fewer problems from a policy and po-
litical angle as they were not intended to revise the regime of reservations 
contained in the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. 
Statement by India on Agenda Item 81 – Report of the International Law 
Commission – Part I at the Sixth Committee of the 65th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly on 30 October 2013102
 India in its opening statement, while appreciating the report delivered 
by the Chairman of the International Law Commission (ILC), focused on 
two topics; namely “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in 
relation to the interpretation of treaties”; and “Immunity of State officials 
from foreign criminal jurisdiction.” 
India agreed with the observation that the rules contained in articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention reflect the customary international 
law. The subsequent practice, according to India, was an authentic means 
of interpretation that could be taken into account while interpreting the 
terms used in the provisions of the treaty, but could not be taken as con-
clusive or legally binding unless the parties had agreed to it. 
India noted that there was a clear distinction between a subsequent 
agreement and subsequent practice. It agreed with the Commission that 
“subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions” ipso facto had the effect of 
constituting an authentic interpretation of the treaty, whereas a “subsequent 
102 Neeru Chadha, Joint Secretary, Statement on Agenda Item 81, at the Sixth 
Committee of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 
30, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/
uploadpdf/22873pmi122.pdf). 
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practice” only had this effect if it “show[ed] the common understanding 
of the parties as to the meaning of the terms.” The subsequent practice, 
India added, could only be taken into account as a means of interpreta-
tion, if it establishes an agreement between the parties. India pointed out 
that the basic determining factor, whether or not a subsequent agreement 
or practice has acquired the status as a means of interpretation of a treaty, 
was the acceptance thereof by all parties to the treaty.  
Similarly, India continued, the evolutive interpretation of a treaty 
could not be merely a matter of the presumption of the intent of parties, 
particularly in regard to treaties that laid down specific rights for each 
Party, and where such an interpretation could alter the core rights of a 
party. Therefore India was of the view that the nature of the Treaty might 
be relevant for determining whether more or less weight should be given 
to certain means of interpretation. 
Turning to the topic of “Immunity of State officials from foreign crimi-
nal jurisdiction,” India agreed with the understanding of the Commission, 
reflected in paragraph 10 of the commentary to paragraph 2 of draft article 
1, that the rules regulating the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdic-
tion of persons connected with activities in specific fields of international 
relations were the treaty-based and custom-based “special rules.” India 
noted that the Commission had decided not to include an explicit refer-
ence to international conventions and instruments. However, India was 
of the view that making reference to the regimes under which the special 
rules fell, would provide greater clarity in understanding the nature and 
the scope of the immunity. 
India pointed out that regarding the immunity ratione personae, it is 
universally accepted that the Heads of States, Heads of Governments and 
the Foreign Ministers, the so called Troika, were entitled to immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction of foreign States by virtue of their representational 
capacity for the State abroad and functional necessity. India considered that 
were the same criteria applied, a few other high ranking officials, especially 
Ministers of Defence and Ministers of International Trade, could also be 
considered as the State officials deserving immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of foreign States.
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Statement by India on Agenda Item 77 - “Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts” at the Sixth Committee of the 68th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 October 2013103
India noted that the draft articles on “Responsibility of States for interna-
tionally wrongful acts” were adopted by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) at its 53rd session in 2001. The ILC submitted the draft article to the 
General Assembly, with the recommendation for taking note thereof; and 
further recommended for the possibility of convening an international 
conference to examine the draft articles, with a view to conclude a conven-
tion on this topic. India also noted that the Sixth Committee considered 
these draft articles in 2001 vide its resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001. 
Thereafter, India pointed out, the Sixth Committee took up this topic for 
consideration in 2004, 2007 and 2010. Subsequently, India noted that the 
Secretary-General had submitted several reports containing compilation 
of decisions of international courts, tribunals and other bodies referring 
to the ILC draft articles on responsibility of the States for internationally 
wrongful acts; and containing comments and information received from 
governments concerning the draft articles.  
According to India, these draft articles were concise and now less 
complicated than it was in its initial stages. India explained this with an 
example, stating that:
[T]he concept of State crimes was replaced by the concept of serious 
breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
international law. The commentary on draft article 40 gives several 
illustrations of such peremptory norms. Some of the most difficult 
articles were refashioned and they exhibit sensitivity to the needs 
of States in difficult circumstances. So, as finally adopted by the 
ILC, the draft articles have several merits and present a delicate 
balance reached with difficulty. 
 India, however, reiterated that the draft articles addressed only secondary 
rules of State responsibility. These would come into play, India stated, only 
in case an internationally wrongful act, as defined by a primary rule, was 
103 Avinash Pande, Member of Parliament & Member of the Indian Delegation, 
Statement on Agenda Item 77, at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 21, 2013) (transcript available in https://
www.pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/49443pmi97.pdf). 
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committed. In this connection, India noted that international law was still 
striving to achieve the type of universality that was essential in the dif-
ferent fields. It further noted that “[t]he international structure is still in 
the making and we cannot rush ahead of institutional developments and 
the development of the international legal system, without risking coun-
terproductive effects.” While stating that it would be prudent to maintain 
a careful balance in the text of the draft articles, which ILC struggled for 
more than forty years to achieve, India expressed its happiness with regards 
to the reception of the ILC’s draft articles on the State responsibility into 
international law, through State practice, scholarly writings, decisions of 
courts, tribunals and other bodies.
International Organisations
BANGLADESH
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION – SECURITY/
ANTI-CORRUPTION/COMBATTING DRUGS AND ORGANISED 
CRIMES – INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS – ENERGY 
COOPERATION – MONEY LAUNDERING AND COOPERATION TO 
PREVENT TERRORIST FINANCING AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and 
40th OIC Sessions
On 17-18 October 2013, Bangladesh joined in a preparatory meeting in 
London before the 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) that was held in Sri Lanka later in the year, on 10-17 Novem-
ber. Bangladesh attended the Committee of the Whole (COW) meeting 
and the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in London, and played its role 
in adopting a Memorandum of Issues for the 2013 CHOGM. Bangladesh 
proposed the following, among other, issues/initiatives to be included in 
the Communique of the 2013 CHOGM: (i) duty-free export of goods from 
the least developed countries to the developed countries, (ii) inclusion of 
migration into the Development Programmes since 2015 onward, (iii) 
combatting terrorism and religious fundamentalism, and (iv) the holding 
of 10th Commonwealth Women Affairs Ministerial Meeting.
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Bangladesh also attended the 40th Session of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of OIC that was held in Conakry, Guinea, on 9-11 December 2013. 
UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) 
On 26-27 November 2013, Bangladesh attended the meeting of the First 
Programme Steering and Policy Coordination Committee of the Regional 
Programme for South Asia of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO-
DC). The meeting was held in New Delhi, India. In the meeting, Bangladesh 
shared its views and plans on how to implement regional programmes of 
the UNODC in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh-India Joint Working Group (JWG) on Renewable Energy 
Cooperation
On 28 November 2013, JWG on Renewable Energy Cooperation met in 
Dhaka. During the meeting, both parties agreed to intensify the coopera-
tion on renewable energy in the areas of research and academic collabora-
tion, exchange of information, and institutional and technical capacity-
building, with particular respect to wind energy, solar energy, bio-gas, 
and biomass gasification. 
UN Security Council Resolutions to Prevent Terrorist Financing
In 2013, Bangladesh worked to help implement several resolutions of the 
UN Security Council that aim at preventing money-laundering and ter-
rorist financing. A delegate of the Asia Pacific Regional Review Group 
(AP-RRG) of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) visited Bangladesh 
on 24-25 November 2013. During this visit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
helped the AP-RRG see the progress in the implementation of measures 
against terrorist financing and money laundering in Bangladesh.
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
On 25-29 November 2013, Bangladesh attended the 5th Conference of the 
State Parties (COSP) to the UNCAC, held in Panama City. In that meet-
ing, Bangladesh arranged for a side meeting to discuss the strategies of 
working against corruption through cooperation with civil society organ-




Inaugural Address by Shri. E. Ahamed, Minister of State for External Af-
fairs, Government of India, at the 52nd Annual Session of Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO) on 9 September 2013104
Welcoming all the delegates, the External Affairs Minister noted that inter-
national law was no longer a branch of law which governed only inter-State 
relations. The Minister noted that with the rapid pace of globalization, 
the scope of international law had also expanded to include newer areas 
which were once considered to be in the exclusive domain of domestic law. 
There was, the Minister noted, “virtually no area of international interest, 
which is not, in one way or another, governed by international law.” The 
Minister further noted that: 
International law has witnessed a tremendous evolution in both 
substantive and institutional terms. It has now developed into 
an intense web of rules and institutions that address and govern 
non-State actors, such as international organizations and even 
the individual. Institutions have been established that provide 
for important mechanisms to facilitate international cooperation 
and compliance with international law. Today it touches the lives 
of millions by addressing trade and business, transnational crime 
and human trafficking, terrorism, intellectual property rights, 
child custody, piracy and a host of other issues . . . . International 
law is still in development and remains, as of today, the only viable 
means to ensure a common denominator to regulate the conduct 
of States and other actors. International law and the institutions it 
has created, continue to be the best tool to maintain international 
peace and security.
Referring to the AALCO, the Minister noted that its foundation was firmly 
built on Asian- African solidarity. He also noted that it was the only inter-
governmental organisation which brought together two continents of Asia 
104 E. Ahamed, Minister of State for External Affairs, Inaugural Address at the 
52nd Annual Session of Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (Sep. 
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and Africa in the progressive development of international law. Since 
its inception in 1956, the Minister pointed out that AALCO has served 
countries of the Asian-African region as a consultative inter-governmental 
organisation fostering deliberations of common concerns and playing an 
active role in developing Asian-African perspectives of international law.
Referring to the Indian contribution to AALCO, the Minister conveyed 
that India had been always in the forefront in facilitating the fulfillment of 
AALCO’s noble objectives. He also noted that as a Founding Member of 
AALCO and as a member State which hosted the AALCO’s Headquarters, 
India was committed in contributing to the work of AALCO. India, he 
added, attached the highest importance to the Organization and its work 
and had always played a very significant role in the activities of AALCO. 
The Minister commended AALCO’s role in establishing regional 
arbitration centres under its auspices to settle commercial disputes. He 
also complimented the work of the Centre for Research and Training of 
AALCO for undertaking training activities and bringing out publications 
on international law issues.
While conveying his best wishes for the Fifty-Second Annual Session 
of AALCO, the Minister noted that the four-day session would deliberate 
upon a number of international law issues of contemporary importance 
to our region such as Environment and Sustainable Development; Law 
of the Sea; Challenges in Combating Corruption; Statehood of Palestine 
under International Law; Extra-territorial Application of National Leg-
islation; Sanctions Imposed against Third Parties; and Selected Items on 
the Agenda of the International Law Commission are on the agenda. He 
hoped that the in-depth exchange of views on these issues will contribute 
to the development of law in these areas and the promotion of the interests 
of Asian-African States.
VIETNAM
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS
Accession to The Hague Conference on Private International Law, 10 
April 2013 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH, for Hague 
Conférence de La Haye) is an international inter-governmental organisation 
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established in 1893 to “work for the progressive unification of the rules of 
private international law.”105 It pursues this goal by developing a series of 
multilateral conventions on various matters of private international law 
and assisting member states in implementing these conventions.106 The 
most widely ratified conventions that the organisation has drafted include 
those on the abolition of legalisation, service of process, taking of evidence 
abroad, access to justice, international child abduction, intercountry adop-
tion, conflicts of laws relating to the form of testamentary dispositions, 
maintenance obligations and recognition of divorces.107 The most recent 
conventions are the Convention on the International Recovery of Child 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (2007), the Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of Securities held with 
an Intermediary (2006) and the Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments (2005). To date, eighty states and the European Union are members 
of the Conference.
Vietnam became a member state of the organisation on 10 April 2013, 
exactly 120 years after the Conference was established. The decision to 
admit Vietnam was adopted by the majority of the votes cast at the 2013 
Annual Meeting of the Conference’s Council on General Affairs and 
Policy.108 The accession to the Conference marks an important milestone 
for the country in its integration into the international legal sector. As a 
member state, Vietnam could directly participate in the drafting of future 
conventions, contribute to the policy-making process of the organisation, 
and receive technical assistance in implementing relevant conventions that 
it has expressed consent to be bound.
At the 2013 Annual Meeting of the Conference’s Council on General 
Affairs and Policy, Vietnam also submitted its instrument of accession to 
105 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law art. 1, Oct. 31, 1951, 
220 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force July 15, 1955).
106 Vision and Mission, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/about/vision-and-mission.
107 About HCCH, Hague Conference on Private International Law, https://
www.hcch.net/en/about. 
108 Instruments of Acceptance, Ratification and Accession Deposited During the 
Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, https://www.hcch.net/pt/news-archive/
details/?varevent=305. 
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JURISDICTION – UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION – SCOPE AND 
APPLICATION
On October 17, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement at the 68th 
Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the scope and application 
of the principle of universal jurisdiction: 
First, on definition. Universal jurisdiction refers to criminal ju-
risdiction exercised according to the nature of a crime regardless 
of such related factors as the place where the crime is committed, 
the nationality of the suspect or the victim, or whether the crime 
has jeopardized national security or major interest of a state. 
Therefore, universal criminal jurisdiction is different from both 
the jurisdiction exercised by international criminal judicial organs 
and the obligation of a state to “extradite or prosecute” as a means 
of exercising jurisdiction.
Second, on scope. At present, there is general support for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in case of piracy on the high seas. 
Apart from this, some states believe that it may also be applicable 
to serious violations of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 
international armed conflicts, while some other states hold the 
view that some international crimes stipulated in relevant inter-
national treaties should be included in the scope of application. 
The Chinese delegation believes that the scope of application of 
universal jurisdiction should first and foremost be based on the 
practical need of this principle. Since universal jurisdiction is aimed 
at filling the gaps of territorial, personal and protective jurisdic-
tions of states with a view to eliminating impunity, it is necessary 
to ascertain whether a crime is already covered by the territorial, 
personal or protective jurisdictions of a state before deciding if the 
crime should be included in the scope of application of universal 
jurisdiction. If a state has already established its jurisdiction, be 
it territorial, personal or protective, over a crime, the necessity to 
109 Id. 
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place this crime in the scope of application of universal jurisdiction 
requires further study. In addition, the decision on the scope of 
application of universal jurisdiction should be based on existing 
customary international law and the provisions of international 
treaties. The aim of this agenda item should be codification rather 
than development of existing rules of universal jurisdiction. 
Third, on application. In establishing and exercising universal 
jurisdiction, states should act within the existing international 
legal framework and abide by the fundamental rules and principles 
of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, including non-
violation of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. 
They should also comply with international legal regulations related 
to immunity, including that of states, state officials including heads 
of states, and diplomatic and consular personnel. As universal 
jurisdiction is supplementary in nature, the priority of territorial, 
personal and protective jurisdictions of a state must be respected. 
Only in cases where no state has established or exercised territorial, 
personal or protective jurisdictions can states concerned exercise 
universal jurisdiction.
[U]niversal jurisdiction is a sensitive issue of international law 
with a bearing on the stability and healthy development of inter-
national relations and the world order. Improper legislation or 
application of universal jurisdiction may create negative impacts 
on international relations and affect normal interstate exchanges. 
The Chinese delegation is of the view that the issue of universal 
jurisdiction should be considered in a prudent and balanced man-
ner and decided by consensus. China supports the continuation of 
the exchange of views within the framework of the Working Group 
and is willing to enhance communication with others to bridge 
differences and work for consensus.110
110 Statement by Mr. Xiang Xin Chinese Delegate at the 68th Session of the UN General 
Assembly on Agenda Item 86 Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
UN (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1091531.htm. 
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INDIA
The Hague Convention of 1980 on Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction – Comity of Courts 
– Recognition of the Foreign Judgments in Domestic 
Jurisdictions.
Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshkaka Rao & Others [Supreme Court 
of India, 16 July 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN]
Facts
This is a child removal case (termed as ‘child abduction’ in certain jurisdic-
tions) from the United States to India. Both the parties resided in the United 
States where the case arose on account of the husband filing a petition for 
dissolution of marriage in the Superior Court of Washington, County of 
King at Seattle. The mother of the child, who is the appellant in this case, 
returned to India with the child while the divorce and related proceedings 
were in progress in the United States Court and an ex parte order was is-
sued restraining the wife from leaving the State of Washington. The father 
of the child came to India and pursued the legal remedies available to him 
in the local courts to take custody of the child. The parents of the child are 
both Indians and were married according to Indian law. 
After prolonged litigation in various courts the matter reached the Su-
preme Court where the Court had to decide on three issues in the context of 
an appeal from the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. These three issues were: 
(A) Has not the Hon’ble High Court failed to exercise jurisdic-
tion vested in it under law in not considering the welfare and well 
being of the minor child before issuing the impugned directions? 
(B) Has not the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that when 
there is an order passed by foreign court, it is not necessary to go 
into the facts of the case? (C) Is not the judgment of the U.S. Court 
“not conclusive” as between the parties and hence unenforceable 
in India for being in violation of Section 13(c) and (d) of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908? 
Summary of the Decision
The Court noted that the petitioner was able to defy the orders issued by 
the Court of Competent Jurisdiction in the U.S. as India was not a signa-
tory to the Hague Convention of 1980 on “Civil Aspects of International 
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Child Abduction.” The aforesaid Convention fully recognizes the concept 
of Comity of Courts in private international law. The Court also noted 
that taking note of the undesirable effect of not being the signatory to the 
aforesaid convention, the then Chairman of the Law Commission of India 
had recommended that India should keep pace and change according to 
the changing needs of the society. The Commission recommended that the 
government might consider that India becoming a signatory to the Hague 
Convention of 1980 which would, in turn, bring the prospect of helping 
return of the children to India who had their homes in India. The Court 
also noted that this need to accede to the Hague Convention was under-
scored by this Court in numerous judgments. The Court also considered 
some of its judgments, in particular V. Ravi Chandran (Dr.) v. Union of 
India & Others and Shilpa Aggarwal (Ms.) v. Aviral Mittal and Another. 
Both the cases were decided in 2010.111 The other cases were - Dhanwanti 
Joshi v. Madhav Unde; Sarita Sharma v.. Sushil Sharma; and Ruchi Majoo 
v. Sanjeev Majoo.112
The Court, after considering all the facts, noted that: 
[It was] evident that the wife has reached India in defiance of the 
orders passed by the Courts of competent jurisdiction in the U.S. 
It is apparent that the appellant has scant regard for the orders 
passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court also. Keeping in view 
the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court issued the directions which have been reproduced in the 
earlier part of the judgment.
Decision
The Court concluded in its opinion that no relief could be granted to the 
appellant in the present proceedings given her conduct in removing her 
son from the U.S. in defiance of the orders of the Court of competent 
jurisdiction. The Court further stated: 
The Court has specifically approved the modern theory of Con-
flict of Laws, which prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has 
111 V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 174 (India); Shilpa Aggarwal 
v. Aviral Mittal, (2010) 1 SCC 591 (India). 
112 Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998) 1 SCC 112 (India); Sarita Sharma v. 
Sushul Sharma, (2000) 3 SCC 14 (India); Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 
SCC 479 (India). 
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the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case. The 
Court also holds that Jurisdiction is not attracted “by the operation 
or creation of fortuitous circumstances.” The Court adds a caution 
that to allow the assumption of jurisdiction by another State in 
such circumstances will only result in encouraging forum-shopping. 
The aforesaid observations are fully applicable in the facts and 
circumstances of this case.113 
The Court held that both the parties should submit to the competent U.S. 
Court, i.e. the Superior Court of Washington, to resolve all the pending 
issues. 
Statement by India on Agenda Item 86 – “The Scope and Application of 
the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction” at the Sixth Committee of the 
68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 
2013114
India thanked the Secretary-General for his reports A/68/113 on “The scope 
and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction,” which provided 
information about the laws and practice of certain States concerning the 
universal jurisdiction. India was of the firm view that those who commit 
crimes must be brought to justice and be punished. India pointed out that 
a criminal should not go scot free because of procedural technicalities 
including the lack of jurisdiction. 
India noted that the exercise of jurisdiction was a unique legal subject 
in itself. The term “jurisdiction,” according to India: 
[connoted the] power or the right of a State, which in legal par-
lance referred to two aspects: first, the rule-making; and second, 
the rule-enforcing. The widely recognized bases for the exercise 
of jurisdiction include: Territoriality, which is based on the place 
of the commission of offence; Nationality, which is based on the 
nationality of the accused. Some States recognize the nationality 
113 The Court also noted and further added that Courts have taken cognizance of 
growing practice of children being removed from one country to another just to 
put pressure/influence the legal proceedings that are usually ending in these cases 
in relation to irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
114 Manjeev Singh Puri, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative on Agenda 
Item 86, at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly (Oct. 17, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.pminewyork.org/
adminpart/uploadpdf/15196pmi91.pdf).  
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of victim also, as basis for exercising jurisdiction; and Protective 
principle, which is based on the national interests affected. The 
common feature of these jurisdictional theories is some connection 
between the State asserting jurisdiction and the offence. 
India also noted that under the present agenda item, the deliberations 
were upon a different type of jurisdictional basis, namely the universality 
theory. India further noted that: 
A State invoking the universal jurisdiction claims to exercise ju-
risdiction over an offender, irrespective of his or her nationality 
or the place of commission of the offence, and without any link 
between that State and the offender. It assumes that each State has 
an interest in exercising jurisdiction to prosecute offences which all 
nations have condemned. The rationale for such jurisdiction is the 
nature of certain offences, which affect the interests of all States, 
even when they are unrelated to the State assuming jurisdiction.
Under general international law, India pointed out, piracy on the high 
seas was the only such crime over which claims of universal jurisdiction 
was undisputed. This principle of universal jurisdiction in relation to 
piracy, as noted by India, had been codified in the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 1982. As regards certain serious crimes like genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and torture, etc., India further pointed 
out, international treaties had provided basis for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction. India also added that this was applicable between the States 
parties to those treaties. They included, among others, the Four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Apartheid Convention. 
Dealing with question of applying the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion to other international crimes, India stated: 
The question that arises is whether the jurisdiction provided for 
specific serious international crimes under certain treaties could 
be converted into a commonly exercisable jurisdiction, irrespective 
of the fact whether or not the other State or States are a party to 
those treaties. Several issues remained unanswered, including those 
related to the basis of extending and exercising such jurisdiction, 
the relationship with the laws relating to immunity, pardoning and 
amnesty, and harmonization with domestic laws.
 While concluding, India noted that several treaties obliged the State par-
ties either to try a criminal or hand him over for trial to a party willing to 
do so. This was the obligation of aut dedere, aut judicare (“either extradite 
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or prosecute”). This widely recognised principle, India clarified, includ-
ing the International Court of Justice in its decision of 20 July 2012 in the 
Belgium v. Senegal case, should not be confused with or short circuited by 
the universal jurisdiction. 
Statement by India on Agenda Item 78 – “Criminal Accountability of 
United Nations Officials and Experts on Mission” at the Sixth Com-
mittee of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
16 October 2013115
India noted that the instances of crimes being committed by the United 
Nations’ officials and experts on mission were a matter of grave concern 
to the international community and it also noted that this had an adverse 
impact over the image, credibility and integrity of the organisation. While 
welcoming the Report of the Secretary General A/68/173 on “Criminal ac-
countability of United Nations officials and experts on mission,” submitted 
pursuant to the General Assembly resolution 67/88, India noted that this 
Report, inter alia, provided for information on cooperation among States 
and with the United Nations in the investigation and prosecution of such 
crimes; and on the activities within the UN Secretariat towards disciplining 
the officials and assisting the States to help prevent and stop such crimes. 
India also noted that the General Assembly resolution 67/88 strongly 
urged all States to consider establishing jurisdiction over crimes commit-
ted by their nationals while serving as United Nations officials or experts 
on mission, at least where the conduct of the person amounting to a crime 
both in the host country and the country of his nationality. India pointed 
out that the implementation of this element would help fill the jurisdic-
tional gap in respect of member States that did not assert extra-territorial 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by their nationals abroad. 
India, as regards to the implementation pointed out that the Indian 
Penal Code extended to extra-territorial offences committed by Indian 
nationals. Accordingly, India drew the attention to offences that were com-
mitted by Indian officials or experts on mission while serving abroad, and 
were subject to the jurisdiction of the Indian courts and were punishable 
under the Indian law. Further, the Indian law had provisions for assistance 
115 Vishnu Dutt Sharma, at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (Oct. 16, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.
pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/39940pmi89.pdf). 
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in criminal matters, which enabled them to seek from and extend assistance 
to a foreign State in criminal cases. These provisions, India added, were 
part of the Code of Criminal Procedure of India.  
Further, India also pointed out that the Indian Extradition Act, 1962, 
dealt with extradition of fugitive criminals and related issues. The Act 
allowed for extradition in respect of extraditable offences in terms of an 
extradition treaty with another State. The Act also allowed consideration of 
an international convention as the legal basis for considering an extradition 
request in the absence of a bilateral treaty. India stated that it had concluded 
more than forty bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual assistance in 
criminal matters. Where there was no bilateral treaty, the Government 
of India can provide assistance on a reciprocal and case by case basis, in 
accordance with the provisions of the applicable national laws. 
Concluding, India reiterated its view that dealing with the wrongdoings 
of UN officials or experts on mission, did not require the development of 
an international convention. In its view, what was required was that the 
member States ensure that their laws provided for jurisdiction and had 
adequate provisions for prosecuting any such conduct of their nationals 
serving as UN officials or experts on missions abroad, and that their laws 
had provisions for international assistance for the investigating and pros-
ecuting of committed crimes. India further added: 
[It] ascribes to the zero tolerance policy and considers it extremely 
important that violation of any national or international law by the 
UN officials and experts on mission is properly investigated and 
prosecuted. The UN officials and experts should act and perform 
their duties in a manner consistent with the UN Charter that 
promotes the image, credibility and integrity of the Organization. 
KOREA
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Decision of Seoul High Court Concerning Criminal Trial Jurisdiction
Seoul High Court – Judgment related to the jurisdiction over the foreign 
criminal who committed the crime abroad. Seoul Godeung beobwon [Seoul 
High Ct.], 2013No1936, Dec. 6, 2013 (S. Kor.).
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Facts 
The defendant committed homicide during a robbery and attempted aban-
donment of a corpse of Korean and Filipino victims in Philippines. The 
criminal trial was held in Korea. Meanwhile, the defendant was originally 
Korean, but he became naturalized in the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
Legal Issues
Whether the Korean domestic court can exercise jurisdiction on a foreigner 
who committed an overseas crime. 
Judgment
The Court decided that since the defendant is a foreigner, this is a case 
where a foreigner committed an overseas crime that is outside the territory 
of Korea. Thus, in principle, criminal law cannot be applied unless it is 
listed in Article 5, No. 1 or No. 7 of the Korean Criminal Law. It provides:
Even if foreign criminals committed overseas crime, Article 6 of 
the Criminal Law is applicable if the crime is against Korea or 
Korean citizens. However, the exception is prescribed for the situ-
ation where the crime is constituted based on the legislation on the 
place of an act in the clue of alignment, or when the prosecution 
or execution is exempted. Therefore, based on the facts charged 
for the defendants, jurisdiction will be determined by applying 
Korean Criminal Law. 
For the attempted abandonment of a corpse, there is no regulation to 
punish such a crime under the revised Criminal Law of the Philippines. 
Accordingly, the Court decided that there is no jurisdiction as the crime 
cannot be composed according to Philippine Law. However, for homicide 
committed during a robbery, the Court’s opinion was as follows:
For a homicide in robbery, as the victim is a Korean citizen, Korean 
Criminal Law would be applied as a general rule according to Ar-
ticle 6 of the Criminal Law in Korea . . . . Although our Constitution 
prohibits one from repeatedly being punished for the same crime, 
the effect of prohibition against double jeopardy is only subjected 
for the situation under the same jurisdiction. Therefore, the prohi-
bition against double jeopardy is not effective for a foreign judgment 
… Even though the defendant received a verdict of not guilty in the 
Philippines on homicide in robbery, we can hold a trial by applying 
the Korean Constitution … The defendant argued that as he was 
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already imprisoned for more than two years, which falls under the 
situation of receiving a whole or part of the sentencing, he should 
be exempt or receive reduced sentencing according to Article 7 
of the Criminal Law. However, Article 7 of the Criminal Law is 
not only a temporary reduction. Receiving a sentence in a foreign 
country means the situation when there is an actual execution on 
punishment of restricting physical freedom, monetary penalty, 
and etc. received by a judgment of a conviction from the foreign 
court. Therefore, the defendant’s imprisonment in the Philippines 
in an undetermined state cannot be the applicable situation under 
Article 7 of the Criminal Law.
MALAYSIA
FAMILY LAW – JURISDICTION – DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS – 
WHETHER WIFE ACQUIRED DOMICILE OF HUSBAND – LAW 
(MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 1976, SEC. 28 IMPLEMENTATION 
OF CEDAW IN MALAYSIA) 
KKP v. PCSP, High Court Malaya, Kuala Lumpur [Originating Sum-
mons No: 24-49-02-2013. 11 December 2013]
The husband (PH) and wife (DW) were married in 1970 in Ipoh, Perak and 
had five children (at the time of the proceedings, all five children were over 
eighteen years of age). Over the course of their marriage, PH, DW and their 
five children moved to Perth, Australia and then to Canada. However, PH 
continued to stay in Malaysia and travelled to see his family. Since 1997, 
PH frequently travelled to England for business and DW would accompany 
him. PH and DW purchased a property in England to stay during their 
frequent travels. DW held dual Australian and Canadian citizenship and 
had been living in England since October 2012. 
In February 2013, DW filed for a petition for divorce in England. Con-
sequently, PH applied to the Malaysian High Court for leave to petition for 
divorce under section 53 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 
1976. DW applied for all proceedings in Malaysia to be stayed, pending 
the hearing and disposal of the petition of divorce at the High Court in 
England, on the grounds that the question of domicile is being determined 
in the English proceedings.
Section 48(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
requires two conditions to be fulfilled before a Malaysian Court has juris-
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diction to make a decree of divorce – firstly, that the marriage is registered 
under the 1976 Act and secondly, that the domicile of the parties to the 
marriage at the time when the petition is presented is in Malaysia. 
On the issue of domicile, PH submitted that during the course of a 
marriage, a wife acquires the domicile of her husband and cannot abandon 
such domicile and acquire her own independent domicile. On the other 
hand, DW argued that a wife has the freedom to choose her domicile, and 
in this case, the UK, particularly that Malaysia ratified the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
in 1995 and Malaysia is obliged to respect the same rights of men and 
women in the area of freedom of movement of persons and freedom to 
choose residence and domicile.
The High Court considered articles 2(b), 2(f) and 15(4) of CEDAW and 
held that no provisions in the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
were amended to comply with the cited CEDAW provisions. Therefore, 
a Malaysian woman upon marriage will acquire her husband’s domicile 
until that marriage is lawfully dissolved (Neducheliyan Balasubramaniam 
v. Kohila Shanmugam [1997] 3 MLJ 768). The Court dismissed DW’s ap-
plication and held that the Malaysian court has jurisdiction to hear the 
matrimonial proceedings.
Law of the Sea
CHINA
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA – SUBMISSION TO THE 
COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN 
PART OF THE EAST CHINA SEA
On January 7, 2013, China presented its compliments to the Secretary-
General of the U.N. and, with reference to the statement concerning Diaoyu 
Dao in Note Verbale SC/12/372 from China dated December 28, 2012, to 
the Secretary-General of the UN.
In this written communication, China stated that Diaoyu Dao and its 
affiliated islands have been inherent territory of China since the ancient 
times. China’s sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands has 
sufficient historical, geographical, and legal basis. Japan’s occupation of 
and claim of sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao is illegal and invalid, and in 
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no way change the fact that Diaoyu Dao belongs to China. In September 
2012, the Chinese government delineated and announced the base points 
and baselines of the territorial sea of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands 
in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The Chinese government does not 
accept the position stated by the Note Verbale SC/12/372 of Japan.116
On August 5, 2013, China presented its compliments to the Secretary-
General of the UN and with reference to the Note Verbale SC/12/372 from 
Japan dated December 28, 2012 to the Secretary-General of the UN. In this 
written communication, China stated that:
China does not accept the position stated in the above-mentioned 
Note Verbale of Japan. 
The statement in Japan’s Note Verbale that the establishment 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles cannot be accomplished as “the distance between the op-
posite coasts of Japan and the People’s Republic of China in the 
area with regard to the submission is less than 400 nautical miles” 
has no ground in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (thereafter referred to as “the UNCLOS”) and the rules of 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (thereafter 
referred to as “the Commission”). Therefore, it does not affect or 
impede China’s submission on the outer limits of its continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, nor the consideration of the sub-
mission by the Commission.
It is untenable for Japan to claim that “the delimitation of the 
continental shelf in this area shall be effected by agreement between 
the States concerned in accordance with Article 83 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is, thus, indisputable 
that the People’s Republic of China cannot unilaterally establish 
the outer limits of the continental shelf in this area”. China made 
its submission concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles in part of the East China Sea in strict 
accordance with Article 76 of the UNCLOS, its Annex II and the 
relevant rules of the Commission. In the above submission, China 
has made it clear that in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 10 
of the UNCLOS and the relevant practice, the consideration of the 
submission and the recommendations adopted by the Commission 
116 See generally Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, 
Statements on Diaoyu Dao of Note Verbale SC/12/372, U.N. Doc. 
CML/001/2013 (Jan. 7, 2013).
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shall not prejudice the future delimitation of the continental shelf 
in the East China Sea between the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan.
China reiterates its position on the Diaoyu Dao and its affili-
ated islands as stated in the Note Verbal CML/001/2013 dated 7 
January 2013 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The 
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China would request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the Note Verbale 
(CML/017/2013) be circulated to all members of the Commission, 
all States Parties to the UNCLOS and all Member States of the 
United Nations . . . .117
On August 15, 2013, China made a partial submission to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in respect to part of the East China 
Sea. The following excerpt is from the website of the Commission on the 
Limits of Continental Shelf:
With respect to the notes verbales from Japan dated 28 December 
2012 and 13 August 2013, and the notes verbales from China dated 7 
January and 5 August 2013, Zhang Haiwen noted that the extended 
continental shelf in the submission was the natural prolongation 
of the mainland territory of China and that the submission made 
no reference to the islands of Diaoyu Dao and its affiliated islands.
Zhang Zhanhai noted that this was a partial submission which 
addressed one part of the continental shelf in the East China Sea 
and that it did not prejudice China’s future submission on delinea-
tion of the outer limits of the continental shelf in the East China 
Sea and other areas. He informed the Commission that one of its 
members, Mr. Lu, had provided China with advice and assistance.118
INDIA
EXTENT OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN MARITIME ZONES 
COMPATIBILITY OF INDIAN MARITIME ZONES ACT, 1976 WITH 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) 
Republic of Italy & Others v. Union of India & Others [Supreme Court 
of India, 18 January 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN]
117 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Statements with 
Reference to Note Verbale SC/12/372, U.N. Doc. CML/017/2013 (Aug. 5, 
2013).
118 Comm. on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rep. on the Work of Its 
Thirty-Second Session, ¶¶ 59-60, U.N. Doc. CLCS/80 (Sep. 24, 2013).
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Facts
The Italian ship Enrica Lexie was on a voyage from Galle, Sri Lanka to 
Muscat, Oman. Later it changed its destination to Djibouti. This change 
was conveyed to all the concerned coastal States, including India. While 
on its journey near the coast of the Indian State of Kerala, Enrica Lexie 
allegedly mistook an Indian fishing vessel, St. Antony, for a pirate boat. 
Italian marines who were on board the Enrica Lexie fired gun shots at this 
fishing vessel, killing two Indian fishermen. This incident happened on 
14 February 2012 off the Indian coast at a distance of 20.5 nautical miles. 
Pursuant to this incident, the journey of the Enrica Lexie was halted and 
it was asked to return to the port of Cochin in the Indian State of Kerala. 
By then, the local police authorities had filed criminal charges against the 
two marines of the Italian ship Enrica Lexie for murder and later on 15 
February 2012 took them into custody for further investigation and trial.
Italy had argued that these two marines, along with two others, were 
on board the Enrica Lexie as part of the Italian Government’s initiative to 
check and combat piracy. Italy also argued that its marines were on board 
the Enrica Lexie in their official capacity and under proper official autho-
rization. The Italian Embassy in India filed a writ petition before the High 
Court of Kerala, seeking the release of the marines as they were on board 
the Enrica Lexie in their official capacity. Italy had also argued before the 
High Court of Kerala that the Kerala police authorities had no jurisdic-
tion to try and investigate the case. According to Italy, the Indian Federal/
Central Government had authority and jurisdiction to try and investigate 
the case. Since the High Court of Kerala reserved its judgment and noth-
ing was forthcoming, the Italian Embassy invoked the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of India to transfer the case to the Central Government 
and also sought the marines to be handed over to the Central Government 
so that they could be tried under Italian law in Italy where the case had 
already been registered.
While the writ petition was pending before the Indian Supreme Court, 
the Kerala State Police filed charge sheet against two Italian marines on 18 
May 2012 under Indian Penal Laws along with Section 3 of the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed 
Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002 (“SUA Act”). Kerala High Court, 
delivering its judgment on 29 May 2012, held that the entire Indian Penal 
Code had been extended to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and that the 
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territorial jurisdiction of the State of Kerala was not limited to 12 nautical 
miles only. The Kerala High Court also held that under the provisions of 
the SUA Act, the State of Kerala had jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles 
from the Indian coast falling within the EEZ of India.
 Aggrieved by this order of the Kerala High Court, Italy again appealed 
to the Indian Supreme Court arguing that its marines were “discharging 
their duties as members of the Italian Armed Forces, in accordance with 
principles of Public International Law and Italian National Law requiring 
the presence of armed personnel on board commercial vessels to protect 
them from attacks of piracy.” Italy also argued that:
[T]he determination of international disputes and responsibilities 
as well as proceedings connected therewith, must necessarily be 
between the Sovereign Governments of the two countries and not 
constituent elements of a Federal Structure. In other words, in cases 
of international disputes, the State units/governments within a fed-
eral structure could not be regarded as entities entitled to maintain 
or participate in proceedings relating to the sovereign acts of one 
nation against another, nor could such status be conferred upon 
them by the Federal/Central Government. 
Summary of the Judgment
The Court considered the contention of Italy which, inter alia, pointed 
out that:
[T]he incident having occurred at a place which was 20.5 nautical 
miles from the coast of India, it was outside the territorial waters 
though within the Contiguous Zone and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, as indicated hereinabove. Accordingly, by no means could it 
be said that the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of one of 
the federal units of the Union of India . . . the incident, therefore, 
occurred in a zone in which the Central Government is entitled 
under the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, as well as UNCLOS, to exer-
cise sovereign rights, not amounting to sovereignty.
Italy also argued that “since provisions of the 1976 Act and also UNCLOS 
recognise the primacy of Flag State jurisdiction, the Petitioner No.1 i.e. 
the Republic of Italy, has the preemptive right to try the Petitioner Nos.2 
and 3 under its local laws.”
As to criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship, Italy referred to 
Article 27 of the UNCLOS, which provides that: 
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The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exer-
cised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea 
to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection 
with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, 
save only in the following cases: 
(a) if the consequences of the crime extended to the coastal State; 
(b) if the crime was of a kind to disturb the peace of the country 
or the good order of the territorial sea; 
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities had been requested 
by the Master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular 
officer of the flag State; or 
(d) if such measures were necessary for the suppression of illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
Italy urged that none of the aforesaid conditions were present in the facts 
of this case so as to attract the criminal jurisdiction of the State within 
the federal structure of the Union of India. Italy also argued that f lag 
state had the primary jurisdiction for any acts or incident that took place 
outside the territorial sea. It also referred to Article 100 of the UNCLOS 
which required “[a]ll States [to] cooperate to the fullest possible extent in 
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State.” 
Italy also submitted that “the coastal State has no sovereignty in the ter-
ritorial sense of dominion over Contiguous Zones, but it exercised sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring the Continental Shelf and exploiting its 
natural resources.” Italy also noted that the Coastal State had “jurisdiction 
to enforce its fiscal, revenue and penal laws by intercepting vessels engaged 
in suspected smuggling or other illegal activities attributable to a violation 
of the existing laws.” Italy also pointed out that “[t]he waters which extend 
beyond the Contiguous Zone are traditionally the domain of high seas or 
open sea which juristically speaking, enjoyed the status of International 
waters where all States enjoyed traditional high seas freedoms, including 
freedom of navigation.” Italy further noted: 
The coastal States c[ould] exercise their right of search, seizure 
or confiscation of vessels for violation of its customs or fiscal or 
penal laws in the Contiguous Zone, but it c[ould] not exercise these 
rights once the vessel in question entered the high seas, since it 
ha[d] no right of hot pursuit, except where the vessel was engaged 
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in piratical acts, which ma[d]e it liable for arrest and condemna-
tion within the seas. 
Accordingly, Italy concluded, “although, the coastal States do not ex-
ercise sovereignty over the Contiguous Zone, they are entitled to exercise 
sovereign rights and take appropriate steps to protect its revenues and 
like matters.”
India argued on two issues, namely: “(i) Whether Indian Courts had 
territorial jurisdiction to try Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 (Italian Marines) un-
der the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860? (ii) If so, whether the 
Writ Petitioners were entitled to claim sovereign immunity?” On the first 
issue, India contended that Maritime Zones Act 1976 extended the penal 
jurisdiction beyond territorial waters. India also contended that: 
[A]n attempt must necessarily be made in the first instance, to 
harmonise the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 with the UNCLOS. If 
this was not possible and there was no alternative but a conflict 
between municipal law and the international convention, then 
the provisions of the 1976 Act would prevail . . . that primacy in 
interpretation by a domestic Court, must, in the first instance, be 
given to the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 rather than the UNCLOS. 
As regards the second issue, India submitted that: 
[T]he case of the Petitioners that the Indian Courts had no jurisdic-
tion to take cognizance of the offence which is alleged to have taken 
place in the Contiguous Zone, which was beyond the territorial 
waters of India, as far as India was concerned, was misconceived. 
The Contiguous Zone would also be deemed to be a part of the 
territory of India, inasmuch as, the Indian Penal Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure had been extended to the Contigu-
ous Zone/Exclusive Economic Zone by virtue of the Notification 
dated 27th August, 1981, issued under Section 7(7) of the Maritime 
Zones Act, 1976. 
India submitted that “the domestic law was not inconsistent with the 
International law and in fact even as a matter of international law, the 
Indian Courts ha[d] jurisdiction to try the present offence.” India further 
submitted that: 
[I]n order to determine the issue of territorial jurisdiction, it would 
be necessary to conjointly read the provisions of Section 2 I.P.C., 
the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 and the 27th August,1981 Notifica-
tion and all attempts had to be made to harmonise the said provi-
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sions with the UNCLOS. However, if a conflict was inevitable, the 
domestic laws must prevail over the International Conventions 
and Agreements. 
India also submitted that “the voyage contemplated under the [relevant 
Indian law] [wa]s not the voyage of the Enrica Lexie, but the voyage of St. 
Antony.”
Decision
According to the Court:
Two issues, both relating to jurisdiction fall for determination 
in this case. While the first issue concerns the jurisdiction of the 
Kerala State Police to investigate the incident of shooting of the two 
Indian fishermen on board their fishing vessel, the second issue, 
which was wider in its import, in view of the Public International 
Law, involves the question as to whether the Courts of the Republic 
of Italy or the Indian Courts had jurisdiction to try the accused. 
The Court held: 
The incident, therefore, occurred not within the territorial waters 
of the coastline of the State of Kerala, but within the Contiguous 
Zone, over which the State Police of the State of Kerala ordinarily 
has no jurisdiction . . . . The State of Kerala had no jurisdiction 
over the Contiguous Zone and even if the provisions of the Indian 
Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure Code were ex-
tended to the Contiguous Zone, it did not vest the State of Kerala 
with the powers to investigate and, thereafter, to try the offence. 
What, in effect, is the result of such extension is that the Union 
of India extended the application of the Indian Penal Code and 
the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Contiguous Zone, which 
entitled the Union of India to take cognizance of, investigate and 
prosecute persons who commit any infraction of the domestic laws 
within the Contiguous Zone. However, such a power is not vested 
with the State of Kerala.
The Court, while holding that the State of Kerala had no jurisdiction to 
investigate the incident, decided that it was the Government of India which 
had jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation and trial of the Italian 
marines in terms of the provisions of UNCLOS 1982. The Court directed 
the Government of India to set up a Special Court in consultation with 
Chief Justice of India “to dispose of the [case] in accordance with the pro-
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visions of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, the Indian Penal Code, the Code 
of Criminal Procedure and most importantly, the provisions of UNCLOS 
1982, where there is no conflict between the domestic law and UNCLOS 
1982.” The Court also held that “the pending proceedings before the Chief 
Judicial Magistrate, Kollam, shall stand transferred to the Special Court 
to be constituted in terms of this judgment.”
MALAYSIA
LAW OF THE SEA – UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) – PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
Statement at the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings to Prepare for the 22nd 
ASEAN Summit, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 April 
2013
Subsequent to the ASEAN Ministerial meetings, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs reported that the Ministers discussed the developments in the 
Korean Peninsula and South China Sea, in particular, the deteriorating 
security situation in the Korean Peninsula. Malaysia, together with the 
other ASEAN member states, agreed that conflicting parties should exercise 
self-restraint and take immediate action to restore calm and reduce tension.
Malaysia emphasised that the peaceful resolution of disputes in the 
South China Sea should be carried out in accordance with the universally 
recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Ministers also 
reiterated the need for all parties to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of 
activities that would complicate or escalate disputes; the Statement on the 
Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea; and the need to maintain the 
momentum on dialogue and consultations. In this regard, the Ministers 
agreed to work actively on concluding the Code of Conduct.
LAW OF THE SEA – DECLARATION ON THE CONDUCT IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA – ASEAN
Statement at the 46th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Related Meetings, 
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 July 2013
The statement addressed a number of issues that were discussed at the 46th 
ASEAN Ministerial meeting. In particular, it was reported that the meet-
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ing welcomed China’s willingness to start formal talks on a regional code 
of conduct in the South China Sea through a process of negotiation under 
the framework of the Declaration on the Conduct in the South China Sea 
(DOC). The meeting also welcomed China’s proposal to organise a meet-
ing of Senior Officials on the Implementation of the ASEAN-China DOC 
in Beijing in September 2013.
In this regard, Malaysia stressed that ASEAN and China should main-
tain the momentum of dialogue and negotiations on the issue of the South 
China Sea. Both sides should build on the existing relationship to find 
solutions to realise the regional code of conduct in the South China Sea. 
It was also emphasised that ASEAN and China should demonstrate to the 
international community that the relationship between the two sides covers 
various aspects and not just focused on the South China Sea issue alone.
LAW OF THE SEA – UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS) – ASEAN – REGIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION – DECLARATION OF THE EAST ASIA SUMMIT ON HE 
PRINCIPLES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS 
Statement at the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit-
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 
3 July 2013 
Malaysia drew attention to the issues that were discussed at the meeting, 
i.e. development in the South China Sea, Middle East Peace Process and 
situation in the Korean Peninsula and Syria.
With regard to the situation in the South China Sea, Malaysia stressed 
that the principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea should guide the dialogue and negotia-
tions. 
In the area of non-traditional security, Malaysia called for greater 
collaboration amongst participants of the ASEAN Regional Forum, par-
ticularly, to increase preparedness and capacity to deal with cyber security 
threats.
As regards security cooperation, it was emphasised that a rules-based 
approach is vital in governing inter-state relations as this can encour-
age, promote and ensure the transparency of intent and predictability 
in behaviour in a sustained manner; in particular, the twelve points in 
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the Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually 
Beneficial Relations adopted in Bali in 2011 should be taken into account.
VIETNAM
LAW OF THE SEA – 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF THE SEA – NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS 
Entry into force of the Vietnam’s Law of the Sea, 1 January 2013
On 1 January 2013, the Vietnam’s Law of the Sea entered into force (the 
“Law”). This is the country’s most important and comprehensive piece 
of legislation on law of the sea. The Law covers all major aspects of the 
management and use of the sea. It regulates the regime of internal waters, 
territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental 
shelf, regime of islands, archipelagos, and activities in the Vietnamese sea 
areas. It sets rules for protecting the marine environment and conducting 
marine scientific research. It also includes provisions on search and rescue, 
development of maritime economy, sea patrol and control, and maritime 
international cooperation. 
Under this national Law, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has become a guiding principle for the State’s 
management and protection of the sea.119 International law, international 
treaties and UNCLOS are referred to in 40 provisions of the Law.120 The 
Law clearly states that Vietnam shall respect and protect the rights and 
interests of foreign vessels in its maritime zones in conformity with inter-
national treaties to which Vietnam is a party.121 It affirms the primary role 
of UNCLOS in case there are differences between its provisions and those 
119 Law of the Sea art. 2(1) (2012) (Viet.).
120 “International law” is referred to in 15 provisions, including id. arts. 4(3), 5(3), 5(4), 
6(1), 16(1), 22(1), 22(3), 28, 32, 33(3), 33(6), 35(1), 35(4), 36(2), 37(9). “International 
treaties” is referred to in 21 provisions, including id. arts. 4(1), 5(4), 12(3), 12(4), 
16(2), 16(3), 18(4), 18(5), 22(1), 23(1), 30(4), 33(7), 35(4), 35(5), 39(2), 48(b). The 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is referred to 
in three provisions, including id. arts. 3(1), 4(3), 12(1). The Charter of the United 
Nations is referred to in id. art. 4(1).
121 Id. art. 22(2) (2012).
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under UNCLOS.122 Clarifying the relationship between its provisions and 
those in previous legal documents on the same matters, the Law maintains 
that, in case of differences between the Law and the previous documents, 
the Law shall prevail.123 This demonstrates the importance of the UNCLOS 
in Vietnam’s maritime order and its maritime policy.
With respect to the regime of islands, for example, the Law uses iden-
tical language to Article 121(1) of UNCLOS in defining an island as “a 
naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above water 
at high tide.”124 Similarly, it provides that “[r]ocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own have no exclusive economic 
zone or continental shelf,”125 which is identical to the language in Article 
121(3) of UNCLOS. 
In terms of navigational rights of foreign vessels in Vietnam’s maritime 
zones, the Law states that Vietnam’s sovereignty in its territorial sea shall 
be exercised in accordance with UNCLOS,126 according to which vessels 
of all states shall enjoy the right of innocent passage.127 Innocent passage 
of foreign vessels shall be conducted on the basis of international treaties 
to which Vietnam is a party, including UNCLOS.128 The Law does require 
that, when entering Vietnam’s territorial sea, foreign submarines surface 
and fly their national flags129 and foreign nuclear-powered ships carry 
documents and observe special precautionary measures established for 
such ships under international law.130 These requirements, however, are 
consistent with UNCLOS provisions.131 The Law provides that Vietnam 
122 Id. art. 2(1).
123 Id.
124 Id. art. 19(1).
125 Id. art. 20(2).
126 Id. art. 12(1).
127 Id. art. 12(2).
128 Id. art. 12(3).
129 Id. art. 29.
130 Id. art. 23.
131 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 20 & 23, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter 
UNCLOS].
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may temporarily suspend the exercise of innocent passage in specified 
areas in Vietnam’s territorial sea if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security,132 which is again allowed under UNCLOS.133 
It further specifies that the temporary suspension shall be made public 
domestically and internationally on the “Maritime Notice” in accordance 
with the international maritime practice at least fifteen days before the 
temporary suspension.134 The 2012 Law also has a similar list of activities 
like the one in Article 19 of UNCLOS that are considered to be prejudicial 
to Vietnam’s peace, good order and security.135
In the contiguous zone, the Law maintains that, in addition to rights 
and jurisdiction over natural resources as provided in UNCLOS, Vietnam 
can also exercise control to prevent and punish acts of infringement of 
legislation on customs, tariff, health or immigration committed in the 
territory or the territorial sea of Vietnam.136 This provision is consistent 
with Article 33 of UNCLOS.
In the exclusive economic zone, the Law provides that Vietnam “re-
spects freedoms of navigation and overflight, the right of the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines and lawful uses of the sea by other states” 
in accordance with this Law and international treaties to which Vietnam 
is a party, including UNCLOS.137 It should be noted that this is the first 
time that a Vietnamese legal document formally acknowledges freedom 
of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone.
132 Law of the Sea art. 26 (Viet.).
133 UNCLOS, supra note 130, art. 25.
134 Law of the Sea art. 26 (Viet.).
135 The major difference is that, unlike the UNCLOS, Law of the Sea art. 12(3) (Viet.) 
views threat or use of force against other countries as rendering passage in the 
territorial sea not innocent.
136 Law of the Sea art. 14(2) (Viet.).




COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Decision of Daegu District Court Concerning Succession of National 
Compensation Obligation
Daegu District Court Judgment for a claim of government compensation 
responsibility to the victims of Daegu October incident – Korea’s succes-
sion of the liability to compensate for the damages by the U.S. Military 
Government in Korea. Daegu Jibang beobwon [Daegu Dist. Ct.], 2012Ga-
Hap6923, Oct. 27, 2013 (S. Kor.).
Facts
In the raid of so-called “Daegu October Affair,”138 which occurred when 
civilians and few leftist faction stood against the police and administra-
tive authority as they were discontent with the U.S. military’s hiring 
pro-Japanese Governmental officer directly after the liberation, the delay 
of land reformation, and coercive delivery of food, a number of civilians 
suffered from cruel treatment, such as torture, or suffered retaliation after 
their release, and some of them were even killed without any due process. 
By receiving requests from the related parties of the civilian casualty from 
Daegu October Affair, past affairs arrangement committee for truth and 
reconciliation on year 2010 made a determination on the investigation 
for truth. In accordance with this investigation, the plaintiffs claimed a 
compensatory damage against the Korean Government, the defendant, 
for the deceased and victims’ family’s mental sufferings claiming that 
138 At the occurrence of the incident, the U.S. military suppressed the incident by 
announcing a martial law in October 2, 1964 and 7,500 of residents were arrested 
in the process. On the investigation process, some of the civilians suffered from 
cruel treatment such as torture or they suffered retaliation such as destruction or 
forfeit of their asset and property by the police or right-wring group after their 
release. Some of them were even killed without any due process. Furthermore, 
some of the residents were even killed, who were totally unrelated to this incident.
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the Government was the managerial supervisor of the police officers who 
killed the victims. 
Legal Issues
Whether a claim of compensatory damage can be incurred against the 
Korean Government and the validity on the defendant’s counter-argument 
on extinctive prescription. 
Judgment
The defendant denied Korean Government’s succession on the compensa-
tion obligation for the damages caused by the U.S. Military Government 
in Korea on the issue of whether a claim of compensation damages can be 
incurred against the Korean Government. Below is the Court’s opinion:
The defendant argued that the Daegu October Affair is an incident 
that occurred during the U.S. Military Government in Korea, which 
is before the establishment of the Government of the Republic of 
Korea, and that the defendant is not liable for the unlawful acts 
committed by the government officers, who belonged to the U.S. 
Military Government and had the responsibility to manage the 
police at that time. According to the “Agreement between the 
Korean Government and the U.S. Government on the transfer of 
Sovereign Power to Korean Government and the Evacuation of 
the U.S. Army Occupation,” made on August 11, 1948, and Article 
2 of the “Administrative Agreement on Potential Military Safety 
for the Transition Period between the President of Korea and the 
U.S. Armed Forces Commander in Korea,” made on August 24, 
1948, “when the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) regard it in accordance 
with common security, the transfer of commanding duty of the 
Korean national defense force to the Korean Government on the 
entire police, coast guard, and the existing national defense guard 
is gradually agreed and the Korean President agrees to receive the 
commanding duty of the national defense force.” Therefore, the 
defendant’s contention is without reason as the defendant has suc-
ceeded the responsibility for the unlawful acts, even though the 
victims of Daegu October Affair suffered from the unlawful acts 
committed by the police who were under the command manage-
ment of the U.S. Military.
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Meanwhile, the Court held that the defendant’s contention on the extinc-
tion of right of compensatory claim is not allowed as it is an abuse on rights, 
which is against the duty of good faith. 
Therefore, there was an exercise of rights within a reasonable time 
based on good-faith principle. The plaintiffs probably expected appropriate 
measure for reputation recovery and compensatory damages by enacting 
the Special Compensatory Law for the before and after Korean War suf-
ferings after the defendant said that it will take appropriate measures to 
recover the damages and reputations of the victims and the families of the 
deceased according to the clarified truth through the legislation for the 
basic past affairs arrangement. Nevertheless, the defendant did not take 
any active step, leading the plaintiffs to file suits individually against the 
defendant for compensatory damage. In addition, the characteristics of the 
defendant’s unlawful act, the degree of claim of right for compensation 
damage and the scope of the claimants, and the process of similar incidents 
on State compensation led to such a conclusion.
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS – MUNICIPAL / TREATIES –  
DOMESTIC EFFECT
Decision of Constitutional Court Concerning Domestic Effect of the 
Treaty 
Constitutional Court – Constitutional appeal about the invasion of voting 
right due to Korea-U.S. FTA. Hunbeob jaepanso [Const. Ct.], 2012Hun-
Ma166, Nov. 28, 2013 (S. Kor.).
Facts 
The claimant claimed on February 20, 2012, a constitutional appeal re-
questing the validation of the constitutional violation by arguing that the 
“Korea-U.S. FTA,” which was approved by the Assembly plenary session 
on November 22, 2011, invades the claimant’s voting right and equal right.
Legal Issues
Whether the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (March 12, 2012 Treaty No. 
2081) violates the claimant’s fundamental right. More specifically, whether 
this treaty changes the scope of legislative power and judicial power of 
Korea, and whether Article 119 and Article 123 of the constitutional eco-
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nomic clause is an amendment to the Constitution. If it is, whether the 
voting right of the claimant, a citizen of Korea, is violated as it did not go 
through a voting process.
Judgment
The Constitutional Court found that a citizen’s voting right in Article 72 
of the Constitutional Law is a fundamental right, which is only effective 
when the President puts some policies to a plebiscite. Therefore, unless 
the President puts the issue of a trade agreement between Korea and the 
U.S. to a plebiscite, the possibility of the invasion of citizen’s right stated 
in Article 72 of the Constitutional Law is not recognized. In addition, the 
amendment to the written Constitution is only allowed by the submission 
of a proposal on the constitutional amendment, which contains the explicit 
and direct change on the Constitution’s provision or statement. It is not 
allowed by regular legislative procedure like a lower standard of formality 
of law. Thus, the written Constitution cannot be amended for the trade 
agreement between Korea and the U.S. as its legal effect is recognized as 
one of the treaty that needs consent from Congress. In addition, according 
to the trade agreement, the possibility on the invasion of claimant’s voting 
rights is not violated by the procedure of the constitutional amendment 
pursuant to Article 13, Section 2 of the Constitution. The important part 
of the opinion is as follows:
Article 6, Section 1 of our Constitution states that “Treaties duly 
concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and the gener-
ally recognized rules of international law shall have the same effect 
as the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea” and Article 5 of the 
Addenda of the Constitution states that “Acts, decrees, ordinances 
and treaties in force at the time this Constitution enters into force, 
shall remain valid unless they are contrary to this Constitution.” 
Therefore, our Constitution premises the constitutional superiority 
on treaties and does not accept treaties, known as constitutional 
treaties, the same effect as the Constitution. For the trade agreement 
between Korea and the U.S., its legal effect is recognized as part of 
the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between Korea 
and the U.S., which requires the approval of Congress according 
to Article 60, Section 1 of the Constitution. Thus, a target of nor-
mative control is set apart and the written Constitution cannot be 
amended. Therefore, unless a trade agreement between Korea and 
the U.S. has an effect to amend the written Constitution, the pos-
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sibility for the invasion cannot be acknowledged because it is hard 
to say that the Constitution is amended enough for the citizen’s vot-
ing right to be exercised at a Constitution amendment procedure.
SRI LANKA
INCORPORATION OF TREATY – MUNICIPAL LAW
Legislative incorporation of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Fish Stocks Agreement 1995, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Agreement on Port State 
measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Un-
regulated Fishing 2009 – Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Amendment) 
Act No 35 of 2013
One of the objectives of this Amendment is to give effect to Sri Lanka’s 
international obligations under ‘certain International and Regional Fish-
eries agreements.’ Accordingly S 14G requires that any fishing operations 
licensed by the Sri Lankan government shall comply with any regulations 
issued to implement any measures adopted under the following interna-
tional and regional agreements - the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Fish Stocks Agreement 
1995, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Agreement on Port 
State measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 2009.  S 31 further vests power with the Minister to 
exercise his powers to implement any conservation and/or management 
measures under the aforesaid agreements. 
Legislative incorporation of the Convention Against Doping in Sports 
- Convention Against Doping in Sports Act No 33 of 2013
The International Convention Against Doping in Sport 2005 was given 
effect to by this Act. Among other things, this Act establishes an Anti-
Doping Agency for Sri Lanka, declares doping to be a criminal offence, 
and recognizes therapeutic use exemptions and provides for a procedure 
for determining such exemptions.
Strengthening of provisions relating to terrorist financing – Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing – Convention on the Suppres-
sion of Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Act No 3 of 2013
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Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (Amendment) 
Act No 3 of 2013
Several sections of the parent Act were repealed and replaced through 
this Amendment. For instance, the Amendment introduced a definition 
of a ‘terrorist’ following the definition provided in the Convention. The 
Amendment expanded the definition of a ‘terrorist act’. The definition 
now refers to acts which are declared to be offences under the nine treaties 
recognized in Schedule I of the parent Act. 
Sovereignty
CHINA
TERRITORIAL – INTERNAL AFFAIRS – TAIWAN
On July 16, 2013, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson made remarks on the 
U.S. President’s endorsement of the Act supporting Taiwan’s participation 
in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Taiwan compatriots’ participation in activities of international 
organizations, including those of the ICAO is China’s internal 
affairs. China is firmly opposed to the interference by any foreign 
government, organization or individual. The relevant act of the US 
Congress grossly violated the “one China” policy and the principle 
of the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués. China expresses firm 
opposition to that and has lodged solemn representations with the 
U.S. side. We urge the US side to honor its commitment to China 
on Taiwan-related issues, handle them in a discreet and proper 
manner, stop interfering in China’s internal affairs and do more 
things that are conducive to the peaceful development of cross-
Straits relations, instead of the contrary.139
139 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the U.S. President’s 
Endorsement of an Act Supporting Taiwan’s Participation in the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China (July 16, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1059285.shtml; see Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Taiwan-Related Issue Which Arose 
at Japan’s Memorial Ceremony of the March 11 Earthquake, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
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TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY – NANSHA ISLANDS 
At a regular press conference on January 7, 2013, a Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson stated:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and 
their adjacent waters, and opposes any action that may impair 
China’s territorial sovereignty. We urge relevant countr[ies] to 
earnestly abide by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (DOC) and [to] stop provocative acts that may 
complicate or amplify the issue.140
NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
On May 15, 2013, a Chinese representative made a statement on the voting 
of a resolution on the situation in Syria at the UNGA. He stated:
With regard to the Syrian issue, the international community 
must respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity of Syria and uphold the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs in particular, as well as international law and the 
basic norms governing international militias.141
BOUNDARY DISPUTES – CHINA-INDIA BORDER
On May 6, 2013, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson made remarks on the 
settlement of the standoff incident between the Chinese and Indian border.
China and India have recently reached [an] agreement on [a] proper 
solution [to] the incident in the western section of the China-India 
eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1020675.shtml; see also Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the European Parliament’s 
Adoption of a Taiwan-Related Resolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1088457.shtml.
140 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on January 
7, 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/
t1003841.shtml.
141 U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/67/PV.80 (May 15, 2013).
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boundary through consultation. Border troops of the two sides 
have now withdrawn from the area of standoff at the Tiannan 
River Valley area. Since the occurrence of the incident, China and 
India, with the larger interest of bilateral relations in mind, have 
taken a constructive and cooperative attitude, exercised restraint 
and maintained close communication and consultation through the 
border-related mechanism, border defense meetings and diplomatic 
channels. Maintaining peace and tranquility in the China-India 
border areas serve[] the common interests of both sides. China is 
ready to work with India to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually 
acceptable solution to the boundary question at an early date.142
Territory
VIETNAM
VIETNAM – CAMBODIA RELATIONS – BORDER AND TERRITORY 
– SETTING UP LANDMARKS – INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND 
BORDER SECURITY ENHANCEMENT 
The Border Committee of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its coun-
terpart of Cambodia have agreed on eight border landmarks alongside the 
Tay Ninh Province and Kom Pong Cham of Cambodia on 26 March 2013.
Vietnam and Cambodia have cooperated to set up landmarks in 
compliance with the Supplementary Treaty for Treaty on National Border 
Planning 1985 between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Kingdom 
of Cambodia signed on 10 October 2005 and the Memorandum on the 
Adjustments of the Land Borderline in Unresolved Areas between the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Kingdom of Cambodia signed on 23 
April 2011. Until 30 June 2013, according to the report of the Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the competent authorities of the two countries 
have together identified 237/287 places to set up landmarks; built 231/280 
142 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Settlement 
of the Standoff Incident Between China and India in the Border Areas, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
(May 7, 2013), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1038241.shtml. 
State Practice 359
landmarks; and delimitated 850/1,137 km of borderline.143 The two nations 
often exchange information regarding border administration, security and 
order maintenance, in compliance with the Treaty on Border Adminis-
tration Regimes 1983, as well as organise friendly cultural exchanges and 
trade and tourism cooperation activities between the citizens of Vietnam 
and Cambodia. 
Following the above development, the Government of Vietnam has 
approved the plan to negotiate with its counterpart to develop thirteen 
new border gates over the next seven years in areas belonging to the Cen-
tral Highlands and the Mekong Delta. One of the new ports of entry will 
be at a railway station, three on the main highways and nine spread out 
along the local roads. Other border gates will be also upgraded from 2013 
to 2016. Such developments should help in boosting trade that has already 
been growing between the two Southeast Asian nations.144 
The efforts of the two states on determining land borders are considered 
as remarkable given the boundary disputes in the past. It shows their desire 
to improve their bilateral relations, to become a strategic partnership to 
provide an umbrella for closer cooperation between the two states.
VIETNAM-LAOS RELATIONS – BORDER AND TERRITORY – SETTING 
UP LANDMARKS – TREATY AND CONVENTIONS 
On 9 July 2013, the Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of the Socialist Re-
public of Vietnam and the Prime Minister of the People Republic of Laos 
together hosted the Ceremony on the Establishment of the Landmarks 
number 460 at the border gate Thanh Thuy, Nghe An and the Ceremony 
on the Completion of the Project for Landmarks Increase and Construction 
between Vietnam and Laos. The two nations have built a system of 835 
modern and persistent landmarks and supplemented 20 marks, thereby 
143 Report No. 2840/BC-BNG-LPQT of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 30 July 
2013 on the Conclusion and Implementation of International Treaties, Agreements 
and Contracts signed during the visit of Senior Leaders in the first six months of 
2013.
144 Gen. Statistics Office of Viet., Economic Report 2013 (“The trade between 
Vietnam and Cambodia has been rising fast in recent years, reaching US$ 4.1 
billion in 2012. That’s up from US$ 3.3 billion in 2012 and 2.8 billion 2011.”). 
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contributing to planning 2,067 km of the borderline between Vietnam 
and Laos.
In the next stages, the two nations will continue to cooperate to com-
plete the rest of the Project for Landmarks Increase and Construction 
between Vietnam and Laos in 2014, as well as drafting and concluding 
legal documentaries regarding border issues, such as the Convention 
regarding the borderline and national landmarks between the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and of the People Republic of Laos, the new Treaty 
on Border Administration Regime, Regulations on Border Gates and the 
Administration of Border Gates.
Terrorism
CHINA
AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURE FOR ORGANIZING 
AND CONDUCTING JOINT ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS 
WITHIN MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION
On June 29, 2013, the Third Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress decided to ratify the Agreement on the 
Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Joint Anti-Terrorist Operations 
Within Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This 
Agreement was signed by China in Shanghai on June 15, 2006. It applies to 
Macau Special Administrative Region, and does not apply to Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, unless otherwise notified by the People’s 
Republic of China.145 Apart from the preamble and signatures, this Agree-
ment has 36 articles, including the definitions of relevant terms, purposes 
and content of joint anti-terrorism operations, the decision-making and its 
procedure of joint anti-terrorism operations, the establishment, operation 
and cancellation procedures of joint antiterrorism operation commanding 
organs, the rights, duties and responsibilities of the troops and personnel 
145 中国批准: 关于在上海合作组织成员国境内组织和举行联合反恐行动的程序协
定, Xinhua [China Approves: Agreement on the Organization and Conduct of 
Joint Anti-Terrorism Operations in the SCO Member States] (June 29, 2013, 8:29 
PM), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-06/29/content_2437053.htm.
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in participation of the joint operations, and the principles on exercise juris-
dictions.146 According to Mr. Yang Huanning, the Vice Minister of Public 
Security, the Agreement has a substantive significance in strengthening the 
stability of China’s northwest neighboring areas and safeguarding China’s 
security and development in its aims to accomplish the domestic proce-
dure for the ratification of this Agreement, to improve the legal basis of 
organizing and conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises by Member States 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and to actively enhance the 
effective cooperation in suppression of “Three Forces” in Member States 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.147 The official languages of 
this Agreement are in both Chinese and Russian.
INDIA
Statement by India on Agenda Item 110 - “Measures to Eliminate Inter-
national Terrorism” at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly on 8 October 2013148
Thanking the Secretary-General for his report A/68/180 dated 23 July 2013 
entitled “Measures to eliminate international terrorism,” India noted that 
the international community is continuously facing a grave challenge from 
terrorism and that it was a scourge that undermined peace, democracy 
and freedom. India asserted that it condemned terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations, including those in which States were directly or in-
directly involved, including the State-sponsored cross-border terrorism, 
146 关于在上海合作组织成员国境内组织和举行联合反恐行动的程序协
定 [Agreement on the Organization and Conduct of Joint Anti-Terrorism 
Operations in the SCO Member States], 中国人大网 [China National People’s 
Congress Network] (2006), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2013-10/22/
content_1811025.htm.
147	 中国批准 :上海合作组织成员国组织和举行联合反恐演习的程序协定 , 
Xinhua (June 29, 2013, 8:17 PM) http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-
06/29/c_116339848.htm.
148 Arun Jaitley, Member of Parliament & Member of the Indian Delegation, Statement 
on Agenda Item 110, at the Sixth Committee of the 68th Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (Oct. 08, 2013) (transcript available in https://www.
pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/29264pmi77.pdf).
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and reiterated the call for the adoption of a holistic approach that ensures 
zero-tolerance towards terrorism. 
While strongly supporting all efforts to eradicate international terror-
ism, India noted that it had been in the forefront of global counter-terrorism 
efforts and was part of all major global initiatives against international 
terrorism, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). India further 
noted that “The Global Counter Terrorism Strategy” is a unique and uni-
versally agreed strategic framework to counter terrorism. The setting up 
of the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in 2010 has 
provided an institutional framework to support the implementation of the 
Strategy as well as the harmonization of an integrated counter-terrorism 
approach within the UN system. An effective and balanced implementation 
of the Strategy requires greater international and regional cooperation. In 
this context, we also count on the UN Counter Terrorism Center established 
within the CTITF Office, to supplement these efforts. 
India strongly favoured the strengthening of the normative framework 
at the United Nations to effectively deal with the scourge of terrorism. It 
continued to stress the need for expanding the scope of the legal instru-
ments, and the enforcement efforts to destroy safe havens for terrorists, 
their financial flows and support networks and to bring the terrorists to 
justice. In this context, India pointed out that it attached significance to 
the work undertaken by the ad hoc Committee towards negotiations of the 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). In its view, 
the 2007 package submitted by the Coordinator of the ad hoc Committee 
presented a viable and, delicately balanced text of the Convention. India 
reiterated its support to the Coordinator’s text and was hopeful that all 
States, considering the seriousness of the threat of the menace of terrorism 
and the importance of the measures to deal therewith, would consider ac-
cording their acceptance to the text of the draft Convention. 
 India believed that, in addition to the law enforcement measures, 
the preventive aspect was equally important. India also noted that focus 
on development, education, social integration, tolerance, rule of law and 
respect for human rights were the integral components of such an approach. 
Referring to its brush with the scourge of terrorism for over two-and-
a-half decades, India pointed out that it was, indeed, the entire region, had 
been wracked by the activities of the biggest terrorist actors in the world, be 
they Al-Qaida, elements of Taliban or Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamat-ud Daawa or 
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others. India also pointed out that terrorism, extremism and radicalization 
continue to pose a serious challenge to peace, progress and prosperity in 
the region. Stressing on the regional framework, India stated: 
Within the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), we have the SAARC Regional Convention 
on Suppression of Terrorism of 1987, and its Additional Protocol 
of 2004 on the financing of terrorism, and the SAARC Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 2008. India is work-
ing with fellow SAARC nations to strengthen counter-terrorism 
cooperation.
India also outlined the steps taken by it to strengthen strategic, legal and 
operational framework in the fight against terrorism. India noted that it 
had become party to 13 international counter-terrorism conventions and 
protocols. As regards to its national implementation, it pointed out that 
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act incorporated provisions dealing 
with all aspects of terrorism including conspiracy and incitement to ter-
rorism. The Act criminalized the raising of funds for terrorist activities, 
holding of proceeds of terrorism, harboring of terrorists, unauthorized 
possession or use of any bomb, dynamite or hazardous explosive substance 
or other lethal weapons. The Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention) 
Act 2005 provided detailed measures preventing the falling of weapons 
of mass destruction or dual use materials in the hands of terrorists and 
non-state actors. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 sought 
to further streamline, monitoring of all foreign contributions received by 
non-governmental organisations and religious, educational and charitable 
organisations. In addition to all the above, India pointed out that it had 
concluded more than forty bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters. 
As part of the operational counter-terrorism framework, India drew the 
attention of all the Members that its National Investigation Agency (NIA) 
was mandated to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sover-
eignty, security and integrity of India, friendly relations with foreign States, 
and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, and 
resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations. A 
National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), linking data bases for constructing 
actionable intelligence to combat terrorism and internal security threats, 
had also been set up, India added. The Financial Intelligence Unit-India 
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(FIU-IND) had launched Project FINnet (Financial Intelligence Network) 
with the objective to adopt best practices and appropriate technology to 
collect, analyze and disseminate valuable financial information for com-
bating money laundering and related crimes. 
Concluding, India stressed that the international community could 
not afford selective approaches in dealing with terrorist groups or in dis-
mantling the infrastructure of terrorism. India called for stepping up of 
collective efforts with real cooperation among member states to confront 
the scourge of terrorism squarely and decisively. 
Treaties
BANGLADESH
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO FOSTER COOPERATION BETWEEN 
FOREIGN MINISTRIES OF BANGLADESH AND AZERBAIJAN 
On 10-11 June 2013, Bangladesh entered into two agreements with Azerbai-
jan to establish, respectively, a consultation mechanism that would foster 
mutual cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two countries and 
a relationship between the two diplomatic academies. The Memorandums 
of Understanding are: 
(i) Memorandum of Understanding for Consultation Mechanism 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, 10 June 2013, Baku; and 
(ii) Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation between Foreign 
Service Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh and Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy of 




Implementation of TRIPs Obligations - ‘Evergreening 
of Patents’ and challenge to Indian domestic 
implementation process – History and Evolution of 
Indian Patent System
Novartis A.G. v. Union of India & Others [Supreme Court of India, 1 
April 2013 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN]
Facts
This case dealt with some intricate issues relating to the implementation 
of Indian obligations under the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) with a particular focus on section 
3(d) of its Patents Act, 1970. Appellant pharmaceutical company Novartis’ 
claim on a patent was in question, as to whether it could qualify as a “new 
product” involving technical advance over the existing knowledge and 
as to whether that made the invention not obvious to a person skilled in 
the art. Novartis had claimed the patent for the beta crystalline form of 
a chemical compound called Imatinib Mesylate which was a therapeutic 
drug for chronic myeloid leukemia and certain kinds of tumors and was 
marketed under the name ‘Glivec’ or ‘Gleevec.’ 
The case also raised the issues relating to the definition of ‘invention’ 
under section 2 of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 and its relationship with 
section 3(d) which provided for what could not be patented. It was argued 
that this new drug did not pass the muster of the section 3(d) of the Indian 
Patents Act, 1970. There were also larger issues relating to striking a bal-
ance between the need to promote research and development in science 
and technology and to keep the private monopoly at the minimum while 
not violating any of the Indian obligations under the TRIPs. Since this was 
a life-saving drug, the Court felt it should not be kept beyond the reach 
of “multitude of ailing humanity not only in this country but in many 
developing and under-developed countries.”
The Court noted that patents were granted to this product in 1996 both 
in the United States and Europe.149 Appellant applied for this patent in India 
149 The original patent was granted to Jurg Zimmermann in the United States in 
1996 and it was known as ‘Zimmermann’ patent. The Court also explained in its 
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in 1998 at a time when Indian patent law was in transition to give effect 
to various obligations undertaken under the TRIPs Agreement.150 Besides 
its TRIPs obligations, India also added a few more provisions into its pat-
ent law as a safeguard measure to regulate the abuse of patent monopoly. 
Appellant’s patent application in India was taken up for examination in 
2005 after India completed its implementation of its obligations under 
the TRIPs. India, as a developing country, was entitled to have a ten-year 
transition period under the TRIPs Agreement.151
Appellant’s patent application was rejected in 2006 by the Indian Patent 
Office on the ground that it was anticipated by prior publication and that 
the invention claimed by the Appellant was obvious to a person skilled 
in the art in view of the disclosure made in earlier Zimmermann patent. 
Further, the Indian Patent Office also disallowed the patent under section 
3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 which, inter alia, held non-patentable those 
patents whose properties were already known. Aggrieved by this order of 
the Patent Office, the Appellant challenged it in the Madras High Court 
in 2007, seeking a declaration that section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act 
was unconstitutional because it not only violated Article 14 of the Con-
stitution of India but it is also not in compliance with TRIPs. The Madras 
High Court sent the matter to the newly constituted Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board (IPAB) for consideration of the issue. IPAB held that the 
appellant’s invention satisfied the tests of novelty and non-obviousness, 
verdict in detail as to what this new invention was about and how it was granted. 
The appellant filed the application (Application No.1602/MAS/1998) for grant of 
the patent for Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form at the Chennai Patent 
Office on 17 July, 1998. In the application it claimed that the invented product, 
the beta crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate, had (i) more beneficial flow properties: 
(ii) better thermodynamic stability; and (iii) lower hygroscopicity than the alpha 
crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate. It further claimed that the aforesaid properties 
made the invented product “new” (and superior! as noted by the Court) as it “stores 
better and is easier to process”; had “better process ability of the methanesulfonic 
acid addition salt of a compound of formula I”, and has a “further advantage for 
processing and storing.”
150 India had provided for ‘mail-box’ provisions and also granted ‘exclusive marketing 
rights’ to give immediate effect to Article 70(8) and (9) of the TRIPs Agreement. 
151 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 65, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995).
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but held that the patentability of the subject product was hit by section 3(d) 
of the Act. IPAB, however, held that the appellant could not be denied the 
process patent for preparation of Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystal form. 
From IPAB the matter was taken to the Indian Supreme Court for resolving 
some of the above mentioned issues.152 Both NATCO Pharma Ltd. and M/S 
Cancer Patients Aids Association also filed Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) 
before the Indian Supreme Court. 
Summary of the Judgment
The Court, while delivering the judgment, first noted that the case of the 
appellant “f[e]ll in the transitional period between two fundamentally dif-
ferent patent regimes.” In 1998, when the patent was sought, there was no 
product patent regime for pharmaceutical products; only process patents 
were granted.153 From 1998 to 2005, the Indian Patent Law was amended 
to make it compliant with the terms of the TRIPs Agreement. One of the 
major amendments was to introduce product patents for pharmaceutical 
products by deleting section 5 of the Act. There were also changes in the 
definition of ‘invention.’ The 2005 Indian Patent Law amendment redefined 
the concepts of ‘invention’ and ‘patentability.’ The Court also noted that 
“in order to correctly understand the present law it would be necessary to 
briefly delve into the legislative history of the law of patents in the country.”
The Court noted that the way the colonial patent law, Patents and De-
signs Act 1911, was designed to “benefit foreigners far more than Indians. 
It did not help at all in the promotion of scientific research and industrial-
ization in the country, and it curbed the innovativeness and inventiveness 
of Indians.” The Court noted that considering this imbalance, the post-
independence India constituted two Committees to rectify the anomalies 
that existed in the patent law of India. One Committee was the 1949 Bakshi 
152 Supreme Court of India had initially decided that it would send the matter back to 
the Madras High Court for the resolution of these issues. However, after hearing 
the counsels and the impact it could have on the patents during this period, the 
Court agreed to hear the matter. The Court, however, made it clear that that “any 
attempt to challenge the IPAB order directly before this Court, side-stepping the 
High Court, needs to be strongly discouraged and this case is certainly not to be 
treated as a precedent in that regard.” See paragraph 21 of the judgment. 
153 Section 5 of the then Indian Patent Act provided for only process patents in the 
field of food, medicines and drug.
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Tek Chand Committee and the other was the 1957 Rajagopala Ayyangar 
Committee. It took nearly two decades for India to evolve its own patent 
law in the form of 1970 Indian Patents Act. Regarding the Ayyangar Com-
mittee, the Court noted:
 Observing that industrial countries and under-developed countries 
had different demands and requirements, Justice Ayyangar pointed 
out that the same patent law would operate differently in two countries 
at two different levels of technological and economic development, 
and hence the need to regulate the patent law in accordance with the 
need[s] of the country. 
The Court also noted the recommendations made by the Ayyangar 
Committee to constitute and formulate various provisions for the new 
patent law that would take into account the needs of the country, particu-
larly in the poorer sections of society. Depicting the scenario that existed 
on the eve of the introduction of the new Indian Patent Law in 1972, the 
Court noted:
Till the early 1970s the industry was dominated by MNCs who 
commanded 68% of the market share. India was dependent on 
imports for many essential bulk drugs. This import dependence 
constricted consumption in a country deficient in foreign exchange, 
and inhibited the growth of the industry. Drug prices in India 
were very high.
The Court noted that due to the advent of the new Indian Patent Law, with 
all the necessary balances, drug production in India rapidly grew by the 
1990s. However, all this changed with the introduction of TRIPs and the 
Court pointed out: 
Even as the country’s pharmaceutical industry, helped by the basic 
changes made in the patent system by the Patent Act, 1970, was 
going from strength to strength, certain developments were taking 
place at the international level that would deeply impact the Patent 
system in the country. Following the Uruguay round of multilateral 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (The TRIPS) was arrived at and it came into force 
on January I, 1995. The TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehen-
sive multilateral agreement to set detailed minimum standards 
for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
and aims at harmonizing national intellectual property systems. 
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All members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are bound 
by the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. India is one of the 
founding members of the GATT and thus a member of the WTO 
from its inception from January 1, 1995, and is bound by the obliga-
tions under TRIPS Agreement like all other members of the WTO.
Referring to various other developments that had taken place in the context 
of TRIPs Agreement, in particular the adoption of the ‘TRIPs and Public 
Health’ declaration by the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that was to take into account and to act upon the 
concerns of developing and less-developed countries, the Court noted its 
limits in examining some of these issues, and it stated, thus:
We have referred to the TRIPS Agreement and certain develop-
ments arising from it not to comment upon the fairness or other-
wise of the Agreement nor to examine the correctness and wisdom 
of the decision of the Government of India to subscribe to the 
Agreement. That is farthest from our mind. We have referred to 
the Agreement as being the main reason behind the basic changes 
brought about in the patent law of the country by legislative ac-
tion. We have also referred to the Agreement as being the cause 
of a good deal of concern not only in this country but also (as we 
shall see presently) in other parts of the world; the concern being 
that patent protection to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemi-
cal products might have the effect of putting life-saving medicines 
beyond the reach of a very large section of people. . . . [W]e shall 
see how the Indian legislature addressed this concern and, while 
harmonizing the patent law in the country with the provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement, strove to balance its obligations under the 
international treaty and its commitment to protect and promote 
public health considerations, not only of its own people but in many 
other parts of the world (particularly in the Developing Countries 
and the Least Developed Countries).
After considering the scope and content of section 3(d), the Court exam-
ined the technical details of the drug in the context of the legal question 
of its ‘patentability.’ The court noted that “in order to test the correctness 
of the claim made on behalf of the appellant, that the subject product is 
brought into being through inventive research, we need to examine in 
some detail the Zimmermann patent and certain developments that took 
place on that basis.”
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Decision
After examining the technical details of the patent ‘Gleevec’ in detail,154 
the Court pointed out that:
From the above discussion it would be clear that the drug Gleevec 
directly emanates from the Zimmermann patent and comes to the 
market for commercial sale. Since the grant of the Zimmermann 
patent, the appellant has maintained that Gleevec (that is, Imatinib 
Mesylate) is part of the Zimmermann patent. It obtained drug ap-
proval for Gleevec on that basis. It claimed extension of the term 
of the Zimmermann patent for the period of regulatory review for 
Gleevec, and it successfully stopped NATCO Pharma Ltd. from 
marketing its drug in the UK on the basis of the Zimmermann 
patent. Not only the appellant but the US Board of Patent Ap-
peals, in its judgment granting patent for beta crystalline form of 
Imatinib Mesylate, proceeded on the basis that though the beta 
crystal form might not have been covered by the Zimmermann 
patent, the Zimmermann patent had the teaching for the making 
of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib, and for its use in a pharma-
cological compositions for treating tumours or in a method of 
treating warm blooded animals suffering from a tumoral disease. 
This finding was recorded by the US Board of Patent Appeals, in 
the case of the appellant itself, on the very same issue that is now 
under consideration. The appellant is, therefore, fully bound by the 
finding and cannot be heard to take any contrary plea.
The Court, accordingly, concluded “[w]e thus find no force in the submis-
sion that the development of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib is outside 
the Zimmermann patent and constitutes an invention as understood in 
the law of patent in India.” The Court held that:
[W]e firmly reject the appellant’s case that Imatinib Mesylate is a 
new product and the outcome of an invention beyond the Zimmer-
mann patent. We hold and find that Imatinib Mesylate is a known 
substance from the Zimmermann patent itself. Not only is Imatinib 
Mesylate known as a substance in the Zimmermann patent, but its 
pharmacological properties are also known in the Zimmermann 
patent . . . . The consequential finding, therefore, is that Imatinib 
Mesylate does not qualify the test of “invention” as laid down in 
section 2(1)(j) and section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970.
154 The Court subsequently referred to various scientific journals, publications, and 
articles to justify its assessment on technical details. 
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Statement by India at the Closing Plenary of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Arms Trade Treaty on 28 March 2013155
India made this statement at the final session of the Conference on Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT), noting that the final daft was an improvement over 
the earlier draft of July 2012 which had served as the basis for negotiations. 
India also noted that the “road to final session of the Conference has been 
a long one.” However, India noted that the final draft fell short of its and 
a number of key stakeholders’ expectations in producing a text that was 
clear, balanced and implementable and able to attract universal adher-
ence. India pointed out that it had made clear that the ATT should make 
a real impact on illicit trafficking in conventional arms and their illicit use 
especially by terrorists and other unauthorized and unlawful non-State 
actors. The provisions in the final draft on terrorism and non-state actors, 
India noted, were weak and diffused and did not find any mention in the 
specific prohibitions of the Treaty.
According to India, ATT should ensure a balance of obligations be-
tween exporting and importing states. India further noted that it could not 
accept the Treaty to be used as an instrument in the hands of exporting 
states to take unilateral force majeure measures against importing states 
parties without consequences. While pointing out that the final draft did 
not meet its requirements, India asserted that there was a “fundamental 
imbalance in the text which is flawed as the weight of obligations is tilted 
against importing States. As an importing state we will take measures 
to ensure that the treaty does not affect the stability and predictability 
of defense cooperation agreements and contracts entered into by India.”
India also stressed on the principle that member states had a legitimate 
right to self-defence. It believed that there was no conflict between the 
pursuit of national security objectives and the aspiration that the ATT be 
strong, balanced and effective. This, it further noted, was consistent with 
the strong and effective national export controls that it had already in place 
with respect to the export of defence items.
155 Ministry of External Affairs, Gov’t of India, Statement by India at the Closing 
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India also noted that though it negotiated: 
in good faith and in an open and transparent manner with respect 
to its essential interests, the final draft had the tell tale marks of 
behind- the- scenes carve outs of exclusive interests of a select few 
countries, such as egregiously excluding non-state actors or arms 
transfers as gifts or loans, thus seriously diminishing the value of 
a multilateral Treaty negotiated in the UN. 
India also stressed that the universal adherence to this Treaty would not be 
possible unless all stakeholders were on board including major exporting 
as well as importing states. 
India assured that it will examine the draft text carefully and in detail. 
It would also undertake a thorough assessment of the ATT from its defence, 
security and foreign policy interests. It also clarified that its “participation 
in this session does not in any way prejudice our position on the substantive 
aspects of the Treaty and should not be construed as our endorsement.”
Statement by India to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), at 2013 
Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
at Geneva, 9 December 2013156
India stated that it attached high importance to the BWC as the first dis-
armament treaty banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. 
Through this instrument, India noted, the 170 States parties to the treaty 
have pledged never to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire 
or retain” biological weapons and have committed not to use in any way 
and under any circumstances, biological agents or toxins not consistent 
with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
India pointed out that it remained committed to improving the ef-
fectiveness of the BWC and strengthening its implementation and uni-
versalization. It believed this was necessary in view of the new challenges 
to international peace and security, emanating from proliferation trends, 
including the threat posed by terrorists or other non-state actors seek-
156 D.B. Venkatesh Varma, Ambassador, Statement at 2013 Meeting of States Parties 






ing access to biological agents or toxins for terror purposes. It was the 
responsibility of the States parties, India noted, to ensure that their com-
mitments and obligations under the Convention were fully and effectively 
implemented. India believed that only a multilaterally agreed mechanism 
for verification of compliance could provide the assurance of observance 
of compliance obligations by States parties and act as deterrence against 
non-compliance. Referring to the new inter-sessional process and other 
meetings, India outlined its broad position on the issues to be covered. It 
believed that the standing agenda item on review of S&T developments 
was important for States Parties to keep pace with the rapid developments 
in biological science and technology which might impact the implemen-
tation of the Convention. According to India it was important that these 
discussions cover all ongoing high-risk dual use research. Referring to some 
examples and balancing of various interests, India noted that: 
It is important to review all ramifications of the recent advance-
ments in scientific understanding related to H5N1, H7N1, H7N9, 
MERS as well as other BSL 3&4 pathogens. The measures taken 
to mitigate biological risks should be proportional to the assessed 
risk and not hamper legitimate peaceful activities including inter-
national cooperation. Further, peaceful activities such as vaccine 
development, which are important for developing countries for 
meeting their public health needs, should not be unnecessarily 
highlighted as posing a risk for uses contrary to the provisions of 
the Convention. India looks forward to continuing discussions on 
Codes of Conduct and education and awareness raising in order 
to address issues related to biorisk management. India would also 
be willing to make a contribution to the discussion on exploring 
the best way of conducting S&T review under the Convention in 
the run up to the next Review Conference, recalling the Working 
Paper submitted by India at the last Review Conference. 
Dwelling on the full and effective implementation of the Article X of the 
Convention, India wanted due importance to be given to the measures 
suggested by the Non-Aligned Movement in its Working Paper submit-
ted at the Meeting of Experts. While legitimate peaceful uses should not 
be hampered, India pointed out that it was not in favour of unregulated 
transfers. In this context, it believes that strengthened implementation 
of the Article III would ensure that the cooperation envisaged under the 
Article X is not abused. At the same time, it was important that factors like 
the lack of technical capability in developing countries were not used to 
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hamper international cooperation, such as by denying new and advanced 
technology to developing countries. Referring to national implementa-
tion, it noted that it had a broad based regulatory framework to prevent 
the misuse of biological science and technology, including effective export 
controls matching highest international standards. It also supported as-
sistance to the States parties for strengthening their national systems for 
bio-safety and bio-security. 
Regarding the compliance and confidence building measures (CBMs), 
India noted that it was an important transparency measure to enhance 
trust in implementation of the Convention. However, CBMs or voluntary 
measures for demonstrating national implementation could not be an al-
ternative to an effective multilaterally agreed mechanism for verification 
of compliance. 
MALAYSIA
treaties and conventions – cultural heritage – 
convention for the safeguarding of the  
intangible cultural heritage –  
ratification subject to domestic law 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
Malaysia ratified the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage on 23 July 2013 and the Convention entered into force 
on 23 October 2013. The purposes of the said Convention are to safeguard 
the intangible cultural heritage; ensure respect for the intangible cultural 
heritage of the communities, groups and individuals concerned; raise 
awareness at the local, national and international levels of the importance 
of the intangible cultural heritage, and of ensuring mutual appreciation 
thereof; and provide for international cooperation and assistance. 
It should be noted that upon ratification, Malaysia made a declaration 
that the application and implementation of the provision of this Conven-
tion shall be subject to, and in accordance with, the applicable domestic 
laws of Malaysia and the applicable administrative and policy measures 
of the government of Malaysia.
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treaties and conventions – SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – 
INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT 2010 – INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE WORLD COCOA ECONOMY 
International Cocoa Agreement 2010
Malaysia signed the International Cocoa Agreement 2010 on 5 August 2013 
and ratified it on 30 August 2013. The objectives of the said 2010 Agree-
ment are to strengthen the global cocoa sector, support the sustainable 
development of cocoa, and increase the benefits to all stakeholders. It also 
aims to promote international cooperation in the world cocoa economy and 
to provide an appropriate framework for discussion on all cocoa matters 
amongst governments, and with the private sector.
The said Agreement also establishes a Consultative Board on the World 
Cocoa Economy, which has the responsibility to encourage the active par-
ticipation of experts from the private sector in the work of the International 
Cocoa Organisation and to promote a continuous dialogue among experts 
from the public and private sectors. The Consultative Board provides ad-
vice to the International Cocoa Council on general and strategic matters.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 
– ILO LABOUR CONVENTION 2006 – SAFE AND SECURE WORKING 
CONDITIONS FOR EVERY SEAFARER 
ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006
Malaysia ratified the ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006 on 20 August 
2013. The Convention sets out the principles of decent work on all ships, 
whether publicly or privately owned. The Convention guarantees a number 
of rights for seafarers – for example, it ensures the right of every seafarer 
to a safe and secure workplace that complies with safety standards; right to 
fair terms of employment; right to decent working and living conditions on 
board ship; and right to health protection, medical care, welfare measures 
and other forms of social protection. 
By being party to this Convention, Malaysia undertakes to ensure 
that seafarers’ employment and social rights are fully implemented in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Convention.
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TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – ARMS – ARMS TRADE TREATY – 
regulation of international trade  
in conventional arms 
Arms Trade Treaty
Malaysia signed the Arms Trade Treaty on 26 September 2013 and had 
contributed to its adoption and drafting of the said Treaty. The Arms 
Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, regulates 
the international trade in conventional arms – from small arms to battle 
tanks, combat aircraft and warships. The objectives of the said Treaty are to 
establish the highest possible common international standards for regulat-
ing or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional 
arms; and to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms 
and prevent their diversion (article 1). It should be noted that Malaysia has 
yet to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS – environmental rights – 
right to health – minamata convention on mercury 
– bans on specified mercury-added products – 
management of mercury waste 
Minamata Convention on Mercury
Malaysia signed the Minamata Convention on Mercury on 10 October 2013. 
The objective of the said Convention is to protect the human health and 
the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury 
and mercury compounds (article 1). The Convention calls upon state par-
ties to, inter alia, ban and phase-out both new and existing manufacture; 
import or export of specified mercury-added products; control and reduce 
emissions of mercury and mercury compounds into the atmosphere, land 
and water; take measures to ensure that the interim storage of mercury 
and mercury compounds are environmentally sound and in accordance 
with the Convention guidelines; and to take appropriate measures so that 
mercury waste is managed in an environmentally sound manner.
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arms – arms trade treaty –  
regulation of conventional arms trade 
Statement at the ‘Asia Regional Meeting to Facilitate Dialogue on the 
Arms Trade Treaty’, Kuala Lumpur, 26-27 February 2013
In the statement, Malaysia explained that the upcoming regional meeting 
was aimed at creating a dialogue among senior officials in Asia and the 
Pacific to share their views ahead of the Final Conference of the United 
Nations for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which will be held in New York 
from 18 to 28 March 2013.
Malaysia reiterated its support for the organisation of the final con-
ference for the ATT as the Treaty seeks to regulate the conventional arms 
trade and prevent the transfer of weapons to the black market.
DISARMAMENT – weapons of mass destruction – 
multilateral nuclear disarmament – model nuclear 
weapons convention 
Statement by H.E. Dato’ Mazlan Muhammad, Permanent Representa-
tive of Malaysia to the United Nations in Geneva at the Open Ended 
Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament 
Negotiations, Geneva, 16 May 2013
The Permanent Representative reiterated Malaysia’s commitment to the 
general and complete disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. 
Malaysia is also the prime mover of the annual General Assembly resolu-
tion on the ICJ Advisory Opinion of the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons. 
In this regard, Malaysia proposed the creation of a nuclear weapons 
convention as the best practical way to take forward the Multilateral 
Nuclear Disarmament negotiations. Such a convention would be able to 
ensure that the development and the maintenance of nuclear weapons are 
prohibited and all nuclear weapons under effective control are destroyed. 
This is because the existence of nuclear weapons will threaten humanity 
and all life. 
Malaysia urged that the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention is used 
as a tool in the exploration, development, negotiation and achievement of 
such an instrument. 
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VIETNAM
STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – PACTA SUNT SERVANDA – 
TREATY MAKING POWER 
Adoption of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 28 
November 2013 
Vietnam has had five different constitutions over the course of its modern 
history. The 1946 Constitution was the fresh voice of the new state that had 
just gained independence the previous year in 1945. The 1959 Constitution 
was adopted after the country’s victory against France and its separation 
into the North and the South in accordance with the Geneva Peace Accord. 
Following the reunification of both sides in 1975, a new constitution was 
adopted in 1980. In 1992, another constitution was passed to provide the 
legal foundation for the reform process that the ruling Communist Party 
initiated in 1986. Finally, on 28 November 2013, the National Assembly 
adopted the new 2013 Constitution to further the reform process.
Under the new constitution, international law assumes a more promi-
nent role. The 2013 Constitution is the country’s first constitution that 
refers to the Charter of the United Nations. It is also the first constitution 
that acknowledges the State’s commitment to implement its international 
obligations, thereby formally embracing the pacta sunt servanda principle. 
Article 12 of the new constitution provides that Vietnam “shall . . . abide 
by the Charter of the United Nations and treaties to which the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam is a contracting party.”
The 2013 Constitution also goes one step further than previous con-
stitutions in defining the treaty-making powers of the National Assembly, 
the President, and the Government. Previous constitutions do not prescribe 
the types of treaties that should be subject to the ratification authority of 
the National Assembly.157 The 2013 Constitution specifies that, for treaties 
related to war, peace, national sovereignty, treaties on Vietnam’s member-
ship in important international and regional organisations, treaties on 
human rights or fundamental rights and obligations of citizens, and other 
157 See, e.g., 1992 Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [1992 
Viet. Const.] Apr. 15,1992, art. 103 (10). 
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treaties that are not consistent with the laws or resolutions of the National 
Assembly, the treaty-making powers belong to the National Assembly.158
The new constitution further provides that the President has the au-
thority “to decide on the ratification of, accession to, or withdrawal from, 
other treaties in the name of the State.”159 The Government has the authority 
to “decide on the conclusion, accession to, ratification of, or withdrawal 
from, treaties in the name of the Government.”160 The Prime Minister has 
the authority to “decide on and direct the negotiation of, and to direct the 
conclusion, and accession to, or ratification of, treaties within the scope of 
the tasks and powers of the Government; to organize the implementation of 
treaties to which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a contracting party.”161
United Nations
MALAYSIA 
united nations security council – peace and security – 
conflict resolution 
Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia on Malaysia’s 
Candidature for the Non-Permanent Membership to the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) for the term 2015-2016, 17 September 2013
In support of Malaysia’s candidature as a non-permanent member to the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Malaysia reiterated its com-
mitment to ensure lasting peace and security in the world and to finding 
lasting resolutions to conflicts through peaceful means.
If elected, Malaysia pledged to undertake five key steps – first, to pro-
mote the Global Movement of Moderates (GMM) agenda at the UNSC in 
relation to the Council’s primary responsibility to maintain world security; 
second, to continue playing a proactive and effective role in bringing new 
momentum to the existing UNSC reform process; third, to promote media-
158 2013 Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [2013 Viet. 
Const.] Nov. 28, 2013, art. 70 (14). 
159 Id. art. 88(6).
160 Id. art. 96(7).
161 Id. art. 98(5).
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tion as an approach and to share its experience and expertise in finding a 
lasting peace in the current regional and international conflicts; fourth, 
to continue to contribute towards enhancing UN efforts at peacekeeping 
through promoting such operations; and fifth, to continue to promote 
as well as support, peaceful efforts of countries emerging from conflicts.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION – MODERATION KEY ELEMENT TO PEACE 
AND HARMONY AND OVERCOMING PREJUDICE 
Statement by the Honourable Mr. Anifah Aman, Minister Of Foreign Af-
fairs Malaysia At The United Nations Alliance Of Civilizations (UNAoC) 
Groups Of Friends Ministerial Meeting, 27 September 2013
In the statement, the Minister Foreign Affairs emphasised the importance 
of moderation in efforts to bridge culture and religious divides and to 
overcome prejudice. He pointed out that moderation is a key element in 
maintaining peace and harmony in Malaysia. As regards conflicts in the 
region, Malaysia’s efforts have been based on the principle of moderation 
and the belief that all conflicts can be solved peacefully. Malaysia hopes to 
apply the same principles to the situation in Southern Thailand.
The statement clarified that Malaysia’s efforts in resolving conflicts in 
ASEAN should not be seen as interfering into the affairs of other States; 
rather, it is motivated by the desire to ensure peace in the region and the 
belief that member states cannot be idle bystanders in the face of conflict 
and violence. Peace-loving moderate nations should take action when, 
where and by whatever way. 
The Minister pointed out that the number of conflicts in ASEAN has 
decreased dramatically and this is very much due to the application of 
the concept of moderation; this should be replicated in other parts of the 
world that are facing conflict.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION – MODERATION AND TOLERANCE VITAL 
TO TACKLE EXTREMISM – MUTUAL RESPECT AND INCLUSIVITY 
Statement by YAB Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, 
Prime Minister Of Malaysia at the UN General Assembly, New York, 
USA, 28 September 2013
The Prime Minister drew attention to the many conflicts around the world, 
which had turned into wider religious wars, such as the conflict in Syria, 
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Iraq and Pakistan. He underscored that the conflict is contrary to Islam 
and the Quran not only condemns suicide, unjust war, and retribution but it 
beseeches Muslims to live in peace with one another and their neighbours. 
In this regard, the Prime Minister encouraged Muslims to reclaim their 
faith by articulating that Islam is about peace, moderation and tolerance. 
Moderation is not a sign of weakness; rather, speaking up to condemn 
violence is a show of strength and as such, Muslim leaders should speak 
up lest their silence is mistaken as condoning violence.
He drew parallels to Malaysia where mutual respect and inclusivity has 
strengthened bonds between the different communities and faiths. This 
has contributed to sustainable development and stable economic growth. 
Similarly, moderation practiced at the international level can tackle violent 
extremism and enhance sustainable development and equitable growth.
The Prime Minister reiterated Malaysia’s commitment to resolving 
problems in Syria and Palestine, in particular, the need for a Syrian-led 
inclusive political process and a just solution for the Palestinian people. 
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International Law in Asia: 
A Bibliographic Survey – 2013
Jeong Woo Kim
Research Fellow, DILA-Korea
PhD Candidate, Law Faculty, National University of Singapore
INTRODUCTION
This bibliography provides information on books, articles, notes, and 
other materials dealing with international law in Asia, broadly defined. 
Only English language publications are listed. In the preparation of this 
bibliography, good use has been made of the list of acquisitions of the Peace 
Palace Library, the Washington & Lee University law journal rankings, as 
well as book reviews in journals of international law, Asian studies, and 
international affairs. Most of the materials can be listed under multiple 
categories, but to save space each item is listed under a single category. 
(Edited books however may appear more than once if multiple chapters 
from the book are listed under different categories). Readers are advised 
to refer to all categories relevant to their research.
The bibliography is limited to new materials published in 2013 or 
previously published materials that have updated editions in 2013. The 
headings used in this year’s bibliography are as follows:
1. Asia & Regions
2. States & Sovereignty
3. ASEAN & Other IGOs
4. Territory & Borders
5. Seas & Marine Resources
6. Rivers & Water Resources
7. Law of War & Peacekeeping
8. International Criminal Law & Transitional Justice
9. Terrorism, Transnational Crime, & Piracy
10. Security & Nonproliferation
11. Environment
12. Energy
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13. Development
14. Human rights – Asia in General
15. Human rights – Central Asia
16. Human rights – South Asia
17. Human rights – Northeast Asia
18. Human rights – West Asia
19. Human rights – Southeast Asia
20. Nationality, Migration, & Refugees
21. (Post-)Colonialism, & Self Determination
22. International Economic and Business Law – General
23. WTO & Trade
24. Investment & Taxation
25. Intellectual Property 
26. Cultural Property & Heritage
27. Courts & Dispute Settlement
28. Alternative Dispute Resolution
29. Private International Law
30. Internet, Data, & Privacy
31. Air & Space 
32. Miscellaneous
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Governance, 19(4) Global Governance 545-566 (2013).
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eds., Ashgate 2013).
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